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ABSTRACT
The general post-Soviet decline of the states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) mirrors specific declines in the robustness of these
states' stocks of financial, physical, natural, human, organizational, and social capital assets.
This loss of various kinds of capital assets over the past decade reduces the current potential and
capacity of the region to implement reforms for sustainable development.
While Central Asia entered the 20th century as a comparatively marginal and underdeveloped
area of the world, during the Soviet period it amassed appreciable stocks of capital, especially
human, physical, and social capital. The emergence of a vibrant scientific community in Central
Asia during the middle of the century marked one of the most rapid expansions of scientific
prestige, talent, and institutions in the developing world.
With the disassembly of the Soviet Union, development and reform projects within Central Asia
and funded by foreign donors have failed to achieve their development and reform goals. Within
the environmental sphere, the post-Soviet period, despite a massive investment in environmental
aid to the region from the West and Japan, has yielded few environmental benefits and seen the
worsening of several environmental conditions, captured in the desiccation of the Aral Sea and
the collapse of Caspian Sea fisheries. Paralleling this trend, democracy and rule of law have not
taken strong root in Central Asia; rather authoritarianism and corruption are the norm in national
governments.
While processes of globalization (especially the free movement of human and financial capital)
suggest that Central Asia could not have avoided decline in the 1990s, the severity of declines
could have been mitigated by a more robust Western appreciation of the unique endowments of
the Soviet era in human (the scientific community) and organizational (Perestroika public
dialogues on rule of law, civil society, and democracy) capital.
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INTRODUCTION
CENTRAL ASIA IN TRANSITION: THE CAPITAL OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Central Asia1 is an area of the planet poorly known beyond its own borders. Yet, Central Asia's
contribution to the resolution of many global environmental problems will be critical in coming
years, even as the region continues to venture to overcome the local environmental problems it
inherited from the Soviet Union. In both endeavors, Central Asia's struggle is to embrace
sustainable development. Central Asia as a whole, belying the optimism of reports (particularly
previous to 1998) issued locally, by scholars, and by development organizations 2 , is in fact
moving annually further from embodying sustainable development.
The vast majority of the more than 55 million people in Central Asia were born Soviet.
Ten years ago, they overwhelmingly identified themselves as superpower citizens, as
comparatively wealthy, and as distinct from their southern neighbors. Since then, three major
changes transpired. First, these people have a new status as citizens of marginal states. Second,
these citizens experience poverty typified by declines in annual salaries from thousands of
dollars to, often, only 100 dollars, accompanied by a sharp decline in state programs providing
welfare benefits, public education, and medical services. Moreover, the region suffered a severe
economic shock in the wake of the 1998 Russian economic collapse, and in 1999 real income fell
by half for a large proportion of the region's residents. The third change involves the appearance
or realization of domestic problems and issues that make apparent the region's ties with other
developing states in Asia and beyond, for example armed civil conflict, Islamicization as a
challenge to secular state legitimacy, and efforts to appease China, Russia, and the IMIF.
While newfound freedoms to use national languages, spotty and infrequent democratic
reforms, and some possibilities for freedom of expression may somewhat offset these perceived
trends of economic decline and global marginalization, increasingly, citizens of the region
conclude that independence has not worked to their favor. Out-migration of scientists and
specialists, fraying social safety nets, an aging and decaying, although appreciable, Soviet
physical infrastructure, and a prevalence of elite authoritarianism over democratic rule of law all
In my discussion, "Central Asia" means the contiguous area covered by five former USSR republics: Kazakhstan
(KZ), Kyrgyzstan (KG), Tajikistan (TJ), Turkmenistan (TM), and Uzbekistan (UZ). Occasional references will also
be made to the sixth "Islamic" republic of the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan (AZ).
2 See Douglas Saltmarshe, "Civil Society and Sustainable Development in Central Asia" 15 Central Asian Survey
(1996). Actual assessments of programs, in contrast to scholarly recommendations and donor prospective
descriptions of programs, have been rare. The few environmental transition assessments from donor agencies were
positive prior to 1998. While assessments are now increasingly critical, many donors still claim environmental and
other developmental successes in Central Asia. For example, Asian Development Bank (ADB) describes its projects
as of "major environmental importance... with direct positive impacts on the environment in Central Asia." Asian
Development Bank, Central Asian Environments in Transition (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1998), p. 25.
World Bank not only claims that most of its projects, including environmental projects, in the region have been
successful, but that they are more successful than the global average. Nagy Hanna et al., 1999 Annual Review of
Development Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 1999), p. 43. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) notes its "significant progress towards the twin
objectives of establishing a region-wide energy system and managing transboundary water issues." USAID,
USAID's Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005 (Almnaty: USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia,
2000), p. 66.
symbolize the decline of Central Asia and the region's difficulties in implementing reforms for
sustainable development.
Illustrating the reticence of many in the region to accept the post-Soviet era, reactions to
these components of decline, especially reactions from specialists and political leaders, more
often produce suggestions appropriate to wealthy and/or very strong states than to the new
realities of Central Asia. Exacerbating this situation, while assistance to Central Asia from
developed countries consistently is at (comparatively) high levels, it is less than the states
expected, is more targeted towards trade and markets than to environment and democratization,
and is insufficient by itself to move the states into effective regimes of sustainable development.
None of this was expected. With its blend of endowments, Central Asia expected great
improvements to follow from post-Soviet independence. Notwithstanding a variety of generally
inarticulate negative voices, consensus within the region was that independence would bring
economic growth, open and democratic societies, and rapid integration into Western economic,
political, and social life. Western states, donors, and institutions, while somewhat more
restrained in their enthusiasm, expected essentially similar outcomes. Internal and external
commentators identified the risk of civil or regional armed conflict arising from Islamic
renaissance, water disputes, oil, or some sort of "clash of civilizations" as the greatest, and
perhaps only, barrier to realization of a bright future in Central Asia.
Yet, the next ten years in Central Asia did not usher in a bright future, and regional and
civilizational conflict seem not to have had much to do with this disappointment. With the
exception of Tajikistan (and Azerbaijan), wars have not materialized. Instead of war, the region
has encountered pervasive stagnation. Perhaps the only kind of violence that has not appeared
anywhere in Central Asia is civilizational violence; Christian/Islamic violence is actually far less
common than virtually any
other kind of violence and,
if anything, has declined
since 1992. Economies,
societies, and institutions
across contemporary
Central Asia are in
shambles, and each year
brings more decline.
Excepting the emerging and
small elite classes, the
people of Central Asia are
every year looking more
and more like impoverished
post-colonial counterparts
in Africa; their children are
less literate, their lifespans
are shortening, and their
connections to political,
social, and economic
policies of their states are
Adapted from Central Intelligence Agency, Mal # 802410: Caucasus and becoming increasingly
Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1995). tenuous.
Pre-Soviet, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Central Asia
Central Asia's history is long and exceedingly complex. Likewise, the origins and heritage of its
peoples are richly complex and open to heated controversy, both within and outside the region.
Thus, the following effort to gloss this history is necessarily sparse and aims only to provide a
useful context for readers who may not be familiar with the contours of the region's history and
culture.
Indo-European peoples may have originated in areas of present-day southern Russian and
Kazakhstan 3, spreading from there southwards and westwards. Soon after agriculture blossomed
in the Fertile Crescent, it took root in Central Asia. During the bronze age, as during most of
Central Asia's history, the region was invaded repeatedly by steppe tribes from the north and
kingdoms based in Persia, as well as infused culturally by civilizations to the south. Perhaps the
first precise date in Central Asian history4, in 530 B.C., the Scythian queen Tomiris lured Kir II
and his armies into an ambush within Central Asia to prevent expansion of the Persian Kingdom
and avenge the death of her son Nevertheless, for the next several centuries, southern Central
Asia was under the control of Achaemenid rulers, known both for their harsh treatment of the
region and also for innovations such as introducing the first coins to the region. From this period
until the advent of the global sea trade, Central Asia enjoyed the fruits of being at the crossroads
of global trade. As a result, the region received wealth and cultural infusions.
When the Greeks defeated the Persians in 331 B.C., Alexander the Great began an
advance to subjugate Persian lands. Experienced in fighting the Greeks as soldiers in Persian
armies, the Sogdians of modern day Uzbekistan mounted fierce resistance to Alexander.
However, through victories claiming hundreds of thousands of Central Asian lives and by
marrying into the local nobility, Alexander brought Central Asia, with the partial exception of
Khorezm (on the southern shores of the Aral Sea), into his empire, established new towns (such
as Khujand in Tajikistan), and then returned to Babylon. After Alexander's death, a separate
Seleucid Greek kingdom arose in Central Asia.
The Parthian state soon broke off from this kingdom. When, in 53 B.C. Parthia defeated
Rome's armies, it settled captured Roman soldiers near Merv, in modern day Turkmenistan.
Soon thereafter, a Buddhist Kushan state came to control much of Central Asia east of
Turkmenistan. Earlier, Chinese armies temporarily captured areas in Kazakhstan and the
Fergana Valley (present day KG, TJ, and UZ). East of Kushan, Persian Sassanids ruled Central
Asia and used Central Asian soldiers in both of their successful wars on Rome.
In 470 A.D., a wave of invasions from the north and east began. First, White Huns
captured much of Central Asia, followed shortly thereafter by a series of Turkic invasions that
led to establishment of the Turkic Kaganate, which at one time stretched from Korea to the Black
Sea.
In 651, Arabs captured Merv and shortly thereafter began annual efforts to capture the
Central Asian lands to the east of the Amudarya River. Beginning in 708, Arab armies took,
lost, and gradually consolidated their hold on Bukhara and Khorezm. A Central Asian coalition
formed to repel the Arabs failed, and by the middle of the eighth century, Islam had come to
most of Central Asia. In 751, the khalifate's troops defeated Chinese armies sent to capture
Central Asia.
3 Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Central Asia (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), p, 35.
* B. G. Gafurov, Tajiki: Drevneishaya, drevnyaya i srednevekovaya istoriya (Volume I) (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1989), p.
88.
While Central Asia flourished at this time, invasions, especially from the north,
continued, as did internecine warfare. In the early thirteenth century, however, Chinggis Khan's
armies descended from Mongolia, quickly subdued the entire region, and destroyed much of the
region's impressive government, educational, and agricultural infrastructure. A century later,
launching from the heritage of Chinggis Khan, Tamerlane established an empire based in Central
Asia that controlled much of the civilized world. When Uzbek tribes 5 descended from the north
two centuries later to capture the major cities of Central Asia, one of Tamerlane's heirs, Babur,
fled to India, and there established the Moghul Empire.
From the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, three states controlled much of Central
Asia: Khorezm, Bukhara, and Kokand. Yet, much of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan was under
the control of nomadic tribes and many border areas were often controlled by neighboring states
such as China, Balkh, Persia, and Russia. Importantly, none of the three established states within
Central Asia developed strongly over this period, and all substantially lost power when compared
to the development of neighboring states to the north, east, and south. By this time, Central Asia
was no longer of any real importance to global trade, and it gradually receded into obscurity,
even within the Islamic world.
Central Asia came under the control of the Russian Empire in stages. While northern
Kazakhstan had mostly acceded to the Russian Empire by the end of the eighteenth century, the
rest of Central Asia fell to Russian armies in a series of military campaigns in the second half of
the nineteenth century, most notably in the 1860s. In 1887, delimiting their spheres of influence
in Central Asia, Russia and Britain established the border between Central Asia and Afghanistan.
The Russian Empire sought in Central Asia a consumer market for emerging Russian industries,
a trade route to India, and a guaranteed supply of raw materials such as cotton. The Russian
Empire settled its citizens in the region, built railroads, and embarked on plans to build the
region into a major source of cotton.
After the October Revolution and after the new leadership consolidated its control over
the former Russian Empire, it embarked on the task of integrating Central Asia into the new
state. Worried about Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic threats of revolution in the region (and similar
movements in other parts of the realm), Soviet planners settled on a strategy of encouraging
national consciousness and of building quasi-nation states as a bulwark against more widely
appealing expressions of identity. It is this process that led to creation of the Kazakh (1936),
Kyrgyz (1936), Tajik (1929), Turkmen (1924), and Uzbek (1924) Soviet Socialist republics as
five of the fifteen republics that constituted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
At the beginning of the Soviet era, residents of Central Asia did not readily identify
themselves as belonging to an ethnic group eponymous with these republics, nor could they
readily discern by language to which group one should belong. A continuum of closely related
language (including a norm of multilingualism) and a diversity of primary associational loyalties
(to city, to religion, to ethnic group, to tribe, etc.) made delineation of the region a largely
arbitrary undertaking.
The experience of Central Asia under the Soviet Union was certainly ambivalent but not
uneventful. In a relatively short period of time, the Soviet state quashed Islam and Islamic
SThe Uzbeks, as well as the Kazakhs who split from them in the sixteenth century, emerged from the Turko-
Mongolian Golden and White Hordes of Siberia that, like the contemporaneous rulers of Central Asia, claimed
legitimacy through tracing their origins back to Chinggis Khan. Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Tajiks all claim roots in
tribes and civilizations rnillenia old, and in response Kazakhs and Uzbelks also claim roots far further back than
those cited above.
institutions, assigned citizens to ethnic groups, abolished religious trusts and schools, and
redistributed land. In the second decade of Soviet rule, a rapid effort at collectivization of
agriculture and animal husbandry led to a famine in which hundreds of thousands died or fled to
neighboring states, such as China, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. Likewise, Stalinist repressions
led to mass executions of prominent local leaders, intellectuals, and common folk alike.
Yet, at the same time, standards of living began to increase dramatically in the region,
and basic infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and airports expanded dramatically. Of course,
however, Central Asians did not enjoy extensive political freedoms. On the other hand, their
educational opportunities were considerable, and over time, many Central Asians ascended to
prominent positions within the Russian dominated political, scholarly, and economic
communities of the Soviet Union, two even ascending to Politburo status. These improvements
were especially notable when compared to the plight of the region's co-nationals residing at the
time in Mongolia, China, and Afghanistan.
During the 1980s, life changed quickly in the Soviet Union after several decades of
stability and slower growth under Leonid Brezhnev. In the 1980s, economic problems and
shortfalls in meeting economic targets brought to light serious structural problems in the Soviet
economy and society. The limitations of economic centralization, the cost of sustaining the
military, the lack of appropriate incentives in the workplace, and a disconnect between
technology innovation and industrial production were among the reasons why the USSR fell
short of its own hopes for growth. However, enduring problems of lack of civic freedoms and
corruption within government exacerbated these problems.
When Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to leadership of the USSR in 1985, all of these
problems were already apparent. The economy had already begun to sour, and for the first time
in its history the Soviet Union began to witness widespread declines in higher education
matriculation, life expectancy, and similar social indicators. Gorbachev firmly believed that
none of these problems, however, disproved the promise of the Soviet development enterprise.
Rather, he saw in these problems errors of design and judgment that could be addressed
effectively through decentralization of economic and political decisionmaking, greater civic
freedoms, and an encouragement of public dialogue (Glasnost) to introduce accountability to
political leadership. Accordingly, under Perestroika, Gorbachev replaced much of the top
leadership in various republics, including in Central Asia, encouraged passage of new legislation
to allow religious, entrepreneurial, and social freedoms, and sought to chart a new policy in
Soviet foreign relations.
As a result, newspapers across the Soviet Union began to print letters to the editor and
carry articles that diverged critically from the party line. Independent civic organizations,
religious congregations, and private businesses sprouted up everywhere. Books on mysticism,
training in martial arts, and exposes of every sort became hugely popular. More importantly,
revisionist histories began to appear, and an open dialogue about Moscow's past and present
actions and crimes gained momentum. Vehement resistance arose against state development
projects, chemical factories, nuclear power plants, and the war in Afghanistan where only a few
years earlier few critical voices were heard. Free elections for republic and union legislative
bodies in 1989 and 1990 further facilitated these reforms.
Moreover, with decentralization, local governments began to reflect constituent concerns,
or at least to leverage their own political aspirations with reference to such concerns. The
formerly quiet republican governments began an open struggle with Moscow for greater power,
funding, and autonomy. In the Baltic republics, which were only annexed into the USSR after
World War II, true independence movements finally led to those republics declaring their
independence and attempting to secede from the USSR, a right supposedly granted under the
USSR Constitution. As part of their efforts to wrest power from Moscow, the Central Asian
republics also asserted their sovereignty and independence, even though there is no serious
indication that either the governments (beneficiaries of large subsidies from Moscow) or the
citizenry desired separation from the USSR. Indeed, in a 1991 referendum on whether to
preserve the Soviet Union, a large majority of voters across the USSR voted to prevent its
disassembly, with the largest majorities coming from the Central Asian republics.
Accordingly, the Central Asian republics, unlike other Soviet republics, had little reason
to want true independence. For the governments, Moscow subsidies were indisputably heftier
than the products of the local economy. For the populace, unlike in virtually every other USSR
republic, Perestroika had brought no wars, no tanks in the street, and little expectation that a
fundamental change was about to occur. Correspondingly, because of the region's reliance on
Moscow subsidies and its isolation from the rest of the world, Central Asian was perhaps least
prepared for liberation from the Soviet Union.
It is the uneven mix of post-Soviet endowments that makes Central Asia's independence a
more substantial event than mere liberation. While the region is now liberated from the atrocities
of the Soviet era, from outside repression of civil and political rights, and from the economic
limitations of Soviet development policies, it does not enter the independence era without history
and without a unique heritage. While part of this history and heritage is grounded in the Islam,
societies, and institutions of the pre-Russian era, a great deal of this heritage comes from the
Soviet period as well and the educational and professional skills that the period offered today's
Central Asian leaders. In other words, no matter the reaction of individuals in the region to the
disassembly of the USSR, they greeted this independence as individuals distinctly Soviet.
Indeed, independence was a surprisingly casual event for the region. The actual physical
infrastructure determining how people carry out their daily activities, has remained virtually
intact and much "reform" has frequently been little more than cosmetic, as the rise of the
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan illustrates.
The Turkmen [Communist] party had its last meeting on the morning of December 16, 1991. At
that meeting the party faithful agreed to disband the party. The assembled then went to lunch
together and reconvened afterward to establish the People's Democratic Party of Turkmenistan.
Within months the Democratic Party had a membership of nearly 52,000, of whom 48,000 were
former communists6.
Central Asia Experienced and Abstracted
Central Asia's independence sparked a number of reactions beyond the borders of the region.
Development organizations, spurred by European and American state commitments to assist the
transition states, found opportunities to become active in the reason. Similarly, the scholarly
world found reason to include Central Asia in surveys of late 20th century expansions of
democracy and markets. How both of these communities, development and scholarly, have
approached the region is vital to understanding what has happened in Central Asia since
independence.
6Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 116.
Specifically, such an understanding is vital to understanding how these communities have
failed the region in the past decade. In claiming that these communities have failed the region, I
of necessity implicate myself, and thus this work is also infused with a personal investment. I
spent almost all of the past decade, beginning before the disassembly of the USSR, as a member
of the development community on the ground in Central Asia or as a member of the academic
community studying the region from abroad. Thus, to the extent that this work strongly
criticizes the shortcomings of developers and scholars over the past decade, in neither case can I
exempt myself from such criticism.
To begin with the abstract and academia, the main focus of comparative scholars is to
categorize Central Asia into existing conceptions of states, societies, and transitions. Whether or
not Central Asia is best characterized as post-colonial or simply post-Soviet is a matter of debate.
Since the Soviet republics were contiguous, since they were constituents of a formally federal
state, and since state subsidies arguably benefited the various republics more than Russia, it is
probably incorrect to call Central Asia post-colonial, despite some similarities with other post-
colonial areas. Perhaps most tellingly, the existence of Joseph Stalin and several other non-
Russians among the USSR's top leadership separates Central Asia and other Soviet republics
from the kind of "imagined communities7 " that typify colonialism and the birth of nationalism.
While Central Asia's ambiguous status as colonial or merely newly independent provokes
the expenditure of considerable scholarly effort and should (but does not) entail consequences
for the states involved under international law 8 , this issue has little bearing on whether or not the
region is moving in the direction of sustainable development. Moreover, given the contradictory
experiences of post-colonial states in Latin America, Asia, and Africa in recent decades, the
post-colonial label would provide much in the way of fueling claims of moral entitlement and
little in the way of clarifying Central Asia's needs for the future or the sources of its current
failures.
As a starting point, some possible explanations offer themselves as candidates for Central
Asia's failures. These include, first, an explanation based on perverse inherent cultural attributes
of Central Asia, as, alternately, Soviet, Asian, or Islamic. Easily the most popular thesis in the
1990s among the possibilities here listed, this first explanation resonates strongly with models
9such as the "Clash of Civilizations" of Samuel Huntington
7 See Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991). Cf Olivier Roy, La Nouvelle Asie
Centrale ou La Fabrication des Nations (Paris: Seuil, 1997). Roy argues that Anderson's ideas about the
development of national identities are applicable to Central Asia. While he acknowledges some important
distinctions between Central Asia and Latin America (esp. the kinds of efforts made by intellectuals to spark
national identification, pp. 15-16), he also exaggerates the degree to which Central Asians (and other non-Russians)
were excluded from USSR and Russian Federation posts (pp. 170-74). For example, while Roy praises Chingiz
Aitmatov as Central Asian (p. 16), he appears to be unaware that Aitmatov is now a Russian Ambassador, not a
Kyrgyzstan Ambassador. Likewise, he seems unaware of the consensus that Kazakhstan's Nazarbaev was a likely,
at least viable, candidate to succeed Gorbachev. In stark, even shocking contrast to Anderson, Roy relies on weak
sources (i.e. no Russian language or Central Asian sources), fails to display any access to the colloquial that vivifies
Anderson's work, and casts a very thin net. On this last point, Roy restricts his analysis to formal political leaders,
failing to appreciate the symbolic and ideological importance of numerous USSR-level scientists, astronauts, state
heroes, army generals, and other very visible persons from Central Asia serving in Moscow, Leningrad and other
Russian cities.
SInternational agencies are incurring a long list of apparent violations of international nonns in treating these states
on an ad hoc basis. See Akbar Rasulov, "Pravopreemstvo i Tsentralnaya Aziya" in Eric W. Sievers et al. eds.,
Mezhdunarodnoe ekologicheskoe pravo i Tsentralnava Azia (Aimaly: XXIv, 2001).
9Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1996).
A second possibility hinges on the structural alterations introduced in the global system
by globalization; in short, the tighter commodity markets, increased personal mobility, and the
isomorphic institutionalism of the era of globalization put any state that undergoes deep
structural changes at a serious disadvantage. This possibility reflects some of the globalization
and failed states ideas of thinkers such as Saskia Sassenl0 and Robert Kaplan
A third possibility is that Central Asia's decade of decline is only a temporary blip related
to re-organization; Central Asia will inevitably reconstruct and resurrect itself to realize the
advantages of free markets and democracy envisioned at the beginning of the decade' 2 . This line
of reasoning, increasingly tenuous, is proffered by a variety of donors interested in continuing
the status quo of aid programs in the region.
A fourth possibility is that donor policies and pressures from other states have weakened
Central Asia. A strong form of this theory would assign this weakening to the purposeful
planning of the West and would thus fit a hegemonic international relations theory. A weaker
form, in which this weakening was not an intended result, suggests failures of international
planning institutions of the kind that have sparked recent public protests at World Bank and
World Trade Organization meetings.
Finally, a fifth possibility is that Central Asia's abandonment of the human capital
emphases of the Soviet period and ideological emphases of Perestroika have rapidly driven it
from the developed world to the third world. This final model resonates with ideas about social
capital outlined by Robert Putnam'", as well as currently marginalized ideas about the role of
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science and technology in building strong economies
The goal of this dissertation is, obliquely, to investigate the causation of Central Asia's
1990s decline. This investigation fits into a larger examination of the region's progress towards
sustainable development generally and its preservation of natural capital specifically.
Accordingly, the dissertation begins by presenting a cognitive hurdle; it seems to suppose both
the importance and interconnectedness of three very different topics: Central Asia, sustainable
development, and natural capital.
To be explicit, the combination of these three themes was not necessitated by anything
more than my own simultaneous interests in such themes. While natural capital and sustainable
development are indeed closely linked conceptions, pollution and natural resources are not the
key to understanding modern Central Asia, and Central Asia does not hold special clues to
understanding sustainable development. Moreover, while natural capital and sustainable
development are globally important issues, Central Asia is not an area of special significance. Its
importance pales compared with that of China, Russia, or Europe. Yet, partly for this reason,
scholarly analyses and reliable data about Central Asia are notably not robust at present.
Consequently, even if it promises no immediate application to policy, my effort to generate
1See Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998).
" e Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy" The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), p. 4 4 and Robert D. Kaplan,
The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Centr (New York: Random House, 1996).
"Notably, this argument is now ridiculed. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Whither Reform: Ten Years of the Transition"
Paper presented April 28, 1999 at Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, 1999), p.2 1. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/researchabcde/washingtonl 11/pdfs/stiglitz.pdf.
"
3 See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) and Robert
Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
"4 See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
reliable data about and analyze the recent history of Central Asia facilitates the scholarly, if not
the professional, mission of academia. Simply, "we can know more about ourselves"1 5 .
Yet, while Central Asia in itself may not be a key region in the world, when measured
with traditional metrics of size of population, military strength importance for trade, wealth, and
influence, it stands between several such key regions, many of which are currently in transition.
As scholars increasingly expand the depth of their analyses of transition successes and failures,
comparative studies will need to become more sophisticated to explain the quite divergent
experiences of Central Europe, Russia, China, and Vietnam. In this regard, the common general
experience of the Central Asian states, even despite interesting differences among these states,
may be indispensable to such scholarship in order to challenge the robustness of existing theories
based on extrapolations from events in a small number of world regions. Thus an important
reason to study and understand the post-Soviet transition of Central Asia, and by extension to
incorporate case studies of Central Asia into comparative studies, is that such an effort promises
to enrich the insights of global analyses by challenging privileged assumptions, testing accepted
ideas, opening avenues for new insights, and generally broadening scholarly horizons.
While the scholarly ideas and possibilities glossed above have found some expression in
the policies of the development agencies that began arriving in Central Asia in 1992, on the
whole development agencies exist as a separate community. Yet, like their academic colleagues,
the policy staff of development organizations also endeavored as an initial task to identify
Central Asia as an already familiar region, one either like Eastern Europe, like Latin America, or
like other parts of Asia. Unlike their academic counterparts, however, developers injected
themselves into Central Asian society and experienced it as a reality, albeit through the filter of
the sheltered environs of development agency staff.
To illustrate how close the development community is to the scholarly community at
times, the following relates a not unusual meeting between Harvard and Central Asia. In the
early spring of 1997, Kazakhstan dispatched a dozen high ranking officials from its ministries
and planning agencies to Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government for a week of
training in strategic planning. One afternoon Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, the young new director of
the Agency for Control over Strategic Natural Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, crossed
the Kennedy School courtyard to the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID)
with me as his interpreter. Zhakiyanov, born close to the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, thanks
to the Soviet Union enjoyed social, human, and organization capital assets unknown to his
parents. In the ensuing discussion, HIID attempted to sell its expertise to Zhakiyanov, and the
two sides, as commonly occurs in development aid events, talked past each other.
HIID emphasized its current activities in dozens of developing countries, particularly its
decades of success in Indonesia. Kazakhstan, HIID told Zhakiyanov, could learn much from
Indonesia's successes. Zhakiyanov, a member of the technical intelligentsia of northern
Kazakhstan, educated in Moscow and lured personally by President Nazarbaev out of a
successful career in private business, replied that, having visited and studied Indonesia, he failed
to see what Indonesia could offer Kazakhstan. After all, "Indonesia's per capita income is far
below Kazakhstan's." Heading off further explanations from HIID, Zhakiyanov noted that much
of Indonesia' s international economic influence is the natural result of boasting such a large
population. Since, Zhakiyanov continued, the majority of Indonesians live at the poverty line,
Kazakhstan would have to do some regressing to arrive at an Indonesian model of development.
"5 Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 40.
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Not dissuaded, HIID then offered Korea as a development model for Kazakhstan. After
all, being itself an Asian country, HIID reasoned, Kazakhstan could probably learn best from an
Asian model. Zhakiyanov's retort expressed the opinion that both Korea and Indonesia treat
their citizens in ways that not only the government of Kazakhstan finds unacceptable but that the
citizens of Kazakhstan would actively resist. "There are no slaves in Kazakhstan," concluded
Zhakiyanov. HIID then offered to help Kazakhstan chart an entirely new development path,
eliciting Zhakiyanov's assurance that no novel path was justified; other postcommunist models,
especially Poland, offered all the inspiration, warnings, and lessons that Kazakhstan would need.
The discussion then turned to Kazakhstan's natural resources. HIID outlined its current
"environmental" initiatives in Kazakhstan, projects to improve the functionality of the extraction
sector. In response, Zhakiyanov noted that while Kazakhstan faces some of the worst
environmental problems on the planet, HIID had never once mentioned an environmental or
ecological issue, only economic efficiency. HIID agreed that its projects were implemented by
economists instead of ecologists, but posited that the core issue in any case was not whether
Kazakhstan's natural resources were going to be exploited, but how well. "As long as natural
resources are going to be used, it would be illogical not to maximize their economic benefit for
Kazakhstan," a young HIID economist volunteered. Such an approach should at least not be
advertised as environmental, Zhakiyanov concluded.
Yet, what makes this exchange more interesting is to consider its relationship to
development projects occurring on the ground in the former Soviet Union Until soon after this
exchange at Harvard, what most of the world knew about HIID's development work in the region
came from HIID's own assessments or the assessments of HIID's funder, USAID. In both cases,
the self-interested norm was to advertise strong successes. Basically all USAID contractors and
grantees, and USAID itself, achieved success in the early independence years, according to their
own reports. These reports also had substantial impact on scholars tracking changes in the
region, and as a result, most scholarly reports of the early transition period also glowed. My own
experience has been, especially as someone who has been asked to pen such reports, that these
reports have little connection to reality. As if to spite these reports on market and economic
successes, all the region's economies tanked in 1998, and elections in the past two years have in
virtually all cases been less free than their counterparts four or five years ago.
Moreover, a U.S. federal criminal and civil investigation is now proceeding against HIID
economists for their insider trading and other digressions in Russia16. Closer to home for Central
Asia, USAID's prominent Central Asian American Enterprise Fund is now the subject of a
potentially worse shortcoming. The FBI is now investigating allegations that two of its original
American staff in Tashkent embezzled $10 million". Not all development projects are failures
and not all encourage criminal activity. Yet, as a corollary, no development project is a
philanthropic panacea, and, once that point is accepted, no development project is beyond the
reach of, or somehow entitled to exemption from, critical assessment.
StpenKrkin Officials of Harvard Program that Aided Russia are Probed" The Boston Globe (Jan. 15,
1999), p. Al.
17 Steve Levine, "Probe Begun of U.S. Fund in Central Asia" Wall Street Journal (Dec. 27, 2000), p. 8.
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Sustainable Development
Putting aside for the moment the fact that there exists no consensus definition of sustainable
development, Central Asia's leaders, the region's major international donors, and a variety of
other stakeholders explicitly acclaim sustainable development as both a moral imperative and a
rational long-term goal. It is this consensus that grounds the applicability of an analysis of the
region's development within the framework of sustainable development instead of analyzing the
region's economic development by sequestering it from concerns about environmental, social,
and governance issues.
Outsiders are often puzzled about why Central Asian policymakers devote considerable
attention to and valorize biodiversity and carbon emissions concerns. Although the modeled
effects of global warming promise comparatively little dislocation to Central Asia (and a few
models even hint at better conditions for agriculture through increased precipitation), nowhere in
the region does one encounter any substantive opposition to the assertion that a global effort is
needed to limit global warming and that all states must lower carbon emissions. This global
outlook is just one of the peculiarities of Central Asia that sets the region apart from paradigm
transition states like China' .
Sustainable development, in its early and concise definition, "is development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs19." In the practice of development, this definition is unworkable for two reasons. First, its
straightforward implementation implies a level of reform and action that is a radical departure
from development policy norms and values. Namely, it would require raising the development
bar, a bar whose upper limits are usually set at the levels of Western states' democracies,
governments, schools, and financial systems. In other words, for sustainable development,
Westernization is patently insufficient. Second, sustainable development's employment of the
term "needs" does not provide a context for natural capital as distinct from other forms of capital.
Of the needs of humanity, some can be met by assets of natural capital, some by assets of
physical capital, and some others by assets of human capital.
In other words, for their needs, human societies depend on and revolve around more than
just natural capital. Consequently, other forms of capital also claim relevance to any discussion
of reform possibilities and objectives. Such other forms of capital include financial capital,
human capital, physical capital, social capital, and organizational capital20. The relevance of
other forms of capital to sustainable development hinges on three considerations, explained
briefly below and also analyzed in Chart 1.
First, sustainable development involves more than just conservation of natural resources;
it implicitly assumes the continuation of human communities and human life. So, if general
sustainable development "success" could involve extinction of some species, it could not involve
extinction of Homo sapiens. The "needs of future generations" means the needs of future
humans. Even were it shown that gradual elimination of the human species was the only means
18 China recognizes the threat from climate change, but argues (justifiably) that to the extent atmospheric carbon
concentrations are the result of Western development, the West must cut its emissions drastically and allow
developing states the opportunity even to increase their emissions. For China's ambiguous position on international
environmental policies, see Elizabeth Economy, "Chinese Policy-Making and Global Climate Change: Two-Front
Diplomacy and the International Community" in Miranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth C. Economy eds., The
Internationalization of Environmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge Uniersity Press, 1997), p. 19.
19Wol Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987), p. 43.
20 All of these forms of capital are described in detail below.
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of achieving sustainable development's objective of preventing the collapse of global
ecosystems, there is no chance that such a program would be approved.
Second, to a certain degree forms of capital are fungible. For example, better technology
(human capital plus physical capital) can reduce carbon emissions (natural capital improvement),
increased education (human capital) can facilitate a wider involvement in networks of secondary
associations (social capital), and better government (organizational capital) can spark creations
of economic wealth (financial capital). Given the broad complementarity of forms of capital,
proponents of improvement in the stock of any kind of capital can frame their efforts as not only
related to sustainable development but, opportunistically, as intrinsic to achievement of
sustainable development. In practice, the complementarity of capital has provided a platform for
human rights advocates to emphasize freedom from torture as the key to sustainable
development, all the while that women's organizations, poverty alleviation organizations, and
any number of other advocacy and reform camps make similar, and ultimately irreconcilable,
claims. For just this reason, sustainable development has become a "dump for everyone's
environmental and social wish lists."
Third, as the old adage posits, "wealth begets wealth." Perhaps the only thing on which
proponents of sustainable development can agree is that reform is both imminent and necessary.
Even if and after desired or acceptable reforms are envisioned, their realization will rely on
mobilization and expenditure of other forms of capital. Some reforms may require large
financial outlays, others changes in legal regimes or eating habits, still others a rethinking of
education. In this regard, larger (or more robust) stocks of physical, financial, social, human,
and organizational capital may be key to realizing ambitions to safeguard stocks of natural
capital. It is the importance of this combination of forms of capital that underpins my urging of
"comprehensive capital" as a benchmark for the potential, as opposed to the present condition, of
states to achieve sustainable development, or any other development objective.
21 Robert Goodland and Herman Daly, "Environmental Sustainability: Universal and Non-Negotiable" Ecological
Applications 6 (1996): 1002. See also, Eric Sievers, "Ustoichivoe razvitie: Proklyatiye ili spaseniye?" Vestnik
"Zelenoe spaseniye" 1 (1995): 55-64.
22 William R. Catton, Jr., Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1982), p. 158.
Despite the relationships and mutual dependencies that exist between the various forms
of capital, there is something of special importance about natural capital, both in its own right
and with regard to human communities. Human experience, especially the American and the
immigrant American experience, shows that improvements in and recoveries ofphysical,
financial, human, organizational and, probably, social capital require little time2 . These forms
of capital can be built almost as quickly as they can be destroyed; while it is by no means easy to
build these forms of capital quickly, it is possible.
The same thing cannot be said of natural capital. The land, the atmosphere, and sources
of water cannot be restored within either human lifetimes or with equivalent expenditures of
other forms of capital. Given enough will to expend its collected financial, organizational, and
physical capital, humanity could build Sierra Leone in one or two generations into a model of
democracy and human welfare24 . Even mobilizing all its various forms of capital, humanity
probably cannot prevent mass extinctions, reduce concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere, or
remove polychlorinated biphenyls in the oceans by the end of the 21st century.2 5
Thus, while my analysis sustains a general concern with other forms of capital, it
privileges the implications of natural capital. This emphasis on natural capital and attention to
other forms of capital comes at a time when economists are beginning to agree that post-Soviet
reforms failed largely because development agency economists en masse (the "Washington
Consensus") pursued too narrow a definition of capital and too neoclassical a conception of the
relationship between kinds of capital26. Through surveying the various forms of capital, I
conclude not only that Central Asia's stock of natural capital is degrading 27, but that so are its
stocks of other forms of capital. To the extent that Central Asia faces a Sisyphian task in moving
from Soviet practices to sustainable development, the post-Soviet period has involved reforms
that make the hill it faces ever higher. Ironically, almost all forms of capital were higher in the
twilight of the Soviet era that at any time under the celebratory glow of the alleged free markets,
democracy, and freedom that, as the teleological tale goes, killed communism.
The following sections of this Chapter expand upon and define the forms of capital
glossed above. Subsequent chapters explore, first, stocks of these various forms of capital in
23 Cf Fukuyama claims that social capital replenishment requires centuries, if it can happen at all. Francis
Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 321.
However, in this conclusion, Fukuyama contradicts himself in many ways. He claims that ideas can change quickly,
but cultures cannot; yet he also claims that East Germans, as a result of communism, now have more in common
with Bulgarians and Russians. Ibid.
24 "Enough" will here means a level heretofore not seen in any development or peacekeeping interventions. Europe
and the United States have the capacity to simply buy off Sierra Leone's residents with huge cash subsidies (to
overcome the critical problem of generating internal support for their efforts) and station troops (who would not be
withdrawn after an incident of violence). That the West will not expend a billion dollars or thousands of human
lives in order to save Sierra Leone is not relevant to a consideration of whether it has the capacity to do so. In fact,
Sierra Leone would only marginally impact the reserves of capital of the West.
25 In part relying on such concerns, in exploring the implications of diverse forms of capital on definitions of
sustainable development, economists Robert Goodland and Herman Daly refine the term to emphasize natural
capital: "sustainable development is development without growth in throughput of matter and energy beyond
regenerative and absorptive capacities." Goodland and Daly, "Environmental Sustainability: Universal and Non-
Negotiable."
2See generally, Stiglitz, "Whither Reform: Ten Years of the Transition."
" Whether this decline is Soviet or post-Soviet depends on context. Whereas declines in other forms of capital
rapidly register in economic balance sheets, or at most require a generation to register, only losses of natural capital
can require, potentially, decades or centuries to manifest in monetary terms
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Central Asia and, second, case studies that confirm that the region's post-Soviet trajectory has
been one moving it away from, instead of towards, hopes of realizing sustainable development.
The use of various forms of capital to frame a study into the environment and society of
Central Asia, especially by a non-economist, is the result of the singular influences on and in
Central Asia in the past decade. The 1990s were the decade of reform (even if reform did not
occur) in Central Asia, and the language of reform in the 1990s was economics, despite the
existence of more economic reform failures than successes. Despite nearly a decade of
victorious reports about independence released by both state governments and development
agencies alike, the development failures of Central Asia are now finding scholarly appreciation.
Lacking still, however, is a robust scholarly explanation to account for Central Asia's decline and
to reconcile how the myopic successes of individual development projects have aggregated into
manifest regional failures.
The usual suspects guilty of intra-regional differences find little application in Central
Asia; despite clear differences between the Central Asian states, they have shared a post-Soviet
fate. States that have experienced war (TJ and AZ) only slightly trail their more peaceful
neighbors in human development indicators. States that have embraced free trade and embraced
wholesale the policy prescriptions of international financial institutions (Kyrgyzstan and, to a
lesser extent, Kazakhstan) are not better off than the more isolationist states. States that have
embraced human rights also show no economic or other advantages a decade after independence.
Likewise, the states with the most abundant natural resources also have failed to leap ahead of
their neighbors. In short, the Clinton administration's panacea of free trade finds no support in
Central Asia, but neither do propositions that human rights, democracy, or structural
readjustment hold the key to economic prosperity and human welfare.
Concurrently, environmental issues suffuse and run parallel to larger issues of political
governance, legal reform, economic management, social solidarity, and many other
developmental concerns. Upon independence, environmental issues rated among the top three or
five concerns of Central Asia's citizens. Governments, groups of scientists, and NGOs predicted
that Western assistance, matched with local scientific strength, would effect rapid and durable
environmental improvements in the region, including the clean-up of the Semipalatinsk nuclear
and other test sites, the restoration of the Aral Sea, and the re-fitting of the industrial sector to
more efficient and environmentally friendly technology. So pervasive was this belief that it was
echoed in virtually every presidential speech, political party platform, donor prospectus, and
NGO newsletter of 1992.
Encouraging these statements, beginning this decade, international environment and
development organizations began the difficult task of establishing programs within these states to
help them adjust to markets and effect a transition to sustainable development. Yet, both society
and the political establishment were blindsided by unexpected and sharp economic declines that
displaced general environmental programs to the far edges of popular concern and political
action. Consequently, environmental management reforms and initiatives struggle to win
support from political and other leaders as a priority for these states, despite the wave of
environmental interest and activism that emerged in the twilight years of the USSR.
The economic analysis that follows explicitly assumes that, in all cases, higher stocks of
each type of capital are preferable and, of themselves, public goods28. "Stock" implies a purely
28 This assumption may be false. One current of development economics posits that low stocks of natural capital are
preferable in the global service economy. However, this argument embraces only a quantitative conception of
natural capital (i.e. it would not argue in favor of the benefits of air pollution) and states not that natural capital is
14
quantitative assessment, but because of globalization and the nature of certain kinds of capital, it
carries in this discussion a strong qualitative character as well 2 9
In economic terms, the ideal of "sustainability" narrowly defined is "maintenance of
capital3 0 ." My argument assumes that all economic activity, save the most primitive, relies on
the simultaneous drawdown of (and possible accretion to) stocks of all types of capital, and,
therefore, the continuous interaction of all kinds of capital. Sustainability, then, would depend
upon maintenance of an aggregate stock of comprehensive capital instead of rigorous
maintenance of each stock of capital in isolation .
While capital is inherently an economic term, it is not alien to other social sciences. In
defining forms of capital and their relationship to sustainable development, the following
discussion relies primarily on economic theory to provide a model of how these divergent forms
of capital complement each other. However, it relies equally strongly on symmetry, a mode of
social science inquiry poorly represented in economics. By symmetry, I mean that social
scientists must not dismiss "false" ideas according to one criterion and accept "true" ideas by
another; unless a social science theory can be and is applicable to both successes and failures,
bad and good, and us and them, it should be eschewed. While there is a wealth of literature
about symmetry, the core concerns behind symmetry find little application in scholarship about
the USSR or post-Soviet world. Instead of approaching such issues from an appropriately
scholarly stance, many writers base their work on assum tions about the immorality, inferiority,
and unacceptability of communism and all things Soviet
In contrast, I note both that the failings of the USSR were numerous and that democratic
and capitalist societies are also not perfect. Moreover, from a methodological and epistemic
standpoint, I note that the failure of various communist governments does not in any way justify
or validate democracy or capitalism. In part, my approach is based on an appreciation that both
these systems are fallible because they are human and complex, and in part on an appreciation
that communist governments have strayed far from communism and capitalist governments far
bad, but that a particular reliance on natural resource exports is bad. More recently, some comparative evaluations
of transition suggest that among the "adverse initial conditions" for transition states is a "high degree of
industrialization," such as possessed by the CIS but not by China. Accordingly, transition states heavily reliant on
agriculture faced better "initial conditions" for transition than their industrialized peers. IMF Staff, Transition
Economies: An IMF Perspective on Progress and Prospects (Issue Brief 00/08, November 2000).
29 To wit, in the former Soviet Union, the wealth held by billionaires means little since it is held in Swiss banks or
invested largely in the West. Similarly, "good" government is what I mean by "high" stocks of organizational
capital.
30 Goodland and Daly, "Environmental Sustainability: Universal and Non-Negotiable," p. 1004.
31 This is roughly equivalent to what Goodland and Daly call "strong sustainability." Ibid., p. 1005.
32 Examples include all of the recent work of Francis Fukuyama and much of the recent work of Samuel Huntington.
Both authors employ a discursive strategy of describing other parts of the world in order to create a platform for
their ultimate goal, namely to make policy points relevant to United States society. Yet in the process, both authors
tend towards opportunistic descriptions of other countries and cultures, descriptions that draw almost exclusively on
English sources, on sources often eschewed by more careful scholars. Consequently, Huntington's and Fukuyama's
ostensibly neutral factual descriptions of other states find very little support among regional specialists. For
example, while I find both authors' descriptions of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet events misleading and factually
troubled, Middle Eastern, Chinese, and other area scholars point overwhelmingly to similar flaws in the ways in
which these authors treat their areas. While I leave it to other authors to reveal the myths and errors that Huntington
and Fukuyama propagate about other areas of the world, an objective of later chapters in this work is to suggest that
their theories about culture clash, trust, and social capital have great relevance for Central Asia, but only when
viewed in the context of a balanced analysis of the region's history and culture. In other words, by abandoning these
authors' political agendas and poor scholarship, I endeavor to evaluate the strangths of their theoretical work. Put to
the test of Central Asia, Fukuyama's general ideas fare far better than Huntington's.
from free markets. Religious, political, or ideological commitments are certainly valuable and
justifiable, but they cloud social science research, and I explicitly attempt to distance myself
from such commitments. Social science conclusions are not necessarily preferable to other
conclusions, but, I contend, very little social science "research" currently being pursued on
Central Asia, development, or the former Soviet Union really qualifies as social science from the
standpoint of the requirement of symmetry.
Stocks of capital are comprised of capital assets, which leads to a quandary.
Colloquially, an asset is an unqualified positive. In other languages, French and Russian are
most applicable, asset is expressed as "acquisition" or "active," respectively, which in both cases
are less misleading terms. When an object of capital is "active," at least such an expression does
not connote that it produces only positive externalities, which is the case with "asset." For
example, a gun, which is a physical capital asset, is still an asset in strict economic terms even if
held in the hand of a bank robber. Likewise, mafia solidarity is, despite subjective opinions
about the phenomenon, a form of active social capital. Thus, the mere fact of a large stock of a
certain kind of capital is important and significant, but the composition of the capital stock is
also important. Accordingly, as a primary task, I inquire into the raw stocks of capital in Central
Asia, but as a secondary task am interested in the composition of these stocks.
Methodology: The Dilemma of Statistics
Intentionally, this dissertation relies on data of questionable authority for statistical references.
Reliable statistical information about Central Asia is sparse, but a diverse set of possible sources
exist. For example, in addition to statistical information from development agencies, Central
Asian governmental statistical agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and independent
scholars all provide statistical references. Except where development agencies have either not
compiled statistical information (such as for science in Central Asia and for some environmental
problems) or where I have been personally able to undertake original research (such as in social
capital and international environmental policy), I prefer development agency statistics to
alternative sources, even if the alternative sources seem more credible.
Preferring World Bank and International Monetary Fund publications (when possible
penned by World Bank and IMF staff) and eschewing more radical thinkers and other
disciplinary voices is an intentional discursive strategy. This strategy is based on anticipated
resistance from an important component of the audience intended to be reached through this
work. I believe that, to the extent that my work may be considered by the development
community, it would be easily dismissed if it relied on diverse statistical sources, but taken much
more seriously if it remains within the parameters of development discussions already underway.
What this strategy sacrifices in foreclosing presentation of some of the more dramatic local
stories and interpretations of post-Soviet decline it makes up for in opening opportunities for
critical deconstruction of development community assumptions.
Not an abstract strategy, this decision is a direct result of my own frusti-ating affiliation
with the development community. Employed in USAID projects in Central Asia from 1992-95, I
consistently, yet futilely, protested counterproductive efforts by USAID, World Bank, and
others. I saw (and participated in) environmental aid projects that demoralized the
environmental community, a result of surprisingly little concern to technical environmental
development specialists. I saw (and participated in) rule of law development projects that
rejected promising Perestroika reform trajectories because of their "communist taint." I saw (and
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participated in) civil society development programs that eagerly awaited dynamic 20-somethings
who never arrived, all the while pushing aside middle-aged Ph.D.s with long resumes of social
action on the curious, but USAID-mandated, assumption that over-40 is synonymous with civic
obsolescence33 .
And I saw (and participated in) dozens of training programs premised on the notion that
Central Asians are ignorant or cannot read training materials on their own, programs that drove
away the best participants in disgust and boredom and rewarded the convivial smiles of their less
impressive cohorts who remained, often for lack of anything better to do. Based on these
experiences, I predicted failure at a time when faith in development economics (as it was
practiced in the early 1990s) was strong and easily pushed aside critical voices much stronger
than my own3 .
Looking back on these disheartening experiences, I believe that my failure to explain
convincingly then why development projects were not destined to succeed in Central Asia was
not because I did not clearly state my arguments. Rather, this failure was because I expressed
my arguments outside of the dominant discourse of the development community. Within this
community, the strongest arguments are those expressed within the shared intellectual
foundations and practices of the community itself. Accordingly, this dissertation is an effort to
restate my earlier arguments in a form accessible and palatable to both scholars and the
development community.
Curiously, far more people in 2000 claim to have predicted decline in 1995 than was in
fact the case in 1995 or, especially, 1992. As a result, while decline is now almost universally
acknowledged and pessimists may now outnumber optimists in Central Asian development
circles, no one has yet explained this decline in a robust manner. The simplistic explanations
(i.e. "laws were not enforced" or "corruption") are remarkably similar to the simplistic panaceas
(i.e. "privatize" or "remove subsidies") that failed. Thus, I believe these new explanations to be
similarly flawed, and, consequently, I believe that revisionist development programs based on
such explanations will also fail. In arguing this point, I go far beyond my arguments of the early
1990s.
Unstated so far is my belief that the development community, at the policy level, speaks
economics. Perhaps only a minority of development professionals ground themselves in the
discipline of economics, but those wielding the most influence over general development
strategies speak economics as a lingua franca. While economics is a dynamic discipline, ever
open to new ideas, it is also exceedingly insular. Until ideas are expressed in its own language,
the ideas will be meaningless to economics and, as far as the world of development is concerned,
3 During the first years of independence, perhaps the bulk of reform project focused on trainings, both within
Central Asia and as components of trips to Western states. All localUSAID staff and contractors were involved in
candidate selection for trainings. Thus, I was frequently contacted about candidate nominationsand selections for
environmental, democracy, law, and NGO training programs, programs that I estimate involved more than 1000
Central Asians. In each case (the situation may have changed) USAI]) summarily threw out applications of any
applicants over 40 on the explicit assumption that they were "too set in their ways," no matter a person's
accomplishments or dissident activities. Such individuals were only selected when USAIlD or itstfrainings
coordinator, Academy for Educational Development, was lobbied intesively. Thus, for a human rights program,
USAID) would prefer a 20 year old student with no discernible cornitment to a 45 year old dissident who had
continued human rights work in the Soviet era despite repression.
SFor example, in the fields of democracy and environment, Gregory Gleason, Kathleen Braden, Nancy Lubin, and
Michael Glantz are some of the senior scholars in U.S. institutions with substantial experience in Central Asia whose
thoughtful criticism of early USAID development programs (both through direct participation and through scholarly
works) was, unfortunately, more often ignored than considered.
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not exist. Accordingly, for me it is axiomatic that those who would wish to communicate
fruitfully with economists are well-advised to do so in their own language35. In the end, the
development community and the major development agencies rely on economists for direction,
and, thus, overtures to the terminology of economics are an incumbent, if academically
demoralizing, part of the kind of project contained in these pages.
Physical and Financial Capital
Physical (or man-made) capital refers to artifacts available to human communities. These
include housing, transportation networks, factories, clothes and televisions, and other tangible
goods. Any item of physical capital is usually (comparatively) easily expressed in terms of
financial capital, and for this reason it is not necessary to distinguish between the two forms of
capital. Financial capital involves non-tangible savings, investments, and other goods related to
monetary systems. Objects of both physical and financial capital are (comparatively)
straightforward to catalog, aggregate, and measure. They, along with natural and human capital,
are the traditional units of capital, and they are the two units most often emphasized in analyses
of economic well-being.
Because the bulk of the work pursued on Central Asia by economists and political
scientists, as well as the bulk of the reports of donors like the World Bank, USAID, and the
International Monetary Fund, chose physical and financial capital as their major concerns, my
analysis devotes no special effort to compiling inventories of these forms of capital in later
chapters. Rather, it is well-settled that levels of physical and financial capital in Central Asia
have been steadily on the decline. Just how much they have declined is an issue I leave to the
economists.
Most likely, none of the values in Table 1 are accurate. Most indicators, except life
expectancy, can vary by as much as an order of magnitude depending on source consulted 6 . The
reliability of and lack of standardization of economic statistics on Central Asia is, in fact, too low
to deserve much reliance. However, in the aggregate, these statistics do converge on two salient
facts: the region boasts non-GDP (infrastructure and consumer goods) figures exorbitantly high
by developing country standards, and the high standards of the Soviet era are in decline.
It is easy for commentators to belittle Soviet accomplishments in Central Asia by
pointing out that other Soviet republics exhibited much higher per capita GDP, as if that alone
relegates the area to Third World status or precludes investigating progress from the 1917 local
35 While I try to do that in this work, I also attempt to adhere to a mode of inquiry better represented in other social
sciences than in economics. A lack of reflexivity has been particularly crippling in post-Soviet development
economics. Anything "Soviet" often carries a taint and a prejudice ill-suited to responsible scholarship or "rational"
scholarship; in the end the Soviet Union was a creation of rational individuals and it boasted both successes and
failures, as does any human system. Ironically, the kind of totalizing and teleological rejection of communism
voiced by many Western refonners, and their attempts to castigate "sympathizers" and "apologists" has a historical
antecedent; Bolshevik strategies to maintain control employed the very same tactics. That noted, I state explicitly
that I consider free markets a preferred rnechanism of organization, but they have their limnits.
For example, reflecting one of these extreme statistical discrepancies even among relatively conservative sources,
a 1998 Asian Development Bank source posits Kazakhstan's 1994-96 per-capita GDP to have been $410. Asian
Development Bank, Central Asian Environments in Transition, p. 35. Despite the economic travails of intervening
years, UNDP in 2000 posits that 1998 per-capita GDP in Kazakhstan was $4378. UNDP, Human Development
Report 2000, p. 158. For the period covered by the ADB report, UNDP reported per-capita GDP in Kazakhstan of
$3284. UNDP, Humanl Developmen! Rport (UNDP; New York, 1997).
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Table 1: Various Physical and Financial Indicators in Central Asia 3
Decline in Capital
Increase in or Maintenance of Capital
KZ | KG I TJ TM I UZ
Pre- 1999 1999 IPre- 1999 1999 |Pre- 1999 1999 Pre- 1999 1999 |Pre- 1999 1999
% Population 35% 40% N/A 20.9% 3.3%
Below Poverty (1996) (1993) (1993) (1993)
Line"
GNP $42.3b $7.1b $6b $6.8b $29.3b
Per capita GDP $2470 $1550 $1050 $1700 $1350
Televisions per 28 20-23 15-19 18-19 18
100 people
baseline. However, in reality, the regional discrepancies in the Soviet Union were no more
severe than those in contemporary Italy 37, or even the United States. What's more, in terms of
both absolute and percentage gains, for some indicators Central Asia led the USSR, and in
ownership of many consumer goods (especially cars and televisions), it led all republics save the
Baltics 8 . While per capita numbers of cars, refrigerators, and televisions have increased since
independence, especially in Uzbekistan, there is now little upkeep of apartment and other
buildings. Many families, perhaps even most families, continue to rely primarily on clothes and
books purchased during the Soviet period, or on inferior Chinese imports. Of course, a few
families have also become much better off.
But the numbers of such families are few. In fact, what is striking from an economics
point of view is that the former Soviet Union has virtually overturned a tenet of development
economics. Increases in inequality are supposed to be the price paid for economic growth. The
tide that raises all ships is expected to raise the ships very unevenly. The former Soviet Union
has achieved the inequality of growth, without any of the benefits of growth. The receding tide,
it seems, also lowers ships unevenly.
Beyond the figures in Table 1, in every republic, exports have declined, foreign debt
continues to soar, balance of payments figures elicit concern, and the occasional signs of hope
shown by some statistics in some years disappear when factored into a time line longer than one
or two years. Over the past decade, annual GNP has fallen by an average of 4.4% per year41 .
37 See Putnam, Making Democracy Work.
38 Walter D. Connor, "Class, Social Structure, Nationality" in Alexander J. Motyl ed., The Post-Soviet Nations (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 276-78.
39Figures taken from most current World Bank Group Country Reports (http://www.worldbank.org). Where figures
unavailable from this source in dollars, information was taken from as similarly conservative sources as possible.
1991 GDP figures from Alexander Akimov, "Central Asia as a Region in the World Economy" in Roald Z. Sagdeev
and Susan Eisenhower eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Baltimore: CPSS Press, 1995), p. 279.
Data on consumer goods from UNDP, 2000 World Development Indicators (UNDP: New York, 2000), pp. 301-02;
T Koichuev et al. eds., Istoriva Kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana (Bishkek: Iim, 1998), p. 282; UNDP, Human Development
Report 2000 (New York: UNDP, 2000), pp. 199-200; and Emine Gurgen, "Central Asia: Achievements and
Prospects," Finance & Development 37 (September 2000), p. 41.
40 World Bank Vice President Stiglitz posits a forty-fold increase in poverty. Stiglitz, "Whither Reform: Ten Years
of the Transition," p. 1.
4' Gurgen, "Central Asia: Achievements and Prospects," p. 42. While Gurgen's numbers are quite conservative,
moderately conservative estimates are 6-10% per year. UNDP, Human Development Report 2000, pp. 203-04;
Grzegorz W. Kolodko, "Ten Years of Postsocialist Transition: the Lessons for Policy Reforms" (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank Development Economics Research Group, 1998), p. 3.
As unreliable and misleading as current economic statistics on Central Asia are, they are
far more accurate and accessible than assessments of the region's other kinds of capital. With the
partial exception of human capital, Soviet-era statistics (from the centralized State Statistical
Committee) related to other forms of capital have no or very weak counterparts in the
independence period 4 2 . For social and organizational capital, there may indeed by no data at all
upon which to base a rigorous, or at least a credible, assessment. Subsequent chapters attempt to
address this vacuum.
Natural Capital
Natural capital refers to natural resource stocks, natural resource flows, pollution of such stocks
and flows, and sinks for such pollution. While natural capital could (and perhaps should) be
measured from the perspective of its relation to the sustainability of non-humian species, within
the framework of sustainable development, it primarily relates to human communities. In this
regard it refers not only to the ability of these communities to extract and use available resources,
but also to the impact of the natural environment on human health and welfare. In other words,
as with all other forms of capital, natural capital evidences impacts on and by other forms of
capital; an extractive enterprise that enriches a local community may also pollute the water and
lead to increased morbidity, while subsequent financial outlays to purify sources of drinking
water may lead to increased local human health.
Accordingly, in assessing natural capital, a traditional economic analysis would restrict
attention to the availability and quantities of scarce natural resources valuable for various
processes of producing physical capital. According to traditional economic modes, extraction
and use of natural resources could not, by definition, deplete stocks of capital, but would only
increase them. "Prevailing modes of economic analysis tend to treat consumption of natural
capital as income, and therefore tend to promote patterns of economic activity that are
unsustainable43."
However, an analysis that recognizes natural capital asks whether use of natural resources
depletes stocks of natural capital and whether the result of this use balances or exceeds the costs
of depleted natural capital. Likewise, such an analysis concerns itself with the impacts of
pollution, and it would consider such results as improved water quality in a river, rebounded
populations of endangered species, and newly discovered reserves of natural resources to be
accession to wealth from increased natural capital.
Such an approach is especially warranted since countries essentially do not differ with
regard to their potential natural capital, meaning the potential return in terms of financial capital
from utilization of their forests, croplands, minerals, waters, and other natural assets. Across
dozens of states, this potential financial capital return from present natural capital evidences a
3:1 ratio between the richest and poorest states. In contrast, ratios based on differences in human
or financial capital are roughly 20:144.
42While Soviet era statistics should be used with caution, and while I note that Soviet statistical agencies inflated
many statistics for political reasons, I do not directly addressithese shortcomings in later chpters in the belief that
were more accurate statistics available they would reduce in scale but would not change the general contours of
decline that I track.
9 Goodland and Daly, "Environmental Sustainability: Universal and Non-Negotiable," p. 1005.
" John A. Dixon and Kirk Hamilton, "Expanding the Measure of Wealth" Finance & Development 33 (December
1996): 16. See generally The World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth: Indicators ofEnironimentally
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Accordingly, my analysis appreciates that Central Asia enjoys a wealth of natural assets
valued by financial capitalists, but also appreciates that their value is diminished because of
transportation and other problems. It also appreciates that much of the region's forests and
croplands are far less impressive, although these are, consistently, the most significant
contributors of natural capital throughout the world. Central Asia's general potential financial
wealth contained in natural assets is probably, given the peculiarities and structure of financial
systems, near the average for world states.
This conclusion increases emphasis on the link between natural capital and human capital
(and, by implication, social and organizational capital). The Central Asian environment is not
roughly comparable to the world average. Moreover, high levels of financial capital and
environments conducive to human capital are highly correlated in a way that is not the case for
financial capital and natural capital. Whether wealth buys a clean environment or whether a
clean environment buys wealth may remain undecided for the purposes of my analysis; what is
important is that a clean environment for humans (even if this is, as the case for Europe, an awful
environment for wild nature) produces higher levels of human capital 45.
Nevertheless, on a global scale, what happens with Central Asia's hydrocarbon reserves is
at the core of global sustainable development. However, at the regional scale, Central Asia's
sustainable development depends greatly on the ability of humans to inhabit the environment of
Central Asia, and this concern dominates the following Chapter on natural capital. Despite the
fact that clear causal chains between environmental conditions and morbidity are lacking, the
assumption that poor environmental conditions degrades human capital is, by now, generally and
broadly accepted. Accordingly, accepting that Central Asia boasts appreciable stocks of natural
resources, the component of natural capital of most interest in this analysis concerns the
environmental health risks faced by the population of Central Asia and their access to the most
basic natural resources (potable water, adequate food, etc.) needed for human life.
Human Capital
Human capital refers to the non-tangible elements of knowledge (educational capital) and health
possessed by members of human communities. These translate into information, technology,
physical labor, and other inputs and components of production processes and other economic
activities.
Indicators of human capital related to the mind involve literacy rates, levels of
completion of various stages of formal education, numbers of scientists, and investments in
research and development. Indicators of human capital related to the body include life
expectancy, morbidity rates, and nutrition. Not only building human capital is important;
maintaining it is also important. Illustrating the connection between natural capital and human
Sustainable Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997); see also The World Bank, Monitoring
Eniomna rges Rpr nWr nPors (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995).
45 Not analyzed here, time discounting exacerbates this relationship by making intercessions to safeguard natural
capital appear irrational under all but an unusually low discount rate, or unless generational discounting is used. See
Jerome Rothenberg, "Economic Perspective on Time Comparisons: Evaluation of Time Discounting' in Nazli
Choucri, ed., Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1993), p. 333.
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capital, in Chile, every ton of air pollution reduced results in an estimated $18,000 in public
health benefits4 6.
Human capital issues are an especially rich topic for a study of the comprehensive capital
stock of the former Soviet Union. At the beginning of the Soviet period, Soviet Central Asians
were illiterate and unhealthy. By Perestroika, they enjoyed European levels of education,
universal literacy, and health indicators superior to almost any part of the developing world. The
task of the independence era, thus, was to maintain this high level of human capital, and the
hopes were that it would be increased through improvements in the educational system,
especially the social sciences, and overdue reforms, such as removal of lead from gasoline.
However, that has just not happened. Life expectancies have declined. Sanitation
services have disappeared even in capital cities. Physicians have emigrated. Years of required
schooling have decreased, and the quality of education has plummeted. Illiteracy is on the rise.
Students who once would have studied engineering or physics and pioneered the kind of
innovation that builds economies now study the social sciences. Infectious diseases, like typhus,
thought locally eradicated are reappearing.
A number of experts posit that the single most important fonn of capital for economic
growth and high returns on investments is human capital, especially investments in increasing
years of formal education. "Natural resources count, but people count for more47." Drawing on
1990 U.S. Census figures, Robert Ellickson argues that 75% of wealth in the United States takes
the form of human capital48. In a complementary study, rates of return on investments in human
capital in the form of expenditures on scientific research and development have consistently far
exceeded the private rate of return 9 .
Accordingly in this analysis, while health is of course important, primary attention will
be devoted to tracking education systems in Central Asia, both quantitatively and qualitatively,
in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
Organizational Capital
Organizational capital, the least appreciated and recognized of the types of capital presented
here, refers to the set of governing rules and organizations of a community. Organizational
capital embraces both laws and state agencies, but it also accords central importance to social
norms, structures of families, and other elements of organization or regulation of behavior not
dictated formally or by the state.
Accordingly, organizational capital consists of four definable poles: formal rules, formal
organizations, informal rules, and informal organizations. In the language of sociology
(institutions) or political science (regimes), only two poles would require explication since both
concepts embrace the interplay between rules and organizations. In a simplified explication of
the four poles of organizational capital, formal rules consist of both laws and the extent to which
laws and other administrative processes are or are not enforced. Formal organizations, actually
inseparable from formal rules, involve the structure and composition of courts, state agencies,
local agencies, legislatures, and other organizations. Informal rules connote customs,
*Patricia Annez and Alfred Friendly, "Cities in the Developing World: Agenda for Action Following Habitat II"
Fiac eeomn 33 (December 1996), p. 13.
4Dixon and Hamilton, "Expanding the Measure of Wealth," p. 15.
4Robert C. FEllickson, "Property in Land" Yale Law Journal 102 (1993), p. 1353.
49 See generally, Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993),
pp. 112-28.
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conventions, norms, and other acculturated rules of behavior not fully reflected by law, uniform,
or even recognized cognitively. Informal organizations relate to the range of forms of
organization, such as, inter alia, families, friendship cohorts, and ad hoc clubs, that are to a
degree beyond the realm of attempted or actual state regulation.
Organizational capital is important because different rules and organizations produce
different effects. Legalization of abortion (a change in a rule) has led to lowered crime rates in
the United States". Similarly, the federal organization of the United States has allowed
contradictory human rights regimes (for the most part North/South) throughout most of the
country's history. Likewise, a preference for boys in some cultures underlies patterns of abortion
and child abuse linked to social norms, while increasing expectations in industrializing cultures
of parental obligations to provide for all children until late in life partially explain reductions in
average fertility.
At the beginning of the 21st century, an unspoken consensus has emerged about
organizational capital. The state, despite valorization of free markets, must be an administrative
state, engaged in a great many activities requiring a kind of capacity, even in the smallest states,
far beyond the imagination of even developed states at the beginning of this century5 . No state
without courts, environmental protection agencies, or schools can even be imagined today,
although, empirically, a great many states lacked all of these at the beginning of this century and,
theoretically, none of these is necessary for human life.
Similarly, laws are universally accepted and valorized. No authority would seriously
propose regulation of a modern state through informal norms such as universal respect, love, or
the golden rule, despite the fact that, throughout human history cherished philosophers have
argued for just such a condition5 2. Likewise, especially after the demise of communism and
other utopian ideas, there prevails a global consensus that children should be raised in families
and that independent
associations are preferable
to corporatist formations.
All of these consensus
positions contain
tremendous, if under-
appreciated, significance.
Only in the realm of
informal rules is there still a
great amount of flexibility
in labeling the normative
content of modern society.
5 0 John J. Donahue III and Steven D. Levitt, "Legalized Abortion and Crime," Quarterly Journal of Economics
forthcoming).
1Explicitly ignored in this analysis are armies. Armies (and national defense in general) pose a major challenge to
the premises of my analysis (which assumes international allocations through markets and not through force) and are
simply beyond the scope of the present work. While in my analysis size of population is of ambiguous importance,
in a more traditional political economy, for national defense reasons, size of population is of key importance. A
more mature account of development, or an actual development intervention, could not ignore armies and national
defense, both to the extent that they may be necessary and to the extent that they produce major domestic negative
externalities. See any publication of IMF, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 1993-present).
52 For example, Aristotle and Tolstoy. See Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law.
Some scholars suggest that social norms are merely the content of normatively desirable future
laws, but others suggest, theoretically and empirically, that this "law from order" approach will
often lead to failures of both formal and informal rules5 3 .
Both rules and organizations impact and shape transaction costs, information economics,
incentives, and the ease with which self-interested actors can achieve efficient allocations of
resources while limiting the negative externalities produced from free-riding, adverse selection,
moral hazard, and defection. The entire current debate on corruption would in fact be best
framed as an investigation into a shortfall in organizational capital54 . Likewise, an emphasis on
only one element of organizational capital (i.e. an anti-corruption law) will surely fail if such a
reform does not resonate with the other formal and informal organizations and rules in a society.
Similarly, a concept such as rule of law is not contained within just one axis of organizational
capital, but depends upon the interaction between the formal content of laws, formal
organizational enforcement of law, informal norms of lawfulness, and the impact of informal
organizations on incentives to obey the law.
Even all other capital stocks being equal, a society with a more robust stock of
organizational capital may be at a distinct advantage. Many states, including many NICs, with
poor endowments of natural capital and very little physical (or financial) capital have
nonetheless experienced dynamic growth in recent years. Conversely, some states with abundant
natural and human capital, including most post-Soviet states, have experienced decline over the
same period.
Consequently, in recent years, major international lenders, especially the Bretton Woods
institutions, have begun to devote considerable attention to shortfalls in organizational capital,
but using a terminology different than that employed here55. Under a set of concerns labeled
"governance," these institutions have broadened their conception of the necessary precursors of
development from physical, natural, and human capital to also include organizational capital.
However, they have yet to formulate a workable understanding or nuanced approach to the task
of developing organizational capital.
In surveying stocks of organizational capital in Central Asia, my analysis concentrates on
disaggregating Central Asian society into formal and informal organizations and rules in order to
produce a rough survey of the assets and shortfalls of Central Asian organizational capital in the
pre-independence and post-Soviet eras.
53 For the theoretical argument, see Eric A. Posner, "The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action," University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996): 133. For the empirical
argument, see Eric W. Sievers, "Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community
Associations" Unpublished paper presented September 29, 2000 at Central Eurasia Studies Conference, University
of Wisconsin.
Accordingly, I posit that definitions of corruption such as "use of public office for private gain" fail on all counts.
Cheryl W. Gray and Daniel Kaufman, "Corruption and Development" Finance & Development 35 (March 1998): 7.
Such a definition limits corruption to state offices and limits its externalities to negative exter-nalities. A better and
broader definition would define corruption as transgression of a rule (formal or informal) against appropriation of a
specific consumer surplus as a rent. Such a definition also highlights the fact that not all "offices" encourage
corruption, but only those that intersect with (or, often, create) consumer surplus in the form of a rent. While his
analysis also precludes private corruption, a similar definition ("corruption can occur where rents exist .. ,. and
public officials have discretion in allocating them") is contained in Paulo Mauro, "Corruption: Causes,
Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research" Finance and Development 35 (March 1998): 11.
*For a historical perspective, see Harold James, "From Grandmotherliness to Governance" Finance & Development
35 (December 1998): 44.
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Social Capital
Social capital is only vaguely defined in existing literature; social capital's presence is inferred in
many works, but nowhere is it defined with either the language of economics or with internal
consistency. As Francis Fukuyama notes: "While social capital has been given a number of
different definitions, most of them refer to manifestations of social capital rather than to social
capital itself5 6." To date, no definition of social capital allows the term the two core elements of
any other form of capital: the ability to disaggregate the stock into discrete assets and the ability
to link deployment of such assets to externalities, both negative and positive.
I posit that social capital can be defined concisely with reference to game theory and that
its full explication will depend on its integration into information economics57. Social capital
consists of two necessary but independently insufficient conditions. First, social capital requires
a dense network of social interaction; it requires that individuals be enmeshed in multiple social
networks. These social networks are the loci of the repetitive interactions that constitute social
capital assets; they are, to paraphrase Durkheim, the social facts that are the things that lend
themselves to social science inquiry58. For example, a person who has a family, is employed,
and belongs to a number of clubs has more potential social capital than an unemployed single
person who spends most of the day in front of a television. Second, social capital requires that
these social networks fulfill two quite different functions: reduce information transaction costs
and provide signals about propensities to cooperate or defect.
Social capital facilitates the reduction of information transaction costs by providing
alternate channels for information flow. Persons with high social capital often rely on their
informal knowledge about potential business partners, investors, and service providers, and in
doing so eliminate costs associated with investigation of and search for such information.
Persistent data from a variety of sources in the United States suggest that most people find
employment through such social networks instead of through formal employment procedures.
Social capital also provides information and signals about other people's tendencies to
cooperate or defect. In their economic and game theory contexts, these terms refer to
individuals' decisions to honor agreements or break agreements (when there is some payoff for
doing so). Individuals may tend to cooperate either because of some predisposition to do so
generally (some internal morality or standard) or because the payoff from defection is lowered
because an interaction (a "period" in game-theory terms) is not one-time but "iterated." In
iterated games, a player will encounter the other player again, at least many or an indefinite
number of times, in the future and will be disadvantaged by that other player's refusal to
cooperate 9 . While this phenomenon clearly applies to villages where reputation and frequent
56 Francis Fukuyama, "Social Capital and Civil Society" IMF Working Paper WP/00/74 (April, 2000).
57 Francis Fukuyama recently provided a roughly similar definition, but his definition lacks internal consistency.
Despite attempting to define social capital through the argot of economics, he ultimately contradicts this attempt by
conflating the term with his previous work on trust, expanding the term to encompass absolutely all social norms,
and ignoring the non-trust externalities of social capital (i.e. information). See Ibid. Moreover, Fukuyama fails to
produce a symmetrically valid definition of social capital; he defines it as "an instantiated norm that promotes
cooperation between two or more individuals." This definition fails to appreciate the clear evidence that some social
capital frustrates cooperation and it fails to identify a social capital asset. Fukuyama says others for substituting a
manifestation of social capital for a definition, he does just that as well.
58 "[C]onsider social facts as things." Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Free Press,
1964), p.14.
5See generally, Robert C. Ellickson, Orer W~ithout jLlow Neihbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994), pp. 64-66.
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interaction are central elements of life, given dense enough social networks, it can also apply to
towns or segments of cities.
Generally speaking, individuals are involved in two broad types of social networks.
Their primary associations are largely non-voluntary and hierarchically organized (vertical) and
include family, residence, school, and work. Their secondary associations are voluntary and less
hierarchical (horizontal) and involve civic organizations, sports leagues, and similar associations.
While no clear boundary exists between primary and secondary associations (neighborhood
watch groups, school alumni associations, and professional societies all combine elements of
both), the distinction between the two is important because of evidence about the ambiguous
externalities that stem from social capital. "Bonding" social capital based primarily on primary
associations tends often to produce negative societal externalities and inefficient resource
allocation60. Examples include old boys' networks, the Mafia, and nepotism. "Bridging" social
capital, in contrast, relies less on the phenomenon of (and disadvantages of) cartel loyalty and
more on the gains to efficiency produced by reduced transaction costs in information. Moreover,
bridging social capital can displace some of the inefficient aspects of bonding social capital.
Thus, while bonding social capital is not (by any means) an unqualified bad, all other things
equal it is preferable to have at least a large part of a society's stock of social capital in bridging
social capital. More concisely and importantly, the lack of bridging social capital can be a
serious developmental disadvantage6 1.
All of the foregoing builds up to a definition of social capital. A social capital asset is a
social network (primary or secondary) combining two or more people. The sum of such
networks and the breadth of such networks constitute a society's social capital. The relevant
composition of these networks between bonding and bridging social capital directly shapes the
kinds of negative and positive externalities flowing from a society's social capital.
In so defining social capital, I also concede that social capital is a subset of organizational
capital. Its place as a separate category of capital is contestable, but is useful in the present
analysis because it complements analyses of organizational capital and confronts, directly, the
past decade's simultaneously confused and exuberant fascination with social capital.
Expanding the discussion above to focus more explicitly on economic issues, one's social
capital refers to the sum of one's involvement in iterated games. The result is that one's social
capital reflects reputation and reduces certain transaction costs. Reputation allows other players
to gauge in advance what your game strategy will be and how likely it is that you will cooperate
or defect. Expanding critique of the Arrow-Debreu model begun by the information economists
that prices do not convey all relevant information, social capital hones in on the information
contained in reputation, information valuable for such core economic activities as forming a
partnership.
60 1 borrow the terms "bonding" and "bridging" from Robert Putnam, although he does not employ these terms in
this economic context. See Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 2-24.
61 The lack of bonding social capital may also be a severe handicap, which is why I explicitly disagree that the task
of development is to replace bonding with bridging social capital. Scholarship has yet to inquire into the
consequences of overly low bonding social capital, but does appreciate the consequences of overly high bonding
social capital. It would be a mistake of logic to extrapolate from the conclusion that high levels of bonding social
capital produce negative externalities that returns from reduction of bonding social capital would remain positive as
bonding social capital approached zero. Bonding social capital is vital to healthy child psychology, to informal
insurance mechanisms, and to a variety of other human needs. For an empirical investigation of bonding social
capital and insurance in Uzbekistan residential associations, see Sievers, "Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to
Absolutist Residential Community Associations."
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Likewise, the information forcing and sharing elements of social interactions reduce
general societal transaction costs of information. As social capital relates to democracy, to the
extent that social capital is a barometer of how active or passive individuals are generally, it is
directly proportional to democratic participation. As social capital relates to economics, while
reducing transaction costs of information facilitates general economic well-being, some
cooperative game strategies (like cartels) have negative economic externalities.
Accordingly, social capital is generally coterminous with civil society, but it is not
identical. A vibrant civil society assumes high levels of social capital within many secondary
associations, but it also highlights the organizational capital character of social capital by
connecting the latter to a variety of political functions, such as expression of diverse values,
ensuring accountability, and providing alternates to state services. Nevertheless, given the lack
of viable alternatives, in surveying stocks of social capital in Central Asia, I employ civil society
secondary associations, as well as residence associations and simple economic transactions, as a
proxy for social capital
Sustainable Development and International Environmental Law
Thus far, my assumption has been that the concerns behind adopting a mode of analysis based on
comprehensive capital relate directly to sustainable development. This assumption implies that
physical, natural, human, and organizational capital all will be needed in a transition from
Soviet-era practices to sustainable development. It thus rejects the non-organizational capital
and indirect means of achieving sustainable development that can be imagined under scenarios
initiated by disaster, war, or disease. The implication of this rejection is a commitment to the
idea that sustainable development is primarily an organizational and intentional endeavor; as
such it cannot be achieved without law, institutions, or related feats of social engineering,
facilitated, but not driven by, stocks of human, physical, and natural capital.
Perhaps, no social science agenda more complex and demanding can be imagined than
the one suggested by this chapter. Assessing stocks of all relevant kinds of capital, cataloging
how these stocks are currently deployed and impacted, and projecting how these stocks can and
will be deployed in the future to, alternately, fail or succeed to attain sustainable development is
an ambitious, and unworkable, agenda.
At some risk of irrelevance and running afoul of a fallacy of composition, I choose
international environmental law as a lens through which to frame a workable investigation into
how Central Asia's comprehensive capital relates to aspirations for sustainable development. By
international environmental law, I mean the existing range of policies and institutions that
currently relate to efforts to manage transboundary environmental problems. These include,
inter alia, multilateral treaties (such as the Convention on Biological Diversity), multilateral
institutions (such as the Global Environment Facility), bilateral donors (such as UISAID),
international NGOs, and local NOOs. In the aggregate, the policies and practices that form the
heart of current international environmental law display the advantage of addressing directly key
issues for natural, physical, human, and organizational capital. It is this implicit embrace of
comprehensive capital and explicit efforts by actors in international environmental law to change
strategies and practices of deploying these forms of capital that rest at the heart of the decision to
view trends through the lens of international environmental law.
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Moreover, justification for a focus on international environmental law stands on two
observations. First, these five states have been unusually active in ratifying international
environmental conventions; the story of their integration alone provides case studies that
challenge and support a number of current debates within the field of international environmental
politics. Second, these environmental conventions, in both theory and practice, create a
meaningful and unusually dynamic framework in which to study interactions between sectors of
societies (state, science/research, and NGO) and between important conflicting aspects of
national policies (inter alia, economics, environment, and nationalism).
Thus, the nature of Central Asia's relationship to international environmental law is my
proxy for evaluating the region's movement towards or away from sustainable development. The
following chapters follow the emphases of this Introduction in assessing the region's rising and
declining potentials of natural, human, organizational, and social capital through three broad
periods (pre-Soviet, Soviet, post-Soviet). Complementing this assessment of potential, I then
examine realizations of current comprehensive capital within case studies of ongoing
international environmental law projects in Central Asia. Disappointingly, I conclude that
modern Central Asia may now lack the comprehensive capital necessary to pursue a viable
transition to sustainable development.
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N: Lack of infrastructure forces H: Low salaries for physicians 0: State unable to enforce S: Even when they work longer
local populations to deforest and lead to inadequate provision of against or monitor opportunistic hours than poorer counterparts,
harm local biodiversity. medical care. behavior, enforce laws. high earning individuals tend to
be engaged in more bridging
social capital networks.
P: Salinized lands, lands H: Pollution causes increased 0: As pollution levels increase, S: As pollution increases,
showing trends of morbidity and mortality. threat to stability increases. survival threats elevate bonding
desertification less productive. social capital over bridging.
P: Healthier and more-well- N: Loss of strong infrastructure 0: As scale of government S: Within states, individuals
educated individuals are more in science and technology increases and complexity of with less education tend to have
productive. precludes innovation in management functions less bridging social capital.
pollution abatement and energy increases, need increases for
saving technologies. skilled technical managers.
P: Local political instability N: Poor enforcement of H: Corruption changes S: Where protections for
causes capital flight. environmental laws frustrates preferences in state nongovernmental organizations,
attempts to control or abate expenditures. Officials prefer foundations, and the press are
pollution. rent-seeking options (large lacking or decline (or are
projects, licensed activities) to precluded by corporatism),
support of schools. bridging social capital also
declines.
P: Low social trust inhibits N: Only a community low in H: Reduced transaction costs of 0: Areas low in social capital
access to credit. social capital falls prey to a information facilitated by evidence low levels of tax
"tragedy of the commons." bridging social capital facilitate compliance, frustrate creation of
better individual choices in independent watchdogs, and
selection of educational and offer few "training grounds" to
health opportunities. build leadership skills.
CHAPTER ONE
NATURAL CAPITAL: THE CENTRAL ASIAN HUMAN AND NATURAL
ENVIRONMENT1
With northern taiga forests and large southern deserts, as well as the largest mountains in
the former Soviet Union, Central Asia exhibits a tremendous diversity of ecosystems. Central
Asia contains the world's fourth deepest lake (Issyk-kul) and borders the largest inland body of
water in the world (the Caspian Sea). Central Asia also holds some of the USSR's principal
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons production and testing sites, and one of the world's
worst environmental disasters, the desiccation of the Aral Sea, once both the planet's fourth
largest lake and a thriving fishery. Bequeathed substantial and highly polluting industry from the
remarkable Soviet development enterprise, the region also boasts important reserves of
hydrocarbons and precious metals. At over four million square kilometers, Central Asia covers
an area larger in size than India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh combined, but with less than 5% of
their population.
The major environmental event of the 20th century in Central Asia was the reign of the
Soviet Union. Just as in the West, Soviet economic, accounting and planning ideology for most
of this century assumed that natural resource stocks were not scarce and underestimated the costs
resulting from pollution of natural resource flows. In other words, environmental management
was, for most of its existence, not a concern of the Soviet Union. Soviet factories produced
tremendous amounts of pollution, and the environmental consequences of this pollution were
easy to ignore considering the heavy winds of many industrial areas and the immense flow of
such rivers as the Irtysh in northern Kazakhstan. With development and industrial progress
enjoying sacred status in the Soviet political establishment, the state placed few restraints or
safeguards on industrial development. Given the social and political context of the USSR,
criticism of Soviet development policies was rare, and it only gained momentum in the 1980s,
later than analogous voicings in the West.
At the same time, population expanded rapidly in Central Asia after the famines and
purges of the pre-World War II era. This population, coupled with ambitious educational
programs favoring the natural and technical sciences and the USSR's early integration of women
into the labor force, served dynamically to facilitate the Soviet development enterprise.
Collective and mechanized agriculture, especially cotton (with great reliance on chemical
fertilizers and pesticides), dominated the fertile valleys of Central Asia. Industry, research, and
economic planning came to absorb much of the population freed from subsistence agriculture.
The contributions to the Soviet economy from this new professional class resulted in many of the
weapons, factories, and infrastructure innovations whose deployment lies at the heart of the
unsustainability of modern Central Asia.
To reiterate, this assumed unsustainability of natural capital in Central Asia refers not to
stocks of exploitable resources (like hydrocarbons) of the type that could be used to generate
physical capital through export to world commodity markets. This unsustainability of natural
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as part of Eric W. Sievers, "Subregional Cooperation for Environmental
Management in Central Asia," in Rezaul Karim, ed., State of the Environment Report in Asia and the Pacific 2000
(Bangkok: United Nations Ecornomic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2001). In Press.
capital is related not to the magnitude of stocks of natural resources, but to the integrity of these
stocks from the standpoint of biological organisms, specifically people.
Whereas Central Asia may currently have as much water as a century ago and therefore
just as great a raw stock of this natural resource, untreated potable water is now relatively rare in
Table 1: Central Asian Environmental Problems
Environmental Issue E
-1999 Rocket Explosions (heptyl
fuel pollution) in Kazakhstan
-Runoff from Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan uranium mines into
regional rivers
-Clean-up of dozens of chemical,
biological, and nuclear testing and
production sites in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan
-Aral Sea desiccation
-Chinese diversion of Black Irtysh
River from Kazakhstan
*Lack of potable water in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
-Most of region already covered by
deserts and semi-deserts
-Salinization and topsoil erosion
reducing yields throughout region
-Connected to and exacerbated by
biodiversity, water, poverty issues
-Loss in past 50 years of both
cheetah and tiger from region
-Inability/unwillingness of state
agencies to control illegal trade andpoaching
-Loss of critical habitat due to
expanding population
S -Chronic disease and high cancer
rates in most industrial cities
-High levels of lead in soils
-Air quality very low in most capital
cities due to expanding automobile
use and Soviet industry
ea -Caviar industry crash
-Threats to ecosystems from
hydrocarbon production and
transport
Region's only nuclear power plant
(providing heat and de-salinization
in Kazakhstan) on Caspian shore
Ol ]AG Etc, 0 -1998 cyanide/chlorine spill in
Issyk-kul related to Kumtor gold
mine
-Drilling in Caspian Sea for oil
-Still poorly understood
consequences of Soviet era nuclear-
assisted mining
the region. Similarly, while the region
now has equivalently as much ore
containing potentially valuable
radioactive isotopes as a century ago,
previously less of this ore was openly
exposed to air or water. Currently,
mining waste tailings leach radioactive
elements into the air, water, and
agriculture soils of Central Asia. Added
to such "natural" contaminants are an
abundance of anthropogenic pollutants.
The effects on human health of drinking
water saturated with various kinds of
salts, of eating plants containing
radionucleides, and of consuming meat
suffused with concentrated amounts of
persistent organic pollutants are not
beneficial. This pollution, degradation of
the natural resource flows upon which
human populations depend, directly
impacts possibilities for sustainable
development. Other natural resource
flows, arguably not as directly or no
longer as vital to human health (such as
levels of flow in small mountain streams)
nevertheless directly influence the
viability of other species and, hence,
larger ecosystems.
In addition to stocks of natural
resources and flows of natural resources,
the environment also contains sinks.
Forests are a carbon sink, meaning that
they reduce concentrations of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. Sinks for
various, but not all, types of pollutants
frame possibilities for sustainability;
when emissions of pollutants exceed rates
at which sinks (natural or artificial)
remove these pollutants from the
environment, sustainability is threatened.
For example, notwithstanding the
appreciable size of carbon sinks such as
forests and the ocean, industrial era emissions of carbon dioxide far exceeding the capacity of
such sinks explain the rapidly increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Currently, seven major problems involving natural resource flows and sinks afflict
Central Asia. These are: (a) the lingering effects of the Soviet military establishment, (b)
problems of water management, (c) desertification and land degradation, (d) loss of biodiversity
and habitat, (e) industrial pollution, (f) preservation of the Caspian Sea, and (g) dangers from
hydrocarbon production and mining activities.
In addition, another natural condition related directly to development aspirations afflicts
Central Asia: an abundance of threats from natural disasters. In recent years, devastating
earthquakes have ringed the borders of Central Asia, specifically in Afghanistan, Iran, and
Turkey. In the past century, massive quakes ten times larger than the summer 1999 Turkish
earthquake killed tens of thousands of residents of Almaty, Tashkent, Ashgabad, Turkmenbashi
(TM), and Armenia. In many cities of Central Asia, the population lives in desperate fear of
imminent quakes, and even of the delayed results of pre-Soviet earthquakes. On 18 February
1911, a quake 50 times stronger than the 1999 Turkish quake "caused a 2.2 cubic kilometer piece
of the Muzkol Range.. . to fall off, closing off the entire width of the Murgab Valley" in
Tajikistan and creating the Sarez Lake2 . Experts in the region are now warning that this natural
dam is weakening and could break, releasing more than 17,000 m3 of water and endangering
more than five million people.
Lingering Effects of the Soviet Military Establishment
In July 1999, a Russian Proton rocket launched from the Baikenour Launch Facility in
Kazakhstan exploded five minutes after take-off, spreading debris and fuel (dimethyl hydrazine)
over parts of the Karaganda Region. Russia leases this principal Soviet launch facility from
Kazakhstan. While no one was killed in the incident, and while the incident resulted in only a
temporary suspension of launches and a small compensation payment by Russia, it served to
remind residents of Central Asia that their region was an important participant in the entire
Soviet military enterprise. As another reminder, in October 1999, a second Proton rocket
exploded over the Karaganda region.
Hundreds of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons tests were conducted at the
Semipalatinsk/Kurchatov (KZ) nuclear test area, the Naryn (KZ) testing area, and on
Resurrection Island (KZ/UZ) in the Aral Sea. In many of these tests, radiation and chemicals
escaped the test ranges to intrude upon nearby human settlements. Moreover, much of the
uranium mined for Soviet nuclear weapons came from open mines near Atbasar (KZ), Chkalovsk
(TM), and Maili Su (KG), among other places. An installation to recover uranium from the
waters of Lake Issyk-kul also operated in Kyrgyzstan for nearly 40 years3. In addition, principal
chemical and biological weapon production facilities, including for the production of anthrax,
were located in Stepnogorsk (KZ) and Karakalpakstan (LUZ). Accompanying all these inherently
dangerous activities were a range of still little known military accidents in the region, such as a
very large late Soviet spill of kerosene into the Irtysh River from an airbase in Kazakhstan.
While the Soviet anny no longer exists, the national militaries still control vast swaths of the
region.
2 G. K. Melnikova et al., "A four state crisis: the Sarezsky Lake" Ecostan News 10 (November 1997): 2-3.
SV. P. Charsky and N. M. Tishkova, "Tsekh No. 7" Adam zhana Gera 9 (May-June 1998): 13-15.
Since 1991,
Kazakhstan has voluntarily
relinquished all of its nuclear
armaments, a unique
accomplishment in Asia,
especially in counterpoint to
India and Pakistan. While all
of the Central Asian states
have nuclear capability, none
has essayed to become a
nuclear power. Likewise,
none of the states in the region
attempts to continue Soviet Expos"D"%R
military production in
chemical and biological
weapons, despite wars
involving Azerbaijan and Figure 1: Fallout fro Four Soviet era nuclear tests in Kazakhstan
Tajikistan. Turkmenistan even Source: UNDP Semipalatinsk Relief and Rehabilitation Program.
declared itself a neutral state. Available at: http://www.semipalatinsk.org/Maps/Mwinds/20copy.gif
Nevertheless, Soviet military past practices plague Central Asia. Radiation pollution
around Semipalatinsk from testing and around many mining areas causes high levels of
morbidity. Radioactive tailings in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan threaten the entire region if run-off
or all-too-frequent (due to land degradation) landslides wash these materials into regional rivers.
Moreover, although Kazakhstan is currently decommissioning its sole large Soviet-era nuclear
reactor (research reactors exist in every republic), it is also developing plans to construct several
new nuclear power plants.
Despite the scale and importance of these environmental problems, no state in the region
independently assumes responsibility for addressing these problems. International funding is at
the heart of all the major military clean-up efforts in Central Asia, from Semipalatinsk to nuclear
plant decommissioning, to safeguarding and dismantling the materials and technology contained
in remaining anthrax production facilities.
Water Management
At the beginning of the Soviet era, the Aral Sea, the fourth largest lake on the planet, occupied
the center of Central Asia, and its two main feeder rivers, the Amudarya and Syrdarya, carried
flow of well over 100 km3. The climate around the Aral Sea, especially on the southern and
eastern shores, was very habitable, the land agriculturally productive, and the Aral Sea itself one
of the most productive and major fisheries of the Soviet Union. Tigers roamed the tugai forests
along the major tributaries. At the end of the Soviet era, the Amudarya no longer emptied into
the Aral Sea; it ran out of water before reaching the sea. The Syrdarya only emptied into the
Aral in good years. Most of the volume of the sea had already disappeared, the fishery was dead
and all native fish species extirpated, and agricultural productivity had been reduced to less than
its pre-Soviet levels. Where once tugai forests abounded, the land was denuded, desertified, and
devoid of most life.
In contrast to many other arid areas of the world, Central Asia's problems with water
management rarely are as simple as lack of water. In fact, the region has a great amount of
water. Kazakhstan, for example, claims more than 85,000 rivers and streams4, and 57,000
lakes5. The four largest rivers in the region alone (the Syrdarya, Amudarya, Ural, and Irtysh),
even despite greatly reduced levels due to irrigation diversion, carry more than 100 km 3 of water
annually. Serious problems, however, stem from unsound practices of irrigation, pollution, and
coordination. Distribution, not availability, is the principal problem in Central Asia.
Symptomatically, crude over-irrigation leading to salinization of soils is perhaps the most
appropriate snapshot of the root of Central Asia's water problems. Most of the region's
agriculture is now based on irrigated lands, three times the area that was irrigated at the
beginning of Soviet collectivization efforts. As one expert on the Central Asian environment
observes, "a sustainable future in Central Asia begins and ends with improving irrigation and
water management6-
Most irrigation canals are unlined, and these canals are especially prone to choke with
weeds when not maintained. Throughout the region, it is common to see such canals so choked
with weeds as to be virtually closed. Local communities lack plausible incentives to maintain
these canals since the state still controls selling prices of agricultural goods in many areas and/or
is still the major consumer of water for agriculture. As a result, large pools of standing water,
instead of being directed towards replenishing the Aral Sea, gradually evaporate, ruining the land
in the process. Indeed, 30% of the Aral's "missing" water has been driven underground,
mobilizing deep salt reserves, raising the water table, and waterlogging fields'. As a
counterpoint, many lined or maintained canals divert far more water than needed. In either case,
the roots of the Aral Sea crisis are not widely debated. Because of poorly designed irrigation
canals and the Soviet tradition of payment-free use of water, 50 per cent to 90 per cent of water
diverted for irrigation never reaches cropsg.
Moreover, drainage water does not flow back towards the sea as it should. While the
Aral Sea has all but disappeared as the result of irrigation, the Aidar-Arnasai Lake System, a
300km by 60km body of water, appeared after 1960 primarily as the result of excess irrigation
flows diverted from the Syrdarya River, and its level continues to rise9 . The Amudarya River
counterpoint to the Aidar is Lake Sarykamysh in northern Turkmenistan, which is also
expanding and already covers several thousand square kilometers. Despite all these well-known
consequences of Soviet practices, Turkmenistan announced in 2000 plans to create a 150 km 3
lake in the middle of the Kara-Kum desert using drainage waters1 ; this "Lake of the Golden
Century" would only exacerbate the region's water problems.
4 Kazakhstan Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, "Ekologicheskaya obstanovka v
Respublike Kazakhstan" Ekologicheskii byulleten' 1 (1999): 5-44.
5 Republic of Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Almaty: KazMIIMOSK, 1998). Available at:
http ://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/natckaznc 1.pdf.
6 Michael Thurman, "A photographic tour of irrigation in Uzbekistan," 1999. Available at:
http://homepages.infoseek.com/~mirablik/atraf-muhit/photo.html
International Fund for the Aral Sea, "Water and environmental management in the Aral Sea basin" GEF Project
Proposal 1997. Available at: http://www.gefweb.org/wprogram/1JULY97/ARALSEA.DOC.
8 Marjukka Hiltunen, Environmental Development Co-operation Oportunities: Kazakstan, Kyrgz Republic,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (Helsinki: Finnish Environment Institute, 1998), p. 6.
9 Oleg Tsaruk, "Big water flows to the Kyzylkum or is the Aral dying?" Ecostan News 3 (April 1995); 2-3.
1 0Niyaz Ataev, "The Turkmenbashi-Aral Sea" Ecostan News 7 (July 2000): 8.
Along the lower reaches of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers, Figure 2:
which both empty into and are the source of the Aral Sea, these water Aal Sea 190-2000
management practices have had devastating effect on human lives and
the environment. Beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
cotton cultivation expanded rapidly along these two river basins; since
1960 the Aral Sea itself has been shrinking. The Aral Sea is a dead
sea, desiccated now to a discontiguous fraction of its former size of
almost 70,000 km2; all 24 native species of fish in the sea are now
extirpated". In all, an area of the Aral seabed substantially larger than
Taiwan has been exposed in the last two decades. Cities near the sea,
such as Tashauz (TM), Nukus (UZ), and Kzyl-Orda (KZ), not to
mention dozens of towns near the shore, saw quality of life and life
expectancy plummet as a result of lack of clean drinking water and U
failed agriculture. 97 per cent of women in the hardest hit area,
Karakalpakstan, are anemic', and levels of infant mortality, cancer,
and respiratory diseases have skyrocketed in recent decades.
The environmental situation in Central Asia is so desperate that
for many problems solutions are no longer pursued. Instead,
mitigation is the only response possible given economic and
technological constraints. The paradigm case to illustrate this point is
the Aral Sea. In the first years of independence, states and donors,
especially USAID and the World Bank, asked what would be needed
to restore the sea. In fact, United States political leaders and
diplomatic staff pledged in 1992 to provide the funds and expertise
needed to help the basin states restore the sea. However, as estimates
of the costs of this undertaking increased to well over a billion dollars,
U.S. and other donors began to recede quietly from their enthusiastic
promises to facilitate restoration of the sea. Plans turned to mitigation,
to a plan to stabilize the region as a set of discontiguous lakes and
wetlands capable of supporting some agriculture and fisheries. The
agriculture and fisheries envisioned under this new plan will produce
only a fraction of what the Aral Sea once produced, even as population
in the region continues to grow.
Water management issues likewise trouble the areas of Central
Asia not contained in the Aral Sea basin. For example, recent
activities in China will divert portions of the flow of the Ili and Irtysh
rivers, two of Kazakhstan's most important rivers. The Irtysh, the fifth Source: San Diego State
largest river in the world, flows through Kazakhstan on its way to Universit; Available at:
Russia where it joins the Ob and eventually flows into the Arctic Sea. http://visearth.ucsd.edu
How Kazakhstan will react to these Chinese efforts to increase irrigation in Xinjiang Province
will prove to be of great importance to the economic and ecological future of northern and
eastern Kazakhstan. However, despite public outcry, Kazakhstan has yet to take any substantive
measures to either attempt to restrain China or to mitigate the consequences of this project,
" Richard Stone, "Coming to grips with the Aral Sea's grim legacy" Science 284/5411 (April 1999): 30-33.
12 Food and Agriculture Organization, "Contaminated water devastates health across the Aral Sea region," 1997.
Available at: http://www.fao.org/NEWS/1997/970104-e.htm
although the project would ravage the agricultural and animal husbandry industry of northern
Kazakhstan and make several key hydroelectric and shipping installations untenable to operate'
Soviet policies encouraged liberal application of pesticides and chemical fertilizers on
crops in Central Asia, and levels of these chemicals per hectare, even DDT, which while
supposedly banned was nonetheless used widely, were perhaps the highest in the world before
the dissolution of the USSR. While the Central Asian states have roughly halved their pesticide
use since independence, DDT is still highly concentrated in the soils of residential areas far from
centers of agriculture'4 . Little consideration was paid to the environment's ability to absorb
these chemicals, which has led, among other things, to high concentrations of these chemicals in
both the water and wildlife of the region. Agricultural pesticides also highlight the linkages
between environmental problems, especially the close link between land and water in Central
Asia.
Land Degradation
No environmental issue in Central Asia enjoys more consensus than that of desertification and
related forms of land degradation. The Central Asian republics were among the very first states
in the world to sign and ratify the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.
Moreover, the large numbers of geographers, soil scientists, and other specialists in the region do
not diverge appreciably in their qualitative or quantitative assessments of the causes and
consequences of desertification in Central Asia. A recent UNDP report states that losses in
"natural potential" in Kazakhstan stemming from desertification could "already be comparable to
the country's GDP"
Within the Central Asian republics, diverse factors cause and exacerbate desertification
and land degradation. These are loss of vegetative cover (i.e. from over-grazing, expanding
human populations, and pollution), erosion (both wind and water), depletion of soil resources
(i.e. from non-rotation of crops), waterlogging of soils and salinization (from substandard
irrigation practices), and, of course, the desiccation of the Aral Sea. Consequently, land
degradation in Central Asia is a concern equally of settlements at the edge of existing deserts and
semi-deserts in Turkmenistan, of agriculturists in Uzbekistan's valleys, and of populations living
at high altitudes in the Tien-Shan and Pamir mountains of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
The largest states of Central Asia are already largely desert; roughly 60 per cent of
Kazakhstan's territory is covered by deserts or semi-deserts, compared to 80 per cent of
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The remaining states also contain arid and desert areas, but are
also more mountainous. All the states of the region utilize deserts and semi-deserts extensively
for agriculture and animal husbandry, despite the sensitivity of these lands and the expense of
reclamation.
The arable lands of Central Asia are heavily degraded. For example, in Turkmenistan, 95
per cent of irrigated lands suffer from salinization1 6, 40 per cent from extensive degradation, and
only 17 per cent are in acceptable condition' 7. Approximately 30 per cent of Kazakhstan's
1Eric Sievers, "China Set to Divert World's Fifth Largest River" Ecostan News 7 (July 2000): 2.
1See, e.g., Asian Development Bank, Central Asian Environments in Tranisition, pp. 61, 136.
1United Nations Development Programme, Kazakhstan Human Development Report (Almnaty: UNDP, 1996).
1P. Kurbanov, ed., Sostoyaniye okruZhaxrusChei sredy v Turkmenistane (Ashgabad: Ministry of Nature Use and
Environmental Protection, unpublished), p. 153.
17 Kh. Atamuradov, Kb., Environmental information systems in Turkmenistan (Arendal: UNEP GRID, 1998).
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agricultural lands are salinated, waterlogged, or at-risk18 . In Tajikistan, 16 per cent of irrigated
lands suffer to some degree from salinization, another eight per cent are otherwise degraded
and soil erosion affects most areas of the republic not used directly for agriculture2 1 . In their
adverse impacts on Central Asia, desertification and land degradation reach levels similar to
those of'Africa 2 2
The transition period exacerbates these trends. While total numbers of livestock have
decreased, thereby allowing some natural restoration 23 , control and regulation of where livestock
graze has become lax and contributes to degraded local carrying capacity. As a result, many
sensitive areas, especially in mountainous areas, are overgrazed, leading to land degradation.
Likewise, wartime conditions in Tajikistan that have forced refugees to new areas,
impoverishment that forces villagers to cut slow-growing critical species like saksaul
(Haloxylon) and juniper for fuel24, and trade in species like soaproot, for local subsistence and
Asian medical markets, explain loss of vegetation 25.
While the root causes of land degradation in Central Asia are not actively disputed, to
date almost no effort has been made to address these root causes, and there is little political will
to do so. While it is no secret that extensive cultivation of cotton is a prime culprit in
degradation, the governments of the major cotton export states (TM/LUZ) show no intention to
abandon the reduced but considerable foreign currency to be gained from "white gold."
Ten years into independence, discussions about the need to reinvent the economy still
abound. Yet, while these states are actively interested in mitigation of the effects on the land of
cotton and other agriculture, they balk at the idea of more serious reforms and more substantive
revisions of their economic foundations. They also remain committed to untenable practices
(such as the overgrazing that is connected to the livestock industry or the population expansion
connected with policies that encourage high birth rates) despite the medium and long-term
erosion of natural capital that results from such practices.
Biodiversity
i V. K. Yesekin et al., Sostoyanie okruzhayuschei sredy v Respublike Kazakhstan, undated. Available at:
http://www.grida.no/prog/cee/enrin/lhtmls/kazahst/soe/start.htm
19 M. B. Baratov et al., "Osnovnye napravleniya zemledeliya v Respublike Tajikistan i ikh vliyaniye na strukturu i
sostoyaniye zemel' v usloviyakh perekhodnogo perioda" Paper presented 16 April at National Seminar on
Implementation in the Republic of Tajikistan of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
(Dushanbe, 1998).
20 D. M. Makhsudov, "Oroshaemoe zemledeliye i problemy opustynivaniya zemel' v Tajikistane" Paper presented 16
April at National Seminar on Implementation in the Republic of Tajikistan of the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification (Dushanbe, unpublished, 1998).
21 Kh. M. Akhmadov, "Opustynivaniye i bor'ba s nim v razlichnykh prirodo-lesokhozyaistvennykh zonakh
Tajikistana" Paper presented 16 April at National Seminar on Implementation in the Republic of Tajikistan of the
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (Dushanbe, unpublished, 1998).
22 65% of Africa's croplands are degraded. The World Bank, Toward an Environment Strategy for the World Bank
(April 2000 Progress Report/Discussion Draft), p. 12.
V. I. Nifadiev et al,"Sostoyaniye okuhyshisredy Kygztn"(undated). Availableat
http://www.grida.no/prog/cee/enrin/htmls/kyrghiz/soe/indexr.htm
2Galina Kamakhina, "An alternative approach to saving Turkmenistan's biodiversity" Ecostan News 5 (September
1997): 2-4. See also Anonymous, Tajikistan State of the Environment, 1998. Available at:
http://www.grida.no/prog/cee/enrin/htmls/tadjik/soe/index.htm
25 Elena Mukhina, "Soaproot Poaching" Ecostan News 3 (May 1995): 6-7.
Central Asia boasts considerable biological diversity, including more than 7,000 flowering
species of plants; in some areas up to 20 per cent of plant species are endemic2 7. Similarly, the
region has nearly a thousand species of vertebrates, including more than a hundred reptile
species28. Notable species include snow leopard, Caspian seal, Karatau argali, Severtsov urial,
MacQueen's bustard, bearded vulture, Ship sturgeon, Menzbir's groundhog, and Striped hyena.
Complementing these species are numerous rare and endangered ecosystems, such as
feathergrass steppes, walnut and pistachio forests, and high altitude (above 10,000 feet) lakes.
Other species (Turan tiger, Near Eastern cheetah, and
honey badger) and ecosystems (tugai forests) have
either completely disappeared or declined by more than
90% over the past 100 years.
Central Asia is substantially more biodiverse
than its neighbors to the north and west. This wealth of
biodiversity and its continued existence are important
for both global reasons (as sinks and as the common
heritage and concern of humanity) and local reasons (as
an indicator of the health of the human environment, as
a source of tourism revenue, and as local heritage).
While the region now possesses only limited
capacity to reverse or mitigate its other environmental
problems, it boasts established mechanisms to protect
biodiversity. Central Asia contains a developed
network of nature reserves inherited from the Soviet
Union. Roughly three per cent of the region existed as
conservation land in the late Soviet era , the bulk
primarily in strict reserves (zapovedniki), temporary or
less strict, at times even only nominally conservationist,
reserves (zakazniki), and newly emerging national
parks. Complicating analysis, there is overlap between
these lands; in most states, a zakaznik can be part of a
zapovednik, which itself can be part of a national park.
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have over two per cent of
their territory in zapovedniki, and the other states
roughly .5 per cent. Today, 2.5 per cent of Central Asia, or 100,000 km2, is in some sort of
conservation regime. For perspective, the aggregate size of the parts of Central Asia set aside as
26 Derived from Eric W. Sievers et al., "National Parks, Snow Leopards, and Poppy Plantations: The Development
and Degradation of Central Asia's Preserved Lands" in Central Asia Monitor 2 (1995): 23-30 and 3 (1995): 17-26; I.
Kh. Mirkhashimov, ed., Biologicheskoe i landshaftnoe raznoobrazie Kazakhstana (Almaty: Ministry of Ecology and
Natural Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997), I. Kh. Mirkhashimov, et al., "Osobo okhranyaemye
prirodnye territorii Kazakstana" in V. I. Drobzhev et al., eds., Novosti nauki Kazakhstana (Almaty: Ministry of
Science- Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997); Kh. Atamuradov, "Osobo okhranyaemye
prirodnye territorii i buduschie zapovednye zony" (unpublished map of Turkmenistan Ministry of Nature Use and
Environmental Protection, 1999).2 7 Vladimir Krever et al., eds., Biodiversity Conservation in Central Asia (Moscow: World Wide Fund for Nature,
1998), p. 9.
21 Ibid., p. 12.
29 Sievers et al., "National Parks, Snow Leopards, and Poppy Plantations: The Development and Degradation of
Central Asia's Preserved Lands".
conservation land slightly exceeds the total area of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
These various conservation lands directly protect the viability of Central Asian ecosystems to
sustain agriculture, supply fresh water, and buffer an increasingly harsh climate.
The post-communist fate of these reserves remains unclear. After independence
governments permitted previously unthinkable assaults on these reserves. These assaults took
the form of military activities (TJ/AZ), widespread appropriation or lease of reserve lands for
fishing and agriculture (KZ/TM), and parties of Arabs and Europeans taking trophies of
endangered species such as argali and urial in reserves (KG/LTZ/TM)30. Indirectly, similar
damage was inflicted to the reserve system because of the collapse of science in all six states, the
out-migration of scientists, and the remarkably severe impoverishment of park rangers, leaving
the latter understandably prone to participate in or ignore violations of environmental laws.
However, the states in the region and their activist communities of conservation and
research biologists deserve special recognition for taking steps toward the preservation and even
revitalization of the system of nature reserves. Tajikistan plans to complete its pre-independence
steps toward creation of a Pamir National Park covering much of the eastern part of the country,
in effect creating one of the largest parks in the world3 1 . Also notable, Kazakhstan created the
Eastern Kazakhstan Zapovednik in 1992 and the Alakol Zapovednik in 1998, and it recently
formed the Ili-Alatau National Park in the mountains bordering the former capital, Almaty.
Similarly, Kyrgyzstan is establishing the Issyk-kul area as a biosphere reserve, and Turkmenistan
is also on the verge of creating a new zapovednik. Yet, while the situation with regard to
reserves provides some basis for optimism, most of the region's biodiversity, of course, is located
outside of the boundaries of these reserves. Most activities relating to biodiversity protection in
the region nevertheless focus exclusively on reserves.
In summary, current efforts to protect biodiversity in Central Asia have two major
failings due to the over-use of reserves as proxies for preservation. First, a comparatively minor
effort is directed towards general enforcement of the region's adequate laws on wildlife
protection; legal efforts are limited to drafting new laws instead of enforcing existing laws.
Second, local communities are often very hostile to the assignment of lands to conservation
regimes32 , especially zapovedniki that, by law, prevent even physical access to their territories by
non-scientific personnel. The consequences are that Central Asia's stocks of important
biodiversity are on the decline, conditions for recovery are diminishing, and, although field
science is not supported enough to report them, rates of extinction have probably increased in the
post-independence period.
Industrial Pollution
Energy and water are comparable components of Central Asian life. The massively inefficient
irrigation practices of Central Asia match massively inefficient patterns of energy use.
Kazakhstan's Ekibastuz coal power plant was the most polluting power plant in the USSR33 .
3Ibid.
31 N. Safarov, ed., Ekologiva i okbrana prirody (Dushanbe: Ministry of Nature Protection of the Republic of
Tajikistan, 1998).
32 A. Kovshar and A. Zatoka, "Printsipy razmeshcheniia i infrastruktura osobo okhraniaemykh prirodnykh territorii v
aridnoi zone SSSR" Problemy osvoeniia pustyn' 3-4 (1991): 155-160.
'* Ruben A. Manatsakanian, Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics (Edinburgh: University of
Edinburgh Press, 1992), p. 82.
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While hydropower and natural gas meet an appreciable amount of the region's energy needs,
reliance on coal and inefficient power plants drives levels of tons of carbon emission per unit
GDP to extraordinary levels. Kazakhstan's levels even surpass those of the USA 34 , as probably
do Azerbaijan's.
One of the most significant reforms of the post-Soviet period has been the separation of
Central Asia's energy grid into two districts; this process, ongoing since 1997, will reverse the
trends towards nationalization of energy transmission networks that dominated the early
independence period. Under this effort, all of Central Asia except northern Kazakhstan will be
part of a single electricity and gas network, while northern Kazakhstan and Siberia will form a
separate grid. This scheme promises savings in both costs and efficiency and is a major
concession of each state's sovereignty since disputes over electricity and gas have been among
the.largest tensions between the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in
recent years. Notably, the northern Kazakhstan grid hopes to reduce its reliance on local high-
ash coal by emphasizing the hydroelectric assets that it already contains; Kazakhstan currently
exploits only 10% of its hydroelectric potential 35. For Central Asia as a whole, electricity
consumption, while still massively inefficient, is only half what it was during the late Soviet
36
era
Because Central Asia is already heavily degraded environmentally and since much of the
region is situated in environmentally sensitive xeric territories, the link between economic
activities and environmental sustainability is accentuated. The sensitive ecosystems of the area
are for the reasons stated above less able to absorb and mitigate pollution than are ecosystems in
other areas of heavy industrial development, and this situation elevates the marginal
environmental and health costs of industrial activities and development in the region. In other
words, Central Asia's environmental sinks are compromised from the start, with the consequence
that resource flows are prone to degrade faster than in other areas of the planet.
Since 1990, levels of pollution have decreased because of the economic crash in the
region; many factories closed or operate at greatly reduced capacity. Nevertheless, every state in
the region pins hopes for the future on restoration of and, then, expansion and diversification of
the level of industrial output reached by the end of the Soviet era. Thus, the region's uncertain
industrial future presents both regional and global environmental issues, global primarily because
of carbon emissions related to highly inefficient industry, and regional because of air, soil, and
water pollution related to this inefficient industry.
Because the Soviet state situated so many industrial enterprises close to or (especially
those established before the end of World War II) in cities, many heavily populated areas contain
substantial soil pollution. For example, in Leninogorsk (KZ), lead and cadmium levels around
apartment buildings exceed maximum allowable concentrations by nearly 100 times 7. In
Batken (KG), the Kyrgyzstan Medical Ecology Research Institute recorded soil concentrations of
mercury and antimony in 2000 at levels that exceeded maximum allowable concentrations by
several hundred times3 8. While Leninogorsk and Batken are uniquely heavily polluted, levels of
~Sergei Elkin, "Kazakhstan and international greenhouse gas emissions trading" Unpublished talk presented 30
April 1999 at Harvard Institute for International Development.
3United States Department of Energy Information Administration, "Kazakhstan" (April 2000),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazak.lhtml.
37Asa Development Bank, Central Asian Environments in Transition, p. 44.
3Kyrgyz Press, "Na yuge Ferganskoi doliny ekologi obnaruzhili rtut' dazhe v grudnom moloke u zhenschin" (June
28, 2000 wire report).
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heavy metal pollution exceeding allowable norms can be found in every major city in Central
Asia.
Given the region's geography, transboundary river pollution can be easily divided into
regional (little or no flow outside the region) and interregional categories. Within the region, the
internal transboundary rivers are not the most polluted industrially. Salts and agricultural
chemicals are the major, although not exclusive, concerns associated with rivers such as the
Amudarya and Syrdarya. However, these concerns are not trivial. A recent report from
Turkmenistan claims that 98 per cent of women in northern Tajikistan have reproductive
disorders and that 35 per cent of children born to women exposed regularly to pesticides are
partially hermaphroditic39.
The major water borne flows of industrial pollutants are through interregional
watercourses such as the Ural River (phenols, petroleum byproducts, and boron) as it flows from
Russia to Kazakhstan and in the Irtysh (ammonium nitrate, zinc, phenols) as it flows from
Kazakhstan to Russia40 . These two rivers are the most polluted of Kazakhstan's large rivers 1 .
Notable exceptions to this general rule include the Chu, Mailisu, and Surkhandarya
rivers. The Chu flows into Kazakhstan from Kyrgyzstan, where a Chinese joint venture paper
mill operates on the border. Kyrgyzstan NGOs claim that this mill violates environmental laws,
uses polluting technology, and was only approved due to political influence 42 . The
Surkhandarya is heavily polluted by the Tursunzade Aluminum Works (with a half million ton
per year.capacity, one of Asia's largest) in Tajikistan on its way into Uzbekistan, a situation that
Uzbekistan protests often. The Mailisu, which receives runoff from several Kyrgyzstan mines
with large waste piles of radioactive tailings, is of similar concern to Uzbekistan.
An analogous situation holds for transboundary air pollution. Much of the region's air
pollution comes from sources in Russia and beyond. For example, Russia received 4 x 106
grams of sulfur deposition from Kazakhstan in 1994, but Kazakhstan received 74 x 106 grams
from Russia, accounting for 28% of the Kazakhstan total43. However, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan both also send high levels of airborne particulate pollution to their neighbors within
the region.
In summary, Central Asia currently possesses, even after post-Soviet collapses, an
unusually high level of industrial infrastructure. This infrastructure is, per unit output, far more
environmentally devastating than is the global norm. As a consequence, even a slashing of
industrial output in Central Asia of the type that has occurred since 1991 has not been able to
effect a reversal of trends in industrial pollution. Rather, economic decline has merely resulted
in more modest rates of environmental degradation, but rates still in excess of what would be
considered catastrophic in other parts of the world. Environmental gains from reductions in
industrial output are partly offset by the increasing obsolescence of industrial infrastructure. For
example, in the energy sector, "over 90 per cent of gas turbines, 57 per cent of steam turbines,
and 33 per cent of steam boilers have been in place for 20 years or more44." Therefore, stated
aspirations by all states in the region to resurrect industrial output and expand industries only
39 Kurbanov, SostoQyaniye okruzhayuschei sredyv Turkmenistane, pp. 37- 38.
Tatyana Kostina, ed., Gorod XXI veka (Almnaty: Greenwomen, 1999), p. 72.
~Ibid., pp. 58-59.
42 Irina Matveenko, "Kyrgyzstan NGOs fight paper mill" Ecostan News 6 (March 1998): 2-5.
SVladimir Kotov and Elena Nikitina, "Implementation and effectiveness of the acidl rain regime in Russia'' in David
G. Victor et al., eds., The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 5 19-547. See also Tatyana Kostina, ed., Gorod XXI veka, p. 57.
4United States Department of Energy Information Administration, "Kazakhstan."
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promise to further degrade the natural resource flows and sinks of the region. They are not
coupled to any viable or known technologies (or sources of funding) to restrict emissions of
pollutants into the air or water to levels within regional or global carrying capacities.
Caspian Sea
The Caspian Sea, covering more than 370,000 km2, is, by far, the planet's largest inland body of
water and is roughly the size of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand combined or
the size of New York State alone. Its littoral states are Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Turkmenistan, meaning that half of the states of Central Asia have a direct interest in the sea.
This interest extends to communities living near the sea, as well as to the sea's traditional
provision of appreciable income from caviar exports and the sea's potential status as a major
source of hydrocarbons in the next century. The Kashagan Field off Kazakhstan's Caspian coast
may be the second or third largest hydrocarbon deposit in the world.
However, the Caspian is already afflicted by massive amounts of pollution, primarily
brought into the sea from the more than 100 rivers that feed into it, as well as by oil refining
operations on the coast in Azerbaijan. The Volga River is the major Caspian tributary,
contributing 80 per cent of the Caspian's inflow and draining a watershed that includes the bulk
of the Russian Federation's industry. In July 1996, an oil spill from an Azerbaijan offshore
2 45 .. 46drilling operation covered 1,000 km of the sea ; oil is the major pollutant in the sea . In early
2000, the Russian press reported widely about several million tons of oil released into Caspian
tributaries due to hostilities in Chechnya.
Perhaps partly due to this pollution, the Caspian's annual yield of sturgeon plummeted
from tens of thousands of tons per year to under ten thousand tons. Yet, since the planet's other
sturgeon fisheries have also collapsed, the Caspian still yields 90 per cent of the world's
sturgeon47. Other primary reasons for sturgeon decline are overfishing, dams, and pollution of
rivers used for spawning, especially the Volga. In 1988 almost no sturgeon spawned
successfully in the Volga River due to heavy metal poisoning48.
More recently, resolution of these problems and the success of conservation programs have
been frustrated by a precipitous rise in poaching. A 1999 TRAFFIC report argues that the
majority of government officials in the Republic of Kalmykia in Russia are involved in sturgeon
poaching49. A 2000 report prepared for TRAFFIC on Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also
revealed previously unknown levels of poaching and state corruption in those republics". In a
needed but insufficient move, the Interstate Commission for Conservation of the Biological
Resources of the Caspian Sea reduced its 2000 national quotas to only 70% of 1999 quotas",
41 Michael H. Glantz, "Global environmental problems in the Caspian region" Unpublished paper presented at 15
March 1999 NATO Advanced Research Workshop on the Caspian Sea in Venice.
46 Igor S. Zonn, "Ecological Consequences of Oil and Gas Development" in William Ascher and Natalia
Mirovitskaya eds., The Caspian Sea: A Quest for Environmental Security (Amsterdam: Kiuwer Academic
Publishers, 2000), p. 67.
47 I. S. Zonn, Kaspiiskii memorandum (Moscow: Korkis, 1997), p. 137.
48 Ibid, p. 145.
"4 TRAFFIC Europe Russia, "Vylov osetrovykh v Rossii i torgovlya imi" (unpublished, 1999).
sLaw and Environment Eurasia Partnership, "Review of existing fisheries management measures for Sturgeon in
the Caspian Sea, Danube and Amur River basins range states: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan" (unpublished, 2000).
S"Prikaspiiskie strany sokratyat vylov osetrovykh" Panorama (Jan. 21, 2000), http://www.panorama.kz. Quotas on
smaller fish were also reduced.
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which themselves were only a fraction of late Soviet production figures. The littoral states' state
fisheries cannot even meet these small quotas, and as a result Russia has announced that it may
suspend all exports of caviar in order to preserve a commercially viable stock of sturgeon.
Kazakhstan expected to export in 2000 only one-sixth of its 1999 caviar exports.
In recent decades another major environmental issue involving the Caspian has been the
rising level of the sea. Before the Second World War, the sea's level fell to such a great degree
that ports and other coastal installations had difficulties operating. However, beginning two
decades ago, the sea began to rise dramatically and by 1995 had flooded over 12,000 km2 of
coastal areas . 1999, however, saw a slight decline in the level of the sea and consequent hopes
that this environmental problem is abating.
Beyond sturgeon and other species connected to Caspian fisheries, biodiversity concerns
are also relevant to the Caspian. The sea's unique seal population has in recent years been
subject to mass die-offs. Moreover, the seals are primarily in the northern Caspian shelf area, the
very shallow but highly biologically productive area shared by Kazakhstan and Russia; it is here
that Kazakhstan began drilling for hydrocarbons in 1999. To wit, in spring 2000, 10% of the
entire population of Caspian seals perished under unresolved conditions in the Kazakhstan and
Russian sectors of the Caspian Sea. Also, several important nature reserves lie on the shores of
the Caspian and embrace parts of the sea. In Central Asia, these are Kyzylagach Zapovednik
(AZ, 88,360 ha) and Khazar Zapovednik (TM, 262,000 ha). Both are important nesting areas for
migratory birds and waterfowl, like flamingo, herons, and francolins.
Finally, the only nuclear power plant in Central Asia lies on the shores of the Caspian in
Aktau (KZ). The plant is so close to the shore that the rising sea subsumed its cooling pond.
Constructed in the early 1970s, this BN-350 heat and de-salinization plant was the first of its
kind in the world. Due to be decommissioned in 199653, the Mangystau reactor may remain
operational until at least 2002".
Hydrocarbons and Mining
On 20 May 1998, a truck carrying 20 tons of sodium cyanide veered off a bridge in Kyrgyzstan,
spilling 1760 kilograms of the chemical into the Barskoon River, which empties into Issyk-kul.
Several deaths in the nearby eponymous village and a localized fish kill in Issyk-kul were
blamed on the accident.
Despite widespread hysteria from political groups, NGOs, and the foreign press, it is
likely that no human died as a result of cyanide, especially considering the flow of the Barskoon
river, the immense volume of Lake Issyk-kul, and the rapidity of the dissolution of the toxin as
documented by chemical analyses immediately following the accident55 . Most damage tied to
this incident probably occurred as a result of the Ministry of Health's decision to dump calcium
compounds into the river, an event not well-publicized56 and which, inexplicably, continued for a
52 M. R. Mansimov, "Kolebanie urovnya i zatoplenie pribrezhnoi zony Kaspiiskogo morya" Unpublished paper
peetd15 March 1999 at NA TO Advanced Research Workshop on the Caspian Sea in Venice.
5Timur Berkeliev, "Radiation Wastes and Pollution in Turkmenistan" Ecostan News 5 (June 1997): 2-4
SLiz Fuller, "Kazakhstan to Close Nuclear Power Plant" RFE/RL Newsline 169 (September 1, 2000).
L. A. Kustareva, "Dorogoi moi Issyk-kul" Adam zhana Gera 9 (May-June 1998): 11.
5Irina Matveenko, "Issyk-kul" Ecostan News 6 (June-August 1998): 2-5.
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a Canadian-Kyrgyz joint venture operating the
Kumtor gold mine; this mine produces a sizeable We studied several indicators of health in
portion of Kyrgyzstan's GNP. Likewise, gold the town of Atbasar (Akmola region in central
mines in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, not to mention depresandakhentralheing;ocal
hydrocarbon sources in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, dconan raoncedesig o l
and Turkmenistan, account for large portions of the past forty years, uranium ore has been
their respective state's GNP. transported through the town without regard to
Kyrgyzstan's accident never really human safety. There is one river that flows
threatened to halt the work of the Kumtortrouc the resutdmi1
Operating Company. Because of the economic kilometers upstream at the uranium mines.
scale of hydrocarbon and mining activities in There is also a chemical fertilizer plant in the
Central Asia, companies involved in these activities town. in addition, atomic tests were carried out
and the activities themselves are not scrupulously m the region at a rocket test site not far from the
town. In 1992, the average life expectancy was
monitored. This situation is exacerbated by the fact61
that every mining and drilling operation is distant Infant mortality is 37 in 1000.
from densely populated areas. Increasingly, After researching several population groups
multinationals are assuming management of with an average age of 36, it was revealed that
extractive activities from Soviet-era state concerns, 100 per cent had dental pathologies and a quarterhad lost more than four teeth. Cardiograms of 90
with the exception of coal mining, a major activity per cent of the group evidenced abnormalities.
only in Kazakhstan. Psychological disorders among adults are
NGOs and newspapers often accuse increasing by almost five per cent a year, and by
governments of approving mining and hydrocarbon almost seven per cent a year among children.
projects without legally appropriate environmental pOver hasneased eneioeecopi
impact statements or liability guarantees. In per cent of tenth grade boys have evidenced
response, states in the region rightly point out that serious morphological abnormalities in their
transnational corporations employ technology that sperm. Morbidity rates for malignant tumors are
is both more efficient and less polluting than its increasing by three per cent each year. Radiation
Soviet counterparts. Yet, as the scale of activity and heavy metal pollution have been documented
increases, and as emerging pipelines to Europe, lokth uanekocyteadfontat 16
China, Pakistan, and Iran increase the chances that.pe et evidneaortes.
accidents will occur near areas of denser humanma 
e
population or more environmental sensitivity, hydrocarbon development is emerging as a
potential source of massive transboundary and regional environmental damage.
For example, TengizChevroil allowed a sizable hydrocarbon spill in 1998 that worked its
way into the Caspian watershed leading to deaths of local wildlife (seals and waterfowl), and the
Kazakhstan government complains that Chevron consistently violates Kazakhstan maximum
allowable emissions of pollutants59 . Moreover, without adequate environmental impact
statements, it is hard to gauge the extent to which extractive enterprises are polluting the
environment in Central Asia with the kind of dangerousand persistent radioactive and
hydocabonbypodutshatgolmiingandhydocrong eaton prduc t is redwth
perisene o te  p lua s i e nvi nenthtxadinceds w h resl ofmin gsther
Thernisalsor cemialEfrtiizenplatnitth
58 r.Yui lesevic Rb haskAtbsa" cotatNw n. In (February 1994): 5-6. wr crie u
~ Bella Sewll, "Caspi ISeal9Tragey"eEcosraneewsi7e(July2000):y9-10
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I week after the accident57. The truck was owned by
Kyrgyzstan in 2000 were still advised against breast-feeding; very high levels of radionucleides
in human milk pose a potent health threat to children 0 . What is still more striking is that
information is still gradually emerging about the non-military uses of nuclear explosions during
the Soviet period to facilitate mining efforts in Central Asia; no fewer than thirty-two
underground explosions were conducted outside of military areas for scientific research and
industrial purposes 1.
Moreover, gold (and other metal) and hydrocarbon (but not coal) production in Central
Asia is almost entirely for export. The bulk of the region's several hundred billion barrel
reserves of oil and several hundred trillion cubic feet of gas reserves are destined for markets in
Asia and Europe. Most states in the region rely on coal, natural gas, and hydropower for their
domestic needs, although some are considering nuclear and oil for the future. They all also have
research programs on and limited use of solar, wind, and other alternative sources of power.
Needless to say, local funding and support for environmentally less damaging sources of energy
has dissipated or all but disappeared in the independence period.
Evaluating the Eras of Natural Capital in Central Asia
Painted in broad strokes, the history of natural capital in Central Asia is that natural capital was
steadily but modestly reduced in the centuries before Russian conquest, seriously compromised
during the Soviet-era, and further still degraded after independence.
Even though Central Asia was a center of technology, agriculture, education, culture, and
trade for millennia prior to the advent of the global sea trade, the environmental impacts of these
activities did not rise to the scale of those of modern industrial endeavors and may not have even
exceeded the carrying capacity of the region.
At worse, human activities compromised biodiversity and exacerbated desertification.
There is some evidence that human settlements may have been a factor in the extirpation
62
centuries ago of lion and other species2. Later, the Chingissid era saw the permanent demise of
what had been one of the world's most efficient irrigation systems in the Zeravshan Valley
QTZ/TM) 63, and it also saw a reduction in population. Expansion of the region's deserts
probably preceded and was exacerbated by these and later human agricultural and grazing
activities. Nevertheless, population in Central Asia did not expand during the pre-Russian era at
rates comparable to other parts of the world, and the delayed entry of the industrial revolution
into Central Asia meant that pollution of the region's natural capital flows occurred primarily
after the region lost its independence.
The pollution of the present is primarily linked to the past. Economic and industrial
development, measured traditionally, was the yardstick of Soviet progress. The natural world,
the environment, and quality of life concerns usually took back seats to objectives of factory
construction, resource extraction, and GNP expansion. Enforcement of environmental laws was
lax; and concern for the welfare of future generations was expressed through bequests of large
amounts of human and physical capital, rather than preservation of natural capital. As Central
Asia so recently gained independence from the USSR, most reasons for unsustainable
6Kyrgyz Press, "Na yuge Ferganskoi doliny ekologi obnaruzhili rtut' dazhe v grudnom moloke u zhenschin"
6Asian Development Bank, Central Asian Environments in Transition, p. 44.
6See Eric W. Sievers, "Beyond Ecocide: Cats and Ecology" Central Asia Monitor 5 (1997): 18-26.
63I Donald R. Hill, Islamic Science and Engineering (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), p.17 5 .
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development in the region are linked to the Soviet past. These include, inter alia, inefficient and
ineffective policies typical of world experience (among others, overuse of agricultural chemicals,
lack of catalytic converters for automobiles, and inappropriate storage procedures for mining
tailings). They also include elements inherent to the Soviet system (such as elevation of
development concerns, traditionally formulated, to the level of a state religion) and the scale of
the Soviet system (which emphasized giganticism).
In response to these environmental problems, Soviet culture and government remained
largely uninterested in imposing restraints on industry, or on preserving the viability of natural
resource flows and sinks. Rather, a culture of mitigation arose in which folk remedies like vodka
were believed to cleanse the body of any and all pollutants. This culture of mitigation fails to
capture the whole picture of Soviet society, however; the Ala-Tal farm in Kazakhstan was one of
several farms that turned to organic agriculture and aquaculture in the late Soviet period 6 4
Unfortunately, such examples are few and far between.
Once environmental problems became a serious public issue in the USSR, the region's
set of responses was typical and largely a failure. Namely, the Soviet Union embraced a variety
of command and control mechanisms, such as scrubbers in factories and cooling ponds to
prevent heat pollution, but the effectiveness and availability of such mitigation technologies was
questionable. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had fulfilled only two and one per cent, respectively,
of their mandates to implement such technology as of 198865. Beyond best available technology
approaches, the Soviet Union also made wide use of standards, like "maximum permissible
concentrations" for industrial effluents and discharges. Yet, legend in the region abounds of
nighttime violations, clandestine dumping, and other well-known practices in other parts of the
world through which dedicated polluters sidestep such regulations. The region also
experimented with quasi-market mechanisms to encourage environmental responsibility, but the
budgetary system of Soviet industry only with great difficulty accommodated such reforms, and
so these, too, produced few notable or durable successes.
These attempts encouraged moving the Soviet economy towards better environmental
management, but without major dislocations to the economy. A full assessment of the
performance of these efforts is precluded by the fact that the Soviet environmental gestalt
occurred later than in the West and lasted only a few years before the USSR crumbled. Hence,
Central Asia inherited a range of destructive (but economically vital) practices and policies from
the USSR, but only a protean set of responsive mechanisms to these destructive influences.
Upon dissolution of the USSR, Western environmental donors, especially American,
offered to share with Central Asia the experience of states that had, they said, solved
environmental problems. The explicit implication of early programs and exchanges was that the
West had achieved sustainable development, and that Central Asia would be allowed to copy this
Western model. One reason why this overstatement by Western donors found ready acceptance
in the region is because of the uniquely technophilic nature of Soviet society. Soviet ideology
predicted that there were, echoing similar American leanings, essentially no limits to the
capabilities of human societies ifscience and technology were allowed their full development.
Accordingly, by this logic, technological solutions to all problems both exist and are always the
best solutions. The dissolution of the USSR did not discredit this ideology, and since most
governments in the region are composed primarily of individuals trained in the technical
64 DJ Peterson, Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destrucfion (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993),
p. 109.65Iidp66
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sciences, the effects of this singular aspect of post-Soviet society frustrate transition to a more
sustainable future. Ideas such as appropriate technology or modest lifestyles are essentially
immiscible with this ideology, especially when the American lifestyle is the tangible dream that
has replaced Soviet ambitions.
Central Asia's factories and agricultural systems are based on technologies and
techniques that still rely on massive resource throughput, low efficiency, and high levels of
pollution. Because of the reduction of the private sphere under communism and the
technological giganticism of Soviet planning, Central Asia's development did not embrace small
and medium sized enterprises. Rather, it included several of the largest tractor factories,
smelting operations, mining facilities, and weapons facilities on the planet. When such
enterprises taxed the ability of local electricity grids, the Soviet response was not so much to
increase efficiency, but to increase capacity of the grids. The Soviet system prized output,
whereas efficiency had little practical relevance in a system in which valuations of inputs were
clouded by the lack of markets.
It is this lack of clear pricing and preference for immensity that explains the scale of
efforts in the region. These factors explain Soviet policies for pushing cotton production in
Central Asia through construction of the massively inefficient Kara-Kum Canal (TM), building a
torpedo plant in Kazakhstan's capital city, and expecting northern Kazakhstan's semi-deserts to
become a major source of wheat under Khruschev's Virgin Lands scheme.
As a result, Central Asian economies appear undiversified. Tajikistan's Tursunzade
aluminum factory consumes the bulk of all electricity used in the entire country. While such
enterprises are inefficient, they are also the foundations of their states' economies, which
explains why the transition to sustainable development in the region may be particularly difficult.
Thus, Central Asia's nonsustainable development rests on its Soviet past and
impoverished and economically inviable present. However, capturing the effects of Central
Asia's environmental degradation on other forms of capital is unusually difficult. The area is not
the subject of any large-scale environmental health studies, nor does it offer any reliable raw
economic data amenable to an economic analysis of the region's environmental problems and
their effect on GNP. Even if such data did exist, they would embrace only recent years, making
any conclusions suspect for lack of a meaningful time comparison. Global surveys, such as
WHO's The World Health Report 1999, provide unusually scant information about the Central
Asian states. Of necessity, then, my discussion is more impressionistic and less scientific than
one would like, although effects on the health, social stability, and wealth of the region's people
and institutions are almost certainly equivalently as severe as outlined here.
While life expectancy increased in Central Asia steadily this century, after 1990 it fell in
all states by several years, and unlike the sad picture of other Soviet republics like Russia, in
parts of Central Asia life expectancy has fallen for both men and women, not just for men.
However, the situation in Central Asia is not simply that the old are dying at a younger age,
infant and child mortality is also noticeably on the rise in the region 66. This mortality is partly
explained by increases in morbidity for a variety of diseases and conditions in Central Asia. In
the industrial cities of Eastern Kazakhstan, life expectancies are up to a decade shorter than in
the rest of Kazakhstan, and morbidity rates per 1000 actually exceed 1000. In the Aral Sea
region, nearly 99% of women are anemic, and several forms of cancer have become 25-200%
66 SeWorld Health Organization, The World Health Report 1999: Making a Difference (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 1999).
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more common over the last generation 67 . In fact, reports from newspapers in virtually every city
of the region and from virtually every epidemiologist in the region, as well as from a limited
number of development studies, assert across the board increases (sometimes doubling or
trebling) in morbidity rates. These rates are for respiratory ailments, cancers, and infectious
diseases that are widely suspected by the medical sciences to be linked in part to environmental
conditions68. Culling the outliers, more sensationalist accounts appearing in the years
immediately following the dissolution of the USSR reported that in areas of Central Asia
environmental conditions caused viral hepatitis rates to increase by 700 per cent, typhoid fever
by 3000 per cent, and stomach cancer by 1000 per cent 6.
While reliable statistical evidence is lacking, this increased morbidity is assumed to be
largely due to lack of access to potable water, worsening air quality in cities, various sources of
radiation, and the effects of land degradation. All of these sources of risk relate directly to
degradation of the natural resource flows and sinks in Central Asia. Recent World Bank funded
emergency food supply programs in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan explicitly state
that environmental factors in large part explain these states' inability to produce enough food for
their citizens.
In addition to refugees, possibly up to 100,000 from the Aral Sea region alone,
environmental degradation is also demanding changes in the lifestyles of the region's residents.
Fishermen can no longer fish for a living. Many children cannot swim in local ponds and lakes.
Turkmen traditions of taming cheetahs disappeared a generation ago when cheetah were
extirpated. Families across the region prefer to grow their own food so as to be guaranteed
produce free of pesticides and nitrates, or to be guaranteed food at all. These and other changes
in the social fabric and modes of life of the region's residents impose burdens on the population
that tax both family budgets and social cohesiveness. In other words, they inveigh perversely on
the region's stocks of physical, human, and organizational capital.
While a poor area, Central Asia has already substantially drawn down its reserve of natural
capital and ended the era when subsistence inputs, such as fresh water, could be secured in the
absence of state programs. Since all the states of the region already face chronic inability to
meet the spending needs of their social programs, environmentally exacerbated needs for food,
medical attention, and water help drive the governments of the region into deeper insolvency and
frustrate their efforts to structurally adjust their economies. In this context, added expenditures
for environmental protection face little chance of realization, which means that environmental
control devices for industry pioneered in the late Soviet era that are now wearing out or worn out
will not be replaced.
67TFood and Agriculture Organization, "Contaminated water devastates health across the Aral Sea region".
68 See, e.g., Ayse Kudat et al., Needs Assessment for the Proposed Uzbekistan Water SupplySanitation and Health
Project (Tashkent: World Bank, 1995).
69 See generally Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR (New York: Basic Books, 1992);
Manatsakanian, Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics; and Peterson, Troubled Lands: The Legacy
of Soviet Environmental Destruction.
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CHAPTER TWO
HUMAN CAPITAL: HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND SCIENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asia and Azerbaijan's 60 million population differs from previous post-colonial
populations, and it differs remarkably from other post-colonial Islamic populations. Whereas
other states have boasted highly educated elites at the moment of independence, Central Asia
differs in that such a large percentage of its population, and not just select elites, was
homogeneously educated, modem, and, integrated into the state. At the moment of
independence, Central Asia boasted per capita rates of university education on a par with the
West, comparable per capita numbers of scientists and engineers, and life expectancies nearing
developed country levels. However, the post-Soviet period has witnessed declines in most of the
region's human capital assets. The people of the region are substantially less healthy and less
educated than even a decade ago, and this lack of health and education will frustrate attainment
of sustainable development.
However, as with natural capital issues, the newly independent states frequently invoke
the USSR as a scapegoat for current declines, stating that they represent the continuing
consequences of bad Soviet practices. There is indeed an argument to be made for the delayed
consequences of environmental pollution created in the Soviet period, as well as for the legacy of
Soviet disregard for individual rights. Yet, while the assertion that Soviet inertia troubles the
region is valid, it fails to consider the positive aspects of Soviet inertia, particularly as regional
counterfactuals (i.e. Iran, Afghanistan, and China) highlight the comparative developmental
successes of Central Asia.
Moreover, frequent emphases of negative Soviet endowments alone mask the serious
contemporary shortcomings of the human capital policies of the newly independent states, such
as Kyrgyzstan's recent plans to reduce wheat production in order to make tobacco its primary
export1 . In scapegoating the USSR, critics imply that the region enjoyed something other than
dismal social indicators prior to the Soviet era. Yet, Central Asia was indeed an area of
particularly poor health and poor learning in the middle of the 19th century and at the beginning
of the 20th century.
The following sections disaggregate human capital into two broad categories: health and
education. Human capital in health refers to a variety of impacts on human capital that occur
through the medium of the physical body. In the roughest understanding, human capital in
health could refer to a population's enjoyment of enough health to engage in economically
productive undertakings as diverse as farming and computer programming. However, beyond
workplaces, human capital in health is also a significant proxy for quality of life and human
happiness2. Better daily diets, lower morbidity rates, and declining mortality rates, suggest
higher levels of human capital in health that are important both to economic productivity and to
quality of life.
Educational human capital refers, also roughly, to the ability of a population to
manipulate and manage its physical and social environments so as to achieve better economic
A. A Akev,"Juy 2, 197 epo totheSecurity Council of the Kyrgyz Republic" in K. J. Bokonbaev et al. eds.,
Ekolgiceskva zoasnst'Kyryzsana(Bishikek: Salam, 1998), p. 13.
2 Se, ~g, Mssio iviBaciPoplatonand Nutrition: An Essay on European Demographic History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
productivity and efficiency. As with human capital in health, beyond manipulation of the
environment, educational capital may also be a proxy for quality of life; if this was not true in a
more pastoral time, under current trends of globalization it is at least a more forceful argument.
Rates of educational attainment, infrastructure for the pursuit and implementation of science and
technology, newspaper readership, and migration rates are all fundamental indicators of levels of
and changes in levels of the educational human capital of a society.
Human Capital in Health
During the Soviet period life expectancies increased by several decades in each republic,
although data for accurate pre-revolutionary life expectancies is lacking3. For the USSR as a
whole, official sources claimed that the increase was from 32 years to 70 years by 19854.
By the late Soviet era, Central Asia enjoyed levels of health care and security from
disease at levels that placed the region only slightly behind Russia. Accordingly, the region
occupied a position intermediary between the West and the developing world and substantially
ahead of any of Central Asia's neighbors to the east or south. To quantify this position,
extrapolating from various UNDP Human Development Reports, the Central Asian republics
would have been ranked among the top 50 states in the world according to current WHO
criteria 5.
By 2000, the region had not merely slipped in the rankings; it plummeted, even
considering the sizable number of new developing world states that have appeared in recent
years. According to The World Health Report 2000, the average ranking in Central Asia put the
area towards the bottom of the world's states in 1997 (see Table 1), as a region closely equivalent
to Pakistan6. The situation has probably deteriorated further in the intervening three years. This
deterioration is best viewed through mortality and morbidity rates in the region.
Both morbidity and mortality rates relate dynamically to endowments of the two types of
capital whose decline has been charted so far, physical capital and natural capital. As they relate
to physical capital, elevated morbidity and mortality rates are results of poverty. Morbidity and
mortality rates rise because of insufficient or declining availability of adequate preventative and
curative medical care. This shortfall in availability can arise because of, inter alia, a result of
poor state infrastructure (hospitals/equipment), lack of private funds (for medicines or
hospitalization), lack of funds for adequate sanitation (a deficiency in organizational capital
resulting from a low stock of physical capital), and lack of qualified medical personnel
(educational human capital)7. Because medical budgets, municipal sanitation services, doctors'
salaries, and per capita incomes in Central Asia would all be higher now were it not for the
SSee, e.g., Yu. Zhukov ed., Narodnoejkhozyaistvo Kirgizskoi SSRvl1989godu (Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1991); I.
Gribnev, ed., Narodnoe khozyaistvojazhikcskoi SSR v 1987 odu (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1988); and Narodnoe
khozhyaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR 1987 (Tashkent: Fan, 1988).
Dmitri Chebotarev, "Problems of Gerontology and Health of the Population" in Sergei Burenkov ed., Medicine and
Health Care in the USSR (New York: Internationial Universities Press, 1985) p. 230.
Crteiadescribed at WHO, The Wrld Health Report 2000l: HealthS ystems, p. 144.
6For comparative tables showing the region's 1980-90 advances over Pakistan, see T. Koichuev et al. eds., Istoriya
Kyrgyzov i Kyrgvzstana, pp. 281-82.
7 The 30% of humanity that has access to no medical care is virtually all contained in the world's poorest states.
Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century, p. 434.
region's crash in stocks of physical capital, morbidity and mortality rates exemplify the impact of
physical capital on human capital.
Natural capital exhibits a similar relationship
to human capital in health, one partly glossed in the
previous chapter. As the integrity of natural
resource flows deteriorates (such as happens when a
river becomes polluted), absent some sort of
mitigation strategy (i.e. a municipal water treatment
facility), declining stocks of natural capital effect a
decline in stocks of human capital in health through
increases in incidences of such diseases as cancers.
In the developing world in general, 20% of all death
and disease arises from exposure to the risks created
by environmental degradation 0 . Accordingly, it is
of no small consequence for public health that by
1997 70% of Kyrgyzstan's pollution mitigation
technology was in disrepair
By the end of the Soviet era, life expectancies in Central Asia had risen, depending on the
republic, to between 65 and 70 years, comparing favorably with levels for developed states.
Since that time, life expectancies have been falling in every republic and morbidity rates have
been rising. While data from international agencies varies from year to year, the sources
presenting panel data document decreases in life expectancies from three to five years in the past
decade in all the Central Asian states except Uzbekistan".
Even though Uzbekistan has been generally more successful than its neighbors in
preventing post-Soviet human capital decline, by 1996 its adult morbidity rates had increased by
18% and its teen morbidity rates by 66%13. The previous chapter presented examples of the
kinds of increases in morbidity from non-infectious diseases that in part explain this increasing
mortality. In many cases it is nearly impossible to distinguish between the physical and natural
capital causes of declines in human health, such as, for example in cases where environmental
pollution weakens human immune systems leaving them vulnerable to infectious diseases. In
recent years, compromised human capital from disease has become a major explanation of the
persistent economic troubles of many developing countries. In particular, malaria and AIDS
have attracted academic and policy attention from World Bank and other major development
agencies 14 . Although neither of these diseases is currently prevalent in Central Asia, at least to
8 Derived from World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2000: Health Systems (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 2000), pp. 152-55.
9 80 per cent of diseases in the developing world are caused by contaminated water. Deborah Moore and Leonard
Sklar, "Reforming the World Bank's Lending for Water: The Process and Outcome of Developing a Water
Resources Management Policy" in Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The
World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 345.
1* The World Bank, Toward an Environment Strategy for the World Bank, p. 10.
" K. J. Bokonbaev, "July 29, 1997 Report to the Security Council of the Kyrgyz Republic" in Bokonbaev et al. eds.,
Ekologicheskaya bezopasnost' Kyrgyzstana, p. 23.
1 See WHO, World Health Report 1999, WHO, World Health Report 2000, and UNDP World Development
Indicators.
" UNDP, 1998 Human Development Report: Uzbekistan (Tashkent: JNDP, 1998), p. 17.
" See The World Bank, Sector Strategy: Health, Nutrition, & Population (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
1999).
an appreciable degree, the region's increases in morbidity rates for other infectious diseases, like
tuberculosis and hepatitis, stem not only from worsening sanitation, but also from such
compromised immunity.
Educational Human Capital: Basic Literacy
The Soviet Union demanded and mandated ambitious improvements in literacy and education in
every single part of its territory. With the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922, Soviet
human development policies gained momentum in Central Asia. At the core of the Soviet
development philosophy was the idea that social environments could trump factors such as race,
culture, and language in human communities. To a large degree, Soviet policymakers saw in
education the future transcendence (as opposed to the more dramatic interim control measures
for which the period is well known as one of terror) of divisive elements within Soviet society
such as nationality and class. More precisely, they planned this transcendence to unfold through
a combination of education and exposure to a common set of institutions and experiences.
Accordingly, the USSR attempted to level the playing field between its capital and its
more remote territories. While the Soviet Union had neither the capacity, and probably in many
ways lacked the will, to carry these policies to conclusion, the actual impacts of these policies
strongly shaped Central Asia. Within a few years, most school age children were literate.
Moreover, almost every child went through similar (despite linguistic differences) experiences
with extracurricular activities, Pioneer camps, consumer goods, and hundreds of other
institutional influences. All of these policies affected rural Russia in much the same way they
affected Central Asia, and thus it is the case that these policies were not merely an extension of
development opportunities to Central Asia, but the participation of Central Asia in the building
of Soviet society.
Two decades into the past century, a very small number of people in Central Asia were
literate; starting from a literacy rate of only around five per cent in 19171, Central Asia enjoyed
nearly universal literacy by the 1970s' 6. Most of those literate prior to 1917 were emivants
from Russia. For example, prior to 1917, only half a per cent of Kyrgyz were literate' . What
makes this accomplishment even more notable is that the sixty-year span within which this feat
was achieved did not see the USSR blessed with wealth or peace, or even a tradition of universal
education that could be extrapolated from Russia 8 . Nevertheless, Central Asia exited the Soviet
era with a primary education system in which over 90% of all teachers had university degrees.
This was, moreover, a system in which roughly 95% of teachers in math and science held
degrees in the discipline they taught (not rarely, in the case of female high school teachers,
Ph.D.s).
So important was the educational mission of the USSR that Soviet culture developed a
word for "the state campaign to eradicate illiteracy": Likbez. At exactly the same time that the
'2% in Uzbekistan in 1897 and 8% in Kazakhstan in 1917. A. V. Koltsov, Rol' Akademii nauk v organizatsii
regionalnykh nauchnykh tsentrov SSSR (Leningrad: Nauka, 1988), p. 12.
16 While rates by 1970 were nearly 100%, even by 1939 they were roughly 80%, some parts of the region surpassing
Belorussia's rates. Ibid, p. 49.
1Koichuev et al. eds., Istoriya Kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana, p. 302.
SWhile Russia was by all measures more advanced than Central Asia, at the time of the October Revolution, it had
a literacy rate of only 27%. Koltsov, Rol' Akademii nauk v organizatsii regionalnykh naucbnykh tsentrov SSSR
19 8 8 ,p. 12 .
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early Soviet police state was forcing citizens to alter behavior in ways that made it infamous, it
also forced children into schools, and forced them to stay there. This aspect of the history of the
application of state force in the USSR receives little scholarly attention; yet, in context, it was
ahead of its time. Major humanitarian donors (i.e. World Bank, UNDP, and UNICEF) now
argue that states should remove possibilities (in reality- freedoms) for even poor students to drop
out of schools and should keep all students in schools for a longer number of years19.
Since the 1980s, real per-capita spending on education has increased across the planet,
with the glaring exception of the transition states2 . Since the communist states had much higher
than average expenditures for education, through one lens their reductions are expected
regressions to the mean and do not risk the standings of these states as educationally superior to
developing states in Africa and Asia (see Table 2). However, through another lens, the poor
economic performance of these states may be directly connected with the forces that reduced
these states' emphases on development of human capital.
Current research suggests that literacy rates in the post-Soviet period are falling.
Kazakhstan's Geller Institute regularly issues warnings that the generations in Kazakhstan
currently coming up through the educational system may exhibit functional illiteracy at rates of
up to 40%. Even in the state with the best conditions for study, Uzbekistan, university
enrollment fell by 41% in the years after the disassembly of the USSR 1. At the other end of the
spectrum, Turkmenistan slashed opportunities for university education by roughly an order of
magnitude; it limited the number of first year university students to only 3340 in 200022
Educational Human Capital: Science and Technology
Until the conquests of Chinggis Khan in the early 13th century, Central Asians made substantial
contributions to mathematics, engineering, and the natural sciences. Indeed, one source claims
that more than half of all the scholars at the Baghdad Academy in the 9th and 10th centuries
were from Central Asia 2 3. A number of the works of Central Asian scientists were translated
into Latin and laid the foundation for later European advances. Examples of such scientists
include Ibn Sina (Avicenna) in the fields of medicine and physics in the 11th century, Abu Nasr
Muhammad al-Farabi in the field of chemistry (distillation) in the 10th century, and Muhammad
b. Musa al-Khuwarazmi in the field of mathematics (algebra and trigonometry) in the 9th
century.24 Similarly, Abu 'Abd Allah al-Khwarazmi wrote an important encyclopedia of the
sciences in the 11th century. Finally, al-Biruni (physics), often recognized as the greatest
Islamic scientist, was born 1000 years ago in what is now Uzbekistan.
19 See Enric Fernandez and Paulo Mauro, "The Role of Human Capital in Economic Growth: The Case of Spain"
International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/00/8 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000).
Their data includes panel education figures for many European countries. By their economic model and
mathematical formulas, Central Asia should have per capita GNPs of over $30,000.
20 Sanjeev Gupta et al., "Public Spending on Human Development" Finance &Development 35 (September 1998):
10.
2UN"DP, 1998.jj Hmn.Development Rprt: Uzbekistan, p. 15.
2"Idet priem dokumentov v vuzy strany," Neitralnyi Turkmenistan, Aug 2, 2000, p. 1.
2A. S. Sadykov et al. eds., Akademiya nauk Uzbekskoi S$R (Tashkent: Fan, 1983), p. 54.
See, generally, Hill, Islamic Science and Engineering. See also Ahmad Y. al-Hassan and Donald R. Hill, Islamic
Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Also see A. S. Sadykov et al. eds., Abu Ali ibn Sina i
estestvennye nauki (Tashkent: Fan, 1981) and Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Central Asia (Princeton: Markus
Wiener Publishers, 1996).
After the 13th century, the contributions of Central Asia to science begin to dissipate. By
the Russian conquest, Central Asia was one of the most technologically backward areas of the
Islamic world. While many educational institutions continued to thrive thanks to the Islamic
institution of waqf (charitable endowments)25 , state interest in the sciences or technology was
notably low, as evidenced by the accounts of a variety of local scholars educated abroad whose
plans for local technological enterprises were shunned by political leaders 26
However, the Soviet Union quickly established scientific committees in each republic.
These committees were followed by affiliate institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences and
the expansion of institutions of higher education. While scientific committees and affiliate
institutions employed Slavic and Jewish directors, the next step in the institutionalization of
science in a Soviet republic required a qualitatively different set of resources. The availability of
individuals of the eponymous nationality with substantial scientific credentials or achievements,
as well as the establishment of a mass of scientific institutions large enough to justify a separate
academy were clear requirements. These twin foundations of any nascent academy served the
purpose of establishing "adult" instead of "infant" or "young" peak scientific institutions"27.
It is in the dual nature of a national academy of sciences, that it was meant to be an
expression of both national and scientific development, that we begin to glimpse the ways in
which the discourse of science and the discourse of Soviet politics intersected in Central Asia. In
the Soviet political ideology, scientific and technological development equated to national
strength and progress. Accordingly, scientists were often, especially in the early years of the
USSR, elevated to far more visible and influential levels in the USSR than were their peers in
other countries. The Central Asian republics subscribed fully to this Soviet adoration of science,
and Kazakhstan's most enduring political leader, geologist Dinmuhammed Kunaev, was
President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences before serving thirty years as leader of the Kazakh
SSR and member of the USSR Politburo.
Consequently, scientists assumed primary responsibility for engineering and fostering the
scientific development of the Soviet Union. One explicit goal of Soviet politics was to erase the
gulf that existed economically, socially, and culturally between rural and urban areas of the
country. Accordingly, scientists were asked to develop science not along the centralized
pathways seen in the rest of world, but so as to create a scientific infrastructure with centers of
research and education in every part of the country.
However, the logic of the Academy of Sciences plans for scientific development, a logic
that placed primary emphasis on natural resources and population centers, was in the end
mediated by another current of Soviet development policies, the "nationality" factor. Indeed, the
original plans for the scientific development of the country largely ignored the division of the
USSR into national republics. Accordingly, the two foci for development were imagined as
Siberia and Central Asia, with Siberia as clearly the more important area.
In 1931, the Academy endorsed plans to create Academy affiliates throughout the USSR,
with emphases on "those districts, where in compliance with a unified plan, particularly intensive
construction is being implemented 28." To coordinate these efforts, the Academy created a
25 See, generally, Robert D. McChesney, Wagf in Central Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).26 See, generally, Edward Allworth, The Uzbeks (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 19)and Edward Allworth,
ed., Central Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).
K. Karaveev, Akademiya nauk Kirgizskoi SSR (Frunze: Ilim, 1974), pp. 24-25.
SE. A. Belyaev and N. S. Pyshkova, Forioai avtest nuhyhubehei SR(Moscow: Nauka,
1979), p. 174.
Commission on Bases29. The ten priority
areas for development in the 1931 plan
included five Siberian cities, four Central
Asian capitals, and Tiflis30 . The nationality
factor helped republican capitals, especially
in Central Asia, gain precedence over other
city candidates for development, most
notably over several large cities in Russia.
At this time, when scientists discussed
the creation of affiliate institutions, the
language they employed treated "base,"
"department (filial)," "station," "department
(otdelenie)," and "institution" as largely
interchangeable terms. However, as with
other aspects of Soviet development, legal
organizational terms soon cemented these
discussions in the specific (see Figure 1).
"Base" and "Department (Filial)" became the
two official types of proto-academy
structures. Both structures were governed by
presidia, the nomenklatura bodies that
replaced democratic decision making in the
Academy. These presidia were directly accountable not to republican bodies, but to the
Academy and its Commission on Bases, which in 1935 was renamed the Base and Department
Management Committee . When, in 1942, this body was again renamed to the Council of
Departments and Bases, its only non-academician members were from Central Asia: the Kazakh
geologist Satpaev and the Uzbek mathematician Kary-Niyazov3 2 .
Bases, the less developed form, envisioned the establishment of institutions working on a
set of integrated research issues related primarily to local natural resources, economics, and
culture. Departments were assumed to pursue a more cosmopolitan and substantial research
agenda (often as active partners of central Academy institutions), and, in addition to publishing,
assumed the right to open graduate programs. The Academy was divided into both thematic
departments (otdeleniya) and geographic departments (filialy). By 1940, 38% of Academy
institutions were located in and 20% of Academy staff were employed in local bases and
33departments, and more than half the departments were in Central Asia
For its part, the Academy took these bases and departments seriously, and it sent many of
those who just completed one of its graduate programs to become permanent staff in these
emergent institutions. These personnel transfers were extremely important since department
graduate programs were institutionally weak. The department graduate programs were,
effectively, all in technical and scientific disciplines. The first Uzbek Department programs
34were in math, chemistry, geology, botany, soil sciences, and zoology
29 KoltSov, Rol' Akademii nauk v organizatsii regionalnykh nauchnykh tsentrov SSSR, p. 83.
0 Ibid, p. 84.
3 Ibid, p. 88.
1 Ibid, p. 185.
3 Ibid, pp. 92-93.
1 Ibid, p. 138.
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Of over a dozen generic major fields used by Soviet statisticians to group undergraduates
and researchers, roughly half belonfed to the sciences. Always, four to six of the most populous
categories belonged to the sciences . Similarly, the most populous graduate programs were
almost all in the sciences 36, this even considering that the best physics students, for example,
traveled to study in Moscow and Leningrad, while the best Uzbek literature students probably
stayed home. Accordingly, while Figure 2 shows aggregate numbers of Ph.D.s (equivalents) in
Central Asia, the majority were awarded in the natural and technical sciences.
A full assessment of the quality of Soviet science in Central Asia exceeds the scope of
this dissertation. However, its quality was, ignoring issues of access to funding and equipment,
remarkably close to European and American levels. By this I mean that the education of
students and the general quality of their later research programs and methods (in terms of human
capital, not funding or equipment) was closer to the level of Russia, Japan, and the United
States3 7 than to the norm in the developing world. From a global perspective, there exists a
3s For example, in Tajikistan in the 1980s, physics/math and engineering were always in the top three places among
all scientists, while physics/math, biology, engineering, and medicine were the four most populous graduate
programs in 1987. Gribnev ed., Narodnoe khozyaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR v 1987 godu. This trend dates back to the
earliest days; in statistics for 1950, well over half of all students at Tajikistan State University were in just two
science departments. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR 1968 (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1969).
36 For example, even though numbers slightly declined from 1980-89, three of the four most populous graduate
subjects in Kyrgyzstan (often three of the three most populous) were always engineering, physics/math, and
medicine. Biology and chemistry were not far behind. Zhukov ed., Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kirgizskoi SSR v 1989
godu.
7 Indeed, Japanese scientists in general recognize that Soviet scientific education provided more theory than in
Japan and a much greater concentration on the natural sciences. Similarly, students from Central Asia comment
frequently that, especially in math and physics, American undergraduate and graduate students are inferior on
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tremendous gap between the West and the Third World in science. While Central Asia certainly
fit somewhere in this gap, the simple fact of the dearth of scientists and scientific infrastructure
in most states of the world is what allows Central Asia to boast "Western" levels of scientific
development. Evidence of the scale and intensity of the scientific enterprise in Central Asia can
be seen in the large numbers of scientific workers (the majority of them holding undergraduate
science degrees) employed in research institutions (see Figure 3).
What does science mean for Central Asia? Recent efforts to ask the analogous question
of the USSR in general led one group of scholars to conclude that "Western analysts of the
Soviet Union have usually ignored or underestimated science and technology in their efforts to
understand the evolution of Soviet society.38" Indeed, a review of the evolution of scientific
infrastructures in Central Asia reveals much about its Soviet era changes.
Within Central Asia, every republic experienced a singular but impressive growth of its
scientific infrastructure. The Kazakh Academy opened in June 1946. Over 300 academicians
were elected to the academy during its first 45 years, and 354 by the date of its 50th
anniversary3 9. When the Kazakhstan Base of the USSR Academy of Sciences was established
average to their Central Asian colleagues (of the pre-independence period). The later lack of access to funding,
international contacts (i.e. the globally dominant English language scientific community, which remained ignorant
of many advances in the Russian-speaking world), and equipment of course limited the abilities of the research
efforts of Central Asian scientists. Yet, since this paper's topic concerns potential, these latter factors are not
relevant.
38 Loren R. Graham, "Preface" in Loren R. Graham, ed., Science and the Soviet Social Order (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990), p. xii.
39 See Vestnik Akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstana 5 (1996). Issue dedicated to history of the academy.
on 8 March 1932, it consisted of only two sections: zoology and botany40 . A. D. Arkhangelsky,
a hydrocarbon geologist, directed the department, and his legacy is detectable in the prominence
of geologists in the Kazakhstan Academy in later years. I. M. Gubkin (another hydrocarbon
geologist) was also on the governing board, and he went on to be a founder of the oil industry in
Azerbaijan41. When the Kazakhstan Academy was founded, it consisted of four departments,
one of which was for the humanities and social sciences. The other three were for
physics/mathematics, geological sciences, and life sciences. By 1978, only one more department
had been added, chemical/technical sciences 42, partly in recognition of Kazakhstan's
development of a particularly notable school in chemistry led by Yesen Bekturov. By the 1980s,
Kazakhstan's science and technology community boasted a cyclotron and a nuclear reactor
devoted to desalinization on the shores of the Caspian Sea43 Kazakhstan also boasted
experimental reactors, the largest per capita concentration in the USSR of chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons facilities, and the immense Bukhtarma Hydroelectric Station.
The Kyrgyz Academy was established on 20 December 1954. The Kyrgyz Department
of the USSR Academy was founded on 13 August 1943; and the Kyrgyz State University opened
in 1951. The Kyrgyz Department chair was Konstantin Ivanovich Skryabin44 , a biologist and
leading scholar of helminths. However, when Skryabin stepped down two years before the
establishment of the Kyrgyz Academy, instead of a member of the Soviet Academy, Isa
Akhunbaev, a heart surgeon, ascended to this top post 45. The fivefold mission of the Kyrgyz
Academy was to investigate the biological and geological resources of the region, build local
capacity, exploit "productive forces," conduct fundamental research, and facilitate nation and
union building.
Tajikistan (which gained Soviet republic status only in 1929) established an Academic
Council within its Central Executive Committee in 1930, and in the same year the Academy
formed a Tajik Scientific Commission46. Tajikistan boasted 13 research institutions by 1932,
including an observatory established in that year. The 1930s also saw the opening of
pedagogical and medical institutes in Dushanbe and Khojand. In 1932, the Tajikistan Base of
the USSR Academy of Sciences was founded and was comprised of three sectors:
geology/chemistry, biological sciences, and the arts 47 . In 1940, the USSR Academy finally
established a Tajik Department, headed by Ye. N. Pavlovsky, a pioneer in parasitology and one
of the first leading Russian scientists to join the Communist Party4 8. By 1950, the Tajik
Department boasted 150 scientists, including 11 doctors and 71 candidates of science 49. Finally,
on 14 April 1951, the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences opened.
The institutional history of the Turkmen Academy began in 1925 with the formation of
the State Academic Council of the People's Enlightenment Commissariat50 . In 1929, the
40 A. M. Kunaev, Akademiya nauk Kazakhskoi SSR (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1978).
4' Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 232.
42 See Kunaev, Akademiya nauk Kazakhskoi SSR.
43 Kunaev, Akdmy akKaahkiSR pp. 81-82.
44S. T. Tabyshaliev et al. eds., 25 let Akademii nauk Kirgizskoi SSR (Frunze: Ilim, 1980).
45 N. I. Akhunbaeva et at. Khirurg Akhunbaev (Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1983), pp. 40-4 1.
46KoltSOv, Rot' Akademii nauk v organizatsii regionalnykh nauchnykh tsentrov SSSR, p. 140.
4 7 Kh. M. Saidmuradov et at. eds., Akademiva nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR (Dushanbe: Donish, 1979).
48 Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-70) (ekly
University of California Press, 1984), p. 183.
49 Saidmuradov et at. Akaderniya nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR.
54 Sources disagree on the year of formation. Some claim 1924 as the year of formation. See Kottsov, Rotl'
Akademii nauk v organizatsii regionalnykh nauchnykh tsentrov SSSR, p. 34.
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Academy created a Turkmen SSR Research Commission". During the 1930s, pedagogical,
medical, and agriculture institutes were the first higher education institutions to appear in
Turkmenistan. In 1937, a Scientific Affairs Committee, charged with coordinating all scientific
issues in Turkmenistan, was formed under the Council of People's Commissariats of the
Turkmen SSRs2 . On 29 June 1951, the Turkmenistan Academy formally opened.
Finally, in 1932, the Uzbek SSR government formed the Committee to Manage Scientific
Research Institutions, which later became the Science Committee. In 1940, the USSR Academy
of Sciences created an Uzbek Department, and on 4 November 1943 (ahead of Kazakhstan), the
Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences emerged. By 1983, the Uzbek Academy claimed 34 research
institutes (including one the largest cybernetics institutions in the USSR; Kibernetika employed
16,000 people), 41 academicians, and 57 corresponding memberss3
While the tenths of a percent of each state's population engaged in the sciences (see
Figure 4) may seem too small a figure to merit attention, it should be kept in mind that this figure
does not include several things. It does not include several other institutional settings for
scientific research, does not include many engineers (of whom the USSR had the highest per
capita level in the world), and excludes both future and retired scientists. The scope of these
omissions can begin to be understood if one considers that the number of undergraduates in
Tajikistan in 1985 receiving engineering degrees was 1322. While this class was not aberrantly
large, the total number of engineers contained in the "scientific employees" category for that year
51 Ibid, p. 148.
5 Ibid, p. 150.
53 Sadykov et al. eds., Akademiya nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, p. 8.
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in Tajikistan was 1197 (and in the next year it only rose to 1237)54. Accordingly, the actual
figure could be two or three (or more) times as high, something that only further research could
elucidate. However, for comparison, the most developed states do not boast levels of scientists
much higher than those cited above for Central Asia.
Indeed, while Central Asia boasted a Ph.D. level of between .015 and .05% of the
population, the comparable figure for the United States is only .021% according to a 1995
National Science Foundation study 55. Of course, large number of these U.S. Ph.D.s are
immigrants to the United States, a benefit that Central Asia does not enjoy.
Moreover, investigating these same communities from a critical sociological perspective
also yields surprisingly favorable interpretations of Central Asian science. Whereas scientific
communities in the United States are seemingly constantly embattled over their inabilities to
attract or include representative numbers of women and minorities in their ranks, Central Asia
largely overcame this problem in the Soviet era. One recent National Research Council report
states that women comprised only 16% of the scientific labor force in the United States in 1988,
and only 30% of those receiving advanced degrees in the sciences were women 6.
By contrast, while women have historically not commonly held second-tier leadership
positions (i.e. institute directors) and have never held an academy presidency in Central Asia,
their representative levels of employment and educational attainment exceed those of their peers
in the United States. In Kazakhstan, in 1960, women already made up 36% of the scientific
labor force, and by 1970, they had increased their level of participation to 40%57. While figures
are not available for how many women received advanced degrees in Central Asia, the number
of women in the group of people holding advanced degrees is available. In Kazakhstan, this
figure grew from 24% in 1960 to 27% in 197058. In Kyrgyzstan, where statistics are available
over a more comparable period, the picture is even more impressive. From 1960 to 1986, the
employment of women increased steadily, from 38% in 1960 to 44% in 1986, and in terms of
holders of advanced degrees from 25% to 32%.
In the more "conservative" and "Islamic" republics of the south, even better records are
available, and the results they yield illustrate a Soviet society, at least in the sciences, quite
different from what most scholars would expect and much more professionally egalitarian than
its Western counterparts of the same period. In Tajikistan, while in 1939 42% of the scientific
labor force was composed of women, by 1970 this figure fell to 36%. However, from 1970 to
1985, this figure again rose steadily, finally reaching 40%60. Also, its contingent of women
among those holding advanced degrees increased from 23% to 26% between 1970 and 198061.
Even the worst results from Central Asia are impressive; from 1970 to 1988, the percentage of
See Gribnev ed., Narodnoe khozyaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR v 1987 godu.
ss See http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/databrf/tb297305.gif.
56 National Research Council, "Women Scientists and Engineers Employed in Industry: Why So Few?" Available at:
http://www.cwru.edu/affil/wwwethics/ecsel/abstracts/women-indust.html.
57 See Narodnoe khozhyaistvo Kazakhstana za 60 let.
ss Ibid.
59Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kirgizskoi SSR v 1978 godu; Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kirgizskoi SSR v 1982 godu, and
Narodnoe khozyaistvo v IKirgizskoi SSR za gody Sovetskoi viasti (Frunze: yrgyzstan, 1987).
60Nrdo hzasv aziso S 98gd (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1969); Narodnoe khozyaistvo
Tadzhikskoi SSR v 1980 godu (Dushanbe:ifon, 1982); and Gribnev ed., Nodnoe khozaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR v
1987 gody.
6Narodnoe khozyaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR v 1980 godu and Gribnev ed., Narodnoe khozyaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR v
1987 gody.
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women scientists in Turkmenistan grew from 37% to 40% before falling again to 39%62.
Similarly, Uzbekistan's figures remain between 36%-37% for the entire period between 1970 and
198763. In both of these latter republics, the percentage of women among advanced degreeholders held steady after 1970 at roughly 24%64.
Moreover, in advancing women in the sciences, the Soviet system drew explicit attention
to the issue. For example, in addition to fostering the development of the republican academies
of science in Central Asia, Academician Nalivkin was also the author of a 1979 monograph Our
First Women Geologists65. Thus, without making any claims about the actual level of Central
Asian science, the gains made by Central Asia in a half century remain astounding.
Notably, the penultimate president of the Kyrgyz SSR Academy, Askar Akaev, become
the first President of the Kyrgyz Republic. Four of the five Central Asian presidents hold Ph.D.
level graduate degrees, primarily from Russian educational institutions, and all are multilingual.
Yet, instead of affirming the importance of science in Central Asia, these leaders allowed
independence to mark the beginning of a remarkable dismantling of scientific potential. Akaev
was quick to marginalize the importance of the Kyrgyz Academy. On 2 March 1994, President
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan conducted the largest purge in the history of the Kazakhstan Academy,
replacing its entire leadership. Two years later, he ended the academy's history as a semi-self-
regulating and autonomous institution by folding the academy into the Ministry of Science and
adding the academy presidency to the ministerial portfolio.
That same year, the UNDP Human Development Report for Kazakhstan, in its small
section on science, estimated that levels of research and science in Kazakhstan would probably
level off at 20% of their Soviet level, with fundamental research at less than 7% of its former
scale 66 . The Kazakhstan government itself provides figures suggesting that it awarded funds for
basic research in the sciences in 1997 that totaled far less than $1 million67.
In its 1997 report before the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development,
Uzbekistan frankly documented the effect of the transition period on human capital within its
borders; it admitted to losing 10% of its research and development scientific population every
year for the first four years of independence68.
Perhaps most distressing, in December 1997, President Niyazov of Turkmenistan began
an eight-month siege on the Turkmen Academy with massive reductions of technical staff and a
new building for an Institute of Religion. Both Nesil (Turkmen language) and Turkmenskaya
iskra (Russian language) state newspapers carried a very large article on 26 June 1998 by A.
Poladov, editor of Nesil. In "Who Ruled the Soviet System?" Poladov attacks the
"pseudohypothesis" that humans arose from apes and links communism and evolution together
62 Turkmenistan za 50 let; Turkmenistan v tsifrakh 1986; and Narodnoe khozyaistvo Turkmenskoi SSR v 1988
(Ashgabad: Turkmenistan, 1989).
63 Narodnoe khozhyaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR 1987.
"Turkmenistan za 50 let; Turkmenistan v tsifrakh 1986; Narodnoe khozyaistvo Turkmenskoi SSR v 1988 and
Narodnoe khozhyaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR 1987.
65 D. V. Naivkin. Nashi pervye zhenschiny-geologi (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979).
66 JUNDP, 1996 Kazakstan UNDP Human Development Report, (New York: UNDP, 1997).
67 Reulcof Kazakhstan, "Ob osnovnykh itogakh fundamentalnykh i prikladnykh issledovanii v Respublike
Kazakhstan v 1996-1997 gg." Available at: http://wvww.president.kz/Science.
68 Uzbekistan, in accord with the growth rates of Figure 3 of this Chapter claimed forty-six thousand research
scientists in 1992, but only twenty-seven thousand in 1995. Republic of Uzbekistan, "Country Profile:
Implementation of Agenda 21: Review of Progress Made since the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 1992" (1997), http://www.un.org/esa/earthsumnmit/uzbek-cp.htm. Likewise, it admitted to budget cuts
of 70% for research over the same period. Ibid.
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as foundations of the Soviet ideological brainwashing of the Turkmen people . Later that day
Niyazov ended his siege on the Turkmen Academy by issuing a terse resolution, with the effect
of a coup de grace, to "abolish the central apparatus of the Academy of Sciences of
Turkmenistan70t
While hopeful signs do spring up, like the 1997 award of the UNESCO Niels Bohr medal
for fundamental research to Kazakhstan's outstanding physical chemist Yesen Abikenovich
Bekturov, such incidents are on closer inspection no more than recognition of accomplishments
that belong to the Soviet past.
However, in response to calls from the scientific community, long-range plans for
recovery of the sciences are regularly proposed and adopted. For example, Kazakhstan's
"Strategic Goals and Priorities for the Development of the Sciences until 2030" calls for four
stages. Under this plan, adopted in 1998, Kazakhstan will come out of crisis by 2000, attain
sustainable development by 2010, claim sustainable economic growth by 2020, and during the
next decade will become "competitive7 1 ", but that merely means that only then does the
government envision increased funding for the sciences. Needless to say, such a long-term plan
is a political way of abandoning the sciences.
Scientific communities in Central Asia did not universally equate the attainment of
republic sovereignty with the decline of science. Yet, large numbers of them recognized that
separation from Russia would mean a dramatic cut in funding, and many feared that brewing
nationalist ambitions would result in a loss of interest in fundamental research (and a renaissance
in revisionist history and linguistics). However, many of them also thought that joint research
projects with the West, better access to scientific peers in other states, and Western support
would actually improve conditions for science. A considerable number believed independence
would facilitate local projects in hydrocarbon development, environmentally safer technology,
and even the diversion of Siberian rivers to the Aral Sea. Finally, appreciable numbers of
scientists could simply not imagine that any modem government would not support its scientists.
Accordingly, independence saw not only major declines in the scientific infrastructure. It
also witnessed attempts to continue regional progress along the Soviet continuum of scientific
development. For example, in 1992, the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences founded a Western
Kazakhstan Department (since closed), and in 1993 an Eastern Department to complement its
Soviet-era Southern and Central departments. The Western Department was created in
recognition of the support needed by the hydrocarbon industry of this sparsely populated region's
two academicians, 38 doctors, and 200 candidates, as well as its six institutions of higher
education and 47 research facilities 72.
While the actions of local scientists may not have been enough to stem the decline of
science, the influence of foreign donors and governments may have facilitated the political
marginalization of science. Every large73 state donor and foundation that provided funds or
experts to Central Asia in this decade, with the exception of the Soros Foundation, did so within
69 A. Poladov. "Kto pravil sovetskoi sistemoi" Turkrnenskava iskra (June 26, 1998), p. 2.
70 "Postanovleniye Prezidenta Turkmenistana o deyatelnosti Akademii nauk Turkmenistana'' Turkmenskaya iskra
(June 27, 1998), p. 1.
71 Republic of Kazakhstan, "Strategicheskie tseli i prioritety razvytiya nauki do 2030 g." Available at
http://www.president.kz/Science.
7"Ob organizatsii Zapadno-Kazakhstanskogo otdeleniya Akaademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstana" Vestnik
Akaademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstana 7 (1992): 3-5.
73 Meaning wit an office in and annual expenditures of over five million dollars. Smaller (often private)
foundations and donors
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the framework of or building on the experience of existing programs for post-colonial
developing states. Such programs arrived in Central Asia eager to conduct literacy programs,
initiate municipal sewage works, and bring civilization to Central Asia. Despite initial
reinforcement, in the form of a lack of English speakers who act as an easy barometer of
development in other places, of the presupposition that Central Asia was essentially the same as
other postcolonial areas, the singularities of Central Asia reduced the relevance of many
development programs.
Although "capacity-building 4 " is a cornerstone of development programs, in Central
Asia virtually no funds went to support the maintenance of scientific capacity. Support of the
impressive educational and research structure in Central Asia failed to materialize, because of
donor discomfort in acknowledging the successes of the USSR and because such a developed
system was beyond the pale of development agency paradigms. In either case, prejudices against
a USSR that no longer existed or an Asian Muslim area beyond the experience of the developers
left the development (or even simple maintenance) of science in the lurch in Central Asia. In
turbulent fields such as genetics, ignoring the scientific infrastructure for even two years had the
effect of making that part of the scientific community virtually obsolescent from a global
perspective. In less turbulent fields, a decade of disrepair has effected a similar outcome.
In the many consultations representatives of foundation and state donors organized with
Central Asian governments, the focus of "development" was squarely on democratization and
market reforms. The message of these Westerners (and, to a lesser extent, Japanese) was that
political and economic reform would create wealth and stability in Central Asia. The
concentration of virtually all attention (both verbal and monetary) on these two aspects of society
(law and economics) implicitly led to the devaluation of (he productive and knowledge sectors of
society. Non-economics education and science/technology became tertiary concerns of both the
state and of large and influential parts of society.
This sea change in attitude overhauled the educational landscape. In qualitative terms, it
meant that international relations, law, and various manifestations of business administration
(economics, marketing, and management) began to attract the most talented youth, thereby
replacing math, physics, and other sciences as the prestige disciplines. Quantitatively, it meant a
sharp decline in numbers of students in the sciences and scientists overall. During the Soviet era
(and the late Russian Empire as well) politicization of the social sciences consistently drove
talented students with primary interests in the humanities into the relative academic freedom of
75the natural sciences
Numbers of practicing physicists, mathematicians, biologists, chemists, engineers, and
agricultural scientists all declined by roughly 50% between 1990 and 1996 in Kazakhstan, that
on the heels of less dramatic declines from 1985-1990. Better off sciences, such as geology and
medicine, saw declines of only 40% during the same period, while numbers of literature scholars
increased by 7%, veterinarians by 14% and lawyers by 50% over the same period76
74 While this term is used in a variety of contexts, only the general context of development as practiced by the
development community is here implied.
SSee Kendall E. Bailes, Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1990), for the story of why V. I. Vernadsky chose not to enroll in a university humanities program in the
Tsarist era. This trend held true not only for many scientists, but also for others who eventually returned to the arts.
For example, Yevgeny Zamyatin's consistent literary interests and later literary career; Zamyatin was trained as an
engineer and designed the Soviet Union's first icebreaker.
76 Statisticheskii yezhegodnik Kazakhstana 1994 (Almnaty: Goskomstat 1995) and Statisticheskii yezhegodnik
Kazakhstana 1996 (Almaty: Almatstatagenstvo, 1997).
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The Brain Drain
The Turkmenistan government shut down Ariana, that state's largest Internet service provider in
summer 2000, in order to lessen competition for the state-run Turkmentelecom. As a result,
Ariana's managers, who were simultaneously the holders of multiple technical graduate degrees
and leaders in Turkmenistan's most well-known environmental NGO (Catena), initiated plans to
emigrate to Canada 7.
While it is well accepted that capital flight is a major reason for the crippling effects of
transition in the former Soviet Union, largely ignored is the fact that this capital flight is not
restricted to physical capital. Human capital flight may be of greater import for the future of the
region than flights of dollars. In general, flows of capital are always accompanied by flows of
people, flows of human capital78. This has certainly been the case, the extreme case, with the
former Soviet Union, whose two largest republics (Russia and Kazakhstan) are depopulating due
to emigration. Post-Soviet emigrants generally represent the more highly educated sectors of the
former USSR, a trend that only adheres to, and probably exceeds, the global norm7 9 . Despite
devalorization of immigrants in the popular mind as disadvantaged and disempowered,
naturalized U.S. citizens earn 40% more than native-born Americans80. However, not only
financial opportunities coax former Soviets to emigrate. One important reason for emigration is
also schooling, a reaction against the decline in the quality of local schools.
Trends such as high birth rates and high suicide rates, the latter especially applicable to
Kazakhstan81, can exacerbate the effects of brain drain. Except in Kazakhstan, which lost 10 per
cent of its population, the region shows distressingly high birth rates8 2 and increasing death rates.
Accordingly, in this decade the demographic structure of the Central Asian states has skewed
remarkably in the direction of having a majority of the population under 18 years old. However,
while the birth rates throughout Central Asia are high, they are declining. Taking the five
country region as a whole, the weighted average fertility rate has dropped from 3.8 in 1990 to 3.1
in 199983, which, ignoring emigration, represents 39% of the birthrate reduction needed to
stabilize population in the region.
77 Author's personal correspondence with Ariana and Catena, June and July 2000.
78 See, generally, Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents.
79 William J. Carrington and Enrica Detragiache, "How Extensive is the Brain Drain?" Finance & Development 36
(June 1999): 46. "Immigration flows of individuals with no more than a primary education are quite small." Ibid.
The authors also suggest that numerous developing states lose upwards of 30% of their college educated population
to emigration to developed states.
80 A. Dianne Schmidley and Campbell Gibson, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 1997
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 6. 1 predict that the 2000 census will show unusual
success among the 400,000 recent emigrants from the former Soviet Union and that the 2010 census will reveal that
this group earns more than native-born Americans, a challenge to current conceptions about mediocre Soviet
educations and the strengths of the U.S. educational system.
* See UNDP, Human Development Report 2000, p. 252. Not only is Kazakhstan's suicide rate equivalent to
Russia's, but it is highest in the areas of the country that are most environmentally devastated. Asian Development
Bank, Central Asia Environments in Transition, p. 91.
82 See, e.g., United Nations Development Programme, Making Things Happen: Getting it Done (New York: UNDP
Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS, 1998).
83 Derived from WHO, The World Health Report 2000, pp. 158-62. Birthrates dropped from 18-21% in each
republic, a very uniform decrease.
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Through one lens, this reduction in birthrates is a hopeful sign for sustainability.
However, by definition, every child born in Central Asia is uneducated. Substantial resources
will need to be invested to build that child's human capital. In contrast, also virtually by
definition, every emigrant from Central Asia is well educated. On July 10, 2000, BBC analyst
Stephen Dalziel reported that the reason London's former Soviet population has skyrocketed is
because educated former Soviets have such an easy time finding high-paying jobs in the United
Kingdom84
Part of the region's experience with emigration and brain drain echoes what is now
expected of foreign aid programs85. By opening doors between societies, such programs now as
a rule provoke increased emigration from the developing state to the developed state. While
foreign aid was envisioned primarily as a means to build the capacities of the recipient states, it
has partially had the opposite effect. Foreign aid has also exacerbated emigration from Central
Asia in general, and to the United States in particular8 6. Accordingly, notwithstanding good
intentions, the effects of Western advice and aid in Central Asia have lowered the region's stock
of human capital.
Evaluating the Eras of Human Capital in Central Asia
"Today, Kazakhstan provides qualified scientific and technical assistance to peoples in countries
of Asia and Africa, Europe and Latin America. Every year the republic sends hundreds of
specialists to dozens of countries.8 7 "
These words, written almost twenty years ago by Kazakhstan's current president, when read in
the present encapsulate the fate of human capital in Central Asia. Ironically, when Western
donors claim development successes in the developing world, the kinds of accomplishments of
which they are especially proud are along the lines of those produced by the Soviet Union in
human capital.
Figures 5 illustrates the declines in human capital now underway as part of the transition
period. The sad reversal of human capital fortunes in Central Asia is exemplified in the fate of
the Declaration of Alma-Ata, one of the key, if not the key, documents in the modem global
movement for public health spearheaded by the World Health Organization. In 1978, the USSR
hosted an International Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma-Ata specifically because it
considered the Kazak SSR's capital to be a showcase of development triumph. Given the current
situation, it is sadly ironic to look back two decades, especially since the central achievement of
the Declaration of Alma-Ata is its aspiration for "the attainment by all peoples of the world by
the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically
8 Stephen Daiziel, "London's Russians" BBC World Service On Assignment (July 10, 2000).
8See, generally, S askia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents.
86 In this effect, Central Asia matches precedents from other areas, regardless of whether recipient states were
declining or growing. "The worldwide evidence shows rather clearly that there is considerable patterning in the
geography of migrations, and that the major receiving countries tend to get immigrants from their zones of
influence. This holds for countries as diverse as the United States, France, or Japan. Immigration is at least partly
an outcome of the actions of the governments and major private economic actors in receiving countries." Sassen,
Globalization and Its Discontents, p. 8.
87Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbaev, ''Respublika v bratskoi seine." Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhstana 2 (1982): 2.
Nazarbaev was then a republican party second tier leader speaking at an academy function.
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productive life88." Compared to Figure 5: Decline in Human Development Indicators in Three
1978, few places on earth have Central Asian States Since Independence: Rankings Out of 174
realized less progress towards the States
aspirations of the 1978
Declaration of Alma-Ata than
Almaty, Kazakhstan.
While poverty is not new 10
in Central Asia, Soviet poverty,
especially as experienced by
post-World War II generations,
possessed a character different 37
than post-Soviet poverty. Despite
its justifiably famous failings, the
Soviet state was proud, and with
remarkable consistency, it
mobilized resources to ensure
that its citizens did not die of
hunger and did enjoy a minimum 82
level of state services. In the 91
post-Soviet era, the fuindamental 10
character and mission of the state
109
changed. With abandonment of leTrmbe
the totalizing ideology of the18
USSR, the new states of the
region also accept the worst
human consequences of poverty
with greater complacency. This
withertr co mlacency.This Source: Author's Modeling of Data from UTNDP Human
poverty connects to non-Reports
sustainable development because ID
of the potent way in which it exacerbates other social and environmental problems. Poverty goes
far in explaining why endangered species are extirpated, why corruption is so difficult to
eradicate, and why regional competition for foreign investment may be leading to a "race to the
bottom" in environmental standards and corporate accountability.
Jeffrey Sachs recently lamented that a third of the world is disconnected from
technological innovation, and he explicitly includes Central Asia in that disadvantaged third of-
the world 89. He is probably correct. However, he is correct at least in substantial part because,
in 1991, development organizations, influenced in no small part by the efforts of Jeffrey Sachs
himself, decided to ignore the scientific potential of the former Soviet Union. Were Sachs to
have the opportunity now to retread the 1990s, he would, judging by his recent work, exclaim the
importance of two things at which he explicitly scoffed previously. These are the rule of law and
the wonderful opportunities that existed in 1991 when Central Asia was full of molecular
biologists, computer programmers, engineers, and physicists. At that time, the Soviet scientific
and technology establishment did essay to point these conditions out to their governments and
88 Gro Harlem Brundtland, "Message from the Director General" in The World Health Report 1999, p. viii.
89 Jeffrey Sachs, "A New Map of the World" The Economist (June 24, 2000).
donors. Led by confident Western advisors like Sachs, governments chastised them for not
understanding economics.
In 1991, the states of Central Asia may have been capable of making investments that
would have allowed them to create high-technology islands of expertise for their economy (the
kind that most economists now recognize as crucial in separating the developed and NIC
economies from the rest of the world). However, the success of any such investments would
have depended on applying the scientific and technology endowments of Central Asia to
economic applications in a way capable of overcoming the shortcomings of Soviet science.
These shortcomings included, among other things, a lack of incentives to develop a culture or
practice of innovation, a stark separation between research and teaching, and a stark separation
between fundamental science and technological applications.
While even the most successful transition of the science and technology sector from the
Soviet to a market economy would certainly have involved substantial dislocations, the best
mentors in this process would probably have been the Americans, the Europeans, and the
Japanese. Yet, outside of conversion of military installations and modest efforts to provide
research funding to scientists to prevent emigration to developing state weapons programs, little
effort was made by donors to effect such a transition, and certainly no effort even remotely the
scale of that targeting restructuring of the financial systems of the post-Soviet states. At decade's
end, with the loss of the best personnel, the loss of ten years, the loss of equipment (much sold
abroad on the gray market), and the decimation of educational pathways for young scholars,
these areas are no longer in the same position to secure economically significant places in global
science and technology markets 90.
90 Cf "Uzbekistan has everything to put into action: new innovative models of development founded on the
expanded and effective use of scientific and technical possibilities, wide implementationi of the achievements in
fundamental and applied sciences, scientifically capacious technologies, increase of the number of highly qualified
and gifted scientific experts. This serves as the main requisite and a reliable basis of the country's break through to
the rank of economically and industrially developed countries of the world." IslamiKarimov, U~zbekistan on the
Threshold of the Twenty-F'irst Century (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1997), p. 223. While Karimov insists that this
situation still holds, I argue that as a politician and head of state he feels it expedient to continue to say this although
it is no longer true.
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CHAPTER THREE
FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL: GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS
... it would be much wiser to manage the processes of liberalization and privatization at a pace
compatible with the speed of human capital development... We speak of building institutions, but
in reality, they must be learned.'.
As described by the Introduction, of the types of capital analyzed in this work, organizational
capital is the least appreciated and least recognized in scholarly circles. Yet, this lack of
scholarly deference is purely semantic; it does not mean that little is known about organizational
capital. Indeed, key catchwords of contemporary ideologies- capitalism, communism,
democracy, rule of law, subsidiarity- are, primarily, issues of organizational capital 2. That
scholars conflate these catchwords with stocks of other kinds of capital is largely a consequence
of two trends. First, non-economics scholarship rarely frames governments and markets as
systems in which decisionmaking is impacted by implicit pricing systems. Second, as is still true
of the bulk of English language work about the former Soviet world, ideological allegiances
inevitably produce distorted depictions of the complex relationships between stocks of capital.
Indeed, only as a second order question, and therefore by no means of necessity, does democracy
have much to do with human rights, communism much to do with environmental degradation, or
capitalism much to do with amassed wealth.
So, we require a clearer definition of organizational capital in order to tease apart its
assets and impacts from the normative aspirations (i.e., sustainability, human rights, and
eradication of poverty) of both scholars and policymakers. As the first step towards creating
such a definition, I omit democracy from this list of normative aspirations for the reason that
"democracy" is probably not a normative aspiration, despite its rhetorical deployment as such.
Democracy may be, empirically and theoretically, a very good way to achieve compliance with
human rights, but this situation is of itself not sufficient for deployment of democracy as a proxy
for human rights, for "black-boxing" the link between democracy and human rights3 . To wit,
democracy and communism are not only not the only possible types of government- they are
also not uniformly practiced4. Proponents of democracy, read closely, rarely argue for
democracy for democracy's sake but rather for democracy as a proxy for some other aspiration, a
confusion that rests at the core of a justification for a clearer recognition of the importance of
organizational capital. This confusion also explains why democracy advocates so readily
disregard democratic outcomes that they do not like (i.e., Hitler's 1933 election or the Soviet
Kolodko, "Ten Years of Postsocialist Transition: the Lessons for Policy Reforms," pp. 8, 16.
2 The previous Chapter's assertion that most wealth creation stems from human capital, not natural or physical
capital, assumed only three kinds of capital. Injecting a fourth kind of capital, organizational, reduces the absolute
contribution of human capital and explains how the former USSR can have exuberant human capital and yet be in
decline. Together, human and organizational capital constitute the source of the bulk of the world's wealth creation.
3 Black boxes represent, for cyberneticians, complex feedback relationships and networks. In the place of such
relationships or networks, engineers and scientists "draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but its
input and output." Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Societ
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 3. See also Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings,
Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), p. 57.
4Beyond ideological difference between proponents labeling themselves identically, this divergence is also due to
the fact that organizations need not be the products of intentional design, but may evolve.
electorate's 1991 vote to preserve the USSR 5 ) as somehow non-democratic. It also explains why
they consider it appropriate to nullify such decisions using un-democratic means as diverse -as
war, courts6, and embargoes.
Democracy, like all other expressions of organizational capital is a means of organization
alone; without belittling the importance of process, limits exist to efforts to imbue process with
either moral significance or infallibility. Accordingly, as a working definition, organizational
capital refers expressively to the governing rules and various organizations within a community
and refers functionally to the ways in which these rules and organizations shape incentives
related to actions intended to impact and shape the social and natural environment.
Instead of being a trivial or avocational aspect of humanity, because of the limitations
imposed by scarcity and the laws of thermodynamics, such actions (reflexive and unreflexive)
epitomize the material dimension of human existence. Thus, human lives proceed through a
succession of efforts to manipulate the natural environment, and human lives in communities
proceed through a succession of efforts to manipulate both natural and social environments. At
the risk of sounding tautological, it should be stressed that human survival (at the level of either
individuals or communities) largely depends upon the consequences of these efforts. Moving
from topography to action, we can define assets of organizational capital as the various
incentives at play on individuals to engage in or abstain from specific actions aimed at
manipulating the natural or social environment.
However, this definition is only half-complete without an appreciation of the interplay
between individual perceptions and organizational rules7 . While the general premises of a
rational approach to human behavior8 do not preclude nor are they disproved by the concept of
bounded rationality (arising from incomplete information) or alleged examples of irrational
behavior 9 , they have been more deeply challenged by the fact that rationality is linked to
5 In March 1991, a USSR-wide referendum was held on whether to keep the USSR intact. Over 3/4 of voters cast
their ballots in support of "preserving the union," and the author's firsthand experience in Kazakhstan and Russia
during the week of voting occurred confirms that on that day the mood of voters was indeed in favor of keeping the
union. Moreover, voters in Central Asia constituted the single most avowedly pro-union region. See Gleason, The
Central Asian States, pp. 74-75. Thus, not only was the demise of the USSR (as opposed to the mere secession of
some republics) a violation of national and international law, it was also a violation of democratic principles.
6 Not courts applying positive law (lex), but the turns toward natural law Qus) witnessed in post-Nazi Germany,
among other places. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 208.
7 In sociological terms, this definition would fall within behavioralist or utilitarian schools, both of which have been
largely invalidated through arguments similar to those voiced below.
8 This does not, of course, imply or assume that all human behavior is rational, nor does it need go as far as some
economic and anthropological analyses in the functionalist vein. While an analysis of the meaning of rationalism
for the social sciences is beyond the scope of this analysis, see generally Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes eds.,
Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982). Also significantly, my analysis ellides the epistemology
of incentives, a set of questions examined most prominently in contemporary scholarship by neo-finctionalist law
and economic scholars. See Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes and Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
9 Cf. Theory of action sociologists would argue that unreflexive responses invalidate the rational-actor model. See
Lynne G. Zucker, "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence" American Sociological Review 42: 726-
43 (1977). Yet, the law and economics (organization economics) response to such alleged irrationality would be
that it is often less costly, and so more efficient, to pursue habitual (unreflexive, black box) responses than to expend
the resources needed to make an intentional, rational decision. The unproved meta-assertion of law and economics
is that, if over a sufficient time period the losses incurred from such unreflexive activity outweigh the gains from
economizing on costs of decisionmaking, then the unreflexive response will break down and yield to either a new
unreflexive response or intentional decisionmaking. Similarly, "irrational" organizations, even those the product of
context'0 . Divergent contexts trace their roots to the divergent organizations and rules of
communities, and, hence, contextual rationality is a concept at the heart of an understanding of
organizational capital. Accordingly, the dynamic feedback between, on the one hand, actual and
perceived human options on courses of action and, on the other hand, the rules and organizations
of the social environment constitute the core assets of a stock of organizational capital'. This
feedback also helps explain both the limits to and foundation for social science approaches based
on assumptions of rationality12 . When it comes to human behavior, for the purposes of the social
sciences, all evaluations of rationality should ideally be weighed with all organizational capital
assets on the scale
Consequently, we should be able, theoretically, to evaluate a stock of organizational
capital as the aggregate of these assets/incentives, keeping in mind the Introduction's admonition
to define asset in an agnostic manner. As the "active" or "acquired" constituents of capital,
assets may readily be liabilities or, phrased colloquially, bad incentives. In this conception, a
degraded stock of organizational capital need not necessarily be one in which the variety of
incentives and options at play are fewer, only one in which "bad" incentives assume precedence.
Yet, in a modem society, the converse is not necessarily true. Merely "good" incentives
are probably insufficient to meet the organizational demands of complex modem societies; a
certain amount of complexity and diversity of incentives is a requirement for the demands of
such a society. At the very least, the diverse externalities produced by high resource-throughput
13
modem industries and narrow employment specializations demand complex sets of incentives.
Proceeding from this assertion, despite the difficult questions arising about how to evaluate and
aggregately assess organizational capital assets, three qualitative components of a stock of
organizational capital are relevant to comprehensive capital: efficiency, power, and spillover.
Efficiency refers to the degree to which organizational assets prevent deadweight losses, the
degree to which resources are utilized without waste. Power refers to the impact of technology
and organizational complexity in increasing the scale of human potential to impact natural and
social environments. Finally, spillover refers to the impacts of organizational capital on other
capital stocks, such as the effects of a nationwide system of school testing on human capital, of
stock markets on physical capital, and of free trade guarantees on natural capital.
While efficiency, power, and spillover constitute benchmarks for evaluating a stock of
organizational capital, they do not speak to the nature of the incentives that vivify organizational
capital. As stated above, these incentives relate generally to actions intended to impact the social
and natural environments. More specifically, these incentives are what shape reactions to,
channel incentives to engage in or desist from, and engender predictability about the
careful human design, may persist even when they become suboptimal. Cf Lynne G. Zucker, "Production of Trust:
Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920" Research in Organizational Behavior 8: 53-111 (1986).
10 For an overview of the context of nationality in this regard, see Ronald L. Jepperson and John W. Meyer, "The
Public Order and the Construction of Formal Organizations" in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio eds., The
New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 204-31.
" One regime scholar has acknowledge this feedback through the insight that organizations "do not merely reflect
the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the [organizations] themselves shape those preferences and
that power." Robert 0. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Research Programs" International Studies
Quarterly 32: 379-96 (1988), p. 382.
1For arguments for relativism in the social sciences, see Hollis and Lukes eds., Rationality and Relativism.
1Because pure Pigouvian and pure Coasian administrative solutions to externalities are impractical in real world
situations, complex compromises between the two capture the majority of efforts of and immensity of the task set
before modern governments. See Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 63-70.
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consequences of such actions. While the previous paragraphs suggest obliquely how these
reactions are related to rationality and the relationship between modern societies and the need for
a broad array of incentives, thus far this analysis has not touched on the critical role of
predictability.
To illustrate the importance of predictability, people would never have engaged
consistently in (relied on) agriculture if they were not convinced of the predictability of their
efforts, both in terms of climate and in terms of risks of appropriation from other people and
animals. Similarly, people engage in non-agricultural endeavors only when provided with
organizational guarantees (contracts, food distribution networks, stable currencies, etc.) that
other people will, directly or indirectly, provide them with sustenance. Amartya Sen revealed
that the great famines of recent centuries occurred largely due to hoarding (a breakdown in faith
in predictability), not because of failed crops14 . "[S]ome of the worst famines have taken place
with no significant decline in food availability per head15 ." Thus, the very nature of human
hunger has changed over the course of human civilization from an event illustrating the
degradation or stochasticity of flows of natural capital to one of degradation of organizational
capital assets. In other words, modem famines occur primarily due to breakdowns in
organizational capital, not natural capital.
This example highlights the fact that, in modem societies organizational capital does not
consist alone of elegant Weberian structural frameworks for administrative governments or
corporations. If people within these structures lack faith in the predictability of future payoffs,
and if people in these structures do not expect that deviations from the rules of these structures
will be punished, the elegance of the structures will not impart functional viability. Thus,
predictability is a core component of organizational capital that links organizations and rules.
Predictability occurs in two forms, sure good things and sure bad things. If I know my
crop will be appropriated by a neighbor who promises that no such event will occur, I enjoy the
benefit of my knowledge. I am better off with this knowledge than without it. In counterpoint, a
person who can rely on the promises of her neighbor enjoys the benefit of having more personal
and economic choices of action. Moreover, not only is she better off, but her neighbor probably
is as well for reasons connected to comparative advantage16. Accordingly, predictability in the
form of knowing that another person will act cooperatively is probably more important
economically than is knowing what potential joint venturers will not act cooperatively. This
kind of predictability is described in various disciplines as morality, trust17 , or the key to solving
the Prisoners' Dilemma when Nash equilibrium rests in payoff representations whose sum is
lower than the best possible aggregate payoff' 8 .
While predictability and trust are important, without appropriate incentives organizational
capital will still fail to reach its full potential. An agreement between two neighbors to cooperate
" Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981).
"Ibid, p. 7.
16 Stemming baCk to the introduction of the term comparative advantage in the 19th century by Ricardo. See David
Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996).
'7tee Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press,
1995). Also see Fukuyama, Social Capital and Civil Society.
SFor Nash equilibria, see Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1994), pp. 14-15. For the application of related concepts to good government, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed,
Chaos. & Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.
185-95.
in principle is hollow; both want to know how exactly the fruits of cooperation will be split.
Incentives speak to the quantities and qualities of the payoffs of cooperation, and the
establishment of proper incentives is important since the flip side to any cooperation payoff is a
defection payoff. Even the most "moral" neighbor may essay to undermine an agreement that is
patently unfair or whose breach gives him a winning lottery ticket.
North employs a complementary analytic framework in his work in economic history;
central to his work is the assertion that organizations reduce uncertainty by providing dependable
and efficient frameworks for economic exchange 19. Viewing the Soviet period through such a
lens, I argue that one of the reasons why the Soviet Union worked as well as it did is because its
post World War II era enjoyed a feeling of predictability unknown under Lenin or Stalin.
Sovietologists labeled this emergence of stronger organizational capital as the appearance of an
unwritten social contract, beginning under Nikita Khrushchev, between the state and the
20
citizens . In return for government legitimacy, the state would abandon Stalinist scale
repression and provide social guarantees to society. However, one of the reasons why the Soviet
Union worked as poorly as it did is because the incentives it provided to its citizens were not
appropriate to produce either economic dynamism or efficiency. Unmotivated workers and little
innovation were hallmarks of the Soviet economy.
Continuing this mode of analysis, this Chapter reviews elements of formal organizational
capital in modern Central Asia in an attempt to recast the corrupt, authoritarian, and oligarchic
failures of the reform period. It essays to recast them from events of high human drama rooted
in murky cultural traits to events stemming from rational behavior and leading to degraded
organizational capital. The Chapter roughly divides formal organizational capital into its public
and private aspects, its relationship to public goods and to private goods. While the boundaries
between public and private goods are far from clearly marked, this rough dichotomy captures the
essence of the consensus aspirations of international donors to build organizational capital in the
developing world, to improve governance and to free markets.
Salient differences between approaches appear when one turns to the question of how to
ensure the integrity of the organizations responsible for managing public and private goods, but
these differences, importantly, do not spill outside the consensus described above. Thus, while
Europeans praise parliaments, Americans valorize a different set of democratic institutions.
While Americans praise deregulation, Europeans are more hesitant to expose people to risks of
market failure. However, in both cases, whatever specific tactics are chosen to ensure the
integrity of organizations, law is the instrument through which integrity is (allegedly) ensured.
Therefore, market failures in the United States are often violations of antitrust laws, and
corruption scandals in European states are most frequently framed as violations of the law. The
explicit universal appeal of law and the implicit universal acceptance of organizations as
components of modem societies undergird this Chapter's argument that the true currency of both
effective governments and effective markets is to be found in strong organizational capital assets.
Kaldor-Hicks and Globalization
19Se Douglass C. North, Institutions Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
David Christian, Imperial and Soviet Russia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 372-73.1 5
Returning to the efficiency, power, and spillover criteria for evaluating stocks of organizational
capital, I largely leave an analysis of spillover to the final section of this Chapter. Accordingly,
much of this Chapter restricts itself to the efficiency of current organizations in Central Asia and
the question of whether efficiency has improved in the reform period. I take for granted the raw
power of organizational capital in Central Asia.
After all, the republics in question survived and were shaped by Stalinist-era dislocations
and were constituent parts of one of the world's major industrial, military, and agricultural states.
Despite the problems of the Soviet state, despite ideological considerations, the USSR operated
in general as a modernist administrative state. It did not operate as a "failed state," like those
seen in many parts of the developing world. Many important decisions came as the result of the
efforts of a variety of specialized expert state agencies, and implementation of these decisions
occurred through a system of local governments, courts, and law enforcement agencies.
Extensive information about state activities (yet, misleading and selective information) was
contained in the pages of state newspapers and other media outlets. Every day this state
managed to feed, clothe, educate and care for its citizens. Starvation, illiteracy, and gross
poverty had largely disappeared by the time of the USSR's demise. In counterpoint to its
deserved reputation for inflicting serious burdens on its citizens, especially its more politically
active citizens, the Soviet state also mobilized frequently to mitigate natural disasters and prevent
human suffering from material deprivation. At the heart of the success of these efforts was an
appreciable level of organizational capital.
Theorists of institutions strive to effect reforms that make all participants in systems
better off. Such reforms are called Pareto improvements; the best possible Pareto improvement
would be a Pareto superior improvement. However, especially when systems involve many or
heterogeneous participants, very few reforms will or could actually meet the criterion of leaving
all participants better off. Thus, potential Pareto improvements are changes that increase
aggregate welfare, even though some participants may be left worse off than before. The
challenge in pursuing potential Pareto improvements is to design incentives for those made better
off to compensate those made worse off, in effect engineering a Pareto improvement. Lawyers
and economists refer to a potential Pareto improvement as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; in reform
shorthand Kaldor-Hicks allows reformers to satisfy themselves with potential Pareto
improvements. Kaldor-Hicks is the "black box" of the economics and legal community that this
section seeks to open. The reasons for challenging the viability of this development black box
concern not only the empirical failures of the post-Soviet transition; rather, this black box is
simply no longer viable for state-level analyses in an increasingly globalized world. In a world
in which both capital and people are mobile many Kaldor-Hicks assumptions for state-level
welfare unravel.
The implications of this mobility of people and capital (and not just goods) reveal the
fundamental errors of reason of those who embrace free trade as a moral imperative or as a
proven key to wealth. The theories of comparative advantage behind free trade correctly
describe free trade as a mechanism through which to increase the aggregate physical capital of
humanity. In the langnage of this essay, free trade promises a potential Pareto improvement,
ignoring spillover. Remembering spillover, free trade (more correctly and insightfully called
deregulated international commerce21 ) also encourages, even demands, increased resource
throughput and increased depletion of stocks of natural capital, even if free trade practices result
21 Herman E. Daly, "Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-state Perspectives" in Durwood Zaelke et
al. eds., Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993), p. 157.
in increases in efficiency of use of natural capital. Thus, even at a global scale and even before
considering the implication of the assumptions concerning the "potential" side of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, free trade is at least a challenge to, if not a clear barrier to, achievement of
sustainability. For the same reasons that we would choose to regulate power utilities or chemical
factories, we should be wary about the consequences of free trade at the global level.
However, more pertinent to this discussion, free trade rests upon the oft-explicit
assumption that all states will benefit from free trade; this assumption is a fallacy of composition.
There exists no evidence that this paradigm example of the conflation of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
with Pareto improvement is actually the case, theoretical or otherwise. "Otherwise," in recent
years leaders of developing states have essayed to make it abundantly clear to Western leaders
that globalization has not yielded benefits to the most needy. Indeed, globalization contains no
guarantees of equitable distribution among states. So, free trade proponents may accurately
predict that Uzbekistan will increase world stocks of physical capital if it abandons production of
certain foodstuffs and consumer goods in order to concentrate on exports of gold and oil.
However, that does not preclude the chance that Uzbekistan's citizens will become impoverished
as a result. No economic law dictates that this move will lower food prices in Uzbekistan,
especially in cases where dozens of developing states compete to sell the same commodity to
monopsistic developed states and where capital is mobile. Mobile capital can be (and frequently
is) invested or stored in less volatile or more auspicious corporations and banks in other states.
Accordingly, globalization is altering the efficacy of development interventions.
Development programs that were a success two decades ago may be untenable today, and such
concerns find considerable support in the recent experience of Central Asia. For example a
natural resource export strategy successful two decades ago would now face quite a different
environment; margins are lower and competition among sellers more fierce than before.
Especially for landlocked states emerging from an autarkic economy, globalization and free trade
are not panaceas. The classical free trade paradigm, which is closer to Pareto optimality than to
Kaldor-Hicks wishful thinking, assumes that people and capital are not mobile. Thus, if
international migration ceased and capital was restrained within national borders, free trade's
promise of reducing global poverty would be more viable.
Yet, ironically, free trade proponents also advocate (often as fundamental rights) freedom
of movement for capital and people, movements that undermine the theoretical underpinnings of
comparative advantage's relationship to the transition from Kaldor-Hicks to a true Pareto
improvement. To illustrate, as Kazakhstan's best assets of human capital emigrate and its
revenues from hydrocarbons sit in the foreign personal bank accounts and stock portfolios of its
ruling elite, where is globalization's benefit to Kazakhstanis? The situation would be different if
the country now contained both all of its highly educated native population and stockpiles of
revenue (even if held by a corrupt nomenklatura) from foreign trade that had to be invested or
held within Kazakhstan.
Far from a fanciful scenario, emigrants from Kazakhstan (and all other developing states)
are indeed more highly educated than the norm in country, and autocratic leaders and oligarchs
of developing countries tend not to keep their wealth in country. There are few private
investments within Kazakhstan known to have been made by President Nazarbaev, whose
personal wealth is enormous22 , alleged widely in the former USSR to reach into the billions of
22 While the Kazakhstan opposition cites Financial Times and Guardian articles from recent years as proof that
Nazarbaev is worth several billion dollars, in fact neither publication ever included Nazarbaev in lists of the world's
richest people. Despite this folk myth, Nazarbaev is very wealthy and he personally has extensive foreign holdings.
dollars. Similar situations hold for Uzbekistan's Karimov and Turkmenistan's Niyazov, both of
whom may be, personally, billionaires and both of whose most talented compatriots continue to
flee to the West.
Accordingly, without contesting the aggregate potential economic benefits of
globalization, it is theoretically possible for a country or society to lose much more to
globalization than would be gained by either a controlled exposure to global free trade or by
remaining in a state of autarky23. Ironically, stock market holdings, levels (and kinds) of
immigration, and the general economy of the United States in the past decade suggest that
globalization even works to further enrich the richest states. The relationships between the poles
of globalism (autarky and free trade), on the one hand, and between the poles of post-Kaldor-
Hicks reforms (equitable distribution and arrogation), on the other hand, are the lenses through
which the following pages examine recent events impacting the governments and markets of
Central Asia.
Formal Organizations: The Democratic Administrative State
An irony of constitutional democracy (participatory governance and rule of law) is that its
elevation to the status of a normative ideal, most recently in the United Nations Millennium
Declaration24 , coincides with the virtual disappearance of what Bruce Ackerman calls
constitutional politics25. Rarely anymore are constitutions expressions of a national voice or
aspirations or the product of the transformative impact of a popular movement as much they are
an administrative act whose genesis and negotiation differs little from that of any other law.
Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in Central Asia; constitutions have appeared in Central
Asia, but nowhere have they evolved as an expression of national consensus or meaningfully
been impacted by non-governmental forces.
One example is Kazakhstan, where Nursultan Nazarbaev came to power in 1988.
Kazakhstan's 1993 constitution was both not the product of public dialogue and, simultaneously,
it was a generally fair blueprint for a democratic state with separation of powers 26 . However,
this very separation of powers vexed Nazarbaev's administration, and, gradually, Nazarbaev's
administration cultivated enmity towards the other constitutional organs of the state. Twice in
the early years of independence, Nazarbaev dismissed the legislature for failing to endorse the
government's policies. In 1995, with his power consolidating, Nazarbaev managed, prior to the
23 For instance, Uzbekistan resisted packages of economic reform pushed by the IMIF in the last decade, and in
response was widely condemned. Specifically, Uzbekistan was almost daily criticized for not being more like
Kyrgyzstan. With the collapse of the economies in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, who were among the most compliant
with respect to World Bank and IMF lending programs, ironically, multilateral lenders now discuss the normative
advantages of the "Uzbekistan model of development." Jeromin Zettelmeyer, "The Uzbek Growth Puzzle" IMF Staff
Papers 46 (3): 274-92 (1999).
24nie Nations General Assembly, "United Nations Millennium Declaration," UNGA A/55/L.2 (September 6,
2000), art. 24.25 Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
26 This analysis, for purposes of space, ignores the issue of local governments and their role as checks on the
national government. This elision is possible only because local governments in all republics are headed by
presidential appointees, and in no republic has the legislature or judiciary emerged as the power broker. While local
government is a crucial factor in balancing key coalitions and fueling patronage systems in every republic, only in
Tajikistan could one argue that regions have really been a check on national power, and in that republic those
tensions (serving as a proxy for regional oligarchic economic interests) were the primary reason for the civil war.IK
dismissal of the sitting Figure 1: Separation of Powers in Central Asian Constitutions
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president the power to adopt
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even to adopt, unilaterally,
the "constitutional laws" that 10
required supermajorities for
passage in the Kazakhstan
legislature. Subsequently,
Nazarbaev illegally put
forward a new constitution.
This new constitution
abolished the Constitutional
Court (and thereby judicial
review of presidential acts),
and it established a
legislature institutionally Legislative
incapable of acting as a Executive
check on presidential power Judicial
(and therefore really capable 27,,
only of serving as an "advisory committee to the president). Nazarbaev became the functional
equivalent of an autocrat with this constitution; accordingly, the 1995 Kazakhstan Constitution is
one of the darkest moments in organizational design in post-Soviet Central Asia. Figure 1
illustrates the textual failure of the Central Asian republics to establish meaningful balance of
powers within their constitutions. P
Outside of Kazakhstan, in no other Central Asian republic has a second post-Soviet
constitution appeared; however, if it were to appear, it would almost certainly now copy in large
part the autocratic tendencies of the Kazakhstan Constitution. In all the republics, the current
constitution arose in the period between 1992 and 1994 without substantial public input
Amendments to these constitutions have likewise been engineered and discussed without much
public input, and their usual purpose has been to insulate the administrations of sitting presidents
from the limitations imposed by constitutional regimes. In other words, constitutional reform in
Central Asia is a synonym for the legalization of authoritarianism. One of the great ironies of the
reform and transition period is that, despite the facade of turbulence and re-engineering, there has
been little turnover among the members of the governing elite. The average Central Asian head
of state has been in office for eleven years, although the state of which he is head has existed for
only nine years.
The durability of the sitting presidents and their attacks on the integrity of core
democratic institutions, such as elections and constitutions. A review of post-Soviet constitutions
and elections in Central Asia reveals the extent to which the integrity of governmental
organizational capital may have declined even below that of the general Soviet times, much less
the Perestroika period. For example, in Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev's proposal of the 1995
27 Gleason, The Central Asian States, p. 85.
Constitution of Turkmenistan (May 1992); Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (December 1992);
Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (May 1993); and Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan (November 1994).
Constitution coincided with his illegal2 9 Referendum on the President, asking the electorate
whether they wanted Nazarbaev to continue as president.
During the tense period during which Nazarbaev orchestrated this disenfranchisement of
all non-presidential political components of the Kazakhstan state, Western development agencies
and embassies tacitly supported Nazarbaev and even threatened to deport their nationals who
spoke out against Nazarbaev 30. Western interests in both (perceived) guarantees of stability and
in hydrocarbon investments lay behind this culpability3 1 . Through this referendum and the new
constitution, Nazarbaev avoided holding a presidential election and could claim in 1999 that he
was standing for the first time for election as president, despite the 1993 and 1995 constitutions'
identical limitation of two five-year terms in office for the president. Nazarbaev counts his 1991
Soviet-era election and his 1995 referendum mandate as grandfathered into the status of null acts
under the 1995 Constitution. Through such manipulation, Nazarbaev will likely sit in office until
2009.
Similarly an early darling of the West, coming into office in 1990 and winning a popular
election in 1991, Askar Akaev has employed constitutional amendments in order to extend his
term. Akaev was nearly universally celebrated by Westerners in the early 1990s as possessing an
unbending commitment to democracy and rule of law. Yet, when faced with local opposition
Akaev also disbanded the legislature in 1994 and followed this act with a weakening of the
judiciary and an illegal3 referendum on amendments to the constitution. These amendments
substantially weakened the powers and structure of the legislature. As would be the case in
Kazakhstan a year later, "the international community colluded" to head off criticism of Akaev's
policies or his government as anti-democratic 33. Akaev will also sit in office well into the 21st
century. In a vivid illustration of the perceived durability of the authoritarian regimes in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the 1998 wedding between the children of Nazarbaev and Akaev
was (and is still) called, throughout the former Soviet Union, Central Asia's "royal wedding."
29 This referendum's results were legally invalid because the referendum failed to attract enough voters; 50% of
eligible voters must have voted in order for referendum results to have had legal force. 1995 Presidential Decree
Having the Force of a Constitutional Law On Republican Referenda, Art. 32. The government, drawing on Soviet
practice, fudged the results to make the results appear valid. Assertion based on author's fieldwork during the
referendum.. Likewise, the last act of the legislature in 1995, giving Nazarbaev the power to adopt decrees with the
force of law explicitly violated the 1993 Constitution's nondelegatory vesting of lawmaking power in the legislature.
1993 Kazakhstan Constitution, Preamble (stating that state power is based on the separation of legislative and
executive branches) and Art. 62 (stating that the legislature is the "only legislative" body in the Republic of
Kazakhstan).
30 The United States was the most aggressive such state. Barnabas Johnson, "The Role of the United States in the
Erosion and Collapse of Constitutional Governance in Kazakstan" Central Asia Monitor 6: 14-19 (1995).
31 For a more wide-ranging review of the phenomenal organizational capital inviability of USAID programs in
Kazakhstan, see Matt Bivens, "Aboard the Gravy Train: In Kazakstan, the Farce that is U.S. Foreign Aid" Harper's
Magazine (August): 69-76 (1997).
32 Gleason, the most influential Western writer on this subject, is misleading about the source of this illegality. He
asserts that "Akaev's constitutional referendum itself was patently illegal since Kyrgyzstan's constitution only
empowered the parliament, not the president, to call referenda." Gleason, The Central Asian States, p. 100.
However, under the original 1993 Kyrgyzstan Constitution, Article 46.5, the President was entitled to call referenda
on questions of "state life;" the legal meaning of "state life" is constrained to a sphere of issues separate from "state
structure," which would be the appropriate legal term for a constitutional change. To wit, Article 96 explicitly stated
that the constitution could be amended only by the legislature, not by direct popular vote. Thus, a popular
referendum to amend the constitution was illegal, although in general the President could call referenda.
'Gleason, The Central Asian States, p. 100.
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Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov (a.k.a. Turkmenbashi), in power since 1985, is not
tainted by such a track record of disdain for the constitution of his state. The Turkmenistan
Constitution, from the beginning, never offered the legislative or judicial branches any real
powers to act as checks or balances, reflecting the level of Niyazov's consolidation of power in
1991. Akaev and Nazarbaev only attained equivalent levels of consolidation in the mid-1990s.
While the Turkmenistan judiciary is patently weak, the legislature is made ineffectual because so
many of the powers traditionally conceived of as legislative really rest in a constitutional meta-
structure called the People's Council34 that is controlled by the president and that is in form and
practice substantially indistinguishable from a feudal royal court. The early basis of Niyazov's
popular support was his re-invention of the Soviet social contract; in exchange for support,
Niyazov's "Ten Years to Prosperity" program promised the citizenry that the end of the decade
would bring them Western levels of wealth, including a Mercedes in every driveway. Now that
the decade is over, it is clear that the Soviet social contract actually delivered more than did the
Turkmenbashi social contract. Prima facie, Turkmenistan has no strong claim to being a
constitutional democracy, and practice within Turkmenistan only confirms this conclusion.
Off to a more rocky start than the other Central Asian authoritarians, Islam Karimov
faced palpable opposition during the December 1991 presidential election, especially from a
collection of popular movements, the most powerful of which was Birlik ("Unity"). He had been
in power only two years at the time of this election, becoming First Secretary in 1989 and being
appointed President by the legislature in 1990. However, since Karimov was popular and since
opposition candidates found their efforts frustrated at every turn by the government, Karimov
won by a large margin and then set out to dismantle or co-opt these opposition movements. As
with his peers in the other republics, Karimov had consolidated power by the mid-1990s; in 1995
a referendum extended his term in office from 1997-2000, obviating the scheduled 1997
presidential elections and violating the Uzbekistan Constitution's provisions on presidential
elections. In 2000, Karimov again won re-election; although, as with Nazarbaev, this third
popular election counts as only the first under the 1992 Constitution. Karimov may actually
remain in office 21 years, until 2010.
While each Central Asian republic now advertises itself as a constitutional democracy, no
state, with the outside exception of Tajikistan, amassed over its first decade of existence a
credible claim to either the respect for constitutions or deference to popular sovereignty that
symbolizes constitutional democracy. Only in Tajikistan is the current president a relative
neophyte; Emomali Rakhmonov has only been in office since 1993, and he is the third post-
Soviet leader in Tajikistan, succeeding Rakhman Nabiev and Akbarsho Iskandarov. Similarly,
only in Tajikistan is the transition period invested with meaningful symbols of a break with the
Soviet past; unfortunately these have come at the high cost of a lengthy civil war. However, the
national consensus around the need for peace and an actual national government that since 1998
shares power between the warring sides infuses Tajikistan political life with a kind of democracy
and dialogue almost entirely missing in the other states. Unlike his peers, Rakhmonov was
elected under the current constitution in 1994 and in 1999, in problematic and, the second time,
uncontested elections, meaning that he should leave office in 2004".
*" The People's Council consists of the president, government ministers, regional governors, people's advisors
(allegedly democratically elected), the legislature, and the chairpersons of high courts of law. Constitution of
Turkmenistan, Chapt. 2.
* Constitution of Tajikistan, Art. 65. Since the 1994 Constitution was adopted concurrent to the 1994 presidential
election, the argument can (incredulously) be made that Rakbmonov has been elected only once for the purposes of
this constitution's two term limit.
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The foregoing falls far short of cataloguing the quality of elections (local, parliamentary,
and presidential), the strength of the judiciary, the efficacy of checks and balances, and the place
of administrative agencies in the political systems of the Central Asian states. Such an
accounting would be quite long and quite tilted toward a listing of failures of process and the
law; as such, the foregoing sets the tone of and is symptomatic of such a more nuanced
accounting. For example, many of the tendencies leading to disruption of organizational capital
show up in the environmental administrative sphere.
Perhaps the best example is Kazakhstan's state environmental community, which has
been so much in organizational turmoil that it has been unable to operate as an effective part of
the administrative state. Upon attaining independence, Kazakhstan boasted a Ministry of
Ecology and Bioresources; in the past decade this ministry has been renamed, re-organized, re-
located, or merged with other ministries on average once a year. For recent examples, in 1997
the Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources merged with remnants of the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources and its Minister Nikolai Baev was replaced with the geologist head of the
latter ministry; the new ministry carried the name Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources.
In 1998, the ministry moved to Kokshetau. In 1999, its portfolio expanded substantially at the
expense of the Ministry of Agriculture and the ministry's name changed to the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. Finally, in late 2000, responsibility for
mineral resources was removed from the ministry and vested in a resuscitated Ministry of Energy
and Mineral Resources; Andar Shukputov replaced Serikbek Daukeev as minister.
In Kokshetau, the current Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection is
far from either of Kazakhstan's "capitals" (Almaty and Astana), has lost most of its staff, and is
now charged simultaneously and contradictorily both with exploiting and conserving natural
resources. Analogous ministries and state committees in the other republics share similar,
sometimes even more dramatic, histories. As if to outdo Kazakhstan, in January 2001,
Kyrgyzstan slashed the staff of its environmental ministry, canned the existing minister, and
exiled the institution and newly appointed Minister Eshmambetov from Bishkek to Osh, but not
before combining the ministry with another one to create, aptly enough for the declines tracked
herin, a Ministry of Ecology and States of Emergency 36. Despite this organizational flux, in each
state there exists an appreciable corpus of environmental laws and regulations, but resources for
enforcement have been particularly slim in recent years.
In my interviews with officials, scientists, NGOs, and donors within Central Asia,
officials, scientists, and NGOs broadly agreed that the administrative capacity and efficacy of
environmental institutions had declined drastically over the past decade. Some of these
respondents did harbor hope that the situation would soon improve. Yet, it is not unimportant
that the respondents who overwhelmingly believed that this component of the modem
administrative state had improved since independence were foreigners employed by development
agencies.
Post-Soviet Central Asia's governments, from their constitional organs to their most
basic administrative agencies, are a failure when measured vwith Western standards of
accountability, rule of law, democracy, and efficacy.
However, this observation can be viewed historically in two lights; either as a betrayal of
Perestroika reforms or as the inevitable inertia of sinister Soviet practices. While most readers
are familiar with the shortfalls of the Soviet Union that could be implicated here (i.e. lack of
36 Aleksandr Melekhov, "Sostav pravitelstva ne tolko obnovilsya, no i sokratilsya" Kabar News Agency Analytical
Brief (Jan. 9, 2001); http://www.kabar.gov.kg/russian/gazet/2Q01/O1/9htm.
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human rights, ideological monism, lack of transparency, etc.), readers may not be as familiar
with the impact of the Perestroika period in directly confronting and partially overcoming just
such shortfalls. Accordingly, an overview of Perestroika's connection to organizational capital
may be needed.
Perestroika in this regard had two contradictory manifestations: statist and discursive. As
a state program, its mandates to attack local corruption and otherwise improve Soviet society
cannot meaningfully be separated from the entirety of the government of the USSR. Through
this lens, Perestroika may have been an interesting and remarkable undertaking, but its claims to
validity and importance are largely undercut. They are undercut by the fact that by the mid-
1980s the Soviet economy was largely untenable and the government's totality of policies during
the Perestroika period produced no reason to believe that the USSR was able to ensure the
security or prosperity of its citizens in the future. Through this statist lens, Perestroika was not
distinct from the state, and, consequently, any contemporary laments that Perestroika policies
ended are synonymous with appeals to reinstate the Soviet state.
However, when I refer to Perestroika in this paper, I intend to invoke instead its
discursive nature, and, by implication, a project composed not of agents of the state, but of
individuals in a polity. In this regard, Perestroika participants included a wide range of actors
(most notably, officials, dissidents, NGOs, newspaper editors, and independent politicians) and
continuation of "Perestroika" could have continued in the independence period. The
fundamental substance of discursive Perestroika, Perestroika dialogues (tracked on the pages of
newspapers and other periodicals and through statements of Perestroika actors) concentrated
most attention on the meaning of rule of law, on the nature and value of individual liberties, on
defining democracy, on exposing corruption and nepotism, on wondering about the meaning of
civil society, and on debating distribution of powers in a federal state. As dialogue, discursive
Perestroika contained many viewpoints, ranging from liberal democracy to communism to
nationalism; accordingly, while the dialogues did not point to prescription, they encouraged
participation, reflection, and critical thinking.
These dialogues attracted substantial attention, and the diversity and strength of minority
and other views put into discursive play during this period shocked both locals and
Sovietologists used to the party line's previous tight grip on the substance of public dialogue.
Beyond novelty, these dialogues also attracted attention because of their depth, a depth that has
rarely been matched in post-Soviet public dialogues on transition, nationalism, Russian
chauvinism, and the other themes that now dominate even where the press is free.
With this perspective, we can revisit whether post-Soviet declines in organizational
capital are a betrayal of Perestroika reforms or as the inevitable inertia of sinister Soviet practices
by considering the fate of discursive Perestroika after independence. The USSR's disassembly
shook apart Perestroika by removing Moscow's checks on the republics, by allowing economic
crisis to subvert governance aspirations, and by permitting Western voices to muddy and subvert
the democratic, and law-based agendas and priorities of reform movements. For example,
notwithstanding the extensive references to democracy in the Soviet legal system and several
actual practices, the popular American conception of the fall of the Soviet Union is of democracy
over communism.
This image persists despite the strong democratic element in theoretical communism and
in disregard for the myriad ways in which Western states fall short of democratic ideals.
Western embassies and programs, especially American, continued (destructively) to fight the
straw man of communism instead of to endeavor (constructively) to support democratic and rule
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of law aspirations where they did in fact exist. In other words, paradoxically, discursive
Perestroika founded on critical dialogue was not nurtured by the West, but ignored and
discredited, more often than not in didactic demagogic ways than in critical or thoughtful ways.
Paradoxically, discursive Perestroika birthed critical dialogue as a challenge to the blind
ideology of the Communist Party, but in successfully unshackling society from one uncritical
ideology opened the door to its own demise through, albeit probably a better, the legitimization
of the ideology of the West. Western donors and development agents did not know about (and
lacked the linguistic and cultural skills to lean about) and did not want to learn about (since they
equated everything pre-independence with communism) discursive Perestroika, and they
therefore forcefully urged on communities a break with everything from the Soviet era and an
uncritical acceptance of donor prescriptions.
Thus, Western influence contributed to post-Soviet decline by undermining a powerful
venue for public education and consensus. Neither hegemonic Western prescriptions nor the
imported pamphlets and programs of Western agencies managed to create a viable substitute, and
so public efforts to participate in, shape, and monitor reform declined quickly. As a result, the
disassembly created ideal conditions for ruling local politicians to maximize their rational
political ambitions; just as capitalists seek to maximize profits instead of to ensure competitive
markets, politicians seek to maximize their terms in office instead of to ensure the integrity of the
political process.
However, the alternate viewpoint is also convincing. Under this line of reasoning, the
bloodlessness of the demise of the USSR is a mixed blessing; that the structures and modes of
the USSR existed intact the day after communism may be to the long-term detriment of the
region. On the first day of markets, independence, and democracy in Central Asia in 1991,
everyone reported to the same job, in the same building, to the same boss, and at the same salary
as the day before. While the names and labels of the region changed dramatically, below the
surface the communist society remained intact. Reconstruction does not face the same
challenges of bureaucratic inertia as "transition." This bureaucratic inertia in Central Asia,
symbolized in the resistance of the region to rule of law reforms, this "old vodka in new bottles,"
is one of the region's enduring causes of unsustainable development.
While bureaucratic inertia in Central Asia is certainly a problem, that Perestroika
reforms, practices, and rhetoric were not supported by influential foreign embassies and donors
(but instead often dismissed as atavistic or tainted) certainly did facilitate the region's slide
towards autocracy. Although the Soviet Union in practice fit no serious scholar's ideal of
democracy, towards its end it exhibited a startling embrace of democracy and a dynamic
federalism. National referenda and the emergence of checks and balances among political
subdivisions effected tremendous changes in the USSR, including the demise of the Soviet
Union. More than any ideological divisions, the problems generated by the struggles for power
between the central Soviet structures and their republican counterparts lay at the heart of the
disassembly of the USSR. In Central Asia, none of the republics actually expected or even
desired sovereign status 7, despite deployment of rhetoric of independence and sovereignty as
tools to wrest more power from Moscow.
The roots of independence aside, the link between the public and private failures of
organizational capital in Central Asia is to be found in the "nomenklatura," the oligarchy in the
region whose defining characteristics are its Soviet pedigree and its simultaneous attention to
economic and political power as two sides of the same coin. This group, equivalent but distinct
37 See, generally, Gleason, The Central Asian States.
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in each republic, has been the primary blocker of change and co-opter of reforms. In fact, at
times this group has actively supported certain reforms to the extent that such reforms have
facilitated further consolidation of political or economic power. As even IIMF staff have finally
recognized, "economic reform has been thwarted by rent-seeking vested interests who have the
most to gain if reforms stall halfway between the central planning of the past and a well-
functioning, open, and competitive market economy 38." More specifically, it seems that these
"vested interests" have supported financial stabilization and privatization, while resisting the
equally important objectives of liberalization of markets and rule of law 39.
Feared originally as a reactionary group that had everything to lose from independence,
the nomenklatura actually had everything to gain from a controlled transition from the Soviet
system of generous but limited social and economic entitlements for the nomenklatura. By, in
each republic, working to remove the upper limits of such entitlements (through privatization,
access to global markets, language laws, etc.) while restraining risks to such entitlements
(popular sovereignty, free press, independent judiciaries, etc.) this group managed to turn itself
into the principal beneficiary of the fruits of independence. While sacrificing symbolic or small
amounts of its political hegemony through facilitation of Western development programs, this
group also used such programs to gain economic advantages, in effect trading political for
economic power. In simpler terms, the nomenklatura was and is corrupt40 , but it is corrupt not
because of any peculiar cultural or ethnic traits, but because its members are, in their own
context, rational maximizers of their own welfare.
Asset Stripping: The Post-Soviet Market Game
When reform began 10 years ago... output was expected to fall as a result of economic
stabilization programs and the reallocation of resources from unproductive to productive sectors.
The view was that, as reform policies took hold and new sectors began to develop, aggregate
output would begin to grow. Output was expected to grow more rapidly in the less advanced
41
economies, and there would be a closing of income gaps or even, eventually, convergence
It took me many years to reconcile the fact that Kazakhstan was supposed to be a major
hydrocarbon producer and was supposed to possess immense industrial potential with the fact
that so many of my acquaintances were involved in international trade and that so many of them
described their activities as "metals trading." Metals trading, it turns out, was a euphemism. It
did not mean so much the sale of any of Kazakhstan's extensive deposits of ore, nor did it mean
trading in the production output from Karaganda's Karmet steel factory, one of the largest in the
world. It actually meant the export of finished goods made of metal to foreign purchasers,
38 Oleh Havrylyshyn and John Odling-Smee, "Political Economy of Stalled Reforms," Finance & Development 37
(September 2000): 8.
39Ibid.
4 Beyond the zero -sum implications of corruption, economists identify another important implication of corruption
applicable to Central Asia, especially to the region's interesting history of mega-projects, such as Kazakhstan's new
capital in Astana, Kyrgyzstan's Manas celebrations, Tajikistan's monument to Oli Somon, Turkmenistan's "Lake of
the Golden Century," and Uzbekistan's noticeable Washington, D.C. embassy. "One specific channel through which
corruption may harm economic performance is by distorting the composition of government expenditure. .. .
Corrupt politicians [be] more inclined to spend on fighter aircraft and large-scale investment projects than on
textbooks and teachers' salaries." Mauro, "Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research," p.
12.
~Stanley Fischer and Ratna Sahay, "Economies in Transition: Taking Stock" Finance & Development 37
(September 2000): 2-6. 15
usuallyin Iran, Pakistan, China, or Russia. However, these finished goods were not consumer
goods, but the physical capital of the productive sector, either scrap metal (including parts of the
infrastructure) from Kazakhstan factories or machines for making consumer goods. Some of this
trade was legal, in that the sellers were the legal managers of the enterprises from which these
goods were obtained. Some was illegal, in that these goods were stolen from ill-monitored
enterprises. Perhaps the worst, but most appropriate, snapshot of these practices is the all-too-
common news broadcast about unfortunate young men electrocuted while attempting to steal
active power lines from remote areas to sell to scrap metal brokers42 .
Privatization, no less than democracy, was and continues to be an ideological cornerstone of
almost all internal and foreign development scholars interested in Central Asia's future. This
consensus around privatization attaches to privatization's multiple benefits. The classic goals of
all economic policy are to facilitate economic efficiency (and growth) and, highlighting the
laudable humanistic core of economics as a discipline, just and equitable distribution (both to
eliminate poverty and to increase equality among citizens) 43. Theoretically, privatization
facilitates efficiency by transferring assets (usually physical and natural capital assets) to actors
better able than the state to manage these assets productively. The advantages of these non-state
managers arise from a combination of decentralization, a convergence of interests between
managers and owners, rewards to efficient managers, and relief from the perverse impacts of
state planning. Just as theoretically, mass privatization facilitates just distribution by giving
citizens a formal and financial stake in the productive assets of the state; effectively mass
privatization is a dividend payment to citizens as stakeholders in society.
This metals trading described above, while illegal or only semi-legal, is one form of
privatization. Indeed, the transfer of state assets into private hands can take many different
forms; "privatization programs" stress only a few of these forms. The main kinds of
privatization in post-Soviet Central Asia are informal privatization (of the kind illustrated
above), formal privatization (the type embraced in most development programs), privatization of
sovereign rights, and privatization of human and organizational capital assets. In each case, as
practiced in the last decade in Central Asia, each form of privatization has failed to yield Pareto
improvements. Since property rights are a core, if not the core, component of modern
organizational capital's incentive structure, privatization in Central Asia has thus sometimes
contributed to the degradation of organizational capital. More disturbingly, privatization has also
largely failed to produce intranational Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a failure which poses a special
challenge to the validity of the current consensus around the need for privatization.
Ironically, informal privatization, while often patently illegal, may come the closest to
effecting a Pareto improvement, in part because it is the only type of privatization available to
most people. Despite its theoretical promise, formal privatization has yielded effectively no
direct financial rewards to the citizenry of Central Asia. Kazakhstan's privatization efforts
embraced the norm for post-communism, an effort to distribute state assets to all citizens as
shareholders. All Kazakhstan citizens were issued "private investment coupons" (PIKs) in 1994,
and they could choose from roughly a hundred investment privatization funds in which to deposit
these coupons. Thus, in contrast to Russia, where sirnilar coupons were transferable and could
42 To complement this picture, only in September 2000 were the replica of Boston's "Make Way for Ducklings"
bronze statues that also charm Moscow's children restored in Moscow. The statues, donated by Barbara Bush in
1991 were stolen for scrap, sawed off at the legs, in 1999. Anna Dolgov, "Stolen duck statues restored in Moscow,"
Boston Globe (Sept. 18, 2000).
43 A third basic goal should be to effect sustainable scale, but this goal is only slowly gaining support among
mainstream economists. See Daly, "Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-state Perspectives," p. 156.
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be used to acquire shares in specific enterprises or investment funds, Kazakhstan constrained its
citizens. Kazakhstanis now joke about PIKs, and almost no one expects any financial return on
this investment. PIKs are already part of Kazakhstan's past.
Kazakhstan's PIKs and Kyrgyzstan's privatization coupons have, for the most part,
disappeared into murky management funds, and the managers of these funds have not been held
accountable enough for their holdings. More specifically, they have managed in large part to
informally privatize for themselves the assets they were entrusted to privatize formally for their
fiduciaries. While vague, but convincing, accounts of the alleged mechanics of these deals
circulate as rumors and in occasional newspaper accounts in the Russian language, to date no
details about privatization swindles from Central Asia (as opposed to from the Czech Republic,
Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine) have been explored by reliable sources"
Privatization of sovereign assets is a less appreciated, potentially more devastating perversion
of the humanistic aspirations of privatization. Sovereign states enjoy both rights of seignorage
(coinage) and rights of credit. Private parties may appropriate both rights, with the effect,
directly apposite from the goals of equitable distribution, of a tax on citizenship. For example,
the continued lack of convertibility of Uzbekistan's sum (despite promises by Karimov to
institute convertibility by January 2000), and the enduring disparity between official and black
market exchange rates (in 2000 still roughly 200 and 700 sum to the dollar) operates as a
windfall to those privileged few in Uzbekistan upon whom is conferred the right to convert sum
into dollars at the official rate. Likewise, when states in the region secure dollars from the IMF
and other lenders, the state assumes a debt; when these funds find their way to private accounts,
the fortuitously enriched oligarchs have in effect levied a private tax on future taxpayers.
Finally, because individuals in the Soviet Union were more subjects than citizens,
independence created curious conditions for the privatization of human capital assets. Taking
their futures in their own hands, many Central Asians quickly abandoned the region, and the
effect of their private decisions was to remove human capital assets formerly at the disposal of
the state and relocate them to foreign states. Likewise, the staying power of the nomenklatura
has meant that state entities that should not be privatized and were never meant to be privatized
have remained in private hands instead of reverting to public control and management.
Formal Rules: The Rule of Law State
No authority would seriously propose regulation of a modern state through informal norms such
as universal respect, love, or the golden rule, despite the fact that, throughout human history
cherished philosophers have argued for just such a condition4 5 . Assuming that Central Asia will
not find encouragement to pioneer a strategy for sustainable development employing and
encouraging nepotism and patronage networks as frameworks for environmental incentives, the
lack of rule of law in Central Asia is a potent barrier to effective environmental management. At
the threshold of the past decade, it was virtually axiomatic that the key to a successful transition
4See Peter Elkind, "The Pirate of Prague: The Incredible Half-Billion-Dollar Azerbaijani Oil Swindle" Fortune 141
(Mar. 6, 2000), p. 106; King Banaian, The Ukrainian Economy Since Independence (Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar, 1999); and Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treismnan, Without a Ma p Political Tactics and Economic Reform in
Russia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). IMP and World Bank sources hint at failures ofprivatization in Central
Asia, but offer no details. But see Jeanne Whalen, "Kazakhstan: Foreigners Feel the Pain," Financial Times (July 1,
1999), p. 4.
SFor example, Aristotle and Tolstoy. See Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law.
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from communism was a rapid transfer of management of assets into private hands: to private
businessmen for private goods and to electorates for democratic government. At the threshold of
a new decade, there exists far less enthusiasm for either transfer. Yet, inasmuch as the
development community grasps at new panaceas as old ones fail, it is now just as axiomatic that
a successful transition must involve a deep commitment to rule of law 46.
This new consensus around the need for rule of law presents an unreal counterfactual.
Nowhere in the former Soviet Union did development efforts in the last decade put at their core a
commitment to the finer points of rule of law, namely enforcement, courts, and accountability.
The vast bulk of "legal" work by developers centered on the task of writing legislation, and at
that only draft laws, not the draft instructions upon which regulators and law enforcement
agencies rely. Correspondingly, most legal "assessments" ended with a review of the texts of
laws. Given the gulf between written laws and actual implementation and enforcement, past
legal development work was often meaningless. Accordingly, there is no counterfactual to
justify, or sink, the new belief that the reform period would have progressed much more
favorably if rule of law had been accorded more importance.
Yet, during the Perestroika period, the concept of rule of law (pravovoe gosudarstvo) lay
at the core of reform aspirations 7. Rule of law was the consensus aspiration that conjoined
Perestroika-era social movements as diverse as those representing victims of Stalinist repression,
environmental groups, human rights organizations, and cultural associations. During
Perestroika, some of Central Asia's better and more effective laws were adopted 48, the region's
most daring public interest environmental lawsuits were filed 4 9, non-governmental parties
introduced draft legislation, and independent candidates were elected to all levels of legislatures.
The post-Soviet era has paled in comparison.
The reason why the post-Soviet era has paled in comparison has been suggested in
previous section, but not directly addressed. In all republics, certain "Washington Consensus"
reforms have been supported, and certain of these reforms have been systematically blocked;
especially the reforms related to rule of law have found little support at high levels of
government. Thus, the governing elite's transformation from the communist vanguard to
signatories of the United Nations Millennium Declaration has not been entire. It has been a
transformation that has stressed the elements of rule of law that maintain public order, but that
has belittled those elements that encourage participatory government and accountability. For
example, again turning to the environmental sphere, inasmuch as sustainable management
depends on the rule of law, the current situation in Central Asia is not laudable. Aspects of rule
of law applicable to sustainable development include clear liability regimes, jurisdiction over
polluters, incentives against pollution, public oversight, and transparency guarantees like public
46 See, generally, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katharina Pistor eds., The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). In their introduction, the editors exemplify this commitment to an implicit belief
that there exists a Rosetta Stone to development.
47 See W. E. Butler, "Perestroika and the Rule of Law," in W. E. Butler ed., Russian Legal Theory (New York: New
York University Press, 1996), pp. 417-31. Moreover, this concern with rule of law was not new in Russia. The
"liberal intellectual tradition in pre-revolutionary Russia was [strong and] . . . the main concern of Russia's liberal
thinkers was the problem of the rule of law." Andrzej Walicki, Lega1 Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 1.
48 For example, laws on social associations, on cooperatives, on environmental protection, and on religion; in many
cases these laws were better enforced and more liberal than their donor funded post-Soviet replacements.
49 For example, Kazakhstan's Green Salvation sued Alma-Ata's mayor for negligent homicide in an environmental
suit. Eric W. Sievers, "The Caspian, Regional Seas, and the Case for a Cultural Study of Law, " Georgetown
International Environmental Law Journal 13 (2001).
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access to information. None of these are developed in the region. Instead, their antitheses-
political protection, secrecy, corruption, and exemptions from liability and laws- are the norm in
the extractive sector50 . This particular transformation is what I call a state of apostasy.
The state of apostasy is actually a kind of rule of law, although it is not Pareto optimal.
Because of its socialist foundations, it does not provide efficient incentives for economic actors,
nor does it take advantage of the benefits of policies for decentralized decision making.
However, it boasts all or most of the institutions of a rule of law society, including courts, elected
political representatives, and a culture of the printed word. It boasts a highly developed criminal
law system, high levels of social rights, and a secular conception of justice and authority. As it is
a modem state, it also devotes central authority to administrative and specialized agencies in the
management of economic, social, and welfare programs. In all of these aspects, the apostate
state, is an isomorph of the basic structure of the state apparatuses of Europe and North America,
or at least no more different than these states are between themselves.
Yet, the apostate state lacks as least three key attributes of democratic rule of law, and all
of these focus attention not on the state or government itself, but on authority outside the state
sector. The first of these attributes is the equal capacity or rights of all citizens, regardless of
their position within the state structure. The second attribute is an organizational pluralism that
includes independent organizations and limits numbers of corporatist or parastatal organizations.
The third attribute is the ability of non-state actors to call at will upon the legal mechanisms of
the state, without prior state approval or monitoring, to enforce individual rights.
The transition from the apostate state to democratic rule of law is not reducible in terms
of needs and challenges to the paradigm transition from a state of nature to rule of law glossed or
assumed by law and economics scholars51. Moreover, were one to catalogue the challenges
faced under other transitions in this century, the transition of apostate states to democratic rule of
law may not have much in common either with the experience of Germany or Japan as defeated
52powerss. Nor, as mentioned earlier, would there be confluence with the post-communist states
that are not apostate, such as the Czech Republic. Perhaps, from a transition perspective,
Kazakhstan is more like potential other apostate states, like China or Chile, than it is to its
western post-communist peers, at least as far as democracy (as opposed to economic reform) is
concerned. Naturally, the apostate transition is also separable from the transitions occasioned by
any of the revolutions of this century or past centuries, such as occurred in Russia, China, or the
United States. In broad strokes, the states of nature, revolution, defeat, and apostasy are four
discernible states from which theory and practice can imagine a transition to democratic rule of
law (or some other condition). Each initial state has discrete implications for both theory and
development interventions as these seek to build strong stocks of organizational capital.
Finally, in considering the limits of rule of law, the changes being effected by
globalization are striking. The massive movements of people, capital, and information systems
that comprise what is colloquially know as globalization challenge the belief that a stronger
50 Eric W. Sievers, "Caspian Environment Programme: Prospects for Regime Formation and Effectiveness" in
William Ascher and Natalia Mirovitskaya eds., The Caspian Sea: A Quest for Environmental Security, (Amsterdam:
Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 33 8-39.
~See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999), p. 70; James Q.
Whitman, "Ancient Rights and Wrongs: At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of
Bodies, or Setting of Prices?," Chicago Kent Law Review 71 (1995), p. 41.
5For an illustrative example of the connection between defeat and belief systems, see Paul Forman, "Weimar
culture, causality, and quantum theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a
hostile intellectual environment," Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 3 (1991), pp. 1-115.
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commitment to rule of law would have warded off post-Soviet decline. First, imagine reactions
of the global community to what I term autarkic rule of law, an attempt by a state to bring flows
of people, flows of capital, flows of information, flows of public goods, and flows of private
goods firmly under national control. Judging by the reactions of the world community to efforts
by Bulgaria to charge emigres for the costs of their schooling, efforts by Turkmenistan to forbid
its nationals to hold accounts in foreign banks, efforts by Germ-any to block access to Internet
pornography, efforts by Russia to deny sovereignty to Chechnya, and efforts by Kazakhstan to
discourage "bubble-gum" traders, autarkic rule of law is disfavored by the West. Autarkic
policies may even be violations of emerging norms of international public law.
Evaluating the Eras of Organizational Capital in Central Asia
Beyond the problems for sustainability created by depletion of Central Asia's late Soviet-
era organizational capital, an important aspect of international organizational capital has also
been degraded in the region. At the start of independence, international institutions enjoyed both
popular legitimacy and substantial influence in Central Asia as a reflection of the USSR's strong
public respect for both the United Nations and international law, a topic addressed in Chapter
Six. Again turning to the environmental sphere, residents of the desiccated Aral Sea region often
quip that if only each World Bank and UNDP expert who has been sent to investigate the Aral
Sea had merely brought a glass of fresh water, there would be no more Aral Sea disaster.
Conditions are not now ideal for Western development efforts, even well considered
efforts, in Central Asia to rebuild organizational capital. Donor failures are more notable than
successes, and these failures or perceived failures inform a widespread social essimism about
the goals and efficacy of Western projects. A lauded 60% recovery of output3 only exacerbates
this local pessimism. Indeed this Washington spin conveniently obscures the facts that this
output's dollar value is now far lower than in 1990 and that the gap between the former Soviet
Union and a West that boomed in the 1990s has widened by far more than 40%. Indeed, a state
experiencing 5% annual growth in the past decade would now have a 60% larger economy than
in 1990, meaning that a 40% absolute decline in output in the 1990s is equivalent to a 60+%
comparative decline, even before considering the devaluation of this output because of depressed
raw commodity markets and obsolescence. So, in counterpoint to Washington spin, the obverse
of this local pessimism is a growing popular nostalgia for the USSR, particularly for those social
and economic modalities of the USSR that were existentially better than the conditions
experienced by the populace in the post-Soviet era.
As a result of the degradation of organizational capital in Central Asia, the region has
been unable to protect, manage, and maximize returns on its stocks of natural capital. It has
likewise been unable to protect, nurture, and win the loyalty of its citizens. It has been unable to
enforce laws. It has been unable to practice popular sovereignty. Thus, through the lens of
sustainability, the degradation of the region's stocks of formal organizational capital has had
destructive spillover effects. These disappointments have been mediated only by the region's
successes in pioneering relative fiscal stability, partial privatization, occasionally competitive
markets, and the institutional semblance of constitutional democracy.
Fischer and Sahay, "Economies in Transition: Taking Stock," p. 2
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL CAPITAL: CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOLIDARITY
Rounding out this essay's review of types of capital and their manifestations in Central
Asia, I return now to the underpinnings of a concern for social capital. Social capital is
appropriately defined as a manifestation of organizational capital; its assets are composed of
similar elements of rules and organizations, and the same dynamic feedback between perceived
and actual options. However, social capital deserves separate treatment in this essay for the
reasons that it is currently in vogue, that it is still largely undefined, and that there exist almost
no available data about its history or manifestations in Central Asia.
As stated previously, the official development community has reacted to the failures of
recent years by seeking a new panacea. Together with rule of law1, social capital's reputation has
benefited from this search. Portes and Landolt note that "the popular view now portrays social
capital as wholly beneficial with no significant downside 2 ." Tellingly, social capital now even
has its own homepage on the World Bank website3. Likewise, the IMF supports Francis
Fukuyama's effort to connect social capital policy to efforts of international lending institutions.
There is probably no development agency in existence that has not partially reconceived its
orientations in recent years to integrate social capital concerns into its programs.
However, this embrace of social capital occurs in the continued absence of a clear
definition of social capital, understanding of the origins of social capital, clear conception of the
implications of social capital, or even an explicit effort in any work to connect social capital to
social capital assets. Without reiterating in full the section on social capital in the Introduction,
the need for a working definition of social capital demands some repetition.
To date, no prominent definition of social capital allows the term the two core elements
of any other form of capital: the ability to disaggregate a stock into discrete assets and the ability
to link deployment of assets to externalities, both negative and positive. I posit that social capital
should be defined concisely with reference to game theory and that its full explication will
depend on its integration into information economics. Social capital consists of two necessary
but independently insufficient conditions. First, social capital requires a dense network of social
interaction; it requires that individuals be enmeshed in multiple social networks. Second, social
capital requires that these social networks fulfill two quite different functions: reduce
information transaction costs and provide signals about propensities to cooperate or defect where
market failures preclude inclusion of such information in implicit pricing systems.
To complement the preceding chapter's views on rule of law, the concept of rule of law is not contained in one axis
of organizational capital, but depends upon the interaction between the formal content of laws, formal organizational
enforcement of law, informal norms of lawfulness, and impacts of informal actors on incentives to obey the law.
2 Alejandro Portes & Patricia Landolt, "The Downside of Social Capital" The American Prospect 26 (May-June
1996), pp. 18-21. Also see Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke, "Participatory Development and Empowerment: The
Dangers of Localism" Third World Quarterly 21 (2000), pp. 247-68.
3 See World Bank Group, "Social Capital for Development," http://wuw.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm.
"Social capital is defined as the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of societies that enable
people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals." Ibid.
4~ See Francis Fukuyama, "Social Capital and Civil Society." Concurrently, Fukuyama defines social capital as
"society's stock of shared values" and "a set of informal values or nonms shared among members of a group that
permits cooperation among them." Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Humani Nature and the Reconstitution
of Social Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 14, 16.
Social capital facilitates the reduction of information transaction costs by providing
alternate channels for information flow. Persons with high social capital often rely on their
informal knowledge about potential business partners, investors, and service providers, and in
doing so eliminate costs associated with investigation of and search for such information. Social
capital also provides information and signals about other people's tendencies to cooperate or
defect. In their economic and game theory contexts, these terms refer to individuals' decisions to
honor agreements or break agreements (when there is some payoff for doing so). Individuals
may tend to cooperate either because of some predisposition to do so generally (some internal
morality or standard) or because the payoff from defection is lowered because an interaction (a
"period" in game-theory terms) is not one-time but "iterated." In iterated games, a player will
encounter the other player again, at least many or an indefinite number of times, and will be
disadvantaged by that other player's future refusal to cooperate5. While this phenomenon clearly
applies to villages where reputation and frequent interaction are central elements of life, given
dense enough social networks, it can also apply to towns or segments of cities.
Generally speaking, individuals are involved in two broad types of social networks.
Their primary associations are largely non-voluntary and hierarchically organized (vertical) and
include family, residence, school, and work. Their secondary associations are voluntary and less
hierarchical (horizontal) and involve formal civic organizations, sports leagues, and like ad hoc
associations. While no clear boundary exists between primary and secondary associations
(neighborhood watch groups, school alumni associations, and professional societies all combine
elements of both), the distinction between the two is important because of evidence about the
ambiguous externalities that stem from social capital.
"Bonding" social capital based primarily on primary associations tends often to produce
negative societal externalities and inefficient resource allocation6 . Examples include old boys'
networks, the Mafia, and nepotism. "Bridging" social capital, in contrast, relies less on the
phenomenon of (and disadvantages of) cartel loyalty and more on the gains to efficiency
produced by reduced transaction costs in information. Moreover, bridging social capital can
displace some of the inefficient aspects of bonding social capital. Thus, while bonding social
capital is not an unqualified bad (it is a potent means of insurance), all other things equal it is
preferable to have at least a large part of a society's stock of social capital in bridging social
capital. More concisely and importantly, the lack of bridging social capital can be a serious
developmental disadvantage.
All of the foregoing builds up to a definition of social capital. A social capital asset is a
social network (primary or secondary) combining two or more people. The sum of such
networks and the breadth of such networks constitute a society's stock of social capital7. The
relevant composition of these networks between bonding and bridging social capital directly
shapes the kinds of negative and positive externalities flowing from a society's social capital.
Little fieldwork has been conducted to test existing pluralist conceptions of social capital
with empirical data. Outside of limited work in a variety of locales throughout the world, the
only comprehensive effort at an empirical investigation of social capital is Robert Putnam's
sSee generally, Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, pp. 64-66.
6See Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 22-24.
7 As a consequence, social capital is not a "public good;" it can be created and enjoyed by individuals. Some social
capital scholars erroneously treat social capital as a public good underproduced by markets. For a general
refutation, see Fukuyama, TeGetDsuto:HmnNtranthReotitonfScalOdr, pp. 25 5-57.
Bowling Alone8 , which limits itself to the United States. While several efforts to survey social
capital in Russia are in progress, I know of no fieldwork in any part of Central Asia, other than
my own, to survey social capital. Accordingly, in surveying social capital in Central Asia, this
Chapter departs from the bias of previous chapters of preferring World Bank, I7MF, and similar
"conservative" sources. Such sources simply do not exist. However, this Chapter draws on a
similarly narrow set of sources, primarily my own fieldwork within Central Asia9 .
In order to survey social capital in Central Asia, I choose three proxies: simple economic
transactions between strangers, social associations, and residential community associations.
These by no means exhaust the range of proxies suggested by economists, sociologists, and other
scholars for similar purposes. Among the proxies suggested have been, inter alia, numbers of
independent associations, hours spent visiting neighbors, newspaper readership, means used to
secure jobs, the existence of rotating credit associations, and neighborhood watch groups. Few,
if any, of these proxies are unproblematic or generally accepted, which is inevitable if one
remembers that social capital has no consensus definition. Given the great gulfs between the
World Bank's "social cohesion," Fukuyama's ambivalent privileging of transaction cost reduction
through "trust," Putnam's bonding and bridging social capital, Coleman's reduced costs of
contracting, and the myriad other definitions of social capital, this lack of consensus about how
social capital manifests itself is inescapable.
However, some of the most popular social capital proxies contradict the fundamental
definitions pursued in this essay. By accepting social capital as a component of organizational
capital, we expose certain popular measures of social capital as at worst no more than wishful
thinking and at best multicollinear with truer estimators of social capital. For example,
throughout his works, Putnam relies heavily on voter turnout and membership in political parties,
which relate to social capital, but contradict my definition of social capital as the non-state aspect
of organizational capital. Similarly, Fukuyama relies heavily on data regarding trust in
government, which may be collinear with social capital in a robust understanding of
organizational capital, but has nothing directly to do with social capital itself Fukuyama's
emphasis on crime rates is similarly misdirected; it relies on a perfect confluence between
positive law and the concerns of social norms.
Partly for these reasons, I employ three, instead of only one, proxies. While each of these
proxies could be accepted under any of the schools of social capital listed above, their selection
is purely linked to the definition of social capital I outline in the Introduction. Specifically,
embracing the symmetric insight that active social networks may produce both positive and
negative externalities, I examine the game theoretical aspect of these social networks as well as
their information economy aspects. Symmetry in the first instance is contained within the payout
possibilities for cooperation and defection in the simple economic transactions that I examine.
Deference to symmetry in the second instance comes through attention to the variable
externalities of social (bridging) associations and residential (bonding) associations.
8Putnam, Bowling Alone. Fukuyama's The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order
attempts to survey social capital in the entire developed wvorld, but lacks Putnam's general depth, any appropriate
local sources, and breadth.
9 This fieldwork, conducted 1997-2000, drew primarily upon two methodologies: multi-point ethnography and
sociological survey. My research was supported by Switzer Foundation, the USEPA, National Research Council,
Streicker Fund, Coca-Cola World Fund, and National Security in Education Prograi.
10 See James S. Coleman, "The Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: Implications for the Law," Journal of
Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 3 (1988), pp. 375-404.
One-Shot Games
Expanding the discussion above to focus more explicitly on economic issues and ignoring for the
moment the economic effects of social capital's role in reducing transaction costs in information,
we can redefine a person's individual stock of social capital to be the sum of his involvement in
the iterated games that we alternately call social networks. The result is that his social capital
simultaneously reflects his individual reputation and reduces certain transaction costs connected
to economic bargaining, particularly those costs that are involved in contracting. However,
reputation and transaction costs are intimately connected. Reputation allows other players to
gauge in advance what his game strategy will be and how likely it is that he will cooperate or
defect. Expanding the critique of the Arrow-Debreu model that was initiated by the information
economists, prices indeed do not convey all relevant information. Social capital conveys
reputation, whose reliability for assessing the viability of a joint venturer is not infallible, but is
both relevant and even determinative for many joint venturers given the absence of a market
solution.
The significance of this use of reputation is that it reduces the costs of pursuing economic
activities. Since not all contractual relations are enforceable through the law, and since it is
usually cheaper to arrange contractual relations outside the formal requirements of the law, social
capital avoids costs both in deadweight losses and in transaction costs. In other words, social
capital functions to further economic efficiency both through reducing the information costs of
selecting reliable partners and through allowing joint venturers to avoid the costly process
(notarizations, lawyer fees, etc.) that accrue to the formalization of contractual arrangements.
Such a description almost captures the basic confluence between game theory in
economics and the broader social science embrace of social capital. In the finer points of their
expression, however, these two camps have not so readily agreed on the bases for why many
economic actors engaged in non-iterated games act as though they are engaged in iterated games;
some actors comport themselves as if there is something at stake. They act as if they care what
strangers think of them, or, just as "irrationally," simply desire not to cheat a stranger. For non-
economists, culture and values offer themselves as explanations; for game theorists this
explanation is too facile and lacks theoretical rigor. Yet, simultaneously, game theorists do seek
an explanation for such empirically verifiable human behavior and are willing to accept its
occurrence as a manifestation of social capital. Accordingly, perhaps the only social capital
proxy elemental enough to fit the tastes of all scholars concerns the actions of unacquainted
individuals involved in one-shot economic transactions. Given the opportunity to cheat without
a readily discernible chance of punishment, will a member of a given community betray the trust
of another?
Of course, for the purposes of this essay this question is embedded within the context of
the former Soviet Union, moreover its Central Asian republics. The region is notorious for
unaccountable business practices. The Western business community constantly complains that
its local counterparts are untrustworthy, dishonest, and sneaky. What hope can one have of
finding social capital in such an environment? Notwithstanding the merits of this conventional
wisdom, this reasoning lacks a social science foundation. It implies that economic actors in the
West are uniquely trustworthy, which is a suspect implication, and it assumes that there is only
one proxy for and manifestation of social capital, which is, at best, an unproven suggestion.
Moreover, it assumes that local dealings with foreigners capture fundamental truths about social
capital, which may not be true. Accordingly, I concentrate in this Section on social capital as it
I ________
actually exists within the region, not as it is experienced by foreigners. In such situations, a
number of practices and norms in Central Asia do suggest high levels of social capital, and levels
that are, in my experience, largely unchanged since the Soviet era.
The absence of cheating in such a situation hints at, whatever one's definition of it, the
prevalence of social capital. In game theoretic terms, a community permeated by enough social
networks leaves a rational actor rationally to conclude that her perceived anonymity in such a
transaction is unlikely to be real; sooner or later the community will identify her transgression
and her as its perpetrator. In vaguer social capital terms, the generalized norm of trust penetrates
very deeply into the community. Bridging these two approaches, the law and economics
explanation of such a condition is that the social networks of the community are robust enough
so as to make it economically unproductive for an individual actor to weigh the risks involved in
defection in such a situation. The efficient rule of thumb, the default rule, which saves
individuals the (transaction) costs associated with calculating risks and benefits over and over
again in each new instance, is to treat all countrymen reciprocally. It is this law and economics
view of the efficient rule (the rule that minimizes the sum of transaction costs and opportunity
costs) that frames the following discussion of two largely anonymous economic transactions in
Central Asia's largest (and hence assumedly its most anonymous) city, Tashkent. These two
transactions, among the most common in the city, are the processes of waiting in lines and riding
in private taxis.
Of course, the former Soviet Union is famous for its lines, but these lines are also the
setting for a rich set of cultural norms; an identifiable set of rules guides the behavior of
participants in these lines. At first sight, many of these lines appear to Western observers to be
chaotic mobbings; no single-file construction meets the eye. However, quite outside the law, or
at least the reach of the law should a transgression occur, these mobbings contain a large
complement of social order. For example, most participants in the line can easily point to the
three or four people in front and in back of them. Accordingly, in the event that someone breaks
ahead in line, several line participants can identify such a transgression.
Pure rational actor theory predicts that, in such instances, those waiting in line behind the
transgression will have a reason to expel rule-breakers, while those ahead of the link in the line
under question will be indifferent. However, in actual cases of rule infraction, participants on
both sides of the line take active part in re-establishing order. In many cases, honest mistake lies
at the heart of line arguments; newcomers are expected to seek out and find the last person in
"line" and inform that individual that she or he is assuming the next position. Because the line's
occupants are scattered and conditions for communication often less than ideal, two people often
believe they are directly behind the same person. In such cases, persons immediately in front of
and behind this confusion take equal part in determining the correct order of the line; in almost
all circumstances anterior participants take the opinions of those in front of the confusion as
authoritative determinations. The observation relevant here to an observation about the
reciprocity aspects of social capital is that the people in forward positions in the line simply do
not ignore what is happening in the anterior parts of the line when appeals are made to them.
That they do not is a partial suggestion that the region boasts a healthy stock of some social
capital assets.
Soviet practices also, through both law and norms, allowed certain persons the option of
moving towards the front of the line. The very elderly, those with infants, World War II
veterans, and, occasionally, average citizens offering impassioned reasons for being unable to
wait were allowed to move ahead in the line. While signs often outlined rules for such privileges
in the Soviet period, such signs have become increasingly uncommon in the post-Soviet period.
In stark contrast to what scholars like Fukuyama predict to follow in the wake of the removal of
authoritarian rules", the loss of these signs has not ended the authority of these special privileges
in practice. If anything, in recent years in Tashkent such privileges have experienced a renewed
vigor with these Soviet-era privileged categories trumping other possible privileged categories,
such as the category that comprises foreigners.
This phenomenon of persistent line privileges also suggests a strong stock of certain
social capital assets. Although pure self-interest can explain why people monitor lines (every
person spends equal amounts of time in the front and end parts of lines every day), such an
explanation does not go far in explaining why these privileges maintain intact. Large numbers of
people will never, or believe they will never, carry infants, be war veterans, or be disabled. The
reason why they nevertheless adhere to the social norms described above in anonymous
situations is best illustrated through the following discussion of taxis; the reason is the same
reason that explains the maintenance of taxi social norms throughout Central Asia.
The practice of using private cars as taxis remains the province of very informal
bargaining and generalized trust. To get from one place to another in any Central Asian city,
most people are indifferent as to whether the car that they flag down is a taxi or a private
automobile. During Soviet times, whereas official taxis were expensive, drivers of private
automobiles offered fair odds of refusing payment, especially for passengers with interesting
stories, attractive figures, or destinations that required no detours. One result of the disassembly
of the USSR is that such free rides are now a rarity, and virtually all private cars charge fares.
Over the years, police in every republic have periodically attempted to discourage such private
entrepreneurs, but both riders and drivers have quickly found ways to work around such efforts;
at present the practice is generally tolerated everywhere. The vast majority of trips take place in
private cars, and there is no real difference in price between cars and taxis. Sometimes riders or
drivers negotiate fares in advance; just as often no such advance negotiation occurs. Almost as
universally known as the current dollar/local currency rate of exchange, city residents know
current taxi fares.
That strangers so regularly pick up strangers, especially when riders always have the
option of waiting for formal taxis, hints at a certain level of trust. Likewise, that both drivers and
riders so often fail to negotiate fares in advance also suggests a certain level of trust. Perhaps
most telling, when fares are not negotiated ex ante, disagreements frequently break out at
destination points. However, these disagreements almost never last long, and they virtually
never result in any violence; they are contained by a set of informal rules, and a mutually
agreeable fare usually only requires less than a minute to negotiate.
Further, both taxis and private cars can easily be hired for more complex services. Upon
arrival at a destination, you can ask a driver to wait while you run an errand. What makes the
driver's agreement of interest for social capital is that, if the driver agrees, only in rare
circumstances will you be asked to pay for the trip just taken or leave possessions in the car as
insurance. Drivers are relatively unconcerned that riders will use such a request as a pretext to
avoid paying a fare. Of course, some riders do welch on their obligations in this manner; drivers
readily remember numerous such incidents when queried on the subject. Yet, these situations
have nevertheless not coaxed drivers into demanding security payments from their riders.
Both taxi and line norms in Central Asia raise a number of interesting questions. Why
would people risk confrontation in a line for the sake of strangers? Why would drivers and
SFukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, p. 30.
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riders so often fail to negotiate fares in advance when doing so is a simple affair? Why do
drivers leave them themselves so open to cheating passengers? How can one reconcile this
trusting behavior with true stories about graft, extortion, and the fleecing of gullible Western
businesspeople in the region? I find answers to all these questions by arguing that an
appreciation of how social capital operates on the ground in Central Asia emphasizes and refines
three aspects of social capital assets. Namely, these aspects are their positive information
externalities, their role in redefining community bonds in even large groups, and their
fundamental nature as operative assets instead of moral imperatives.
First, the information economics of social capital are an intrinsic element of social
capital. In both lines and in taxis, Central Asians talk and share information. From both sources,
individuals gather valuable information about where to (or where one can) secure certain goods
and services and at what prices, learn what jobs are available, and learn about current events in
their cities. That this information is valuable creates incentives for Central Asians to facilitate
the cooperative atmosphere in which this information exchange occurs, for example even if this
means paying the price of risking loss of a taxi fare. While the information externalities of such
interactions between strangers could theoretically be negative, within Central Asia they are
overwhelmingly positive.
Second, during the course of such communication, people quite often discover that,
although apparently strangers, they have acquaintances in common. Whereas in the English
speaking world, it is a popular myth that the lives of any two people are separated by no more
than six other people (seven degrees ofseparation), in no Central Asian city is that true. Three
degrees of separation are all that separate most people in even the largest cities; most people
know by name and face a thousand or more of their urban compatriots. In such an environment,
anonymity is more apparent than actual and the boundaries of community membership are
greatly expanded.
Finally, the transactions detailed above belong to a cadre of interpersonal relations in
Central Asia that define the core of one's social being, that define what kind of person one is both
personally and in the community. These low-stake transactions, characterized by strong positive
externalities of information, contrast sharply with the kind of perverse business dealings that
make the region's investment climate suspect in the eyes of foreign investors. The high-payoffs
of business dealings help explain how the same driver who is unconcerned with whether a
passenger will pay his fare would be well advised against entrusting a large investment with his
passenger.
This description resonates with the stark contrast Robert Kaplan describes existing
between Africa and Central Asia. Kaplan praises the extent of social order in Central Asia, while
describing Africa as a place in which exactly the kinds of low-stakes transactions described
above deserve no amount of trust12 .
In summary, for economic relations, there are two worlds of social capital in Central
Asia. In the first world, a world of unusual trust in which information sharing and low stakes
prevail, the game strategy of most participants is to cooperate. In the other world, one of little
trust in which high stakes trump the positive information externalities of the business social
network, the risk of defection is much greater.
12 See Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century.
Bridging Social Capital: Social Associations and Civil Society
Social capital is generally coterminous with civil society, but the two should not be confused. A
vibrant civil society assumes high levels of social capital within a variety of secondary
associations, but it also highlights the organizational capital character of social capital by
connecting the latter to a variety of political functions, such as expression of diverse values,
ensuring the accountability of state agencies, and providing alternatives to state services. These
organizational capital functions of civil society actors need not by definition take place within
secondary associations that are engaged in using and creating social capital. For instance, neither
a rigidly hierarchical NGO that employs its only workers full time, nor a one-person
organization, even if both organizations are highly successful, resonates with the social capital
idealistic view of NGOs as voluntary, secondary associations that expand the density of a
community's social networks and build trust. As a corollary, the lack of civil society is by no
means dispositive of the absence of social capital, even though it does speak to the lack of
important connections between social capital and organizational capital
Accordingly, a strong stock of social capital is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
component of a vibrant civil society. That said, social capital is probably a very important
component of strong civil societies. It may be especially important for any civil society whose
strength is in part built on organizational diversity, for instance with formal primary association
organizations (i.e. the Washington, D.C. corporate office of Sierra Club) complementing the
efforts of more informal secondary associations (local volunteer Sierra Club chapters).
Likewise, all other things being equal, a civil society infused with a large stock of social capital
is probably more effective in its organizational missions and produces more positive externalities
than one weak in social capital.
These observations highlight the assumptions behind the use of NGOs by scholars as a
convenient proxy for social capital, and the serious limitations behind these assumptions. The
social capital relevance of quantitative measurements of members, numbers of organizations, and
rates of growth of both membership or organizations depends on the qualitative horizontality,
secondariness, and social penetration of these members and organizations. This Section thus
attempts to survey the history of NGOs in Central Asia, with an emphasis on environmental civil
society, from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.
For roughly a century, Russia and Central Asia answered to the same sovereign authority.
During that time, both the legal system that bred the first Russian NGOs and some of those
Russian NGOs themselves heavily influenced Central Asia. Current Western development
efforts in the former Soviet Union emphasize the need to develop a local language for NGOs and
expand the number of indigenous NGOs. These efforts are curiously unaware that terms such as
"private voluntary organizations" were in use in Russia a century ago, long before they became
13 Fukuyama misses this point, conflating the lack of an independent Soviet civil society with a total absence of both
social capital and secondary associations. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, pp.
54-55, passim. To read Fukuyama is to imagine the USSR as a place where people went to work and then came
home to (conniving) families, nothing more; in between the individual and state there were "virtually no social
groups whatsoever." Ibid, p. 55. Excluded from Fukuyama's view are the facts that Soviets socialized outside the
family in informal secondary associations. See, description of "spontaneous socializing" in Ibid. They also prized
family, participated in many formal secondary associations (which while state-run were still secondary), and had
potentially greater access to several forms of association (ballet schools, civil aviation clubs, etc.) than Western
counterparts.
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popular in the United States. There were, in fact, hundreds of thousands of NGOs in Tsarist
Russia.
The first such NGO, the Friendly Learned Society, was formed in 1782". In the five
years from 1896-1900, more than 1000 charitable poverty relief societies were formed in the
Russian Empire15 . The spectrum of NGOs also included at least five credit unions by 1868, such
as the Petersburg Mutual Credit Society whose insolvency in 1869 was due to over-liberal
lending standards16 . By 1868, non-profit banks had also appeared".
In addition to charitable organizations, the Russian Empire also boasted a large number
of academic and advocacy organizations. The Mineralogical Society (1816), the Russian
Geographical Society, and the Russian Archaeological Society (both 1840s) grew into large
institutions. Yet, their formation and continued control by foreign scientists (usually German),
as well as their unambiguous ties to the autocracy, argue against accepting these organizations as
great leaps forward for civil society and social capital in Russia.
In contrast, a host of learned societies that sprang up" after Russia's defeat in the Crimean
War did encourage civil society and social capital formation. The Chemical Society, the
Moscow Mathematical Society, the Moscow Society for the Dissemination of Technical
Knowledge, and the Juridical Society are some of the dozens of organizations that appeared in
the 1860s to occupy new ground between private life and the state. Often peopled by scientists
eager to encourage the material and cultural development of the state, the projects and agendas of
these groups regularly challenged the conservative entrenched policies of the autocracy.
Moreover, unlike their predecessors, lacking the financial backing of the state, these
organizations had fewer problems reconciling their goals with those of their financial backers.
For example, of more than two dozen such societies recognized by the Ministry of
National Education in 1865, only seven received continuous financial support from the Russian
state18 . By the 1870s, literacy committees under a variety of names offered courses of
instruction to women in university cities. They also attracted the volunteer time of Russia's
greatest scientists and scores of progressive students in active constructive protest against
continued state resistance to opening the doors of institutions of higher education to women and
minorities.
Several of these academic societies have great historical importance' 9 . The Ledentsov
Society for the Advancement of the Exact Sciences and Their Practical Applications began in
1903. When roughly half of Russian university science professors lost or resigned their posts in
a conflict with the government in 1911, the Ledentsov Society provided salaries, stipends, and
research facilities for many of them. Without the Ledentsov Society, many of these scientists,
some of whom later garnered international acclaim, would have emigrated from Russia, a
curious observation considering the current mass emigration to Russia from Central Asia of
scientists (as well as from Russia to the West).
"1Ael Lindenmeyr, PvryiNoAVieChrtSceyanthSttinIeilRusa(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 101-102.
"~ Ibid, p. 237.
16 Thomas Owen, The Corporation under Russian Law, 1800-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
p. 48.
18 Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture 1861-1917, p. 83.
1For information on these science-oriented NGOs, see Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union and
Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture 1861-1917.
The Pirogov Medical Society was founded in the 1880s in honor of Nikolai Pirogov, a
famous surgeon who supported the autocracy. Despite its namesake's politics, the Pirogov
Society eventually outraged the Tsarist regime through its grassroots efforts to address medical
problems as social problems. By the 1905 Revolution, the Pirogov Society, virtually an umbrella
association of practicing Russian physicians, had to manage its campaign to fight a cholera
epidemic covertly; at the same time, it overtly encouraged all physicians to fight the autocracy in
the name of democratic reforms2
On the eve of the 1905 Revolution, foreshadowing the politics of the post-Soviet era, the
regime attempted to undermine the power of independent associations by creating and fostering
state-sponsored quasi-NGOs. Ironically, it was one of these quasi-trade unions, the Assembly of
Factory Workers, that sparked the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution in St. Petersburg. After the
revolution, in March 1906 a new NGO decree, "On Temporary Rules About Societies and
Unions," passed. It restricted state officials from participation in any organization with political
goals, and gave the Ministry of Internal Affairs the power to close organizations whose activities
threatened the social order2 .
Concurrent to the outbreak of the 1905 revolution, several quasi-NGO structures
endeavored to facilitate independence and self-government in Central Asia. Most of these
organizations embraced either direct or implicit appeals to the authority of Islam and were
innately political. While they often worked at odds with one another, the Islamic Council, the
Council of Religious Scholars, the Association of Working Muslims, the Society of Turkistanian
Federalists, and the Society of Turkic Federalists adopted names and organizational principles
that clearly displayed the influence of Russian culture and Russian norms of mobilizing political
power, despite the fact that their membership was non-Russian. These organizations existed
alongside other, local organizations that are usually ignored in scholarship since they are more
often considered as traditions, rather than as organizations. For example, ancient chivalric
organizations of middle class citizens and trade corporations existed in a variety of Central Asian
cities24
The immigrant Russian-speaking population also established its own organizations,
primarily in urban areas such as Tashkent, Samarkand, and Ashgabad. These organizations, or at
least the ones that garnered attention at the time or, later, the attention of academic writers,
boasted similar political motivations; perhaps, outside of church related associations, only a
handful of these organizations could really be considered nonpartisan charities.
One of the first and the most important of these groups was the Pushkin Society . . . whose
avowed aim was to conduct schools on Sunday for workers, open public reading rooms, and give
lectures. Until 1904-1905 all the opposition groups flocked around this society without worrying
about the divergencies expressed then in Russia between the parties. The activities of the society
very quickly disturbed the local authorities, and the military commander of Tashkent pointed out
in 1905 that "the Pushkin Society for cultural dissemination has long since been transformed into a
social-democratic and revolutionary society 5 "
20 Ibid, pp. 229-23 1.
21 Christian, ImeiladSve usa pp. 14 1-3.
22 I. A. Lsaev, Istoriya gosudarstva i prava Rossii (Moscow: Yurist, 1996), p. 313.
23 Richard Lorenz, "Economic Bases of the Basmachi Movement in the Farghana Valley" in Edward Allworth ed.,
Muslim Communities Reemerge, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 277.
24 See Sukhareva, Kvartalnava obschina pozdnefeodalnogo goroda Bukhary.
25 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Stirring of National Feeliin" in Edared Alworth ed., Central Asia (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1994), p. 172. References omitted. History repeats itself; a Kazakhstan deputy minister of
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Jadid (reformist Islamic) groups became especially influential in this period, both on their
own merits and thanks to support from Russia. However, eventually, the Empire's
administrators in Central Asia interpreted the growing involvement of the local population in
revolutionary activities (and some Jadid newspapers, especially after 1905, were considered
revolutionary) as substantially more threatening than the activities of orthodox religious
organizations. For example, in the first years of the 20th century, the Union of Holy Bukhara, a
Jadidist association, eventually led to the creation of the Young Bukharan Party26 , and secret
societies such as Marifat, Barakat, and the Society for the Education of Youth appeared.
Accordingly, 20th century Russian attempts to co-exist with or control Islam in Central Asia
gradually developed into policies aimed at protecting Islam in its "most rigid, hardened forms" in
the belief that doing so would impede the development of potentially more reactionary social
movements28
It should be noted here that the organizations listed above, despite their fame among
scholars, often boasted far less than 100 members, often fewer than 2029. This point will become
important when Glasnost and independence era organizations are reviewed below since one of
the main criticisms of the new NGOs of Central Asia is that they often have fewer than 20
members.
A core concept in civil society literature is that a private sector exists as a counterweight
to the state; thus, civil society precludes absolutism. Thus, it is of no small importance that,
contrary to popular Western beliefs, destatization was a cornerstone of late Soviet development
policy. The evolution of this policy during the middle decades of the USSR should be
understood as the enabler of the explosion of Glasnost civil society.
In theory, the establishment of the Soviet state and the nationalization of economic
activity (in order to eradicate the perverse influences of private ownership of the means of
production) were supposed to be followed by a devolution of state power into nongovernmental
hands. By Stalin's death, the Soviet state had progressed far in eradicating private initiative and
concentrating state power. Khruschev in turn, in repudiating Stalin's excesses at the Twentieth
Party Congress in 1956 and in the 1961 Party Program, placed devolution of state power and
functions onto social associations as a primary mission of the next stage of communist
development, leading to the eventual withering of the state. Druzhiny (brigades) of citizen
police, comrades' courts, and other social associations were meant to handle the basic
governmental functions of securing public order, while a variety of more charitable associations,
like the Red Cross and the Knowledge Society, were hoped to advance public health, education,
and related fields. Not truly nongovernmental, these parastatal organizations were nevertheless
somewhat independent.
internal affairs issued a letter to regional departments of internal affairs on 22 October 1997wangthmht
NGOs were really revolutionary societies. Anonymous, "Kazakstan Government ThreatensHuaRihsEctn
News 6 (1994), pp. 2-4.
26 d'Encausse, "The Stirring of National Feeling", p. 196.
27Ibdp.18
28 Iip.11
wariIbihmcha
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Soviet law recognized three types of social associations: social organizations, social
movement organizations, and social self-government organizations (SSGOs) 30 . The first two
types relate to horizontal (bridging) expressions of social capital. Social organizations, like trade
unions and the Red Cross/Red Crescent, displayed (ideally) four leglly identifying elements:
voluntary membership, a charter, property, and self-government. Social movement
organizations, typified by the Soviet Peace Committee, were more informal and lacked
membership. Since membership was meaningless anyway in the Soviet context of state funding,
there were, for our present purposes, few salient differences between social organizations and
social movements.
Soviet social associations
during this period enjoyed a special TABLE 1: NUMBER OF NOOs ACTIVE AT EN] OF YEAR
relationship with the state. The Soviet IN KAZAKHISSR
state was envisioned as REGION 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 TOTAl
democratically holding property in __ _I-_FORMIE
trust and acting as a fiduciary for Alma-Ata 0 2 10 33 44 64
citizens consonant with the idea of Djambul 0 0 1 2 2 4
Dzhezkazgan 0 0 0 2 2 2popular sovereignty. Social Karaganda 0 0 1 5 8 8
associations were envisioned as Kokchetav 1 1 1 2 2 3
subsidiary organizations, more Pavlodar 1 2 1 2 6 10
efficient since subsidiary, but with Norther-Kazakhstan 0 0 0 2 7 9
essentially identical fiduciary duties. Semipalatinsk 0 0 1 5 8 9
This conception of fiduciary duties, Taldy-Kurgan 0 0 2 2 3 5
resting on both subsidiaiity and Tselinograd 1 2 3 6 8 11
popular sovereignty 3 K, explains much Chimnt 0 0 2 5 6 16
of the structure of Soviet society. It TOTAL 3 7 22 66 96 141
explinswhySovit achiectsscofed Adapted from Ponomarev, Obschestvennye orgzanizatsiV
explinswhySovit achiectsscofedKazakhstane i Kygystn 1987-199
at the utility of separation of powers
32
why Soviet doctrinaire political scientists could not acknowledge social or environmental
problems 3 3, why Soviet civil society was parastata 34, and why nongovermental organizations
were corporatist35.
30 See Galina Kudryavtseva, Materialnaya osnova devatelnosti obschestvennykh organizatsii na sovremennom etape(Moscow: Nauka, 1988). See also Aron Isaakovich Schiglic Zakoniomernosti sanovieniya i razvitiya
obschestvennykh organizatsii v SSSR (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), pp 3-4. SSGOs are the subject of the next Section.31 This terminology differs from that used 'in Soviet texts, but accurately conveys the conceptions in these texts.
32According to the standard Soviet legal account, only bourgeois democracies required separation of powers given
their intrinsic lack of a state purpose. In contrast, the USSR was imagined to have a clear purpose (in the Hegelian
sense) and its agents to have undivided loyalties.
33Soviet political scientists, economists, and legal scholars envisaged social and environmental problems as
resulting from the rent-seeking of private actors. Since all relevant actors in the Soviet economy (factories,
lanners, state agencies) were supposed to be agents of the state and people, rent-seeking was a priori precluded.
4 Conflicts between nonstate and state agencies were similarly theoretically precluded by the confluence of
fiduciary duties. While nonstate agencies could claim to overcome certain transaction costs (particularly in
information and monitoring costs), they could not reasonably be imagined to be in conflict with the state. Beginning
in the Constitution of the USSR in 1936, and continuing until a February 1990 removal of the clause, Article 6 (Art.
126 in the 1936 Constitution) defined the climate in which social associations operated: "The Communist Party of
the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and of state
agencies and social associations. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people . . . ." USSR Art. 6 (1976).
Since the values of nonstate organizations were merely in their subsidiarity (both in terms of issue disaggregation
and in terms of geographic particularity), it would be wasteful for the Soviet state or people to have two clubs for
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This curious intellectual tradition and policy framework set the stage for an enormous
amount of growth among noncorporatist and independent NGOs in CentralAsia beginning in
1987 (see Table 1). However, roughly a year before the USSR disassembled, grassroots NGOs
began to decrease their activities and disband. Two of the reasons why NGOs up to this time
could operate in Central Asia may have been because most people, especially in urban areas, had
significant leisure time (without television 36) and because the cost of basic office supplies and
communications (mail, telephone, transportation) was low enough to be fuinded out of one or
more members' pockets. A fundamental change in way of life began previous to 1990, but by
1990 it strongly affected people's behavior and outlook. Rising prices and second jobs
slaughtered small NGOs that united five or six people and were run out of someone's kitchen.
Those small NGOs that did survive had to change their basic structure and operations to become
more like a primary association employer and less like a secondary association club.
Unfortunately, we will never know how many NGOs formed and dissolved in Central
Asia during Perestroika. The only directory prepared during this period is an analysis that is not
interested in NGOs as components of civil society, but only in NGOs (including political parties)
as nascent political forces. This directory indicates that in Kazakhstan from 1987 to 1991 (for 11
of Kazakhstan's 19 regions) over 151 NGOs and 24 independent publications formed. These
formations were more common in the north than in the south (with the exception of Alma-Ata)
and 90% of them were located in the republican or regional capitals37 . The same directory lists
27 NGOs (more than 18 of them existing at the end of 1990) and 6 independent publications for
Bishkek, and a very conservative estimate of more than 53 NGOs formed (and more than 36
operating in 1991 ) and 8 independent publications for all of Kyrgyzstan.
However, Ponomarev's research, prepared from justice ministry lists and concerning only
politically active39 NGOs, does not identify smaller or less political NGO initiatives in smaller
towns. At the other extreme, a deputy prosecutor in Kazakhstan in September 1988, probably
through subjective overestimation of quasi-political groups and certainly inclusive of non-
registered organizations, estimated 300 NGOs in Kazakhstan with roughly 3,000 members40 .
Returning to Ponomarev, despite his understated number of NGOs, exclusion of 8 regions of
Kazakhstan, and exclusion of ethnic centers and Kazakh Tili, he estimates that roughly 10,000
people were moderately politically active and 1500 were very active in Kazakhstan through
NGOs during Glasnost 41. He similarly estimates, excluding Ashar, DMK, and the national
radio enthusiasts, two environmental organizations, or two women's councils. Accordingly, Soviet civil society was
diverse in a corporatist, but not a pluralistic, sense.
36 Putnam implicates television as perhaps the major culprit in the decline of social capital in the United States.
Putnam notes that television "privatizes" personal lives, an interesting observation considering privatization of state
assets throughout the former Soviet Union. Robert D. Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance
of Social Capital in America" (Unpublished speech delivered as the 1995 Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture of the
American Political Science Association).
37 Vitalii Ponomarev, Obschestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane 1987-1991 (Alma-Ata: Glagol,
1991), p. 6. For the earliest coherent English language report on NGOs iniKazakhstaii see Bsess Brown, "Informal
Groups in Kazakhstan," Radio Liberty Research Report, RL 549/88 (Dec. 1, 1988). For a more current general
theoretical investigation of NGOs in Central Asia see Saltmarshe, "Civil Society and Sustainable Development in
Central Asia."
3Ponomarev. Obschestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgzstane 1987-1991, p. 82.
39Fo Ponomarev, "political" does not mean partisan, but engagement in any activity that could have an eventual
political character. Thus, this includes almost all environmental, ethnic, publication, and even discussion NGOs.
40 Ingvar Svanberg, "Kazakhs," in Graham Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (New York:
Longman, 1990), p. 208.
41 Ponomarev, Obschestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane 1987-199 1, p. 7.
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culture centers, 1200 moderately politically active and 300 very active individuals in Kyrgyzstan
NGOs during the summer of 199042.
Ponomarev's estimates are certainly conservative. While he lists only 100 very active
members and more than 700 members total for Nevada-Semipalatinsk, the organization
advertised itself as comprised of over one million members. It collected over one million
signatures for a petition to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test-site. Similar situations exist for
Edinstvo, Zheltoksan, and other political NGOs in Kazakhstan43. Moreover, while Ponomarev
lists only 22 NGOs active at the end of 1988, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda posited more than 100 in
November 198844.
Asserting that 70% of these early NGOs in Kazakhstan were effectively local
independent NGOs engaged in building bridging social capital, Ponomarev also, somewhat
confusingly, divides Kazakhstan's NGOs into interest categories: 35% are partisan political, 30%
are environmental or peace, 15% are national cultural (ethnic), 10% are historical educational
(and, ostensibly, human rights), and 10% are "other"45 . While this general compositional
dissociation holds true for the other republics, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan far fewer NGOs
formed, perhaps an order of magnitude fewer. Tajikistan, while less vibrant than Kazakhstan or
Kyrgyzstan, boasted an NGO community and civil society more active than that of Turkmenistan
or Uzbekistan.
Outside of numbers, across the region during this period existing environmental NGOs in
Central Asia had teeth. Green Salvation (KZ) illustrates the unusual abilities expressed by
environmental NGOs. In a case that went up to the Procurator General of the USSR on the eve
of the disassembly of the Soviet Union (and therefore a case that simply died), Green Salvation
sued Alma-Ata's mayor for gross professional and criminal negligence in performing his duties
in a previous post. The group alleged that Mayor Nurkadilov willfully failed to enforce
environmental and safety standards. They alleged, inter alia, a dereliction of duty that on one
count resulted in an explosion at an illegally situated, but officially approved, railway fuel station
in Alma-Ata that killed 16 people, including five children 4 6. The fact that five average citizens
could bring an individual symbolic of the political, economic, and criminal elite of Kazakhstan to
court and potentially win is testimony to the seriousness of the early Gorbachev reforms and the
promise of NGOs. Almost as important, Green Salvation's financing came from the income that
the group received from a consulting business to banks engaged in automating their operations
and from the 1% of their gross incomes that group members gave the organization in
membership dues.
Concurrently the nascent Dashkhovuz Ecological Guardians (TM) ran a computer
programming business to help finance its anti-poaching efforts. The Guardians won the right
from local law enforcement agencies to make citizen arrests for violations of environmental law.
And they exercised this right by, at times violently, preventing would-be poachers from shooting
and capturing native fauna. The physical scars displayed by some members of this NGO attest to
the level of commitment of this organization, while the technological prowess and wide talents
of the organization's members enabled the organization to give full expression to that
commitment.
42 Ibid, p. 82.
4Ibid.
"Razbuzhennoi initsiative- politicheskuyu zrelost i sozidatelnost," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (Nov. 27 1988), pp.
1-2.
Ponomarev, Obschestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgvzstane 1987-1991, p. 11.
46 S. Kuratov and A. Salin, "Gotovtes, katastrofa zaplanirovana," Panorama (Oct. 18, 1990), p. 4.
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At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, two general types of non-profit
organizations existed: the independent NGOs described above and their more lackluster
communist corporatist peers. The latter type of organization was more affected by the breakup.
Usually completely dependent on the state for funding, often disinterested in public opinion, and
too frequently lacking in clear purposes, the communist-era organizations were ill suited for
existence independent of state support. In some cases, especially for critical welfare programs,
reduced state assistance did continue after 1991, but it was often delayed and small. The
recipients of immense subsidies from the Soviet state for so many years, independent Central
Asia was stymied by the problem of where to find new sources of funding for social programs
and state-sponsored non-profits. Initial hopes of international support, especially among the
region's environmentalists, were quelled when actual amounts of foreign assistance became
evident.
However, most of the more visible organizations were not so directly threatened in the
first year or two of independence. Very often, these organizations, forming the core of residual
corporatism, possessed large offices in the center of cities and were directed by individuals with
direct and intimate connections with the local political and economic elites, in other words with
elite social capital. These resources allowed them to remain visible, lowered their operating
costs, and gave them the option of renting out office space for cash. It also enabled possibilities
for special governmental consideration, exposure to foreign funders, and insulation from
enforcement of tax and other legal obligations. Nevertheless, even with these considerable
advantages, many communist non-profits withered away. There are three reasons for this, two of
which are internal. First, governments have been less willing to provide these organizations with
resources. Second, the elites in these organizations fled to positions in emerging commercial
structures, where ministry contacts and family names turned out to be no less important. Finally,
the vast majority of communist organizations failed to reorganize themselves into viable NGOs
with clear missions.
As a typical example of the operations of a voluntary society [communist non-profit], one can take
the work of the Kazakhstan Nature Protection Society (NPS). The Society was organized in 1962
by a decision of the Council of Ministers of the republic for the purposes of providing popular
environmental education. Despite quickly changing economic and socio-political conditions,
NPS's work is still formulated on the basis of unfulfillable five year plans. The leadership of the
society essentially ignores the problems stemming from the difficult environmental conditions in
various regions of Kazakhstan. The only large action of the NPS in the past two years was a
"popular mobilization" to green the streets in honor of the Society's thirtieth anniversary. The
organization suffers chronic financial problems, because of which a number of regional affiliates
have been forced to involve themselves in agricultural projects: in Kzyl-Orda Region a small rice
growing business, in Northern Kazakhstan Region grain, in Kokchetav Region potatoes, etc. The
NPS does not cooperate with native or foreign environmental organizations".
Those organizations that lacked a mission rarely found one. By the end of 1995, the dust
had largely settled. Most communist non-profits had disappeared. Some had become, although
somewhat stilted, NGOs. The vast majority of those that survived found a way to plug in either
to state political needs, often connected with state-building, or to become attractive to businesses.
While some businesses did and do contribute to charities, the most important connections
between businesses and non-profits are popularly suspected as stemming from the ability of non-
profits to avoid taxes or act as holding companies.
Ponomarev, "Sostoyaniye i tendentsiya razvitiye dobrovol'cheskogo sektora v Kazakhstane", p. 65.
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Similarly, grassroots NGOs encountered massive setbacks during this period. The
challenges of meeting basic operational costs that slowed their growth in 1990-1991 intensified
as the prices of basics, such as telephone calls, skyrocketed. While regular mail was less
expensive, it also became unreliable. Membership and volunteer participation plummeted as
formerly active individuals channeled their activism into private businesses, took second jobs to
make ends meet, lost faith in their organization's ability to effect change, or emigrated. Many
NGOs were not able to muster the time and resources necessary to re-register their organizations
within the one year grace period after enactment of national laws on social associations. The
impressive regional and union-wide communication networks that had developed only a year or
two earlier fell apart. International contacts floundered as fax costs were impossible to meet,
even for incoming faxes. Worse, beginning in 1993, even those local groups that secured access
to e-mail found that their potential partners, especially in Europe, were dependent on faxes and
unconnected to e-mail.
They also found that they had, somewhere, lost a generation. During the very difficult
1992-94 years, the vast majority of dedicated grassroots activists were between 35 and 65.
People in their twenties were rarities, despite the fact that, according to Ponomarev, at the end of
the Soviet period, almost one-quarter of associations were comprised only of youth (65% in
Kyrgyzstan) and young adults, and one half of all NGO activists were under 3048. Thus, for
example, Pavlodar's Ecology and Public Opinion (KZ), arguably the oldest continuously active
registered NGO in Central Asia, has based its work on a full time staff person and roughly 30
active members, over 75% of whom are over 50. What happened is that, where possible, youth
fled to the allure of the private sector, which considering its novelty, its brandishment as a
panacea for social ills, and the promise of the fruits of a market economy, could be considered as
an activist decision. Throughout Central Asia, in the environmental sector, the emigration of
scientists and the exodus of younger activists led to an observable increase in numbers of the
"pleasantly insane and scientifically illiterate49."
Furthermore, independence knocked the wind out of many NGOs. At the time, some
environmental groups, especially Nevada-Semipalatinsk, had built thriving constituencies by
blaming Moscow for local ecological disasters. By adapting their discourse to complement the
"ascending spiral of local assertiveness 50," they accrued nationalist backing, while maintaining
their environmental constituency. However, in an independent Kazakhstan, demands that
Moscow restore degraded areas lost political force. Suddenly, the movement's demands could
only be directed to republican structures that did not appreciate being saddled with additional
problems. Moreover, in the case of Nevada-Semipalatinsk, the nuclear testing ground that was
the rallying cry for the organization's activities was closed". Similar situations held for
organizations of deported ethnic groups lobbying to be allowed to return to their homelands and
48
Ponomarev, Obschestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane 1987-1991, pp. 7, 82. Also see
Ponomarev, "Sostoyaniye i tendentsiya razvitiye dobrovol'cheskogo sektora v Kazakhstane'' and Svanberg,
"Kazaks."
4Sergei Kuratov, "The Kazakstan Green Movement" (Unpublished 1993 Report commissioned by the HIVOS
Foundation).
Gregory Gleason, "The 'National Factor' and the Logic of Sovietology," in Alexander J. Motyl ed., The Post-
Soviet Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 1-29.
Roughly one tenth of the entire area of Kazakhstan, much of it degraded through testings, was under thejurisdiction of the Soviet military. Thus, the case of Moscow's problems suddenly becoming Almaty's problems was
much larger than simply the one Semipalatinsk testing ground. See Ponomarev, "Sostoyaniye i tendentsiya razvitiye
dobrovol'cheskogo sektora v Kazakhstane".
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Islamic revivalist groups. Whereas they were previously primary beneficiaries of the struggle
between the union republics and the center, after independence, they became gadflies to the
newly independent states.
While gadflies to new governments, these same organizations were and are the darlings
of international donors. Several foreign programs, channeling in total roughly $25,000,000 to
local NGOs, have existed in Central Asia over the past decade. The largest, most influential, and
most well-known of these is Counterpart Consortium, funded by USAID. Whatever
Counterpart's successes (and they are scant given the organization's lack of case studies similar
to those of Green Salvation and Dashkhovuz Ecological Guardians above), the emphases of its
grants belie both the civil society and the social capital aspects of NGOs. By focusing almost
exclusively in its early years on NGOs as alternative, but state-funded, providers of social
services, Counterpart has largely disregarded the organizational capital promise of NGOs in
democracies and market economies. By emphasizing a later vision of NGOs as full-time
employers, Counterpart has similarly ignored the importance of NGOs as secondary associations
that enrich the density of a community's social networks. Since other donor programs are similar
to Counterpart, foreign aid to Central Asian civil society may not actually be helping to build the
social capital of the region.
Likewise, in response to the availability of donor funds, government organized NGOs
(GONGOs) sprang up across the region. Whereas Soviet nonprofits served to push policy goals
of the Communist Party, GONGOs exist to absorb funds and soften the democratizing impacts of
civil society. Uzbekistan has been the most prolific founder of GONGOs, with ECOSAN in the
environmental sphere an excellent example. Most of the 2300 NGOs UNDP cites as having been
created in Uzbekistan since 199152 are either mahalla or GONGOs.
I estimate that there are currently at least 2000 grassroots NGOs in Central Asia that
explicitly or implicitly have the goal of facilitating the development of civil society. However,
this number is conservative and only refers to actual grassroots NGOs, a label not applicable to
the vast majority of social associations and informal associations. Of these, perhaps only a
hundred or so are really very active or composed of more than one or two people. On the other
hand, I expect that the total number of existing social associations, using the Soviet definitions
and categories, of various types must be well over 25,000. For example, while there has usually
been only one grassroots environmental NGO in the Khorog area of Tajikistan, the Pamir
EcoCenter, there are a large number of other environmental groups that can be classified as
social associations.
In 315 grammar schools, 21 extracurricular institutions, and 18 kindergartens, there are 52.7
thousand students and a teaching collective of 6600 teachers and 124 kindergarten instructors.
The schoolchildren have 30 hectares of arable land for scientific experiments and work, and 70
hectares are employed by schoolchildren working brigades from 152 schools. There are roughly
200 functioning voluntary nature protection societies, more than 150 nature lovers' and young
ecologist clubs, and roughly 30 young forester clubs.53
All of this information leads to an ambiguous assessment of social capital and NGOs in
Central Asia's civil society. On the one hand, there were and are an appreciable number of non-
profits working throughout Central Asia, far more in fact than in rnost coher developing regions.
SExecutive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund,
"Second country cooperation framework for U~zbekistan (2000-2004)" (July 17, 2000); DP/CCF/UZB/2, p. 3.
SN. Ilolov, "A chto ob ekoobrazovanii na Pamire?" Tabiat 13 (1996).
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In absolute numbers, there are more NGOs now, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, than in
1990. On the other hand, more pessimistically, there are no longer any massive membership
NGOs in the region to compare to Kazak Tili or Nevada-Semipalatinsk. Furthermore, there may
be no more NGO members today than there were a decade ago.
Also, there is a nagging suggestion that the organizations that exist today, quite apart
from the likelihood that they contribute less dynamically to civil society development, do a
substandard job of creating social capital. Because of economic crisis, failures within the NGO
community, and the perverse priorities of donors, there are almost certainly fewer people who
are volunteers and participants in NGOs as secondary associations than there were even ten years
ago. By trading in this aspect of civil society and formalizing their structures (while failing to
maintain new voluntary structures), the NGOs of Central Asia are gradually decreasing their
claim to be incubators of social capital.
Bonding Social Capital: Mahalla Community Associations4
SSGOs, the third type of Soviet social association defined in the last section, date back to
the earliest days of the regime in legal acts establishing institutions like the 1920 library
committees55, the 1918 police support brigades and the 1919 comrades' courts56. In later years
they more commonly took the form of druzhiny, residential committees, agricultural committees,
and parents' committees for schools. They in general served as the locus of civil society in its
closest connection to primary associations. Activities of SSGOs included presenting state
agencies with the opinions and ideas of constituents and facilitating rights of citizens to
participate in managin the state and society. They were intended to, and did, assume quasi-
governmental powers5 , even police powers in the case of druzhiny members' authority to make
arrests. SSGOs were formed by decrees of state agencies and, unlike social organizations, did
not have paid staff or status as legal persons.
By focusing on mahalla, the dominant form of post-Soviet SSGO, we can illustrate one
aspect of "bonding" social capital in primary associations; the externalities of such social capital
are expected theoretically to differ from those attaching to bridging social capital. In particular,
a form of insular "familism" is expected to be common of such social capital. I take it for
granted that mahalla do, indeed, produce such negative externalities, but they also do produce
positive externalities. The positive externalities of insular communities have long been believed
to be most important during crises; as the current situation in Central Asia is a crisis situation for
the residents of the region, the primary concern of this Section is to connect crisis concerns with
the externalities of bonding social capital and to ask whether such bonding capital is currently
being transformed in the post-Soviet period.
~The content of this Section comes from Sievers, "U~zbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential
Associations". The full article contains much more extensive historical and ethnographic analyses.
sV. I. Chekharina, "Organy obschestvennoi samodeyatelnosti v sfere kultury i narodnogo obrazovaniya", in Aron
Isaakovich Schiglik ed., Organy obschestvennoi samodevatelnosti kak forma sotsialisticheskoi demokratii (Moscow:
Nauka, 1988), pp. 76-113.
5V. I. Kriger, "rayobschestvennoi saoeaensiv sfere ohaypravoporyadka", inSchiglik ed., Organy
obschestvennoi samodeyatelnosti kak forma sotsialisticheskoi demokrafli, pp. 150-208.
5For general descriptions of the powers and activities of all types of women's councils and residential committees,
see 0. V. Orlova, "Territorialnye organy obschestvennoi samodeyatelnosti", in Schiglik ed., Organy obschestvennoi
samodeyatelnosti kak fonna sotsialisticheskoi demokratii, pp. 25-75.
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Roughly half of Central Asians live in traditional residential community associations
(RCAs), informal obligatory organizations that provide services to and demand contributions
from residents. These "mahalla" are known by various names and exhibit tremendous diversity
throughout the region. Four basic types of mahalla exist in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. In rural
areas, former state and collective farms comprise mahalla ("rural mahalla"). In cities, mahalla
encompass modem apartment complexes ("apartment mahalla"), blocks of relatively spread-out
single-family dwellings ("new mahalla"), and blocks of densely organized pre-Soviet single-
family dwellings ("traditional mahalla"). These last two types of RCAs are the focus of this
Section; until 1992 no Uzbek would have called a kolkhoz or a high-rise apartment a mahalla.5 8
Fundamental mahalla divisions include family, sex, and status. While each of these
divisions holds significance, family possesses the most significance for the organization of space
in a mahalla, and mahalla themselves probably evolved out of family groupings within
expanding cities. In new and old mahalla, teahouses, markets, mosques, and stores are public
and quasi-public spaces. The private spaces in a mahalla consist of family dwellings, although in
most mahalla community members (especially children) feel free to wander in off the street into
the courtyards of family dwellings. They are not as free to enter the rooms off this courtyard.
The entire perimeter of a mahalla property lot is usually walled-in, and abutting houses
either share a wall or have walls built snug against each other. Newer or more ostentatious
houses may boast small lawns or orchards separating a house from the street. One or more sides
of this walled perimeter contain living quarters, and a courtyard always occupies a sizable
portion of the area of the home. Most windows face in towards this courtyard, and the defining
characteristic of any house is its courtyard. Many courtyards are dedicated to complex gardens
that yield a good part of a family's food from a few square yards of soil, while others combine
more decorative gardens with a pool, decorative brick pathways, an aivan (enclosed porch), or a
pen for livestock. The courtyard is a barometer of wealth and status.
Traditional mahalla are, topographically, face blocks in which streets are not boundaries
but medians of communities59. In contrast, in new mahalla, streets (often major streets)
constitute the boundaries delimiting the edges of mahalla. In either case, mahalla often include
some central guzar collection of institutions, like a bazaar, a mosque, a barbershop, a tea house,
or a store. Mahalla are named, sometimes for people, sometimes for events, and sometimes with
monikers whose meaning is now lost to its residents. While most female socializing occurs
within family courtyards and on streets, men (especially older men) also socialize in a choikhana
(tearoom) or in cafes run out of private courtyards. In the past, where a choikhana did not serve
as a social center, a mosque or market did. Children socialize primarily on streets.
One is a member of a mahalla by virtue of residency, not choice. While one can maintain
an association with a close relative's mahalla, one cannot renounce one's own mahalla except by
moving out. Non-Uzbeks (i.e. Russians) living within mahalla are often not expected to
contribute work and services, or even to participate in mahalla events, but the mahalla usually
58 Uzbekistan law currently differentiates mahalla on the basis of administrative subordination. All urban mahalla
are the same under the law, while a separate legal regime exists for town, village, and settlement mahalla. Zakon
Respubliki Uzbekistan Ob organakh samoupravleniya grazhdan (Sept. 2, 1993, revised on Apr. 14, 1999), Olii
Majlis Resolution 758-1, arts. 10-11.
59 Sukhareva, Kvartalnaya obschina pozdnefeodalnogo goroda Bukhary, p. 13. In U.S. urban sociology and property
scholarship, the term face-block means only two sides of one street. Albert J. Hunter & Gerald D. Suttles, "The
Expanding Community of Limited Liability," in Gerald D. Suttles, The Social Construction of Community 44-81,
55-57 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 44-81, 55-57. In the context used here, it means two sides
of a main street, as well as the more minor streets and alleys that branch off along this length.
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still provides them with services and expects them to acknowledge the mahalla as a primary
social force 60. Even as a theoretical possibility, most Uzbeks reject the possibility of divorcing
oneself from a mahalla. However, while voluntary secession from a mahalla is virtually
unknown, some individuals do become separated from mahalla by becoming outcasts. The
devastating effect of such exclusion is captured by several Uzbek sayings that equate internal
mahalla exile with death. Uzbekistan society brandishes a robust set of non-legal punishments
for those who defect from the requirements of mahalla life. Yet, once a family moves to another
mahalla, ties to the old mahalla are greatly attenuated, and the family is expected to reorient its
social life to the new neighborhood. Similarly, when a woman marries, she settles in her
husband's mahalla (usually in a house shared with her in-laws) and is discouraged from
maintaining strong ties with her former mahalla.
A norm of a right of first refusal is conferred on mahalla members in the event a member
sells a home. In many Islamic areas, only an abutting neighbor enjoys this right, but in Central
Asia it extends to all mahalla members 61. In the event that no intra-mahalla buyer comes
forward, a seller may still not be able simply to sell to the highest bidder. Without the formality
of a New York co-op, but with equivalent scrutiny, the blessing of mahalla leadership is often
sought before final sale. While law does not require this blessing, a family taking up residence
against the wishes of mahalla leaders could be subject to unpleasantries. Savvy immigrants
usually seek such a blessing or, at least, make sure that their immediate neighbors are amenable.
Modem mahalla leadership draws on four distinct sources of authority. Under formal
authority: a chairperson (rais) leads the mahalla committee (kengash). Second, under informal
authority, an aksaqal (whitebeard) is an older male selected by consensus from his generational
cohort for his wisdom, clout, and managerial finesse. As wealth engenders respect, the wealthy
comprise a third authority. Finally, under female authority, a senior woman (kaivoni) assumes
informal leadership roles, often in tandem with formal service on a mahalla women's committee.
In clientalistic Uzbekistan, state power, gerontocracy, wealth, and female status are
usually not diffused throughout the mahalla. Usually a few families capture the bulk of mahalla
leadership positions or alter the comparative weight of these positions so as to capture defacto
power62, notwithstanding formal legal entitlements (a straightforward apportionment of votes
according to population). Yet, the structures, public demands on, and internal composition of
mahalla across Uzbekistan produce a great diversity of allocations of mahalla power.
Mahalla channel several institutions that mediate between mahalla and family, mahalla
and culture, mahalla and survival, and mahalla and commerce. Mahalla even externalize the
most meaningful and intimate relations of nuclear families. Families must (at great expense)
mark births, male circumcision, weddings, and deaths with celebrations, called, generically, toi.
Some toi are open to the community at large, but a number are restricted to more parochial
identity groups, such as adult males. Often, the mahalla owns or possesses a supply of tables,
chairs, cooking supplies, and other implements for such celebrations that it lends or leases to
community members for such occasions.
60 David M. Abramson, "Traditionalizing Modernities and Modernizing Traditions: The Forming and Reforming of
Ideologies in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan," (Unpublished paper presented at 1997 American Anthropological Meeting in
Washington, DC).
61 Sukhareva, Kvartalnava obschina pozdnefeodalnogo goroda Bukhary, p. 19.
62 For the pre-Soviet era, Sukhareva has outlined many of the mechanisms that existed to channel this influence. For
instance, in selection of aksaqal, the wealthy often expressed their preferences to the imam of the local mosque, who
was in charge of nominating candidates. Ibid, p. 33.
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Among the Uzbek traditions that bring mahalla or large parts of a mahalla together are
births (sunnat toi and beshik toi)63, khudoii (prayer)64, toi (weddings), four funeral events spread
over a year65, post-Soviet celebrations (Novruz and Mustakillik"), and gap (mutual aid) 67 . In a
mahalla of 2000 people, excluding the rituals that happen more often than once a year, the annual
and once in a lifetime rituals alone create roughly 200 occasions for community or partial
community gathering in a year6 8 . On average the mahalla community comes together once a
week, although the warmer months actually see more activity.
Even outside of these formal occasions, mahalla are a primary source of social services
for residents. In some Soviet era mahalla, this aspect of mahalla life declined due to the Soviet
welfare state, while under post-Soviet decline, some mahalla have again superceded the state as
the primary provider of social guarantees. Mahalla residents call on each other to provide labor
for house repairs, hand-me-downs to children, and a variety of informal services that are easily
described as neighborliness. Uzbeks have a well-developed practice of mutual assistance called
hashar that transcends bilateral relations. Mahalla rais and members draw on hashar to motivate
residents to, inter alia, maintain the cleanliness of streets and gutters and improve the look of
their mahalla on the eve of celebrations and state holidays. Mahalla frequently also provide
substantial support to the elderly, intercede in cases of domestic abuse (and deter divorce),
provide adjudication to quell disputes between neighbors and, in the converse, pressure more
wealthy residents to share some of their wealth with the wider community69
Finally, with the collapse of employment opportunities after the disassembly of the
USSR, mahalla have in many cases become primary centers of economic activity. During the
Soviet period, large parts of Uzbekistan's fabled gray economy also rested on mahalla
foundations. With the collapse of the state's ability to provide even subsistence employment, the
economic significance of mahalla has shifted from being a vehicle through which to amass
additional wealth to a vehicle for survival. Much of Uzbekistan's foreign trade has been
conducted by mahalla-based groups of traders.
Perhaps the most universal aspect of mahalla is that no member is, for class, profession,
or religious reasons, excluded from community events. Without idealizing mahalla into areas of
social harmony (which, of course, they are not), mahalla are traditionally the only places where
some kinds of people (i.e. Sunni/Shiite, merchants/laborers, rich/poor) interact with each other.
63 A sunnat toi celebrates circumcision) while a beshik toi (cradle celebration) occurs forty days after birth.
64 Prayers are used to mark events of importance not of national importance (yedi). Yedi include such celebrations
as Kurban-yedi (thanksgiving), in which food is distributed to relatives and the poor.
65 Marking the seventh, twelfth, and fortieth days after death, as well as the first anniversary after death. Funeral
ceremonies are usually celebrated as ertalabki osh (morning pilau).
66 Novruz is the Islamic New Year and Mustakillik is Independence Day.
67 Sharing similarities with rotating credit institutions the world over, participants contribute fimds to a common pot,
which is then handed over to a participant to hold (with a small part of the receipts) at a male only or female only
evening gap ("discussion," an occasion for ebullient feasting, song, and drinking) that usually precedes that
participant's outlays to organize a wedding or funeral event. This mix of mutual benefit and charity contributions is
both important, and not really charitable in a larger context, since gap is not really anonymous. In a rare empirical
demonstration of Ellickson's "even-up" strategy for maintaining equity and social order in a close-knit group,
individual members keep detailed records of to whom, when, and for what such contributions are made, so as to
provide a basis for each successive bilateral contribution. See Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes, pp. 225-229.
6Because of gap, the events that concentrate attention of funds to purchase expensive presents instead of on funds
to feed hundreds of people often still do have a community-gathering component.
6In the post-Soviet period, with increased mobility, many wealthy mahalla residents are moving out of home
mahalla to certain more fashionable new mahalla to avoid this pressure.
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Moreover, the mahalla system may have historically created a mechanism through which
the services of charitable institutions (waqf) reached a social cross-section of the population.
Olga Sukhareva, an anthropologist who studied mahalla in Bukhara, posits that residents of
mahalla possessed the right to use all social institutions in their mahalla, including mosques,
large cooking areas and supplies, water supply (for cooking, drinking, and ablutions), and
materials for transporting the deceased to a cemetery70.
The foregoing discussion relates to a modem analysis of Uzbekistan's mahalla because it
establishes a history of public goods in Uzbekistan communities similar to the kinds of modem
public goods important to Uzbekistan citizens and the Uzbek state. At the risk of presenting an
overly simplified picture, public goods in medieval Central Asian cities flowed primarily from
the community and waqf, and only marginally from the state. Mahalla provided the framework
for important social and professional networks, coordinated defense, implemented social
insurance strategies, and facilitated communication with the government7 1. Complementing
mahalla, waqf (Islamic trusts) provided spiritual public goods and, with less complete coverage,
72
public goods such as water, education, medical care, libraries, and charitable assistance
When the USSR began uprooting native social institutions to replace them with
isomorphic Soviet institutions, as a glaring exception to this policy, mahalla were incorporated
into the Soviet system rather than targeted for dissolution. Whether Moscow developers
primarily saw mahalla as impossible to eradicate without risking revolt or whether these
developers primarily saw the institutions as complementing development and ideological goals is
not clear, nor is it important to assign primacy to either of these reasons. In the final assessment,
Moscow decided that the benefits of subversion of mahalla outweighed the costs of abolishing it.
The Soviet government retained mahalla as self-governing (in name) RCAs. The mahalla
aksaqal became a symbolically elected chairperson, whose appointment was controlled by the
local party apparatus. Instead of informal advisors, he now could rely on a committee to advise
him, and certain issues were managed by separate committees, such as a women's committee.
By the late Soviet period, the room occupied by the mahalla committee often looked like any
Soviet office, decorated with Soviet symbols and graced with portraits of Soviet leaders, and
most residents did not distinguish between the bureaucratic and informal aspects of mahalla7 3.
Over its lifespan, the Soviet state steadily razed neighborhoods of traditional mahalla
with their narrow streets providing shelter from the summer sun and replaced them with
apartment complexes or new mahalla. Residents could choose to take apartments in these
buildings or move away to areas reserved for new mahalla74, with the effect that the composition
of mahalla changed. By 1989, only a third of Tashkent citizens lived in new or traditional
70 Sukhareva, Kvartalnaya obschina pozdnefeodalnogo goroda Bukhary, pp. 21-22.
71 The government, in fact, notarized the appointment of an aksaqal on the petition of elders of the mahalla. Aksaqal
were also charged with preventing, through mediation, court cases between residents of various mahalla. Ibid, p. 35.
7Accordingly, social norms almost certainly lie behind many institutions that previous scholarship could only
imagine to be the product of a coercive and attentive state. Increasingly, social coordination is replacing coercion in
historical narratives, but the implications of this shift for social theory have yet to be fully appreciated.
73 Koroteyeva & Makarova, The Assertion of Uzbek National Identity: Nativisation or State-Building Process?,
(Unpublished paper presented Aug. 24, 1995 at the Fifth European Seminar on Central Asian Studies, Copenhagen
University). Copy on file with author.
74 In the post-Soviet system, a resident whose house is taken (i.e. for a new apartment complex) may exercise one of
three options. He may demand a free apartment in the new building; he may demand that the taking agency
construct a house on a new plot of land; or he may demand compensation for the house and all improvements made
to the land. Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Privatization of the State Housing Supply (May 7, 1993), art. 8.
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mahalla.7 5 Those who remained in mahalla nevertheless shared increasingly littlein common
with pre-Soviet predecessors. While Soviet era mahalla carried the same name as their 18th
century predecessors, and while these mahalla looked similar on the surface, they had changed
into fundamentally different institutions 76. Most important for the present discussion, whereas
pre-Russian mahalla residents expected almost nothing from the state in the way of public goods,
late Soviet mahalla residents imagined that the only way to good schools, adequate medical care,
potable water, and crime prevention was through a strong state.
This process of state "mahallization," further distances mahalla from its roots in social
norms despite the fact that most current legal reforms primarily codify the heretofore informal
working of mahalla. By law, a "citizen gathering 77" now governs mahalla, but day to day
governance is in the hands of its agents: the kengash (composed of the rais, his advisors,
commission chairs, and a secretary). While all mahalla residents 18 and older ostensibly elect
these agents in a direct vote, in fact the district government is the principal power broker.
These changes and the mahallization of farms and apartment buildings are measures
taken in shallow rejection of the USSR and as a bulkhead against Islam. The appeal of
mahallization from the state's perspective is that it introduces homogeneity into the governing
structure of the state, can be portrayed as Uzbek without reference to Islam, and can Uzbekify an
ethnically diverse population 8 . It is such a foundation of mahallization that explains how the
state can trumpet mahalla as the cornerstone of Uzbekistan society and at the same time
accelerate Soviet projects to raze traditional mahalla, ignore protests from local residents, and
erect modern apartment buildings. In this process, the state views mahalla as secular,
foundational political subdivisions that facilitate communalistic values, and it would appear to
assume that mahalla are inevitable, immutable, and stable.
Uzbekistan is eager to harvest the fruits of social norms, but unconcerned about their
roots. State policies assume mahalla norms to be static and stable and, therefore, manipulable.
For example, the state advocates the creation of mahallaposbonlari (guards) as neighborhood
patrol groups. These groups are formally citizen self-government organizations (CSGOs) like
Soviet SSGOs. Through mahallization they are expected to draw on hashar norms of
noncompensated work and produce results consistent with the fact that during the Soviet and
early post-Soviet period new and traditional mahalla reported lower crime rates than other areas.
When it comes to management, the state views mahalla purely as CSGOs, not as a
balance of social norms. For example, kengash now include, by law, non-resident
representatives of state welfare agencies. In response, in many mahalla, an unofficial aksaqal
has arisen parallel to the official rais and kengash. Through one lens, this parallel pbwer
structure can be viewed as a form of resistance to state arrogation of mahalla.
The irony, of course, is that civil society presupposes spheres of public life autonomous
from the state. Leaving aside concerns about democracy for the moment, it is impossible to
reconcile efforts by the state to consolidate control at the expense of autonomous associations
with development of civil society and social capital. At best, Uzbekistan's current trajectory is
towards an, albeit organizationally pluralistic, parastatal civil society.
75 typa Mkao I, Te Assertion of Uzbek National Identity: Nativis ation or State-Building Process?.
Cf "The Soviet state was content to leave the mahalla to its traditional functions as long as it maintained the
ideological appearance of a Soviet institution." Ibid.
7 1999 Mahalla Law, art. 7.
78Koroteyeva & Makarova, "The Assertion of Uzbek National Identity: Nativisation or State-Building Process?."
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Figure I: Mahalla Importance Time and again in Uzbekistan,
policymakers list the alleged traditional
NarblyEtedayEbenefits of mahalla, add new
responsibilities to mahalla, and then laud
Few LOW MEDIUM mahalla for providing both traditional and
Children new public goods. The implicit
More MEDIUM HIGH assumption is that mahalla will retain local
children authority and will continue to provide
traditional public goods, all the while integrating themselves into the new administrative system
of sovereign Uzbekistan.
Is this assumption defensible? Might administrative mahalla turn out to be immiscible
with social mahalla? Might this result erode the positive externalities of mahalla? Might
expanding administrative functions and state salaries gradually effect a change in perceptions,
gradually transforming mahalla into state agencies unable to mobilize the local community
without dangling funds and no longer allowed authoritatively to mediate neighborhood affairs79?
To research how mahalla are
TABLE 2: What Sparks Concern About Rais and Aksaqal? changing, we surveyed mahalla
resident attitudes toward mahalla
and aspects of contemporary life in
Uzbekistan. We introduced regional
disaggregation to illustrate the
degree to which regions of
Uzbekistan exhibit persistent
differences despite uniform national
laws. We also introduced resident
disaggregation in order to
understand better how the role of
mahalla is changing in light of the
Advice 1.4 .78 1.8 .07 administrative reforms of the 1990s.
City 1.2 .44 2.8 .01 2000 respondents in seven of
Risk -1.5 .76 -2.0 .05 Uzbekistan's twelve viloyatlarREcology 2.9 3.2 .92 .36 provided information to myRFamily -1.5 .87 -1.7 .08 1s8
Time .41 .22 1.8 .07 colleagues on the importance of
mahalla in their lives. In this
survey, divorcees valued mahalla less than do their married or widowed neighbors. Also, the
more children in a family, the more it values mahalla. The richer a family is, the less it values
mahalla, with the caveat that the richest families either highly value (at levels substantially
higher than the merely rich) or essentially resent mahalla. Of critical interest, among the services
most appreciated and valued by residents is spousal dispute resolution. By surveying mahalla
homebuyers81 in three cities82, we found that the presence of relatives in a mahalla shapes
attitudes as strongly as does number of children (Figure 1)83.
79 Actual investigation of these questions is still premature. Most mahalla interactions occur without reference to the
law. More pertinently, the findings presented here reflect conditions prior to the passage of the 1999 Mahalla Law.
Even though provisions of this law (like state salaries for mahalla leaders) had been implemented in practice prior to
passage of the law, it is still too early to determine what effect this law will have on mahalla dynamics.
s Unreported survey data on file with author. The author took no part in this research.1 Forms of real property are defined in Article 83 of the 1996 Civil Code.
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RAIS
N= 72 Prob > chi2= 0.00
Rais Coef. Std. Err z P>|z I
Advice 4.7 1.8 2.6 .01
RFamily -4.4 1.7 -2.7 .01
REcology -3.9 3.8 -1.0 .30
Risk -4.0 1.2 -3.2 .001
City .82 .64 1.3 .20
Time .12 .27 .46 .65
AKSAQAL
N= 72 Prob > chi2= 0.00 Pseudo R2= 0.26
Aksaqal Coef. Std. Err z P>Iz I
Pseudo R2= 0.48
differences between respondents who N= 78 Prob > F=00 Adjusted R2= 0.27inquire into the identities and
characters of rais and aksaqal before REcology Coef. Std. Err t P>jt I
purchase and those who do not (Table Sex -.059 .026 -2.3 .026
2). While these differences include Age .0065 .0013 5.1 .000
variables such as what region of Image .059 .025 2.3 .024
Uzbekistan one inhabits, they also Intercept -.028 .054 -.52 .61
include a proxy for social capital84, the desire to avoid environmental risks, individual risk
averseness, the desire to live near family, and when respondents moved. The dividing line
between the 71% of home buyers who learn about rais before purchasing and the 29% who do
not is in large part explained through these variables.
At statistically significant levels, prospective buyers who do not seek advice outside the
family on whether or not to purchase a given house also tend not to inquire into rais and aksaqal.
Likewise, buyers without family in their prospective mahalla and more risk averse buyers more
frequently make inquiries about aksaqal and rais. While 71% of homebuyers inquired into rais,
only 39% inquired into aksaqal. However, also at statistically significant levels, the more recent
homebuyers8 5 were more likely to inquire into aksaqal, suggesting that as the effects of the
transition period penetrate society, the aksaqal is gaining importance again.
While the influence of environmental concerns is not statistically significant, the
variable's coefficient is positive for aksaqal and negative for rais. Under transition reforms,
mahalla have been endowed with extensive rights and duties regarding environmental protection
and assessment. This curious difference in coefficients may reflect some early effects of state
efforts to establish mahalla as local environmental agencies. New residents concerned about
environment health may see administrative mahalla as relevant and social mahalla as irrelevant.
Education, surprisingly, is a poor predictor of environmental concern. Rather, women, older
respondents, and those who emphasize prestige of a mahalla in house selection are more
concerned with environmental health (Table 3). Disaggregating the data by sex or education
fails to produce statistically significant divergent populations with regard to attitudes about rais,
aksaqal, and most other aspects of mahalla life. Similarly, the bifurcation between city and
country is not a significant source of divergent attitudes in the dataset 6.
The general conclusion relevant to evolving mahalla is that family characteristics remain
central to understanding individual attitudes. The role of the family comes into clearer focus
82 We chose these three cities based on the regional differences highlighted in the original survey, the cities are in
the Fergana Valley (Andijan), Tashkent, and the Zeravshan Valley (Samarkand).
83 Asked to rank 10 factors for their importance in influencing purchasing decisions, price was most important for 33
of 83 respondents (mean- 1.7), and presence of relatives within a mahalla was most important for 23 (mean= 2.2).
All other factors were also important; no factor was never named most important. In a Kruskal-Wallis test, there is
no significant difference between city and relatives (chi-squared=1 .5 with two degrees of freedoni), but for ranking
of price, there is a chi-squared value of 23.
The proxy here is whether or not home buyers turned to non-family to a meaningful degree for advice before
purchasing. Non-family advisors primarily included friends. Whether or not an individual turns to non-family for
advice on home purchases is predicted strongly (z-2.4, significant at .01 level) by which area of Uzbekistan he or
she inhabits, again reinforcing the suggestion that there are significant regional differences.
8The survey was restricted to those who purchased in the past five years.
86 Cf Less than 1% of rural mahalla residents ignore conmmity rituals in general, while nearly 15% of urban
residents ignore such rituals. Generally, richer families and more well-educated individuals are far more likely to
abstain from community rituals.
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Std. Err t
TABLE 4: What Predicts Desire to Live Near Relatives?
Adjusted R2= 0.32N= 72 Prob > F= 0.00
P>lt I
-.37
-.011
-.18
.22
.15
1.0
-3.4
-3.0
-2.0
2.5
1.6
4.9
.001
.004
.05
.02
.11
.000
.11
.004
.092
.087
.089
.21
within the framework of
understanding both mahalla and
family as insurance mechanisms.
Table 4 outlines some of the
characteristics of those who
emphasize the importance of living in
a mahalla that contains close relatives.
Those who are unconcerned with
aksaqal, are younger, less risk averse,
are less concerned with the material
comforts of a given home, or are less likely to turn to friends for advice are more likely to be
seeking out a house in a mahalla with family.
In contrast, as illustrated in Table 5, those who simply looked for the best house at the
best price were more likely to be moving from another city or viloyat than from one mahalla to
another. They were also less likely to be interested in the distribution of power in a mahalla,
were more likely to be younger, less likely to be interested in home gardening, less concerned
about environmental health, and less likely to have family in their prospective new mahalla.
A great number of Uzbekistanis today look beyond primary family and employment
associations to ensure the future. Uzbekistan currently offers three general risk-spreading
institutions: extended family, social mahalla, and administrative mahalla. Given the critical
importance of risk-spreading institutions in the lives of Uzbekistanis, fundamental disruptions in
any institution could produce misfortune for many. Family may still be sacred in Uzbekistan.
The state has lost much of its capacity in the past decade. It remains an open question how
traditional mahalla functions of providing social insurance will weather the transition.
In the present, mahalla residents may enjoy an advantage over apartment mahalla peers.
The failed economy of Uzbekistan and the inadequate social insurance programs of the post-
Soviet period create insurance needs that reinvigorate mahalla, and may possibly provide a
foundation for the appearance of mahalla functions in apartment mahalla. In modern
Uzbekistan, few weddings, emergency medical operations, university matriculations, house
repairs, or funerals take place in the life of the average mahalla resident without some
Coef Std. Err t P>It
TABLE 5: What Predicts Emphasis on Price Alone?
N= 75
RPnice
.07
.08
.004
.075
.087
.077
.075
.080
.18
Immigrant
Aksaqal
Age
Price/Services
Utilities
Price/Ag
Price/Ecology
Family
Intercept
1.3
2.3
-2.7
1.4
-1.3
-2.1
2.7
1.8
3.4
.09
.19
-.010
.10
-.11
-.16
.21
.14
.61
.20
.022
.009
.17
.19
.041
.008
.077
.001
community financial support.
Property scholars usually
look to the productivity of
agricultural land as the metric to
compare property regimes.
However, such analyses offer little
to those interested in urban areas in
states with large service sectors, like
Uzbekistan. The connection
between alternative property
regimes and wealth in Uzbekistan's
cities depends little on which
regimes foster better agricultural
productivity. Wealth in urban land regimes depends more on issues such as security, location,
aesthetics, and transportation. In contemporary Uzbekistan, wealth in land regimes may largely
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RFamily Coef.
Rais
Age
Risk
Utilities
Advice
Intercept
Adjusted R 2= 0.23Prob > F= 0.00
'r
depend on social insurance institutions, and the bonding social capital foundations of these
institutions.
Since they are now at the heart of elections, at the heart of executive government, at the
heart of much employment, administer most social programs, notarize wills, collect taxes, act as
a monitor against the appearance of enemies of the state, organize community events, and are the
conduits for foreign efforts for human rights, family planning, and microcredit, mahalla are
suddenly no longer mere residential associations. Elegantly employing the very rhetoric of
development agencies in the process of defeating the objectives of these agencies, Uzbekistan is
transforming post-Soviet mahalla into the main agencies of an emerging absolutist state.
The majority of mahalla residents, and probably the majority of rais, are unaware of the
normative provisions of recent mahalla legislation. Despite major changes in the laws, for the
most part, mahalla change slowly. In most mahalla, most social organization and most problem
solving proceeds from the same bases as ten years ago, often in contravention of these new laws.
However, it would be premature to conclude from this situation that mahalla will resist
legislative restructuring. More likely, mahalla will, over time, increasingly conform to the
provisions of the new laws. Accordingly, the warning signs and trends provoked by the 1993
mahalla reforms are probably only minor compared to what will result from the 1999 Mahalla
Law, which is far more ambitious in its demands on these local associations to assume new roles.
Just as mahalla begin to capture scholarly attention, much of their charm and promise
may be disappearing. Despite Western awe of the scale of clientalism in Uzbekistan, somehow
all parties (except mahalla residents, who are already complaining) assume that the hallowed
status of mahalla limits corruption, the need for monitoring of agents, and the need for increased
oversight of mahalla by institutions such as courts and auditors8 7. In contrast, it is nearly a
truism of politics in general and RCAs in particular that they warrant "more and more external
checks as [their] power grows88."
This need is exacerbated given new rights of rais to lease land, collect rents, and engage
in commerce. It is no surprise that rais are well-off and that mahalla are increasingly the objects
of popular resentment; they may soon be as healthily resented as any other unit of government.
Even in connection with the supposed charitable functions of mahalla, the new power to disburse
funds challenges and erodes mahalla norms of using community resources to address welfare
cases poorly decided by state welfare agencies 9. It also creates opportunities for corruption9 0 ,
87 It is this lack of checks and balances, both within mahalla and within the political system of Uzbekistan itself, that
precludes characterization of mahalla as comparable to American condominium associations or more innovative
models of urban residential/development associations, such as the Neighborhood Improvement Districts advocated
by Ellickson. See Ellickson, "New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods." Notwithstanding observations about the
unsuitability of courts in Uzbekistan, some effective mechanisms for oversight and accountability is needed.88 Ibid, p. 100.
89 "Thus, despite attempts to distribute aid through mahalla networks, this focus on mahalla may well strengthen
bureaucratic means at the expense of less formal and decentralized ones." Abramson, "Constructing Corruption:
Foreign A id, Bureaucratization, and Uzbek Social Networks" (Unpublished paper presented Mar. 20, 2000 at
Harvard University).
9Koroteyeva & Makarova report that this new function gives rise to much mahalla conflict. Koroteyeva &
Makarova, "The Assertion of Uzbek National Identity: Nativisation or State-Building Process?" A mitigating
component of this system is that aid should not be distributed until a family submits a formal application that
outlines family assets, income, and employment and/or until the mahalla committee directly documents the assets of
a family. Coudouel & Marnie, " The Mahalla System of Allocating Social Assistance in Uzbekistan." Yet, such
disclosures can also work to increasing the leverage of rais and other kengash members within the community.
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Current residential regime reforms threaten to disrupt and dislocate local communities
across Uzbekistan, all in the name of harnessing the promise of local communities. Since this
process is already well under way and broadly supported by foreign donors, one can only hope
that social norms of community celebration, hashar, and gap will migrate to new settings
sheltered from state regulation and beneficence. Notwithstanding the undeniable benefits to be
gained by harnessing the power of mahalla, these benefits pale in comparison to what stands to
be lost in the form of conflict resolution, social insurance, and strong communities.
But, while the state continues to try to move mahalla from the province of gemeinschaft
to the rule of gesellschaft, one trend provides some hope for the continuance of a strong stock of
social capital at the residential level. The individualistic foundations of gesellschaft are being
fundamentally rejected by grassroots Uzbekistani community, and this rejection is building a
new set of mahalla social norms (i.e. the reinvigoration of the aqsakal's role) and a new variety of
mahalla social networks (i.e. connected to new employment and mosques). While neither of
these trends finds favor with the Uzbek ruling elite, they do'create an appreciation for both the
stock and the staying power of social capital in an important segment of Central Asian society.
Evaluating the Eras of Social Capital in Central Asia
[L]evels of social capital were low or depleted under communism to begin with. This should not
surprise us, since the objective of Marxist-Leninism was to stamp out an independent civil society
and the ties between citizens on which civil society was based9
Asked about the historical spread of social capital in Central Asia, recent generations of scholars,
especially economists and political scientists, would likely answer that the region had low stocks
of social capital in both the pre-Soviet and the Soviet eras. The continued social science
dominance of simple and statist depictions of Asian societies, as despotic and hydraulic92, is only
very gradually giving way to the effects of more nuanced histories 3. I believe that, eventually, a
careful review of medieval Central Asian communities will produce a picture of a society in
which most public goods and most complex coordination problems were solved through social
norms and social coordination, not through the offices of the state. Nevertheless, coupling
Orientalism's biases with American scholarship's ambitions to reiterate and expand the failures of
the Soviet Union, existing scholarship related to past social capital is very weak and very
pessimistic. For example, the scholarly world has missed out on the fact that the USSR, in the
Orientalist tradition ostensibly indifferent to internal public opinion and lacking in any civil
society, abandoned its budgeted and approved program to divert Siberian rivers to the Aral Sea
94basin for the sole reason that the public rejected that plan
91 Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, p. 31.
92 Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Hlaven: Yale University Press,
1957). Indeed, the trend among Western economists, political scientists, and legal scholars of Central Asia is to
ignore any social theory that is not statist, and the hydraulic theory is virtually unchallenged still in these
communities. For the best recent example, see Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States, pp. 37-39 (offering
titillating lore about despotism, such as that unsuccessful candidates for office of watermaster were, by rule,
executed).
93 For Central Asia, the principle such histories include the work of Wilhelm Barthold, Robert McChesney, and Olga
Sukhareva, among others.
94 WHltunen, Environmental Development Co-Operation Opportunities, p. 50.
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Likewise, much of the current international research that specifically targets country-
level studies of social capital rests on highly suspect foundations. The current consensus about
social capital is that it is of critical importance to economic development, as well as to many
other public goods. Therefore, in areas experiencing economic booms, researchers implicitly
seek social capital; in areas of less fortunate economic times, researchers seek the absence of
social capital. It is to this trend that Portes and Landolt point when they write that when "social
capital and the benefits derived from it are confused, the term merely says that the successful
succeed9 5." Francis Fukuyama exemplifies this trend in the passage above.
Fukuyama proceeds from the assumption, presented as a conclusion, that the Soviet
Union possessed little social capital. Interestingly, in The Great Disruption, he pursues this
point through a contrast between Boston's North End since the 1950s and a generalized
description of community in the "former communist world96 ." For Fukuyama, this simultaneous
deterioration of community (and hence social capital) was epitomized through a loss of the
streets as communal areas: "The adults retreated from sidewalks to their high-rise apartments,
and as a result, crime rates began to soar97
Unlike Fukuyama, for me a comparison between the North End and the former
communist world is not an abstract inquiry; as a full-time resident of the North End and frequent
resident of the former communist world, I find Fukuyama's descriptions inverted. While
Fukuyama cites Jane Jacobs for his description of the North End, he cites nothing for his picture
of the decline of or absence of community in the communist world. In reality, the Central Asian
communities during the period that he cites (1950-1990) experienced many problems, but not
those ascribed to them by Fukuyama. These neighborhoods, even those, to a lesser degree,
characterized by high-rise apartments, experienced exactly the kind of watchful street life
valorized by Fukuyama and described in passing in the section above on mahalla.
More generally, Fukuyama's concurrent celebration of social capital and castigation of
the USSR does not stick. He celebrates as social capital the fact that, when in trouble, America's
Nucor Corporation cut back on hours instead of laying off staff9 8; rare in America, this practice
has been the norm in the entire post-Soviet world in the past decade. He suggests that the USSR
was a place of weak families, no secondary associations (and he defines such as non-kinship
associations for rich countries but, asymmetrically, as independent in the Soviet context), and
rampant organized crime99 , while no serious study would support any of these findings. He
explains why Korea is successful and China is not by citing five Korean practices without
analogs in China: extended kinship, regionalism, a university class, universal conscription, and
hobby groups 00. These, by implication then, are the same things that differentiate the USSR
(and its successor states) from China' 0 1, which, to follow Fukuyama's logic, implies either that
the USSR had high social capital or that Korea has no trust; Fukuyama, because of his
ideological predispositions, denies either result.
95 Portes & Landolt, "The Downside of Social Capital."
96 Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, pp. 28-31.
97 Ibid, p. 29.
98 Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, pp. 7-9.
10bTid, pp. 140-4 1.
11Since Fukuyama's claim that China lacked these things is probably not correct in the first place (pers.
communication wit Peter Perdue Jan. 30, 2001), my point here is not to use Fukuyama to describe China in any
way, but merely to point out the range of deficiencies in Fukuyama's data, and the implications of tese deficiencies.
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rSimilarly, Fukuyama emphasizes as proof of the existence of social capital in suburban
Washington, D.C. the appearance of'"slugs," commuters who ride in the cars of complete
102strangers'. Without denying the validity of Fukuyama's conclusions regarding the social
capital consequences of such carpooling, his own work would seem to suggest that Washington,
D.C. may now be moving towards level of trust typical of the USSR during the height of its
existence as an Evil Empire.
Given these observations, that crime rates soared after the disassembly of the USSR is
not as telling a symptom of low social capital as Fukuyama suggests. Rather, given the
concurrent spread of heavy out-migration, rising unemployment, and a destroyed economy, it
seems curiously ambitious to ascribe rising crime rates in an area so much in turmoil to
something as obscure as social capital. Moreover, even if social capital plays a role, social
capital use and formation occur on many different levels. Given that the Internet is a minor
presence in Central Asia, and therefore not a mitigating factor, the spread of televisions and non-
educational programming throughout Central Asia is probably as large a factor as anything else
in degrading levels of social capital. Extended families and individuals do socialize less often
than before specifically because of the spread of televisions, satellite dishes, knock-off cassettes
of Hollywood blockbusters, and the expense of cafes, restaurants, and other non-home
recreational venues.
The danger of work such as that pursued by Fukuyama exists on two levels. On one
level, since Fukuyama bases his efforts on a false data set and just is not getting the story right,
his writings work against a deeper understanding of the former Soviet Union. He is, in other
words, misleading. Yet, on the other hand, Fukuyama's work has a darker consequence. By
reducing moments of great suffering and tragedy to simplistic explanations, explanations that are
false, Fukuyama suggests that social capital is a panacea. That is the implicit message of The
Great Disruption, and it is the natural corollary to his assertion in Trust that a deficiency of
social capital is what explains the downfall of the Soviet Union' 0 3 . Fukuyama's message is
unmistakable: if the former communist world or any developing state only had social capital, it
would quickly ascend to the level of a developed state1 4. This kind of scholarship only sets the
stage for a new wave of ill-considered and disastrous development interventions.
Soviet society, very much a civil society in terms of its bounty of crosscutting interests
and vectors of possible identity expression, was more vibrant and more complex than Fukuyama
imagines. What's more, this civil society and its diverse manifestations of social capital built on
pre-Soviet forms of social capital and civil society. Of course, Stalinism may have been the
antithesis of social capital development, but, curiously, World War II may have been one of the
major facilitators of Stalin-era social capital. Simple descriptions and dispositive reasons for the
strengths and weaknesses of Central Asia's historical and current levels of social capital and civil
society are destined to fail given the actual complexity of the region.
Accordingly, the disassembly of the USSR had multiple impacts on social capital. It
probably weakened levels of general social capital, although these may be rebounding and never
reached the low levels that characterize parts of Africa or, for that matter, the United States.
However, indicators from the region suggest that levels of bridging social capital have fallen in
0Fukuyama, Th ra irpin ua aueadteRcnttto fSca repp. 143-44.
13See Fukuyama, Trust: Thbe Social.Virtues and the Creation of Prospeniy
14This is the natural corollary to his earlier conclusion that "a nation's well being, as well as its ability to compete,
is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society." Fukuyama,
Trs:TeSca ite ndteCeto fPoprt p. 7
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the last ten years. In contrast, bonding social capital experienced less degradation during the
transition period. Yet, what has transpired'with bonding social capital inthe region has
substantial implications for social capital's context for development interventions. Some
scholars suggest that social norms are merely the content of normatively desirable future laws' 05,
but others suggest, theoretically, that this "law from order" approach will often lead to failures of
both formal and informal rules' 06. The case of mahalla provides interesting empirical support for
a large theoretical reservation about social norms.
1See Robert Cooter, "Law from Order: Economic Development and the Jurisprudence of Social Norms," John M.
Olin Working Papers in Law, Economics, and Institutions 96/97-4 (1997). See also Robert Cooter, "Inventing
Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea," 25 Law and Society Review 25 (1991), p. 759.
106 See Eric A. Posner, "The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective
Action," 63 University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996), p. 133.
31
FELLOW CITIZENS!
Leaflet copied and distributed in Alma-Ata during the 1991 coup.
* denotes that no signature recordedfor an organization.
A coup has taken place in the USSR. The legal President of the country has been
unconstitutionally removed from power.
Maybe Mikhail Gorbachev foreordained his own removal through his inconsistent and
contradictory domestic policies, but this kind of removal from power by this kind of people is a
state crime, and the people who have removed him are state criminals.
The sovereignty of the republics is being trampled; political parties and democratic social
organizations are being dispersed; freedom of the press is being liquidated; and the country has
been driven to the brink of civil war.
Those in the State Committee for States of Emergency promise to restore order, but can they
really do so through criminal means? We say- no way! Therefore, any support for their
activities or any submission to criminal orders is being an accessory to a crime.
Kazakhstanis, let's not be accessories to this crime!
We, the signers of this appeal, demand that legal government in the USSR be restored and
that the coup organizers be brought to trial.
In the event that the actions of the State Emergency are extended into the territory of
Kazakhstan, we call upon the public to begin a campaign of civil disobedience, and specifically:
on the grounds of anticonstitutionality and illegality, to refuse to submit to the orders of the self-
appointed committee, and at places of work and residence to form civil disobedience
committees.
We call on the government of sovereign Kazakhstan to arrogate in full all governmental
powers in the republic for itself, excluding any execution on our territory of the self-appointed
"Center."
We call on all political powers of Kazakhstan to forget yesterday's disagreements. Today,
something else is more important: the younger generation accuses the older for its lack of
resistance to the forces of Stalinism and Brezhnevism. We'll do everything we can to ensure the
future generation does not so accuse us!
Azat Citizen Movement of Kazakhstan
Azamat Youth Organization of Kazakhstan*
Alash Party of National Independence of Kazakhstan
Zheltoksan National Democratic Party of Kazakhstan
Unity Interethnic Movement of Kazakhstan*
Nevada-Semei Anti-Nuclear Movement of Kazakhstan
Memorial Historical Enlightenment and Human Rights Society
Public Committee Alma-Ata-Helsinki--Paris
Public Committee Aral-Asia
Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan
Helsinki Group
Adilet Historical Enlightenment and Human Rights Society
Democratic Union
Birlesu Trade Union
Transnational Radical Party
Green Salvation Ecological Society
Association for Resistance to Violence
Parasat Society
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CHAPTER FIVE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The international environmental arena is now thematically crowded; few unaddressed themes
can be found among thousands of environmental treaties1 , several dozen specialized international
environmental institutions, and the tens of thousands of NGOs with interests in international
environmental law and politics. Yet, despite this expansion of raw organizational capital sweep
in the international environment, very few of the principles, objectives, or commitments
contained within these treaties, institutions, and associations can readily be considered law. In
other words, a shortfall exists between the organizational capital aspirations of the international
environmental community and the reality that the organizational capital assets that this
community commands display a pervasive lack of robustness. At a global level, the current era
of environmental law has not produced a halt in the degradation of biodiversity, a reversal of
carbon concentration in the atmosphere, a stopping of the advance of deserts, or an aggregate
decline in water pollution. For successes, the era can boast little more than a projected decline in
ozone depleting substances and scattered local improvements.
Nevertheless, the organizational capital assets of environmental regimes, contained for
the most part in a pantheon of treaties and organizations, illustrate the aspirations of a growing
international community. This community endeavors to bring the international environment
under strict regulation (whether through market or command and control mechanisms) and
secure the reign of international environmental rule of law. Yet, while these assets and their
attendant aspirations hold legal content and speak in legal language, they lack several key
features of a democratic system of rule of law 2. Specifically, they do not root themselves in the
authority of a representative legislative body, boast almost no law enforcement agencies, and
lack a judicial system with broad jurisdiction.
In domestic legal systems, a sovereign possesses the exclusive right to declare law; where
a state embraces the emerging international norm of popular sovereignty, as is the case in all the
Central Asian republics 3, the "sovereign" is constituted through elected representatives. In
contrast, the genesis of international law only appears democratic; new rules of international law
can only arise through the consent of states. However, for several reasons, this process falls
short of both the democratic and legislative ideals of popular sovereignty. First, democracy
involves people, and states are imperfect proxies for human individuals, especially considering
the numbers of states not ruled democratically and the fact that foreign policy decisions are
rarely the issues around which internal democratic elections revolve. Second, the international
Even as early as 1992, there were at least 900 international environmental agreements. Harold K. Jacobson and
Edith Brown Weiss, "A Framework for Analysis," in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson eds., Engaging
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp.
1-18.
2 For purposes of conserving natural capital, democratic rule of law is not a necessity. While an environmental
autocracy could preserve the global environment (at the expense of other interests), this possibility is largely
irrelevant at present since dominant sentiments abhor such a solution and since no such autocrat exists.
3 This norm is reflected in the Constitution of Kazakhstan (Article 3), the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic
(Article 1), the Constitution of Tajikistan (Article 6), the Constitution of Turknmenistan (Article 2), and the
Constitution of Uzbekistan (Article 7)
legislative process remains murky; while international law can and is created through explicit
treaty-making, this process rarely involves, or even invites, the involvement of all the states of
the world. Finally, international law also largely arises from the custom of states, and no
scholars or states have developed a test to determine custom that does not leave wide latitude for
manipulation and coercion 4.
Moving to the second general failing of the international legal system, no environmental
regime possesses efficacious law enforcement agents. Where states should perform this
function, they often either do not or, by necessity, constrain this enforcement to their own
borders. While international bodies such as the UN Security Council could essay to assume such
environmental law enforcement functions, to date they have infrequently done so. There simply
is not formal enforcement of international environmental law as such. Moreover, despite
provisions of the United Nations Charter5 meant to establish an effective law enforcement arm
for international law, states ignore (and effectively disobey) requirements to contribute forces,
equipment, and authority to the United Nations. Thus, the failings of international environmental
law enforcement reflect general limits of international law enforcement.
Finally, despite the existence of an International Court of Justice (ICJ) created under the
United Nations Charter and the more recent emergence of a plan for an International Criminal
Court, there is no effective judicial arm of international environmental law. To wit, despite early
willingness by states to give the International Court of Justice a wide degree of jurisdiction,
currently the ICJ finds itself with a narrow jurisdiction over international disputes. The
Environmental Chamber of the International Court of Justice has, in fact, never once been used.
Similarly, there is almost no precedent for, and there are numerous treaty prohibitions against,
the use of domestic courts to adjudicate allegations of the violation of international
environmental law.
All of these organizational weaknesses find expression in international environmental
regimes, and many are exacerbated because, to date, few environmental problems elicit excited
expressions of state interest on the scale of those elicited by concerns over governing ideologies,
nonproliferation, ethnic cleansing, or even trade. As a result, international environmental
regimes lack equivalents to NATO, the World Trade Organization, or the International Atomic
Energy Association.
Yet, that does not mean that environmental regimes are not moving in the direction of
establishing strong international bodies and the institutional arsenal of an effective system of rule
of law. Over the past 30 years, environmental regimes have expanded their scope dramatically.
Nevertheless, at present in those cases when state implement, enforce, and effectuate
international environmental law, it is rarely because of the autonomous imperative of an
environmental rule of law, but because of the fortuitous confluence of diverse organizational,
physical, human, and social capital assets mobilized for non-environmental concerns.
" The rule for determining custom is that state practice must conform to the proposed content of that custom, and
that conforming behavior must have arisen from a belief amonig states that they had no choice but to so behave
without violating international law (opiniojuris). Since this test is circular and tries to pass off a subjective test as
objective, its determinations are always open to contention. Likewise, the existence of regional customs, layers of
customary law (regular customary law and jus cogens customs), and varying kinds of jurisdiction (normal
jurisdictional rules and erga omnnes norms) all contradict the validity of referring to an international legislature.
s See Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations (1945).
6 Under Article 37(2) of the Charter of the United Nations, states can assent to the mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ;
reservations contained in such assents and the withdrawal by key international actors of such assents (such as the
United States' withdrawal in 1984) mean that the ICJ has constrained jurisdiction.
The history of Soviet environmental diplomacy illustrates this trend. Prior to the 1970s,
while environmental treaties, especially for the conservation of wildlife, were not uncommon,
these treaties were, except for the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(1946), not global in scope and not part of a broader environmental agenda. However, in the
1970s a wave of global environmental accords appeared, including, the 1971 Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar), the 1973
Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES),
and the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
Although more generalized environmental concerns did gain attention in the 1970s, wildlife
conservation continued to be the major focus of formal lawmaking.
While largely dismissive of these early 1970s initiatives, by the end of the decade the
Soviet Union actively participated in numerous environmental agreements. However, for the
most part, these agreements were European in scale and motivated in large part by the USSR's
efforts at detente in order to attract Western capital7 . For example, the USSR ratified the 1974
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, the 1979 United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Animals (CMS), and the 1979 UNECE Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)8 , but was not an original party to either CITES or
Ramsar, acceding to both in 1976. It did not accede to MARPOL until 1983.
In the 1980s, international environmental law greatly expanded the scope of its
ambitions, although it did not appreciably increase the number of global environmental
conventions. The 1980s saw major global agreements on protection of the ozone layer and on
movements of hazardous waste, both of which the USSR signed and help negotiate9 . While the
decade's efforts to create agreements for other issues did not come to fruition until the 1990s, the
Soviet Union remained a central and active player in international environmental diplomacy. In
no small part as the result of this activity, the international response to the Soviet Union's
disassembly has involved substantial attention to the environmental legacy of the USSR and the
need to assist the successor states to make a transition to both democratic free markets and
sustainability.
The early 1990s not only saw the appearance of global climate change, biodiversity, and
desertification conventions, but also of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the first major
environmental financial mechanism, jointly managed by UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank. In
addition to these innovations, the 1990s also witnessed a large number of additional protocols
for, inter alia, the ozone regime, CMS, and LRTAP, as well as two major conventions regulating
the use of transboundary watercourses. Matching these trends, state donors and private
foundations also dramatically increased their international environmental assistance, often for
projects explicitly connected to the expansion of international environmental law.
Accordingly, the implementation of international environmental laws now interests not
only treaty secretariats and state parties to treaties; in recent years it has also come to involve the
full panoply of development agencies and global civil society1 0 . On their heels, it also captures
substantial academic attention. Moreover, as these environmental regimes expand, they
7 e generally, Robert G. Darst, "The internationalization of environmental protection in the USSR and its
successor states," in Schreurs and Economy eds., The Internationalization of Environental Protection, pp. 97-133.
8UNECE agreements are not open to non-UNECE states.
9However, the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal was not ratified by the time of the USSR's disassembly.
1See generally, Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: SIJNY Press, 1996).1 _ 3
increasingly intersect with, and at times challenge, other international regimes regulating issues
such as human rights, trade, intellectual property protection, and boundary delimitation.
Given this evolving nature, participatory richness and increasing reach of environmental
regimes, an analysis of environmental treaties in terms of their operation in individual states and
regions promises to yield valuable information about local societies, as these societies adapt to
and act to shape such regimes. This lens promises to provide a rich set of insights to
complement and challenge analyses based entirely on internal factors". Considering an
emerging consensus about the importance of globalization as an influence on people the world
over, such an effort to connect the culture of international regimes with Central Asian culture
promises to highlight forces impacting changes in the region.
The region will not and cannot (evidenced most especially by Turkmenistan) seal itself
off against globalization and the global culture. Despite Turkmenistan's isolationist efforts'2 , the
government of Turkmenistan constantly frets about its international image, monitors
international markets, and essays to impact geopolitical alliances. Likewise, the people of
Turkmenistan, even if deprived of many outside contacts, boast a high rate of satellite television
ownership, listen to popular music, and display tastes and preferences deeply impacted by other
global media.
This Chapter describes international environmental regimes through their expressions of
human capital, organizational capital, and social capital. This approach is based on the
observation stated earlier that in cases when states implement, enforce, and effectuate
international environmental law, they do so rarely because of the inevitability of an
environmental rule of law, but because of a fortuitous confluence of organizational, physical,
human, and social capital assets. Concurrently, this Chapter essays to sketch the broad outlines
of Central Asia's integration into international environmental regimes. Both of these efforts are a
preface to the case studies of the next chapter, which attempt to capture the impacts of the
transition period on stocks of natural capital in Central Asia and the movement of the region
towards sustainability.
The story of international environmental law in the new states of Central Asia started in
Kazakhstan during the first days of independence. The Central Asian republics set the stage for
a strong movement towards both democracy and sustainability through their endorsement of the
Alma-Ata Declaration (December 21, 1991), which created the Commonwealth of Independent
States. The newly independent states began this Declaration by affirming the need for
democratic rule of law and followed by committing themselves to fulfill the international
obligations stemming from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR. In 1991, this
declaration appeared, in accordance with international law, to set the stage for the succession of
each state to the ozone regime, CITES, Ramsar, and many other environmental treaties. Yet, in a
violation and confusion of international norms on succession, no treaty secretariat save
UNESCO heeded this declaration as one of succession and only some of the states subsequently
" In practice, this approach attempts to reconcile the differences between international relations and comparative
politics. See Elizabeth Economy and Miranda A. Schreurs, "Domestic and international linkages in environmental
politics," in Schreurs and Economy eds., The Internationalization of Environmental Protection, pp. 1-18.
12 Interestingly enough, the keystone effort by Turkmenistan to pursue isolationism occurred in the most global of
venues. See United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RFS/50180 (Dec. 12, 1995). Turkmenistan declared
itself a neutral state in the United Nations General Assembly in an effort to insulate itself from scrutiny and in order
to create an internationally acceptable policy cover for its efforts to restrain pluralism internally.
sent secretariats of only some conventions notes on succession13 . To this date, no treaty
secretariat, no development agency, no established scholar, and only one small international
NGO has complained about this negation of the promise and stated rules of international law
governing state succession".
The effect of this failure of international organizational capital was to require the states of
Central Asia deliberately and explicitly to integrate themselves into (or hold themselves aloof
from) the variety of regimes existing for the global environment. Their choices along the way,
the behavior of their international partners, and the effects on the environment of this
unprecedented type of succession reveal more about prospects for sustainability in the region
than would otherwise have been the case.
The New Sovereignty and Managed Compliance as Organizational and Social
Capital
The kind of analysis suggested above requires viewing the world of environmental treaties and
institutions as a world of environmental regimes. Since such a viewpoint is a requirement, I
must define more narrowly what I mean by regime.
Taken alone, the texts of treaties or the charters of organizations invariably mislead. The
treaties themselves are significant of but not wholly dispositive of their eponymous regimes,
since not all provisions of conventions are implemented or enforced equally and since a great
number of issues and practices develop outside the convention text. Similarly, international
institutions do not always faithfully pursue the goals and objectives for which they were
(ostensibly) created, nor does their authority or their power remain static.
Accordingly, by "regime" I mean a governance system that is keyed to a specific issue.
In turn, governance in this context is the "establishment and operation of a set of rules of conduct
that define practices, assign roles, and guide interaction so as to grapple with collective
problems 5." Therefore, an international environmental regime is the sum of the operative rules
deployed in the international arena around a specific environmental concern. These rules
concern both normative aspects of behavior (the objectives of the regime) and actual rules of
how shortfalls in compliance with the normative rules are addressed (enforcement). While some
of these rules are explicit, and here the texts of treaties are particularly relevant, others operate as
unstated norms or are borrowed from other instruments and institutions, and both change over
time. An appreciation of the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of a regime usually
requires a more ambitious effort than is possible by concentrating on one treaty or one
international organization.
So, the sources of regime rules and changes in regime rules are pluralistic and usually
involve some combination of international law, the preferences of hegemonic states, the
availability of funding, the activities of subsidiary scientific and compliance bodies, and
pressures from non-governmental forces (both businesses and NGOs). For example, a full
accounting of the history and present-state of the ozone regime would include, inter alia, the
13 For a fuller explanation of how these events cannot be reconciled with any dominant theory of international law,
see Rasulov, "Pravopreemstvo i Tsentralnaya Aziya."
" See Central Asia Compliance Monitor 2 (2000); available at: http://www.ecostan.org/monitor/cacm2.pdf.
1" Olav Shram Stokke, "Regimes as Governance Systems," in Oran R. Young ed., Global Governance (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1997), pp. 27-63.
relevant treaties1 6, changing rules of international trade in light of the World Trade Organization,
the efforts of the Global Environment Facility to expand its mandate to ozone depleting
substances, the reactions of the subsidiary bodies to smuggling and non-compliance, and the
pressures brought to bear over the years by Dupont and Greenpeace.
While the normative content of an international environmental regime is founded in a
variety of sources, the mechanisms and practices of enforcement are similarly hard to find
identified in any one document. It is through this regime lens that the gulf between the ideal of
strong rule of law and the bricolage of existing environmental law becomes visible. Whether and
which international environmental rules of law are enforced and how depends strongly on an
array of economic, political, geopolitical, security, and private interests.
Nevertheless, in some contrast to how enforcement does or does not operate in other
international regimes such as human rights, trade, or arms control, a distinct mode of general
enforcement exists within environmental regimes. To date, violations of environmental treaties
have little history of sparking serious international tensions, at least many that spill outside the
regime in question. Violators are as likely to receive assistance in the form of capacity building
funds, extended deadlines, or simple looks-the-other-way as they are to endure sustained scrutiny
of their actions or lack of actions. So, while Turkmenistan was harshly scolded in 1999 for its
lack of good-faith effort to meet its obligations under the ozone regime, it and all former Soviet
republics have also benefited from millions of dollars in new aid from the GEF in response to
their general inability to meet deadlines. It is this kind of management of non-compliance that is
described generally by Chayes and Chayes in The New Sovereignty'7 and that has been
catalogued by more recent scholars interested specifically in environmental regimes 18
The viability of managed compliance as a meaningful strategy is closely linked to the
idea of "the new sovereignty." Classical interpretations of sovereignty suggest that states bind
themselves to international regimes only when they have something to gain, specifically when
the results of that regime have something to offer them directly to compensate them for their loss
of latitude and independence. Therefore states have a presumption against acceding to treaties.
The new sovereignty, in contrast, argues that many states, especially developing states, bind
themselves to treaties not only when the treaty is in their direct interest, but also because they are
driven to seek recognition of their sovereign status through such accessions. Thus, new
sovereignty suggests that, for many states, there exists a presumption in favor of acceding to
treaties. As Chayes and Chayes posit:
Sovereignty, in the end, is status- the vindication of the state's existence as a member of the
international system. In today's setting, the only way most states can realize and express their
sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international
system. Isolation from the pervasive and rich international context means that the state's potential
for economic growth and political influence will not be realized. Connection to the rest of the
16 Specifically, the Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol, and the numerous amendments to the Montreal
Protocol.
17Aba Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Chayes and Chayes contrast the pitfalls of~ "coercion"~
(sanctions and other punishments) with the advantage of "management of compliance" since "the principal source of
noncompliance is not willful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or priority." Tbid, p. 22.
LB See generally, David G. Victor et at. eds., The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
Commitments (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
world and the political ability to be an actor within it are more important than any tangible benefits
in explaining compliance with international regulatory agreements 9
Within Central Asia, the new sovereignty has quickly established itself as a constant
presence in the environmental sector. I have never seen an official analysis of an environmental
treaty ratification in the local press that did not comment on the ratification's "affirmation" of
that state's sovereign status. Nor in my interviews with finance, environment, justice, and
foreign affairs ministry staff did I uncover more than a handful of individuals, out of several
dozen, who did not list such "affirmation" in the first or second place in a list of explanations of
why a ratification occurred.
Just as the new sovereignty challenges the stark and two dimensional cost-benefit
narratives of more traditional views, the range of actors in the world of new sovereignty is
complex. With increasing status, formerly excluded non-governmental actors are now mediating
between regimes, the status they confer, the material rewards of managed compliance, and
interested states. While NGOs are now active in virtually every international regime, in
environmental regimes they are arguably the most dynamic20 . Within environmental regimes,
NGOs issue independent verification reports, create policy, attend almost all conferences of the
parties, and even implement some of the most substantial grants of the GEF. Despite this broad
reach, the environmental NGO community remains insular enough to allow it to take on many
aspects of a community; its members know each other and have frequent interactions with each
other.
In contrast, NGOs have no more than a peripheral place in arms control regimes; they are
not allowed access to information or a presence during negotiations. Similarly, while the
situation is now beginning to change, the trade regime has formally excluded NGO participation
from its earliest days21. Consequently, NGOs in such regimes are not confronted with the kind
of difficult choices thrust upon NGOs in environmental regimes; they are too far from any
decision making to allow their subtle ideological differences to come to the surface.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, human rights NGOs in the developing world share
much more programmatically with their developed country peers than do environmental NGOs.
However, even despite recent interventions in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the human rights regime
is distinct in that it commands almost no history of enforcement at the global level. Without any
enforcement and without the substantial financial resources that make conditionality a potent
substitute for enforcement, human rights regimes (not including humanitarian assistance
regimes) lack dynamism. In part, this lack of dynamism is reflected by the fact that
environmental NGOs are somewhat more deeply invested in issues of economic development,
technology, trade, and the future than their human rights peers.
Moreover, human rights regimes have the luxury of offering a "correct" vision of society
on states, and they have the curious opportunity of offering several developed states as models of
human rights, thereby implying that human rights and development are mutually reinforcing. By
contrast, morality is much more contested in the environmental context; just as many developing
world environmental NGOs point to the United States as a model as curse it as the root of the
19 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance wit International Regulatory Agreements, p. 27.
20 In contrast to tis dominant viewpoint, see Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor,"Coniclusions ,"i iVictor et al. eds.,
The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environental Commitments, pp. 667-68.
2For example, GAFF Panels were prohibited frorn considering non-state aicus curie briefs in their adjudication
of trade disputes.
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problem. This dynamism has the consequence that prescriptive proposals are more numerous
and diverse in the environmental community than is the case with the human rights regime.
Finally, while NGOs are expected to fulfill oversight functions in human rights regimes,
in environmental regimes they are also increasingly called upon to play the role of stand-ins for
the state; NGOs are frequently the managers of water users associations, pilot environmental
projects, and even international environmental institutions. The World Conservation Union, an
important and influential international body composed of both state and NGO members has no
parallel in other regimes. Their provision of various economic and social services in addition to
oversight and educational functions means that NGOs participating in the environmental context
display a great diversity of form and ability.
It is this curious mix of formal and informal rules and state and nonstate actors, both
embedded in a discrete community, that imparts to the management of international
environmental regimes an unusual balance between organizational and social capital. Moreover,
the development of these regimes in recent years has depended as much on strengthening formal
verification, scientific, and governance bodies as it has on expanding the role of global civil
society within these regimes.
Accordingly, the states that are most influential within environmental regimes are very
often the ones whose NGOs are the most active, with the important exceptions of China and, to a
lesser extent, India. For most other states, large and small, developed and developing, the
benefits of these regimes accrue most strongly to those countries active both formally and
informally. While small, the Scandinavian states, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands
are among the most active at the formal end of developing international environmental law. For
example, they support the core functions of many treaties and protocols such as CITES and the
1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access To Justice in Environmental Matters 23 They also serve as the headquarters for NGOs
such as World Conservation Union and WWF and, through both foundations and governments,
as primary sources of funding for NGOs in developing states.
On the other end of the spectrum, both the governments and NGOs of Costa Rica and
Pakistan are far more active and influential in these regimes than their size would predict, but
their receipt of financial assistance matches their level of activity, not their comparative global
environmental importance. States such as Iran, France, and Argentina, in contrast, are more
minor players in global environmental regimes, in part because they do not boast as many active
international environmental NGOs.
The Central Asian states consistently express the opinion that they can only contribute
meaningfully to the resolution of global environmental problems and can only solve their own
environmental problems with financial and technical assistance from the West. Accordingly, the
current modes of participation of the Central Asian states in these regimes may be important in
gauging the success these states will achieve in garnering such support.
In this regard, most evidence that I have gathered during the past three years in Central
Asia and at meetings of international environmental regimes outside the region reveals
disappointing signs. By 1999, one Central Asian had achieved visibility within global
environmental regimes; U~zbekistan's Victor Ovchinnikov sat on the Scientific Commission of
2For a sense of the insularity of the community, see Mostafa K. Tolba, GlobaEnvronmjfentalfDilomacqy:
NegtaigEvrnetlAyeet o h ol.17-92(Cambridge: MIT Pess, 1998).
Switzerland is the depository for CITES, and Denmark supported the entire process leading up to the signing of
the Aarhus Convention in Aarhus, Denmark.
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the Convention to Combat Desertification. Almost no Central Asians are currently employed by
the secretariats of conventions, in part because the states in question, in stark contrast to actors
like Pakistan, do not make a serious effort to nominate candidates. Virtually no Central Asians
are sent by their states to participate in any of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies of
conventions, the bodies where important decisions are increasingly being made.
When Central Asian state delegates do attend important regime events, such as
conferences of the parties, as a rule they, on a good day, sit silently in the conference rooms and,
on a bad day, skip all regime events in order to sightsee. Instead of viewing these meetings as
important venues in which to further state interests, the states have a rich history of sending
employees to these meetings as rewards; quite frequently delegates do not speak English or know
the basics of international law. Finally, the Central Asian states are more apt to frustrate the
plans of their local NGOs who wish to participate in such events than to facilitate them. To wit,
the now normal international practice of including national and international NGOs on official
state delegations is not yet the norm in Central Asia, although even Russia has adopted the
practice.
Epistemic Communities as Human and Social Capital
Not only do international environmental regimes strongly privilege NGOs; they also uniquely
privilege scientists. Scientists are not core actors in trade or human rights regimes. Within arms
control regimes, they act in a limited fashion; they assist policy makers to understand what is
possible and to make sense of verification data. Yet, they are not expected to generate solutions.
So, while groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists do have a place within arms control
regimes, it is at best peripheral. Moreover, the open negotiations of many environmental
regimes are pervaded by a kind of pure scientific uncertainty that is quite different than the
technological uncertainty or simple lack of reliable information inherent in arms control settings.
A generalization is that scientists involved in environmental regimes are to a greater degree
independent voices and more often confront scientific questions than their peers in arms control
contexts, where technology and engineering dominate. As a result, largely missing from trade,
human rights, and arms control regimes are what regime scholars call epistemic communities.
"An epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-
effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values2 ." In context,
epistemic community means relying on scientists as a supranational form of identity that
promotes the formation of a solidary group based in bridging social capital. Yet what
distinguishes epistemic communities from other sorts of communities is their lack of an
organizational or membership component. In most respects, epistemic communities are ad hoc
entities, lacking an organizational or leadership framework; accordingly, studies of epistemic
communities privilege the role of individuals over the influence of organizations.25 From the
preceding chapter's review of social capital, one implication of solidary groups is that they
produce externalities.
In this context, Haas discovered that the states whose positions in MedPlan (the plan to
conserve the Mediterranean Sea environment) moved from opposition to support of the regime
24 Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 55.
25 Young ed., Global Governance.
were those states in which scientists boasted gains in internal political influence and
administrative representation over that period26. While Haas coined the phrase epistemic
community, the insights that ground a reliance on epistemic communities were well developed
from the first days of MedPlan under the guidance of one of its UNEP architects and epistemic
community leaders, Stjepan Keckes, a Yugoslav oceanographer. Frequently, MedPlan is
considered to have achieved its successes by basing much of its policy on scientific foundations
and actively including scientists at all stages of the plan's development. Yet, generally speaking,
epistemic communities contribute to regimes in two ways beyond merely bequeathing a regime
with a scientific foundation for the identification and resolution of environmental problems. In
addition, epistemic communities facilitate regimes by altering the negotiating positions of states
and by serving as consumers of assistance programs.
In the former case, as adjunct members of negotiating delegations and as state officials,
scientists can impact the development of foreign policy within their home states. In both
capacities, scientists nudge their states toward negotiating positions congenial to regime
building27. Scientists take pains to point out beliefs held by state officials that may be unfounded
or hinder consensus 28. Generally, in Central Asia, while scientists and officials who attend
international meetings are quiet, within the internal political realm, scientists act in just the
fashion described above.
In the latter case, applicable most pertinently to any regime with developing states,
regime financial assistance provided to national scientific institutions facilitates consensus in two
ways. First, these funds are viewed as victories for developing states and reason to continue
participation in a regime. Second, the results of such funding do more than just advance
scientific knowledge about the issue to be regulated. In many cases, the results of scientific work
so funded do not produce new information. However, they do produce national information, and
state officials in many cases are more prone to accept and react to internally generated scientific
reports than to reports about problems presented by other, or developed, states29. While I do not
find strong grounds for the claim that Central Asian governments are not receptive to "non-
native" scientific conclusions, the allure of possible funding, even funding of only a few
thousand dollars, continues to be a powerful incentive in the region. Such funding is both a
major reason for Central Asian state regime participation and a powerful tool for altering the
negotiating positions of these states.
The reason why epistemic communities are of particular relevance to Central Asia is a
direct result of the human capital development programs of the USSR; Central Asia claims more
scientists and engineers per capita than most European states. Thus, while regional seas
programs served as the environmental regimes that highlighted for academics and policymakers
2Haas, SvnthMeierna:TePltcofItrainlEvrnetlCoeton,. pp. 155-64.
2This conception does not deny that many scientists view environmental problems through Marxist, geopolitical, or
other lenses. Rather, the argument is that scientists aggregately tend to mitigate the impact of ideologies in
negotiations, and they tend to agree on descriptions and prescriptions if they possess the same body of data.
28 Haas points out that scientists involved in MedPlan recognized that foreign affairs diplomats mistakenly assumed
that pollutants were carried by currents throughout the entire Mediterranean. Yet, because of slow currents,
pollution was essentially localized. Scientists chose to allow diplomats to work under their misconception rather
than share knowledge about the reality of pollution, since they assunmed that an environmental agreement would be
frustrated were this knowledge known by diplomats. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International
Environmental Cooperation, pp. 70-71.
29 Moreover, since research institutions in developing countries are often ill-funded, funding from secretariats can
make national scientists more dependent on the regime than on their own governments for funding, and their
loyalties can shift accordingly. Ibid, p. 80.
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Such a decline may have strong effects on the links between epistemic communities and
productive national participation in international environmental regimes. Describing why its
epistemic community has been relatively unsuccessful in forcing France to be a more positive
player in MedPlan, Haas concludes that epistemic communities are ineffective if their claims are
3 0 Ignoring Iran (which has a large number of scientific institutions for water and the Caspian), the scientific capital
brought to the regime by the post-Soviet states is stunning. During the Soviet period, a "Seas of the USSR" program
(including the Caspian) existed that framed research on a scale that the Mediterranean only achieved relatively
recently under MedPlan. In fact, the USSR offered to conduct MedPlan's open water monitoring, but was rebuffed.
Tpid, p. 82. For purposes of comparison, Kazakhstan currently has 13 scientific institutions that are involved in
Caspian Sea research and no fewer than two dozen doctoral level researchers. That is, adjusted for population,
lower than France's MedPlan capacity, but higher than Spain's. Ibid, p. 212.
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not respected elsewhere in the government . In other words, one should not conflate the static
existence of environmental political institutions with the strength of epistemic communities.
While the moments of creation of such institutions correlate strongly with an increase in the
political influence of scientific advice, the continued existence of such institutions may have no
deeper explanation than bureaucratic inertia.
This inertia will be particularly misleading when a state moves away from scientific
decision making to emphasize neorealistic calculations of state power. For all the states of
Central Asia, geopolitical security and influence are extremely important, and these objectives
suffuse and inform a cross-section of state decision making. For example, Turkmenistan points
to its announcement of neutrality as a supposed proof of its commitment to environmental
security, and Kazakhstan points to its environmental burdens from the Soviet era as a vague
proof of commitment to environmental sustainability. In both cases, such strategic political
rhetoric frustrates regime building on scientific grounds 33, and the continuing effective
marginalization of scientists by politicians exacerbates this weakness.
Accordingly, for science as a whole, the post-Soviet era has not seen the advancement of
scientific leaders within national governments in Central Asia, although during Soviet times
leadership in national academies of science was one of the stepping stones to national political
power. More parochially, within the environmental community, the region's half dozen living
ex-environmental ministers have not moved to other ministerial positions or even deputy
minister positions, as is the norm for government ministers, but have invariably receded into
obscurity.
Science is clearly on the decline in the former Soviet world. This decline transcends the
general financial and institutional crisis in the region; science's problems are deeper than drastic
budget cuts and governments with chaotic and ineffective policies. The best and brightest
students in the former USSR are no longer headed for math, physics, and chemistry, but instead
focus on law, business administration, and English. To wit, while many private and state donors
are active in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, none of the most influential stress the importance of
science in society, and none provide meaningful funds for the preservation of scientific human
capital34 .
Ibid, p. 162.
32 Ibid.
33Not examined here is the fact that post-Soviet scientists are dialectical materialists. Dialectical materialism is a
theory of the natural world and natural laws. A form of traditional philosophical materialism, it (ignoring for a
moment its variety of incarnations) is not radically different from the worldviews held by many Western scientists.
Dialectical materialism can be most concisely described as non-reductionist and non-vitalist materialism that
presupposes the existence of different laws on each level of nature (physical, biological, social). For overviews of
dialectical materialism, see Loren R. Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and Technology from the
Russian Experience? (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 6-17; Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The
Academy of Sciences of the USSR (19 17-70). What is the effect, then, of a situation in which in an emerging
regional seas regime UN scientific experts subscribe to a different worldview than local experts, especially if four-
fifths of such a regime subscribes to that different worldview? Dialectical materialism's very existence as a
"scientific" philosophy challenges the idea of epistemic communities. Where a divergence of policy
recommendations occurs, an epistemic community will not form. Cf Other regional seas regimes, especially
MedPlan, have faced no less uncertain possibilities for epistemic community formation due to religious and racial
differences.
~In this regard, articles describing the post-Soviet period using the word "modern" are suspicious since late Soviet
society was modern and industrial, but post-Soviet reorientations toward religion, nationalism, and rejection of
science constitute a rejection of modernism towards pre-modernism instead of post-modernism.
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If the environmental regimes will last more than one generation in Central Asia, who will
take the places of the scientists who have already provided these regimes with a firm scientific
foundation? Will local scientists continue to be capable of fueling the regime and monitoring its
effectiveness? Likewise, whereas the traditional capacity building elements of environmental
regimes in developing countries expect an expansion of scientific potential, perhaps for any such
regime in Central Asia, the focus should instead be on strategically protecting and safeguarding
portions of what already exists.
Accordingly, the Central Asian states will probably be unable to take full advantage of
the opportunities opened to them through international environmental regimes as long as current
trends of marginalizing national environmental agencies and eroding the social standing of
scientists continue. Without a national community of scientists that continues to attract young
scholars, which no state possesses any longer, while future delegates to international meetings
may speak English, they will not possess the human capital assets necessary to achieve
leadership positions in regimes. As a direct result, no Central Asian state will be seen as a strong
player in international environmental issues. Already, the opinion concerning the Central Asian
states within regimes, based on my communications with secretariat staff, is that they offer more
problems to the regimes than they offer assets valuable to the regimes.
Environmental Administrative Agencies as Human and Organizational Capital
During the course of the past 30 years, the appearance of new environmental conventions has
been complemented by the expansion of existing conventions. Most of the environmental
accords in the preceding pages now have well over 100 state parties. Moreover, they boast an
increasingly complex array of subsidiary bodies. In the past, the average environmental regime,
for example Ramsar, consisted of a secretariat of a half dozen people with an annual budget of
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, a conference of the parties every three years, and some
ad hoc committees composed of volunteers from the scientific communities of developed states
and convening rarely. The modem environmental regime looks much different.
Each major new environmental regime of recent years, and in response the older regimes
are also moving towards this model, boasts a large secretariat and a conference of the parties that
meets no less often than once every two years. These new regimes also have nearly weekly
convenings of larger standing committees and commissions composed of a broad range of state
delegates, and several NGOs entrusted with semi-official regime functions. For example, the
regime surrounding the biodiversity convention is now organized as follows3 5 . The still rapidly
expanding CBD secretariat employs more than fifty people but will soon reach ei hty-eight; its
similarly expanding budget now adds up to well more than $10,000,000 annually Among the
more frequent meetings of the regime are those negotiating the Biosafety Protocol, the
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, a half dozen "liaison
groups" on specific issues (inter alia, coral reefs, forests, the ecosystem approach,
agrobiodiversity, and dryland, Mediterranean, arid, semi-arid, and grassland Savannah
ecosystems), an expert panel on access and benefit sharing, intersessional meetings on operation
of the convention, a Consultative Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity Education
and Public Awareness, and ''technical experts" groups on the same issues as the "liaison groups."1
See http://www.biodiv.org.
36 http://www.biodiv.org/conv/QReportO9-2000-6.htmn.
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This voluminous list does not even include those bodies related to the Clearinghouse
Mechanism 7, which is attempting to bring all wildlife conventions under the umbrella of the
CBD.
In addition to the hundreds of people who are involved in the secretariat and these
subsidiary bodies (not to mention the thousandswho attend the conferences of the parties), the
CBD Secretariat essays to convince the regime's roughly 177 state parties to appoint a half dozen
focal points each for various biodiversity issues. Complementing (or coniifusing) this activity, the
World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP also have complicated numbers of staff and programs
specifically tuned to the biodiversity regime, many hundreds at the country level, not the least
since the GEF is the financial mechanism for the Biodiversity Convention. The entire list of
subsidiary bodies above does not even include any of the pantheon of funding sources of the
regime.
A well-funded Canadian NGO, International Institute for Sustainable Development, now
sends out daily and colorful reports from CBD Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and related
events for free to interested parties. Previous to 1999 no such comprehensive source of
information existed in easily accessible form; the IISD bulletins are now something of an
industry standard38. Yet, despite this coverage, whereas the basic maintenance of past
environmental conventions could survive on several tens of thousands of dollars a year, and
whereas scholars could follow in intimate detail the workings of several conventions
simultaneously, no one person could ever hope to follow even the biodiversity regime alone in
detail now. Moreover, whereas high levels of funding for regimes in the past almost
automatically signified that funds were moving out the doors of secretariats to fund
environmental projects in states, today millions of dollars are needed just to keep the
administration of regimes functioning. Whether or not this trend is simply bureaucratization in
the worst sense of the word or the capacity building needed to effect serious change is open to
debate. In the case of the CBD, however, were the regime asked to present a list of
accomplishments produced from its secretariat budget, it would be at a loss to point to even a
few cases of actual biodiversity protection. It could, at best, point to alleged improvements in
the stocks of the regime's human, social, and organizational capital assets; somewhere along the
way in the past decade, most regime activities quietly reassigned direct efforts to save natural
capital assets to secondary importance.
In connection with this trend, in the last decade a revolution occurred in environmental
regimes similar to that which occurred in the United States in the first third of the 20th century.
Most governance and decision making devolved in all but their most symbolic forms from
constitutional (treaty) bodies to administrative agencies and expert commissions. While this
transition, and its predictable pitfalls, has received virtually no attention in scholarly literature, it
has radically changed the normative bases for a state's successful participation in environmental
regimes. Broadly, it has changed the mechanisms through which, first, the international regime
penetrates the space of the state and, second, the mechanisms through which the state acts at the
international level. While these two changes are intimately connected, for purposes of analysis,
they can be addressed separately.
SThese include an informal advisory committee, meetings of national focal points, regional committees, meetings
of technical experts
38 See http://WWW.iisd.ca. The Eat eoitosBlei is in its ninth year, but only recently secured the funding,
staff, and technology to make itself a better source of information than newspapers and related standard news media.
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This first change means that conferences of the parties and very occasional visits of
secretariat staff are no longer the only connection between states and regimes. If formerly
almost all information about states, save some NGO information, was carefully crafted by states
themselves and presented no more often than once a year, in the present day states have far less
control over information. Today, secretariat staff frequently visit states to collect information,
conduct trainings, and consult with governments.
However, the more important change concerns funding agencies. World Bank and
UNDP, and occasionally UNEP, maintain offices within most developing states. These agencies
have done for environmental development what the IMF did for economic development; they
standardized it and programmatically homogenized it to reflect the bureaucratic needs of funders.
Really little different in their production from IMF structural adjustment plans, an
assortment of "action plans" (for, inter alia, biodiversity, climate change, and environmental
protection, at the national and regional levels) now constitute mandatory preconditions for states
seeking substantial environmental funding through UNDP and the World Bank. Whereas even
five years ago a sharply conceived project to conserve biodiversity in a discrete area of a state
could receive funding within eighteen months through the Global Environment Facility, now the
fundamental ideas of such a proposal are of only secondary importance. In my own (frustrating)
experience with UNDP and World Bank in Central Asia, GEF implementing agencies now
refuse to even consider any proposal unless it accords with all relevant action plans and
strategies and is of large enough scale.
If such overarching plans do not exist, these agencies insist as a priority that they be
created, with most of the funds for this process usually going to local offices of and expatriate
staff of UNDP and World Bank. Not surprisingly, the number of such plans increases with each
passing year. Whereas once there was only a biodiversity action plan, now there should be
biodiversity enabling activities, a national biodiversity action plan, and, for Central Asia, a
regional biodiversity action plan. Invariably, this process pushes aside the best discrete local
conservation plans or increases their scale to unworkably large proportions. This top-down
approach with its predilections for gigantomania and opportunities for corruption are very Soviet
in flavor39 and inefficiency. Thus, their emplacement in a more general effort to assist Central
Asia make the transition from social to decentralized free markets is a paradox. Likewise, to the
extent that, especially in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, local UNDP offices have essentially
arrogated for themselves the functions of a national environmental ministry, that these efforts are
justified as capacity building projects is an irony.
Given the declines in Central Asian environmental ministries in the past decade and the
spectacular increase in UNDP budgets and offices over the same period, capacity building takes
on a meaning in Central Asia different from that held by scholars of environmental regimes.
Indeed, UNDP offices in Central Asia now have approximately the number of staff
environmental ministries had seven years ago, and vice versa, illustrating the connection between
these agencies' decline and UNDP's growth.
This trend is not surprising if one accepts UNDP as an administrative agency instead of a
philanthropic organization. One of the basic habits of administrative agencies is that, whatever
their missions, they pursue tactics intended to expand their budgets and protect their privileges.
IJNDP exhibits these traits strongly, in part because UNEP lacks local offices, and in part
because no international environmental NGO like WWF or TUCN maintains a presence in
3But, of course, in the present context, experts are no longer from Moscow and the emphasis is no longer on the
Russian language, but the underlying structure is essentially identical.
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Central Asia; both factors have reduced demands for accountability on UNDP local offices.
Therefore, it is a pressing question, given the range of interested actors in the region, whether
environmental programs in Central Asia, all of which claim to build capacity, be sustainable, and
target environmental needs, are in fact efficient, effective, and further the long term
environmental interests of the region. In this regard, it is curious that UNDP all but ignored
environmental issues until environmental development funds appeared earlier in the decade.
More generally, now that environmental aid is a tangible commodity, the donors most
active in democracy and market development are essentially the same as the environmental
donors. With this shift, the aspirations of environmental aid also began to shift. While the
international community is well aware that the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and (for those states
that seek membership) European Union strongly impact government structure in developing
states, it is less appreciated that equivalent normative pressures are now increasingly being
placed on national environmental agencies. If a national environmental agency or equivalent
agency charged with environmental management is not isomorphic with Western forms,
environmental regimes managed by UNDP or the World Bank will essay strongly to reshape
them. Through this lens, the manager of environmental regimes resemble management
consultants in the United States; much of their value consists of homogenizing sectors of the
economy, not just in assisting individual firms.
The second major change in environmental regimes concerns the range of possibilities
now open for state representation. In the past, the major form of state representation consisted of
state delegations to conferences of the parties (COPs). However, now, COPs in large regimes
merely rubber stamp decisions; they are no longer the negotiating forums of past years. While
important negotiations do occur at COPs, the bulk of decisions are made prior to COPs, as
testified by the fact that the vast majority of final documents issued at such events can be
obtained as draft decisions many months before a COP. Accordingly, states interested in
advancing their interests within regimes increasingly must act during the periods in between
COPs and they must act through subsidiary bodies. The single best way to advance such
interests is to have your nationals occupy authoritative leadership positions within such bodies.
While a strong state can strong-arm its delegates onto such bodies, it cannot make other
members respect its delegates. A review of widely regarded environmental leaders within
regimes highlights the extent to which educational achievement in the sciences and status within
the scientific community are prerequisites for such authority. Such leaders need not be from
developed states or states with strong scientific programs; Egypt has produced two of the most
well-known figures active in environmental regimes: Mohamed T. El-Ashry, the GEF CEO and
Chairman, and Mostafa Tolba, the former UNEP Executive Director. Two other states, Costa
Rica and Pakistan, illustrate the degree to which the example of Egypt can be copied.
Thus, for a state to integrate itself successfully into international environmental regimes,
it will almost certainly need to draw on or develop appropriate stocks of organizational and
human capital. It will need to study and understand the rules and procedures of international
environmental regimes and how to manipulate these rules to its advantage; a core part of such an
effort will involve advancing suitable scientifically trained delegates, from both the state and
NGO sectors, to subsidiary bodies. Likewise, perhaps of critical importance, developing states
will need to develop the ability to resist efforts by international environmental agencies to
arrogate funds and responsibilities intended to remain within state hands.
With the partial exception of Kazakhstan, none of the states in the region have made such
an effort to understand the organizational foundations of international environmental regimes.
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While the scientifically trained staff of Kazakhstan's National Environment Center does possess
the most developed understanding in the entire region of these processes, the ministries of
foreign affairs and environment have made no concerted effort to advance these scientists within
subsidiary bodies. Quite the opposite, this National Environment Center is sequestered in
Kokshetau, and its staff are low on the pecking order of state officials chosen to attend
international events.
Moreover, no Central Asian state has made any serious effort to restrain UNDP's
arrogation of environmental authority on the national level. My research suggests strongly that
national officials assume that local UNDP offices have a mandate to intrude on national authority
as a condition of funding. Yet, UNDP officials in New York resist even the very suggestion that
such intrusions are consonant with UNDP's mission. At the same time, UNDP staff in New
York admit that they know little about what happens in field offices and that national UNDP
mission heads have a great amount of latitude of action.
Connecting International Regimes to Natural CapitaL Compliance and
Effectiveness
Methodologically, analyses of how international environmental regimes relate to their mission of
protecting stocks of natural capital depend on differentiating between three stages of these
regimes. First, regime formation involves negotiations and drafting that create specific
obligations and an instrument of international law. Second, regime implementation involves
effecting the latter through national legislation and national enforcement mechanisms. Finally,
regime compliance entails the process of fulfilling the specific obligations and activities
envisioned by the treaty. Thus, in practice, analysts must examine the activities of and
interactions between state agencies, NGOs, and scientists as treaties are drafted and later revised,
as national laws are drafted and responsibilities are allocated between stakeholders, and as
domestic projects and strategies are carried out in furtherance of (or in spite of) the treaty goals.
Where a regime is well founded and exhibits high levels of compliance, the regime will
likely also be effective; effectiveness refers to the impact of the regime on stocks of natural
capital. If a regime is founded on false premises, watered-down, or timed inopportunely, even
high levels of compliance may not result in effectiveness. Likewise, for the same reasons, a high
non-compliance regime may be effective4 0 . Thus, while compliance and effectiveness are often
mistakenly conflated, compliance refers merely to the organizational capital aspects of a regime,
while effectiveness refers primarily to natural capital.
Thus, an analysis of the transition period in Central Asia through the lens of
environmental regimes tracks these three stages of environmental regimes, and evaluates
effectiveness as a separate question. Tracking these three stages of regimes involves
intersections with the region's array of social, physical, human, and organizational capital assets,
assets that are pertinent to a great many other issues, such as the democratic transition, the role of
religion, and educational systems.
While such information should not displace the insights of anthropology, sociology, or
traditional political science, it does promise to challenge these other approaches by opening up a
new arena of inquiry, especially since many actors display unexpected behavior when released
For example, the Y2K regime, while not environmental, illustrates some of the conditions of a high non-
compliance, high effectiveness regime. The mission of that regime was to prevent chaos on January 1, 2000.
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from a purely domestic context and when the
specter of international comparisons is
imminent. For certain issues, such as the
strength of Central Asian scientists in general,
purely domestic research falls short of
providing the kinds of insights available when
such scientists interact with their peers from
other parts of the world.
As part of a general overview of these
three stages of regime participation in Central
Asia, to date the governments of the region
have been largely uninvolved in multilateral
environmental negotiations. Where they have
had strong opportunities for such involvement,
such as for the 1997 UN Convention on Law of
Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses or the Kyoto Protocol, they have
simply remained on the sidelines. Where they
have been encouraged by the international
community to engage in such negotiations for
the sake of solving their own regional
problems, they have shown no effort beyond
that needed to make statements at conferences.
The shortfalls between the promises contained
in the 1995 Nukus Declaration and the 1997 Almaty declaration (Figure 2) and the reality that no
state even penned a draft treaty for the Aral Sea highlights this lack of effort.
The region's accession to international environmental agreements is, however, more
impressive, as documented in Table 1 following this Chapter. Most of the Central Asian states
have now acceded to most of the major global environmental accords, and each state has plans to
expand its membership in such environmental regimes. However, some of these accessions and
ratifications have occurred in contravention of constitutional law, especially Uzbekistan's
accession to the climate change convention through a unilateral "approval" from Uzbekistan's
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations Secretary-General and Kazakhstan's
ratification of CBD through an equally unilateral resolution of Kazakhstan's executive branch.
Both accessions are presumably valid under international law, and both fail to observe the
legislative foundations of both lawmaking and constitutional separation of powers.
Moreover, no state in the region has displayed a substantial effort to implement these
conventions; in part this lack of effort is connected to the immense expense that such an effort
would entail. Also, since each state grants primacy to international law over national law,
implementation could be merely a formality. Yet, implementation is not merely a formality
considering three active trends in the region. The texts are not widely published; courts resist
"1 See Letter 11/2734 of May 10, 1993 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan Sadyk Safaev
to Butros Butros-Gali and Postanovlenie N. 918 ot 19 Avgusta 1994 Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki Kazakhstan. In
applying provisions of such conventions4; and since new environmental legislation continues to
pass in the region in disregard of the provisions of treaties, implementation is still important and
its absence clearly frustrates the integration of these states into environmental regimes.
Moreover, state practice in the region allows foreign companies to operate outside the realm of
environmental law; by contract several foreign companies have received exemptions from
national (and international) environmental law. The most well-known example concerned the
leak in 1999 that revealed that Karachaganak Petroleum Operating Company is contractually
exempt from payment of environmental fines43. Since many transnational corporations operating
in Central Asia have guarantees from state governments44 that they will not be subject to changes
in environmental law (either by adoption of new legislation or by treaty accession), the region
faces severe limitations on its ability to participate in a number of environmental regimes.
Table 1 also provides an overview of the record of compliance of the Central Asian states
in international environmental regimes, a record that shows great diversity between states, but on
the whole attests to a generally low level of compliance. On a subjective level, I note no decline
in wildlife smuggling in the region, poaching, or industrial emissions as a result of the region's
participation in environmental regimes. Not only are states failing to increase the efficacy of
interventions to protect the environment through their involvement in such regimes, they are also
largely failing to comply with their administrative responsibilities under these regimes. Most of
the membership dues and most of the reports that the Central Asian states are required to submit
to secretariats and subsidiary bodies are submitted at least a year late, if at all. In March 2000,
faced with dues in excess of $21 million and suspension of its membership in many international
organizations, Kazakhstan announced that it would only meet its obligations in 21% of the treaty
regimes to which it had acceded4 , leaving it in stark noncompliance for almost all of its
environmental dues.
In the case of Central Asia, non-compliance with treaties does lead to a failure to meet
the natural capital goals of environmental regimes. The Central Asian environment is in no
appreciable manner better protected or less degraded than it was a decade ago. The major I
improvements (lower levels of industrial pollutants, lowered rates of application of agricultural
chemicals, and the closure of the region's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities46 )
have scant connection to the activities or programs of environmental regimes. Despite this grim
reality, states continue to suggest in public statements that the region is moving towards
sustainable development, and donors are equivalently vocal in advertising purported successes in
this direction. Recognizing the political self-interest of these claims, I distinguish this pervasive
practice and its attendant exuberance of from true environmental effectiveness.
42 Courts in the region operate under a set of instructions regarding sources. While constitutions suggest that courts
should apply treaties directly, these instructions, at least the ones I have been able to collect, universally fail to list
such international sources of law as admissible as sources of law in judicial review.
41 Y.R., "Predstaviteli NPO Kaspiiskogo regiona namerevayutsya usilit svoe vliyanie na transnatsionalnye
korporatsii v voprosakh ekologii," Panorama (Sept. 15, 2000); www.panorama kz. Karachaganak Petroleum is a
consortium primarily comprised of Agip, British Gas, and Texaco.
4More recent laws allowing grandfathering of environmental regulations, for example in Kazakhstan, do not run
afoul of this legal dilemma since they are legislative grants, not executive exemptions.
4'"Oleg Kihe, "Kazakhstan iz-za neuplaty chlenskikh vznosov peresmatrivaet svoe uchastie v mezhdunarodnykh
organizatsiyakh, " Panorama (March 21, 2000), p. 1.
46 Indeed, these closures have often only come about thanks to offers of conditionalized or substantial bilateral
foreign aid connected to military interests. For a case study of Kazakhstan's biological weapons dismantling and
attempted conversion to biotechnology, see Aizhan Madikhojaeva, "Chisto bakteriologicheski my uzhe ne opasny"
Ekspress K (Aug. 5, 2000), p. 3.
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Whether the governments of the region are to blame for development failures or whether
donors have been irresponsible and gullible is not yet clear. What is clear is that both sets of
institutions operate free of much oversight or substantive democratic accountability. Put
differently, both donors and Central Asian governments can pretty much say whatever they want
and do whatever they want in Central Asia without much concern (at least as long as constituents
continue to accept their statements as dispositive of reality) for the veracity, legality, or
consequences of their actions. In this regard, the lack of democracy within Central Asia and the
lock of democracy in environmental regimes both resemble the state of the global trade regime
prior to the 2000 Seattle protests.
Claims of development and success should be evaluated critically and skeptically.
Otherwise, an accounting ten years from now of environmental development in Central Asia will
probably advertise the kind of impressive, glowing, and Orwellian discourse of battles won as
was boasted by the post-Soviet market developers until 1998 erected sobriety and reality as
barriers to such doublespeak.
In operative terms, the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 was a failure on all fronts.
Domestically, new republican governments failed to pay much, if any, attention to international
environmental conventions. Internationally, the world community and its host of organizations
refused to acknowledge this declaration as sufficient to establish membership in the various
international environmental regimes then in existence. In retrospect, the world's disregard of the
actual provisions of the Alma-Ata Declaration was Central Asia's introduction to the fact that
international environmental law and international environmental politics constitute an arcane,
complex, and highly manipulable world.
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Status of International Environmental Accords in Central Asia
(Table 11)
RIGHT COLUMN
Includes information related to notable state compliance, notable state non-compliance,
and errors stemming from secretariats and international agencies. Normal discrepancies
between dates of accession or ratification expressed as date of national act followed by
[date of receipt by secretariat/depository].
1 Current to November 2000 and compiled as author's contribution to Law and Environment Eurasia Partnership, "Global Accords and Ecological Human Rights:
Advocacy for Rule of Law and Environmental Reform in Central Asia," (Unpublished Project Report to John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 2000).
KAZAKHSTAN
Siged 5//982 Raifid 3/10/03AcFcede 23/10/00n ctv n nurn GOacest
information Kazakhstan focal point and ECE listed focal point not the same. No enabling legislation,
limited access to courts.
hovttp:/ww~nec~rln/pcayhm
Cclanion n r i k i s iitoedostue k pnroras uchastiyu o tvelyos i e crot e n
Signed 9/6/92*, Government acceptance 19/8/94' [Ratification 6/9/94]. Violation of provisions of
Constitution related to treaties, possibly undertaken in reliance on invalid advice from representative of
Biodiversity Secretariat.
As of 8/98 dues four years in arrears: $64,000, Late submission of National Report
cceded 6/4/99"o , Note of accession sent only on 14/12/99, [20/1/00"] Entered into force 19/4/00. Active
ha ninternational smuggling of, inter alia, argali and sturgeon.
Voted to adopt in 21/5/97 GA vote". Failed to sign and failed to apply provisions to potentially favorable
IntdrIna " n PiIleverage in disputes over Syrdarya, Ili, and Irtysh rivers.
2 United Nations Economic Council for Europe, "Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General- TREATY I-XXVII" (undated), available at
http://www.unece.org/env/Pp/ctreaty.htm.
3 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 23 oktyabrya 2000g. N 92-II0 ratifikatsii Konventsii o dostupe k informatsi, uchastiyu obschestvennosti v protsesse
prinyatiya reshenii i dostupe k pravosudiyu po voprosam, kasayuschimsya okruzhayuschei sredy.
4 Focal point is Tatyana Adamovna Shakirovna. For examples of efforts to provide information to NGOs, see most issues of KazEcoPravda, available at
http://www.ecostan.org/vestik.html.
' United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, "Information on Kazakhstan," (undated), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda2 /natlinfo/countr/kazakh/index.htm.
6 Kazakstan, "Country Profile: Implementation of Agenda 2 1: Review of Progress Made since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
1992." (1997), http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/kazak-cp.htm
7 Resolution 12-8/3869 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (requiring ministries to assist efforts of Agenda 21 Working Group).
8 Convention on Biological Diversity, "Ratification," (Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/conv/Pdf/ratification-alpha.pdf.
9 POStanovlenie N. 918 ot 19 avgusta 1994 Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki Kazakhstan.
10 Convention on Biological Diversity, "Ratification."
" Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 6 aprelya 1999 goda N 372-10O prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Konventsii o mezhdunarodnoi torgovle vidami dikoi
fauny i flory, nakhodyaschimisya pod ugrozoi ischeznoveniya.
12 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, "List of Parties" (undated), available at
http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/common/parties/alphabet.shtml.
13 United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses," Press Release
GA/9248 (May 21, 1997).
Sf Acceded 23/10/00" Fails to apply provisions to potentially favorable leverage in disputes over Syrdarya,
3 IE MEEMWIiing Ili, and Irtysh rivers.
Co pa h Internal government agreement on accession.
Signed Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane
13/12/984
Signed Memo. of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for Slender-billed Curlew 2/12/949
As of 8/98 dues three years in arrears: $44,500, Focal Point Named, Submitted National Communication
Early (11/5/98), 98 COP Announced Voluntary Reductions (only COP non-host state to do so) and
attempted to join Annex 125.
Signed 3/12/9926
4 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 23 oktyabrya 2000g. N 89-II 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Konventsii o transgranichnom zagryaznenii vozdukha
na bolshie rasstoyaniya.
" Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 23 oktyabrya 2000g. N 94-II 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Konventsii ob okhrane i ispolzovanii transgranichnykh
vodotokov i mezhdunarodnykh ozer.6 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 23 oktyabrya 2000g. N 91-II 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Konventsii o transgranichnom vozdeistvii
promyshlennykh avarii.
" Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 23 oktyabrya 2000g. N 86-II 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Konventsii ob otsenke vozdeistviya na
okruzhayuschuyu sredu v transgranichnom kontekste.
" Convention on Migratory Species, "Agreement Summary Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane,"(Feb. 19, 1999), available at http://wcmc.org.uk/cms/sib-summ.htm.
19 Convention on Migratory Species, "Agreement Summary Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Slender-billed
Curlew. Numenius tenuirostris," (July 1, 1998), available at http://wcmc.org.uk/cms/sbc summ.htm.
21 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD," (Oct. 11, 2000), available at http://www.unccd.int/convention/ratif/doeif.php.
2 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 7 iyulya 1997 goda N 149-1 0 ratifikatsii Konventsii Organizatsii Obyeninennykh Natsii po borbe s opustynivaniem.
21 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD."
Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 4 maya 1995 goda N 2260 0 ratifikatsii Ramochnoi Konventsii Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsii ob izmenenii
klimata.24 Framework Convention on Climate Change-Secretariat, "Update on Ratification of the Convention," (Sept. 7, 2000), available at
http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/ratlist.pdf.25 See United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change FCCC/CP/1999/2 (May 28, 1999).26 Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 12 marta 1999 goda 84 0 podpisanii Respubliki Kizakhstan Kiotskogo protokola k Ramochnoi Konventsii
Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsii ob izmenenii klimata.
27Global Environment Faciliy RListoftteartcptnncthe:tutrdGE, Ot,199,aalbea
G.1 obi 4roParticipant since 30/3/98z , Failed to notify GEF of change of focal points Failed to join Constituency on
GEF Council even after November 2000 GEF Council when other Central Asian states chose
constituency."
Nt arty, but internal government resolution to accede exists, although government support declining;
mr e But List of Wetands of International Importance, . includes (1) Kurgajin/Tengiz Lakes and (2) Lower
Turgai and Irgiz Lakes and includes (2) on the Montreux Record".
Acceded 30/10/97" [26/8/98"] Entrz into force 24/11/98"
Acceded 31/10/97 [26/8/98" ], Entry into force 24/11/983 ; B MOP 11 (11/99) had not provided 1986
Baseline Data for Annex A substances (over 2 years overdue)7; Only Non-Article 5 State party (and one
of only 9 state parties) that had never provided any ODS date to Secretariat by Mop 113
Failed to Accede; Secretariat mistakenly claims KZ more than 2 years overdue to report 1989 baseline
HCFCs, but KZ not a party to London Amendments39.
Failed to Accede.
Enrg Sec. reports "acceptance" 29/4/94 Kazakhstan reports 2994, Possible violation of Constitution.
A s of 8/98, dues four years in arrears: $29,700; only paid on 19 March 1999. Environmental Ministry not
informed of composition of KZ Committee for World Heritage, in whch president's daughter included.
2 Global Environment Facility, "List of States Participating in the Restructured GEF," (Oct. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.gefweb.org/participants/MembersCountries/members-countries.html.
2h Global Environment Facility, "New Participants in Constituencies," GEF/C.16/11 (Oct. 11, 2000), available at
http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Council Documents/GEFC16/GEFC.16_11.pdf
29 Ramsar Bureau, "The List of Wetlands of International Importance," (Nov. 7, 2000), available at http://www.ramsar.org/sitelist.pdf.
30 Ramsar Bureau, "The Montreux Record," (Nov. 5, 2000), available at http://www.ramsar.org/key_montreux record.htm.
3 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 30 oktyabrya 1997 goda N 177-1o prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Venskoi Konventsii ob okhrane ozonovogo sloya.
3 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification," (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/ratif.htmn.
33 Global Environment Facility, "Kazakhstan: Programme for Phasing Out Ozone Depleting Substances," (2000), p. 20, available at
http://www.gefweb.org/wprogrami/Feb00/undp/Kazakhstan/Part%/20I.doc.
34 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 30 oktyabrya 1997 goda N,176-1 O prisoedinenii Respubliki Kazakhstan k Monrealskomu Protokolu po veschestvamn,
razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi.
*5 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
36 Global Environment Facility, "Kazakhstan: Programme for Phasing Out Ozone Depleting Substances," p. 20.
37 United Nations Environment Programme, "Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer: Report of
the Secretariat on Information provided by the Parties in Accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the Montreal Protocol," (Oct. 5, 1999), UNEP/OzL.Pro.1 1/6, p. 2,
available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/Pdf/11Imop-6-en.pdf.
38 Ibid., p. 4.
39 Ii. 
.3
40 United Nations Educational, "Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage," (Oct. 1,
2000), available at https://www.unesco.org/whc/wldrat.htm#debut.
KYRGYZSTAN
Failed to Accede.
Noncompliance
Ratified 18/1/96 [Acceded 13/8/96 ]d.e
Ratified 26/7/96 [Acceded 6/8/96"], Never Provided a National Report
KG recorded as neither for, against, abstaining, or absent for 21/5/97 GA vote .
Acceded 14/11/00 [25/5/00 ]
Acceded 21 / rs; [Accession 19/9/97 R Secretariat considered KG state party without accession by KG
to regime.
Govbal EEK N gaco gr zeParticipant since 9/l/97 Failed to notify GEF of change of focal points, Failed to join Constituency on
6 927a'MGEF Council until 2000 (Switzerland)5'
41 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, "Infornation on Kyrgyzstan," (undated), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/kyrgyz/index.htm.
42 Postanovenie N. 304-1 ot 18 yanvarya 1996 Zakonodatelnogo sobraniya Jogorku Kenesha Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 0 ratifikats Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki
Bazelskoi Konventsii o kontrole za transgranichnoi perevozkoi opasnykh otkhodov i ikh udaleniem.
43 UNEP, "Status of Ratifications of the Basel Convention" (Oct. 9, 2000), available at http://www.unep.ch/basel/ratif/ratif.html.
SConventio on Biological Diversity, "Ratification."
4s United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses."
46Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 14 yanvarya 2000 goda N 11 0 prisoedinenii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki k Ramochnoi Konventsii OON ob izmenenii klimata i
Konventsii EEK OON po transgranichnomu zagryazneniyu vozdukha na bolshie rasstoyaniya.
47 UNECE, Convention on Long-rate Chansboundary Air Pollution, "Status of Ratification," (July 3, 2000), available at
http://www.unece.org/env/hrtap/conv/hrtap-st.htm.
48 Zakon KyrgyzSkoi Respubliki ot 21 iyulya 1999 goda N 85 O prisoedinenii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki k Konventsii po borbe s opustynivaniem v stranakh,
kotorye ispytyvayut seryeznuyu zasukhu i/ili opustynivanie, osobenno y Afrike.
49 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD."
so Global Environment Facility, "List of States Participating in the Restructured GEF."
si Global Environment Facility, "New Participants in Constituencies."
s2 Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 14 yanvarya 2000 goda N 110O prisoedinenii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki k Ramochnoi Konventsii OON ob izmenenii klimata i
Konventsii EEK OON po transgranichnomu zagryazneniyu vozdukha na bolshid' rasstoyaniya.
s3 Framework Convention on Climate Change-Secretariat, "Update on Ratification of the Convention."
Acceded 15/1/00 [3 1/5/00"] Only Central Asian state to be an Article 5 developing country, as of 200061.
Failed to Accede.
Failed to Accede.
Wdrld iiAW~kt Acceded 10/6/95 ; [3/7/95 ]
5 4Ramsar Bureau, "The List of Wetlands of International Importance."
" Ramsar Bureau, "The Montreux Record."
56 Interim SeCretariat of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade, "Status of Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, and Accession," (Oct. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.chem.unep.ch/Rotterdam/statusofsignature_and_ratifica.htm.
" Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 15 yanvarya 2000 goda N 15 0 ratifikatsii Rottersamskoi konventsii OON o protsedure predvaritelnogo obosnovannogo
soglasiya v otnoshenii otdelnykh opasnykh khimicheskikh veschesty i pestitsidov v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle.
5A Interim Secretariat of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade, "Status of Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, and Accession."
59 Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
* The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."6ntDecision adopted at Twelfth Meeting of the Parties, December 2000. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Dec. 15, 2000), p. 7.
Postanovlenie N. 98-1 ot 10 iyunya 1995 Soveta narodnykh predstavitelei Jogorku Kenesha Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 0 prisoedinenii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki k
Konventsii ob okhrane vsemirnogo kulturnogo i prirodnogo naslediya.63 ntedtNations Educational, "Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage."
TAJIKISTAN
Aarhus Convention onAccess to Information, Failed to accede.PulcParticipation 
-mnfecisio'-NknadPublic PaMitini
Access To Justice~in onneW hter
Noncompliance
Convention onBiolegical Diversity (CD) Ratified 15/5/97"; [Ratification 29/1/98 AND Accession 29/10/97"], Focal Point Named by Secretariat,
but unknown to Tajikistan, No CHM Focal Point although Letter sent 21/4/98 to CBD Secretariat naming
Ministry of Nature Protection; Never Provided a National Report
Convention on-Il oW-f ig~iabled ses of. Absent from 21/5/97 vote**.
international Wfeep
Ratified 12/8/97 However Prime Minister Azizov sent letter of accession 1/7/97"'. [Accession 12/8/97"'5
and 16/7/97 6] considered TJ a party in contravention of TJ law; Entry into force 14/10/97
Accession 28/8/97" [7/l/98"], Entry into force 7/4/98, No Focal Point
Participant since 1/10/99 ; GEF incorrectly lists 2 political focal points, Helped engineer accession of
Central Asian states to Switzerland constituency (first and only constituency of developed state
representing developing or transition states)73
Deposited Declaration of Succession Likely accession in 2000
Signed 28/9/98"
64Postanovlenie N. 882 ot 10 marta 1997 goda Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tajikistan C prisoedinenii Respubliki Tajikistan k Konventsii OON o biologicheskom
raznoobrazii.
65 Convention on Biological Diversity, "Ratification."
" United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses."
67 Note 18/2-51 of July 1, 1997 from Prime Minister of the Republic of Tajikistan Y. Azimov.
68 UN Representative Alimov fax of 18/8/97, paragraph 4.
69 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD."7 0 Postanovlenie N. 1152 ot 28 avgusta 1997 goda Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tajikistan C prisoedinenii Respubliki Tajikistan k Ramochnoi Konventsii OON ob
izmenenii klimata.
7' Framework Convention on Climate Change-Secretariat, "Update on Ratification of the Convention."
72 Global Environment Facility, "List of States Participating in the Restructured GEF."
" Global Environment Facility, "New Participants in Constituencies."74 Interim Secretariat of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade, "Status of Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, and Accession."
27
Vienn.Conentip on zoneAcc ded 4/11/95'' [6/5/96'*]. Entered into force 4/8/96
SAcceded 13/12/97" [7/1/98tT ]; t int /4/98io]; By MOP 11 (11/99) had not provided 1986
Baseline Data for Annex A substances (over 2 years overdue)8 ; Did Not Report 1998 Data by 11I MOP
(12/99)
Lodo7Acceded 13/12/9781 [7/1/98 82]; By MOP 11I (11/99) had not provided 1989 Baseline Data for Annex B
substances or HCFCs (over 2 years overdue)83
CopenhagFailed to Accede.
7 5 Postanovlenie N. 188 ot 4 noyabrya 1995 goda Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tajikistan 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Tajikistan k Venskoi Konventsii ob okhrane
ozonovogo sloya.
76 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
" Postanovlenie N. 538 ot 13 dekabrya 1997 goda Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tajikistan 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Tajikistan k Monrealskomu Protokolu po
veschestvan, razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi i Londonskoi Popravke.
78 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
79 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
80 United Nations Environment Programme, "Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer: Report of
the Secretariat on Information provided by the Parties in Accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the Montreal Protocol," p. 2.
Postanovlenie N. 538 ot 13 dekabrya 1997 Majisi Oli Respubliki Tajikistan 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Tajikistan k Monrealskomu Protokolu po veschestvam,
razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi i Londonskoi Popravke.
82 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."8 3 United Nations Environment Programme, "Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer: Report of
the Secretariat on Information provided by the Parties in Accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the Montreal Protocol," pp. 2-3.
8 United Nations Educational, "Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage."
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TURKMENISTAN
Acceded 30/4/99" [Ratified 25/6/99"], but no credible movements to implement
Noncompliance
Ratified 18/6/96 [Acceded 25/9/96"], Failed to name focal point
t Ratified 14/6/96 [Accession 18/9/96 ], Never Provided a National Report; Did not pay 1997-99 Dues to
CBD Trust Fund; as of 1/20 6453 $US in Arrears"
Absent from 21/5/97 vote'
Signatory of Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane
13/12/98'
Signed 27/3/95 . Ratified 14/6/96 [18/9/96 ]; Entry into force 26/12/96
GlobWF~ifoParticipant since 29/5/97" Failed to join Constituency on GEF Council until 2000 (Switzerland) 5, UNEP-
- - C GEF failed to forward appointment of focal point to Secretariat in 199796
Accession 1996, [A ccession 5/6/95"]; Entry into Force 3/9/95, Focal Point Appointed, No National
Communication by Deadline
Signed 25/9/98 [28/9/989]; Ratified 1/11/99
85 Postanovlenie ot 30 aprelya 1999 goda Mejlisa Turkmenistana 0 prisoedinenii k Konventsii o dostupe k informatsii, uchastii obschestvennosti v protsesse
rinyatiya reshenii i dostupe k pravosudiyu po voprosam, kasayuschimsya okruzhayuschei sredy, promulgated in Neitralnyi Turkmenistan, May 5, 1999, p. 2.
United Nations Economic Council for Europe, "Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General- TREATY I-XXVII."
8 7 UNEP, "Status of Ratifications of the Basel Convention."
88 Convention on Biological Diversity, "Ratification."
89 United Nations Office at Nairobi, Invoice No. Fund 5080 TUK (May 20, 1999).
United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses."
91 Convention on Migratory Species, "Agreement Summary Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane."92 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD."
93 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD."
9 Global Environment Facility, "List of States Participating in the Restructured GEF." See also Letter 4-299 of May 29, 1997 from Deputy Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of Turkmenistan Ilaman Shikhiyev to GEF CEO.
95 Global Environment Facility, "New Participants in Constituencies."
Letter of Mar. 15, 1997 from Minister of Nature Use and Environmental Protection of Turkmenistan P. Kurbanov to Ahmed Djoghlaf, appointing Deputy
Minister Khabibulla Atamuradov.
97 Framework Convention on Climate Change-Secretariat, "Update on Ratification of the Convention."
98 UNFCCC, "Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification," (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/kpstats.pdf.
29
[urkmenistan not a party, but environmental ministry believed state to be a party until 1998; But List of
Wetlands of International Importance includes Krasnovodsk and North-Cheleken Bays site9"
Ram-;-11 Com,1 I 21)tlml oll Weddild" of llltL niallollal
Sec. reports that TM succeeded to convention 30/9/94' ', although TM did not consider itself a party until
recently, when it successfully nominated Merv as first site.
* Ramsar Bureau, "The List of Wetlands of International Importance."
loPostanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 1424 ot 3 avgusta 1993 g. 0 prisoedinenii Turkmenistana k Venskoi Konventsii po okhrane ozonovogo sloya,
Monrealskomu Protokolu po veschestvam, razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi, i Popravki k Monrealskomu protokolu po veschestvam, razrushayuschim ozonovyi
sloi.
101 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
102 Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 1424 ot 3 avgusta 1993 g. 0 prisoedinenii Turkmenistana k Venskoi Konventsii po okhrane ozonovogo sloya,
Monrealskomu Protokolu po veschestvam, razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi, i Popravki k Monrealskomu protokolu po veschestvam, razrushayuschim ozonovyi
sloi.
103 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
'
4 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
105 United Nations Environment Programme, "Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer: Report of
the Secretariat on Information provided by the Parties in Accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the Montreal Protocol," p. 2.
06 Ibid., p. 5.
107 Contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro. 1 1/L.2, pp. 20-22 (Nov. 30, 1999).
10 8 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
19United Nations Environment Programme, "Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer: Report of
the Secretariat on Information provided by the Parties in Accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the Montreal Protocol," pp. 2-3.
110 United Nations Educational, "Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage."
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Accession 3/8/93" [18/11/93 ""]
Accession 3/8/93102 [18/11/93103]: Dues to MLF 96-99 in Arrears (235,757 $US'"4 ]; By MOP 11 (11/99)
had not provided 1986 Baseline Data for Annex A substances (over 2 years overdue)'0 5 ; Submitted no
1997 ODS Report'; Did Not Report 1998 Data by 11" MOP (12/99); Draft 11 MOP Resolution
(XI/25)' 07 Notes that Turkmenistan 1996 ODS Use not for Permitted Purposes- TM "WARNED" for
NONCOMPLIANCE for Articles 2A-2E of Protocol; 11" MOP resolved to allow TM to substitute GEF
project timetable to 2003
Accession 15/3/9408; By MOP 11 (11/99) had not provided 1989 Baseline Data for Annex B substances or
HCFCs (over 2 years overdue)"1
Failed to Accede.
UZBEKISTAN
on pi Likely to sign, Focal Point Named
into Force
Acceded 6/5/95"'; Notice sent 27/6/95.. [ 19/7/95 "]; Entered into force 17/10/95 ". Provided National
Report
" United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, "Information on Republic of Uzbekistan," (undated), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda2 1/natlinfo/countr/uzbek/index.htm.
1 2 Republic of Uzbekistan, "Country Profile: Implementation of Agenda 21: Review of Progress Made since the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 1992."
113 Postanovlenie N. 188-1 ot 22 dekabrya 1995 g. Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 prisoedinenii k Bazelskoi konventsii o kontrole za transgranichnoi
?erevozkoi opasnykh otkhodov i ikh udaleniem.
4 Note sent Jan. 12, 1996 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan A. Kamilov to Butros Butros-Gali..
15 UNEP, "Status of Ratifications of the Basel Convention." Under LA 41 TR/221/1 (27-3) of Mar. 12, 1996 UN Legal Advisor accepted instrument of
ratification as ratification not accession.
116 Postanovlenie 82-1 ot 6 maya 1995 Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 prisoedinenii Respubliki Uzbekistan k Konventsii o biologicheskom raznoobrazii,
podpisannoi v Rio-de-Janeiro v 1992 godu.
117 Letter 05/6054 of June 25, 1995 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan A. Komilov to Butros Butros-Gali.
118 Convention on Biological Diversity, "Ratification."
119 Note LA 41 TR/221/1 (27-8) of Sept. 11, 1995 from The United Nations Legal Counsel Hans Corell to Uzbekistan Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Fatikh Teshabaev.
1 2 0 Postanovlenie N. 433-1 ot 25 aprelya 1997 g. Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 prisoedinenii k Konventsii o mezhdunarodnoi torgovle vidami dikoi fauny
i flory, nakhodyaschimsya pod ugrozoi ischeznoveniya.
121 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, "List of Parties."
122 Letter of June 27, 1997 of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan A. Kamilov.
"3 Notification aux Etats signataires et adherents a la Convention sur le commerce international des especes de faune et de flore sauvages menacees d extinction
(CITES), conclue a Washington le 3 mars 1973, Departement Federal des Affaires Etrangers, P.242.45 (undated).
124 United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses."
Convenotio _n MIgatory S i( Ratified 15u8 eNotice of acoitt bev stto be a 1998
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Slender-billed Curlew Signed
1228
and in Force 10/9/942
n oMemorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane Signed and in
130 C t MFinal Act of Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds Signed"
Signe 7/1C2/9Stats'o Ratificaio and95' 311/9"] Entry into orce of1296 th hUNC D."R ify
Global CotipliancRParticipant since 5/4/954 Fied to join Constituency on GEF Council until 2000 (Switzeln)
Constitution of Uzbekistan, Focal Point Named 138, No National Communication by Deadline (due
3/21/97), submitted 22/10/99"9
Not a party, but environmental committee believed state to be a party until 1998
1 Postanovlenie N. 631-1 ot 1 maya 1998 g. Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 prisoedinenii k Konventsii po sokhraneniyu migriryuschikh vidov dikikh
zhivotnykh.
126 Note sent May 26, 1998 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan A. Komilov to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.
m Convention on Migratory Species, "Parties to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals," (Oct. 1, 2000), available at
http://wcmc.org.uk/cms/Part_lst.htm.
128 Convention on Migratory Species, "Agreement Summary Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Slender-billed
Curlew. Numenius tenuirostris."
129 Convention on Migratory Species, "Agreement Summary Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane."
""0 Convention on Migratory Species, "Agreement Summary Sheet: Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA)" (July 1,
1998), available at http://wcmc.org.uk/cms/aewtsumm.htm.d
140
"32 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the UNCCD."
Postanovlenie N. 125-1 ot 31 avgusta 1995 g. Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan O ratifikatsii Konventsii OON po borbe s opustynivaniem v tekh stranakh,
kotorye ispytyvayut seryeznuyu zasukhu i/ili opustynivanie, osobenno y Afike.
13 UNCCD, "Status of Ratification and Entry into Force of the NCCD."
"34 Global Environment Facility, "List of States Participating in the Restructured GEF."
"35 Global Environment Facility, "New Participants in Constituencies."
"36 Letter 02/2814 of May 14, 1993 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan Sadyk Safaev to Butros Butros-Gali.
"37 Framework Convention on Climate Change-Secretariat, "Update on Ratification of the Convention."
"38 Oct. 18, 1999 Letter No. 6-4/10-38 from Deputy Prime Minister B. S. Khamidov to UNFCCC Executive Secretary Cutajar.
139 Main Administration of Hydrometeorology, Initial Communication of the Republic of Uzbekistan Under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, (Tashkent: Main Administration of Hydrometeorology, 1999), available at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/natc/Uzbncl.pdf.
"40 Postanovlenie N. 834-1 ot 20 avgusta 1999g. Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan ratifikatsii Kiotskogo Protokola k Ramochnoi konventsii Organizatsii
Obyedinennykh Natsii ob izmenenii klimata.
"41 UNFCCC, "Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification."
Succeeded throu note of 10/5/93 [Acceded 18/5/93 -]
Succeeded through note of 18/5/93' [Acceded 18/5/93145] entered into force 16/10/97; In FULL
COMPLIANCE with all Montreal, London, and Copenhagen reporting requirements as of MOP 11
(11/99); Did Not Report 1998 Data by 11 MOP (12/99); 97% Reduction in All ODS as compared to
Baseline as of 1997; 86% as of 1996.
Ratification 1/5/98' [Accession 10/6/98"]; 8/9/98 Entry into force.
Ratification 1/5/98 148 [Accession 10/6/98'14]; 8/9/98 Entry into force.
Acceded 22/12/95'", although Sec. reports UZ a party by letter of succession 13/1/93'
142 Letter 11/2734 of May 10, 1993 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan Sadyk Safaev to Butros Butros-Gali.The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
'44Letter 11/2734 of May 10, 1993 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan Sadyk Safaev to Butros Butros-Gali.4 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification."
16Postanovlenie N. 627-1 ot 1 maya 1998g Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 ratifikatsii Londonskoi popravki k Monrealskomu protokolu po veschestvam,
razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi.
The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification." Under Letter LA 41 TR/221/1 (27-2 (b) and (c)) of June 25, 1998, UN Legal Advisor explains that
instruments of ratification accepted as instruments of accession.
148 Postanovlenie N. 628-1 ot 1 maya 1998g Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 ratifikatsii Kopengagenskoi popravki k Monrealskomu protokolu po
veschestvan, razrushayuschim ozonovyi sloi.
149 The Ozone Secretariat, "Status of Ratification." Under Letter LA 41 TR/221/1 (27-2 (b) and (c)) of June 25, 1998, UN Legal Advisor explains that
instruments of ratification accepted as instruments of accession.
50 Postanovlenie N. 182-1 ot 22 dekabrya 1995 g. Olii Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan 0 ratifikatsii Konventsii ob okhrane vsemirnogo kulturnogo i prirodnogo
naslediya ot 1972 goda.
"5 United Nations Educational, "Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage."
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CHAPTER SIX
CASE STUDIES: INTERNATIONALIZING THE CENTRAL ASIAN ENVIRONMENT
The more closely we become acquainted with these [donors], the more evident it becomes that many of them work
in an extremely ineffective manner. [W]e have noticed that where one person worked last year, now 4-7 people do
the job of this one person. [We were incorrect in] viewing recent political changes as erasing a bureaucratic system
which held paper as a god and had an unlimited number of forms and documents. [R]escued from the grasp of the
Soviet bureaucratic system, we have been delivered not into a fresh current of enlightened work and stimulating
initiative, but into a painfully familiar world of bureaucrats.... [D]onors began to demand that work hours be
accounted for in [time sheets]. They require the workdays in the chart to be marked with eights. Just as under the
Soviet era, we can fill in our eights; they don't necessarily mean anything though, nor can they suggest to us how to
more efficiently organize our work ... . Nevertheless, they teach us how to fill in our eights1 .
At the dawn of independence, international institutions enjoyed both popular legitimacy and
substantial influence in Central Asia. This legitimacy and influence reflected both the USSR's
strong iterative respect for the United Nations and international law 2, as well as a mood swing
away from Soviet symbols towards international, "normal," and "successful" institutional
modalities and models3. After three years of direct contact with the actual staffs and projects of
the United Nations and other international donor and development agencies, as opposed to their
promotional literature, most local environmental professionals come to adopt the view that
Western organizations suffer from the same pathologies as their now defunct Soviet
counterparts. Moreover, a large number of local professionals further conclude that the human
capital assets of the West are in some areas weaker than their Soviet counterparts, especially in
some technical fields4 .
The erosion of this general presumption of the efficacy and moral authority of
international organizations coincides with expansion by the Central Asian states of their
participation in international environmental regimes. Environmental protection within Central
Asia, even for environmental issues that are not considered transboundary in nature, is
increasingly tied to international regimes, institutions, and donors. Almost no environmental
programs or efforts within Central Asia are any longer purely national in character; those
environmental agency staff without international connections and those environmental programs
not funded by foreign donors are the most discontent and weakest in the entire region. Any
particular lack of internationalization within environmental affairs in Central Asia is now simply
dispositive of someone's failure to succeed in making international connections. However, as
mentioned above, this embrace of internationalization coincides with a lessening level of faith,
respect, and awe of international institutions; the embrace is, unfortunately, one increasingly of
monetary resources alone.
Sergei Kuratov and Sergei Solyanik, "The Glare and Glimmer of Cooperation" Ecostan News 8 (1995),
http://www.ecostan.org/Ecostan/Ecostan308.htm.
2 See Eric W. Sievers, "Ekologicheskaya refonna, pravovoe gosudarstvo i suverenitet" in Sievers et al. eds.,
Mezhdunarodnoe ekologicheskoe pravo i Tsentralnaya Azia, p. 1.
SIn this regard, in the popular mind, no substantial difference existed between American, European, or United
Nations organizational capital assets; all were democratic, rule of law, and efficient--the things that, in the 1990s
popular mind, Soviet assets were not.
SSee Andrei Aranbaev, "TACIS in Turkmenistan: A Technical Assistance Embarrassment" Ecostan News 10
(1995), http://www.ecostan.org/Ecostan/Ecostan3l0.html.
The Central Asian states all actively request funding from foreign investors and donors to
support state environmental agencies, the environmental sciences, and specific environmental
protection programs. Not all of these funds come through such major donors as GEF, the
European Union's Program on Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(TACIS), UNDP, the World Bank, UNEP, or targeted donors such as the secretariats of
conventions. Some funds come from transnational corporations. These efforts have met with
mixed, but not necessarily disappointing, results. Chevron helped the Kazakhstan Zoological
Society publish a new edition of the Kazakhstan Red Data Book on Endangered Species , and
TengizChevroil is perhaps Kazakhstan's most active charitable donor6.
Some funds have also come through multilateral lenders not originally associated with
the GEF. Asian Development Bank has implemented a program for the Institutional Support for
Sustainable Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan7, and IUCN has coordinated biodiversity
activists and environmental lawyers throughout the region. Some of the funds have come from
private philanthropic foundations. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
provided a grant to Dashkhovuz Ecological Club
(TM) to create a professional association of
Central Asian environmental scientists9 , and local
Soros foundations make grants to more than a
dozen environmental NGOs in the region. Some
of the funds have come from bilateral donors.
Germany assists Kazakhstan in water
conservation in urban areas, and Switzerland
provides funds to improve the state forestry
service of Kyrgyzstan 0 .
All told, more than 1000 discrete
internationally funded environmental projects
have been funded in Central Asia since 1991,
ranging in size from the several hundred dollar
grants to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
environmental education NGOs provided by
Minnesota's Cottonwood Foundation" to loans of
5 Sergei Kuratov, "Reform of Ecological Legislation in Kazakhstan" (Unpublished 1997 Brandeis University M.A.
thesis in sustainable development). Available at: http://www.ecostan.org/Laws/sk.html.
6 See, i.e., Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population
Fund, "UNDP: Financial, Budgetary and Administrative Matters" (July 26, 2000), DP/2000/39/Add. 1 (Annual
Review of the Financial Situation), p. 77.
7 ADB project UZB 30502-01. Available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/ADBBO/AOTA/30502012.ASP.
8 IUCN maintains global networks under the Species Survival Commission and Environmental Law Commission.
Both boast numerous Central Asian members. At its October 2000 World Conservation Congress, IUCN also
resolved to further increase its presence in Central Asia. See http://www.iisd.ca/sd/iucn/wcc2/sdvol39no3e.html.
9 The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Report on Activities 1995 (Chicago: The John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 1996), p. 18. In addition, much of the data in this dissertation arose in part
through a 1999 grant from MacArthur to Law and Environment Eurasia Partnership. See Table 1 in previous
chapter.
10 Hiltunen, Environmental Development Co-operation Opportunities: Kazakstan. Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, pp. 19, 30. Hiltunen provides extensive data on bilateral environmental projects in Central Asia funded
by the United States, Denmark, Germany, France, Finland, Norway, and other states.
" See generally http://www.pressenter.com/-cottonwd.
tens of millions of dollars provided by the World Bank for Aral Sea agriculture and sewage
remediation projects. Despite a great diversity of funders, recipients, sizes, repayment
obligations, and expectations, every single project in the region hoped to, directly or indirectly,
improve the state of the environment in Central Asia.
Figure 112 shows how almost all environmental donors approached and still approach
their efforts in Central Asia. While ambitious foreign donors are still putting the cart before the
horse, in 2001 it will be difficult to find any local expert in Central Asia willing to believe that
by 2005 the region will have "implemented basic institutional infrastructure, completed essential
economic reforms, and averted immediate environmental health risks." Quite the opposite
impression flows from the empirical evidence of the past ten years. In the last decade, the region
made modest progress in building basic institutions, no progress in building healthy economies,
some progress in establishing or re-establishing non-sustainable economies, and simply no
aggregate progress in ensuring environmental health. Indeed, the survey below of Central Asia's
explicit connections to international environmental regimes suggests that there exist scant
grounds to claim that internationalization of the Central Asian environment yields environmental
benefits or that, whatever the effects of disparate individual projects, the region is moving
towards sustainable development.
Agenda 21, Opening States, and the New Era of Sustainable Development
In an international sphere where state coordination is critical and information limited, the first
step towards resolving most issues is to initiate dialogue. Accordingly, for those interested in
bringing the states of the world together to work in concert to avert global environmental
collapse and to pioneer and implement new strategies of sustainable development, chances to
initiate, develop, and expand dialogue have always contained elemental importance. The role of
dialogue, or negotiation, is to share information and build the awareness needed to develop
consensus about the gravity of an issue, to marshal the resources needed to develop data needed
for a full analysis of the issue, and to foster the cooperation and integrated understandings
needed to address an issue.
Efforts that focus primarily on dialogue and cooperation, instead of primarily on
changing specific practices, are called "soft law." Examples of "hard law" in the international
environmental sphere come almost exclusive from regimes concerning the atmosphere or trade.
For example, the ozone regime definitively requires states, by certain dates, to cease trade in and
production of ozone depleting substances. The Kyoto Protocol of the Climate Change
Convention will bind developed states to restrictions on emissions of greenhouse gases as
compared to 1990 levels. CITES generally restricts trade in endangered species. In these cases,
international environmental law comes close to resembling the core of a general conception of
"law": a clear proscription on certain kinds of behavior. Should they fail to punish or otherwise
react to state parties who flagrantly fail to abide by these proscriptions, these regimes will risk
losing their authority and legitimacy within the international community and under international
law.
Yet, clear "environmental laws" are infrequent in environmental regimes. There is no
equivalent "law" requiring states to prevent loss of biodiversity, prevent desertification, or refrain
1The World Bank, "Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development" at http://www-
esd.worldbank.org/ecssd/aarhus/S7long.htm1 (1998).
from pollution of internal waterways. Rather, regimes in these fields impose on states a set of
obligations of a less dramatic and more negotiated character. Often these obligations consist of
little more than filing reports with secretariats, participating in activities intended over time to
yield legal statements, conducting inventories, paying membership dues, and refraining from the
pursuit of activities that would flagrantly undermine the goals of the eponymous convention.
Occasionally such agreements also anticipate binding arbitration between states in cases of
disputes. States and scholars have little problem accepting such obligations as "law," albeit
under a definition that already diverges far from the colloquial meaning of the term and
converges upon what most people would term morality.
Thus, it is a fair description that international efforts for environmental protection contain
not only directed efforts to build environmental law, but also efforts to use legal machinery to
achieve dialogue, awareness, and cooperation, and then to label the outcomes of such efforts
"law." For example, the 1992 Earth Summit, like the 1972 Stockholm Convention, focused
world attention on environmental issues. The 1972 Report of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment (the Stockholm Declaration) and the 1992 Agenda 211, which was the
primary document resulting from the Earth Summit, are nothing less than textbooks on global
environmental problems and possible solutions, but they are simultaneously at the core of
international environmental law. Although Agenda 21 adds little to the knowledge base of
humanity, it does offer itself as a blueprint for the future, ground its authority in its authorship by
diverse environmental and legal experts, and essay to make its contents a fundamental text of
modern human society. Passages contained within Agenda 21 about the need for states to bind
themselves to principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and
intergenerational equity express at best, in a legal sense, a rough estimate of the content of future
binding environmental laws.
Invariably, meetings and documents in the soft law vein envision follow-up meetings,
reports, and assessments to continue and build dialogue. Since such meetings and documents
often require little of states other than that they show up and participate, critics of soft law
complain that these efforts do not go far enough. It would be essentially nonsensical under
international law to claim that Kazakhstan violated Agenda 21 because it did not follow the
precautionary principle in its environmental legislation; Kazakhstan assumed no such obligation
to do so when it signed this document in Rio de Janeiro". Critics of soft law commonly fail to
consider that such "soft" efforts will nevertheless be critical for any efforts, which may or may
not appear in the future, that do go "far enough."
Soft law provides low stakes fora for state diplomats to negotiate, share information, and
otherwise build the social capital that enables later ambitious organizational capital
breakthroughs". Prominent examples in the present day include the Committee on
Environmental Policy of the UNECE 16, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable
'By Agenda 21,1I mean to include the pantheon of 1992 nonbinding Earth Summit agreements: Agenda 21, the Rio
Declaration on Environent and Development, and the Statement of Principles for the Sustainable Management of
Forests. These all issued from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of June 1992. See
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda2ltext.htmn.
1Unfortunately, in more than half the circumstances in which NGOs in Central Asia accuse their governments of
violations of international law, they refer specifically to Agenda 21 as the "law" violated.
15 I argue that this sentence captures what two seminal books in environmental diplomacy are all about. See Richard
Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) and Tolba, Global Environmental
Diplomacy: Negotiating Environmental Agreemnents for the World, 1973-1992.
16 See http://www.unece.org/env/cep.
Development (which sponsors Agenda 21/Rio+ meetings), and the UNESCO-sponsored Earth
Charter meetings17 . Thus, for states at the margins of international environmental regimes, soft
law fora provide an invaluable opportunity to facilitate integration into environmental regimes,
improve national reputations, seek funding, and build general capacity.
Given this rough outline of soft law regimes, such regimes may be analyzed along much
the same lines as other environmental regimes. Thus, the number of states that endorse Agenda
21 or that showed up at the Earth Summit are metrics that are popular, but not significant.
Rather, the impacts of soft law regimes should be sought in the intersection between
international dialogue and state action. Whether states meet deadlines in the submission of and
submit thorough national reports, whether they build capacity through these regimes, whether
new national legislation reflects Agenda 21, whether school curricula change, and whether the
principles of Agenda 21 begin to suffuse national dialogues are all more revealing, albeit more
difficult to measure, criteria. What an analysis of these factors in Central Asia reveals is
ambiguous; while state efforts around Agenda 21 do not inspire, grassroots reactions produce
more hope.
The participation of the Central Asian states in the Agenda 21 regime illustrates the
degree to which the region fails to capitalize on the external opportunities open to it. Two main
avenues for Agenda 21 participation exist: submission of national reports and attendance at
Agenda 21 meetings at United Nations Headquarters.
National reports on sustainable development are arguably the only requirement of
Agenda 21 signatories, and at that they are technically only recommended 8. Yet, because the
Commission on Sustainable Development has decided to publish these reports and otherwise
draw attention to them as the central component of Agenda 21 implementation 19, they are as
close to a requirement of regime participation as exists. No Central Asian state, with the partial
exception of Uzbekistan, has taken advantage of the opportunities accorded by this reporting
system, and no state has invested any effort to engage meaningfully in the actual meetings of the
Commission on Sustainable Development.
The basic reports should have been submitted before 1997, at which point states began to
submit Rio+5 reports. Only Uzbekistan submitted a basic report that could be considered
adequate; although it provided basic information, it failed to use the report as an opportunity to
argue for its needs or exhibits strengths. As for the Rio+5 reports, heavily funded by the United
Nations to do so, Kazakhstan's National Environment Center did submit such a report; yet, like
Uzbekistan three years earlier, Kazakhstan failed to exhibit strengths or argue well for its needs.
In fact, Kazakhstan's report contains three glaring failures beyond its lack of information.
First, it lists millions of dollars of environmental aid provided to Kazakhstan, but provides little
evidence of any result of this aid. Second, it suggests that Kazakhstan has signed several, but
ratified no, environmental conventions. Finally, it contains repeated assurances that Kazakhstan
witnesses great progresses in exactly those instances in which the state should have declared
defeat and requested aid. For instance, despite the crash in the scientific community in human
and financial terms, the report assures readers that the "Scientific community has already
17 See http://www.earthcharter.org/welcome.
SSee Agenda 21, Art. 38.38:" . .. States could consider the preparation of national reports. In this context, the
organs of the United Nations system should, upon request, assist countries, in particular developing countries.
Countries could also consider the preparation of national action plans for the implementation of Agenda 21."19 See http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo.
See Kazakstan, "Country Profile: Implementation of Agenda 21: Review of Progress Made since the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992."
established ways in which to address the general public and deal with sustainable
de velopment2 1 ."
In contrast, in its 1997 report, Uzbekistan provides far more complete information,
suggests that half its scientific potential has been wiped out, and praises international assistance
while giving itself only adequate marks for progress in sustainable development22 Tajikistan
failed to submit any kind of report. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan not only did not submit a
report; the Commission on Sustainable Development also fails to even include them in its list of
world states.
Fortunately, the national aspects of Agenda 21 in Central Asia paint a more hopeful
picture. While there has been almost no effort to create Agenda 21 commitments at the
municipal level, most new environmental legislation does explicitly draw attention to Agenda 21
as a source of environmental legal consensus and borrows, at least at a general level, from
Agenda 21. Ironically, those new laws most impacted by foreign legal assistance are, contrary to
what one would expect, the ones least connected to Agenda 21. Foreign environmental lawyers
employed as advisors to the Central Asian states, especially those from the United States,
command little awareness of international environmental law. As a consequence, they
undermine the global ambitions of Agenda 21 by denying it a role in their own influential drafts
and recommendations submitted to the states, sometimes even explicitly frustrating efforts by
local NGOs and ministries to make textual connections to Agenda 21.
Finally, the Central Asian states deserve recognition for the degree to which Agenda 21
has become part of the core awareness of both the environmental community and environmental
education curricula. Undoubtedly the most impressive aspect of Agenda 21 impact on the
Central Asian states, the general consensus and mood of cooperation among NGOs, experienced
activists, dedicated teachers, and ministries of education to expand environmental education and
incorporate Agenda 21 into all curricula are hampered only by lack of resources in the post-
Soviet era. It is partly on this general public interest in Agenda 21 that Kazakhstan based its
hopes to produce in 2000 an Agenda 21 report of much better quality than its predecessors23
Accordingly, "soft" international environmental law in Central Asia analyzed through
Agenda 21 is largely a success at the grassroots level, a noticeable influence on the national
level, and largely a failure at the highest levels of state and foreign affairs. Other aspects of soft
international environmental law in Central Asia have unfolded in largely similar fashion.
Beyond Agenda 21, several other soft law environmental regimes also impact Central
Asia. Some of these, such as UNESCO's Earth Charter essentially parallel Agenda 21, and it is
open to argument whether they complement other efforts or frustrate them by crowding
consciousness and demanding scarce resources. However, there also exist a set of soft law
efforts that aim not at building shared environmental awareness and consensus regarding future
laws, but at spreading the normative institutions of sustainable development as these impact state
structure. Specifically, two regimes exist to spread environmental civil society and
environmental planning.
The 1998 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access To Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) seeks to
2Ibid.
22Se discussion in Chapter 3 and Republic of Uzbekistan, "Country Profile: lInplementation of Agenda 21: Review
of Progress Made since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992."
23 See 1999 Resolution 12-8/3 869 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (requiring ministries to assist
efforts of Agenda 21 Working Group).
move states towards guaranteeing certain rights for private actors. These rights are essentially
those currently enjoyed by the publics of North America and, more recently, Europe. Over the
past decade, the only environmental convention that has received equivalent attention in Central
Asia has been CCD; just as euphoria over CCD began to subside in 1999, the Aarhus Convention
moved into the void. 2000 saw numerous well-funded regional and national conferences and
trainings that expended considerable funds to bring together NGOs, state officials, and Aarhus
Convention European donors. This support for the Aarhus Convention, however, is in itself
proof of Central Asia's failures.
European donors, like OSCE, actively push the Aarhus Convention because its
appearance coincided with their general realization that, despite their funding, democracy and
rule of law are on the decline in Central Asia. The Aarhus Convention operates now, as a result
of this realization of development failure, often as more of a synecdoche for the need for
Westernization than as a vehicle for sustainable development. In other words, the environmental
content of the Aarhus Convention is not at all what drives its external support in the region.
Rather, the Aarhus Convention is primarily a stand-in for other possible vehicles through which
to criticize the Central Asian states for their failures to conduct free and fair elections, observe
human rights, and be accountable to their own citizens. To date, it has not been invoked by
Western actors with analogous vigor to criticize the Central Asian states for failures that stem
directly from the convention itself, such as failures to effect environmental reforms, allow
private parties access to courts, or pass implementing legislation for the convention itself
Against the background of this co-optation of the Aarhus regime by state interests not
overly concerned with the environment, the second structural soft law regime is more clearly
related to sustainable development. The narrow focus of this second regime, at the center of
which there is no discrete convention, is the establishment of effective institutions for
environmental management. Within the Central Asian context, this normative aspiration, since
environmental committees or ministries already existed in every republic, has focused primarily
on environmental action plans.
World Bank, UNDP, and TACIS fund a variety of efforts in every republic to create
national and regional environmental actions plans for general environmental protection and for
specific environmental problems. A ubiquitous aspect of this funding is the creation of a special
and very well furnished office for the national environmental action plan (NEAP), a kind of
office that stands in stark contrast to anything that the Central Asian states could support on their
own for their environmental state agencies. Kazakhstan's NEAP began in 1995, Kyrgyzstan's in
1994, Turkmenistan's in 1996, and Uzbekistan's in 1997. As an offshoot emblematic of
manifestations in other republics, in 1999, Turkmenistan formed a National Commission for the
Implementation of United Nations Environmental Conventions and Programmes24.
UNDP has been the most active in the NEAP process, and the United States has been
almost entirely absent. Accordingly, NEAPs are best understood as part of UNDP's agenda
within the region, and should be understood within the framework of the comments of the next
Section. However, it should be noted that part of the appeal of NEAPs within the region is that
they are plans. They require both no action beyond assembling paper, and they resurrect and re-
valorize modalities and rhetorical triggers of the planned economy that are familiar to
bureaucrats in the region. No NEAP has yet been meaningfully implemented anywhere in the
2Postanovienie Prezidenta Turkmenistana ot 01.03.1999 goda No. 4091 Gb obrazovanii Gosudarstvennoi komissii
po obespecheniyu vypolneniya obyazatelsty Turkmenistana, vytekayuschikh iz K onventsii i programm OON po
okruzhayuschei srede.
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region. Instead, "successful" NEAPs are those that produce not action for environmental
protection, but a permanent bureaucracy. In April 1998, the Kazakhstan NEAP became the
National Environment Center for Sustainable Development, an organization meant not to
produce a plan, but to be a core environmental agency in Kazakhstan.
Thus, the most interesting aspect of NEAPs is not their tendency to divert attention away
from local problems and non-standard approaches or their alienation of those environmental
agencies that do not directly receive their exuberant funding. Rather, the most interesting aspects
of NEAPs are that they are plan-based (as opposed to market-based, reaction-based, or action-
based), avowedly hierarchical, and beholden to the idea that foreign subsidies will enable
implementation. To date, no one has seemed to notice that these fundamental assumptions, all of
which are endorsed by UNDP staff, inherently and flatly contradict the stated meta-goal of all
Western donors to assist the Central Asian states to move away from the planned economy,
pioneer meaningful decentralization, and embrace the market economy. UNDP and related UN
staff, flying in from the proverbial Miami Beach to the sloping mountains way down in the south
Table 1: of Eurasia, are bringing back the USSR.
Funded Preparation Projects in
GEF Pipeline at end of 1999
(Enabling Activities, PDF A, PDF B Into the Opening: GEF and the GEF Implementors
funding)7.
The Global Environment Facility was created in 1991, and
by mid-1999 had received $2.4 billion in contributions from
donor states, with the United States the only developed state
that failed to contribute its pledged contribution25 . GEF is
the only donor in Central Asia that concentrates its funding
attention exclusively on projects of a global nature.
Bilateral donors, like Finland, Germany,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands, complement GEF
projects with additional funding, sometimes at levels
exceeding those of GEF itself. For example, TACIS funds
a several million dollar river ecology program in Azerbaijan
that is part of the GEF-funded Caspian Environment
Programme. By its mandate, GEF may only fund the
"incremental costs" of environmental projects that have an
impact on the global environment27. This restriction on
GEF funding makes the institution unique, and it is what
requires additional inputs such as those by TACIS
described above.
Because incremental costs remain widely
misunderstood, they deserve explication. Incremental costs
are part of a two stage cost/benefit sharing and analysis that
the GEF Council uses to make decisions on funding. In the
25 See Global Environment Facility, 1999 Annual Report: Volume II (Washington, D.C.: Global Environment
Facility, 1999), pp. 2-3.
26 Derived from various GEF sources, including Global Environment Facility, Operational Report on GEF
Programs.
27 Global Environment Facility, "Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility"
(1994), http://gefweb.org/public/instrume/instruml.htm, Arts 1.1-1.2.
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Table 2: GEF-Funded Large and Medium Sized Projects in first part of the incremental cost
Central Asia at end of 1999 29 analysis, national benefits are
distinguished from global
benefits. Only those costs of a
conservation initiative that exceed
the conservation expenditures that
a state would undertake anyway
(baseline costs) are eligible to be
incremental costs. Furthermore,
such costs are discounted to the
extent that they provide national benefits. The remaining dollar amount is what constitutes,
theoretically, a request to GEF. If the dollar amount is negative (indicating a profit), the project
should seek a loan (such as from the World Bank) instead of a GEF grant.
The second part of the incremental cost analysis examines the environmental benefit per
dollar. In practice, this approach is feasible for climate change projects (since carbon emission
reductions are quantifiable), easy for ozone depleting substances projects (for similar reasons), a
stretch for international waters and desertification (where metrics exist, but means of comparison
are vague), and sophistic for biodiversity (since a discrete metric is unavailable)28 .
GEF's founding logic involves a complementary relationship among its implementing
agencies' comparative advantages30 : UNEP's environmental experience, UNDP's expertise in
capacity building and local partnerships, and World Bank's technical expertise in complex
infrastructure projects. UNEP's role has, to date, been understated; GEF projects in Central Asia
are either UNDP or World Bank, with the three largest projects in Table 2 belonging to World
Bank and most of Table's 1 projects under the supervision of UNDP. Only with Kazakhstan's
three million dollar wind power project and six million dollar ozone project in early 2000 did any
large UNDP-GEF projects in Central Asia appear.
UNDP generally pursues smaller projects developed through close contact with epistemic
communities placed on the UNDP payroll directly or indirectly, and it relies heavily on the
continued loyalty (bonding social capital) of these experts. World Bank, in contrast, uses money
as a leverage to win compliance from ministry level institutions (organizational capital) and
places less emphasis on personal relations. In both cases, it is a myth that either agency is an
indifferent but professional part of the GEF structure committed primarily to facilitating efforts
by governments, NGOs, and local communities in Central Asia. As a preface to this Chapter's
review of specific projects, neither UNDP nor World Bank operates without problems, and both
are among the least indifferent actors in the entire region when it comes to the design, content,
and priorities of GEF proposals.
28 Cf David G. Aubrey et al., "Incremental Cost Country Experience Case Study: Black Sea and Caspian Sea"
Unpublished report presented at May 1999 GEF Council.29 Derived from various GEF sources, including Global Environment Facility, Operational Report on GEF Programs
(Dec. 31, 1999).
30 "The initial commitment of the Implementing Agencies to the GEF had been in developing their GEF activities in
areas of their institutional comparative advantage, as provided for in the Instrument." Global Environment Facility,
"Corporate Business Plan FY02-FY04," p. 14. "UNDP's niche is defined by its network of 133 field offices and the
many years of experience with capacity building programmes in developing countries." Jeff Griffen, Biodiversity,
International Waters and the GEF (Gland, Switzerland: The World Conservation Union, 1997), p. 3.
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UNDP projects ubiquitously employ expensive foreign consultants, who are regulary 40
times as expensive as equivalently, or better, qualified local experts". Moreover, despite
original GEF emphases on specific actions for the environment, over time UNDP projects have
come to contain fewer and fewer such actions and more and more public education, public
outreach, and similar endeavors whose efficacy is questionable, but whose demand for more
intimate UNDP involvement is uideniable.
Traditionally, UNDP has taken 13% of the funding of a project for its own budgets in its
development work . However, that figure has appeared excessive within the framework of
GEF, and so UNDP has operated within the GEF through a set of financial procedures differing
from those of its usual agency support cost arrangements. However, UNDP has in the past
decade made no serious efforts to reveal what its take of GEF projects in fact actually is, which
is curious for an agency that releases in minute financial detail all other aspects of projects. For
the Small Grants Program 1998 Proposal, 6% of the $31.6 million award went to UNDP partner
UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services33) as the executing agency for vague
"support," a euphemism for an unrestricted award. Almost $4 million was allocated for UNDP
to hire staff for the program under local employment contracts with the local UNDP mission34.
Both of these figures contrast starkly with the 1% take by UNDP that UNDP
Kazakhstan's senior environmental officer, Zharas Takenov, claims publicly is the extent of
UNDP's take under the Small Grants Program, and the 3% taken for all other GEF-financed
projects35. Takenov's modest estimates of UNDP's intrusion into GEF funds meant by definition
for the benefit of developing states (and not UN agencies) are widely echoed by most other
UNDP employees in the region. In fact, Takenov and his colleagues, who are all far from New
York, may not be aware that their employer's interest in every GEF project is much deeper.
Indeed, the actual scale of GEF funds siphoned off by UNDP is dramatically greater.
For example, UNDP's Mission in Uzbekistan expects to get well over a million dollars a
year for the foreseeable future from GEF projects, which UNDP itself calls "sustainable
3 For every week UNDP, UNEP, or World Bank contributes a staff person to a GEF project, it receives:
Salaries 140,400 124,900 113,676 126,325
Mission Travel 33,000 20,520 40,000 31,173
General Operating Costs 43,300 68,368 70,000 60,556
Institutional & Fixed Costs 20,300 33,428 16,000 23,243
Total 237,000 247,216 239,676 241,297
Average Staffweek Cost 5,512 5,749 5,574 5,612
Global Environment Facility, "Proposal for a Fee-Based System for Funding GEF Project Implementation" (April
29, 1999), GEF C.13/11, p. 13. Most of the staff in question hold B.A. or M.A. equivalents, not Ph.D.s. For an
examination of this trend in general Central Asian development projects, see Bivens, "Aboard the Gravy Train: In
Kazakstan, the Farce that is U.S. Foreign Aid."
32 JNDP, "Overview of Agency Support Cost Arrangements" (undated),
http://www.undp.org/drpc/guidelns/suptcost/ovranx0l.htm.
33 UNOPS and UNDP have a continuing partnership in effect since 1997, and the two agencies are indistinguishable
from local eyes. See http://www.unops.org/aboutunops/unopsandunsys.html.
34 Global Environment Facility, "Project Proposals Submitted for Council Approval: Volume IV" (Sept. 10, 1998),
GEF/C.12/3, E-16, p. 15.
3s "Razbor poletov: Programma razvitiya OON ne soglasna s kritikoi v svoi adres," NPO: Teoriva i Praktika 10
(2000), p. 4.
development funds3 6." Since the core annual budget allocated to each UNDP office in Central
Asia is roughly $700,000 ($1.1 million for Kazakhstan) 37, even though GEF administrative funds
do not exceed 10% of the total UNDP budget, they increase by 20-100% the internal capacity of
UNDP offices in Central Asia 38 . GEF's billions of dollars have effected, effect, and will
continue to effect the building of UNDP capacity worldwide, dramatically.
To read the dozens of books and booklets issued each year by the GEF implementors is to
assume that these agencies have assumed a thankless task. The Corporate Business Plans for
both FYOO-02 and FY02-04 discuss Implementing Agency fees and a "fee-based structure," but
without any information on what these fees might be in dollar or percentage terms3 9. The lack of
any dollar figures is a notable departure from the norm of GEF documents, which deluge readers
in figures.
Despite its professed commitment to "total transparency4," GEF buries its actual
disclosure of the take of the Implementing Agencies in its annual reports, and almost nowhere
else. As of mid-1999, the Implementing Agencies and similar UN agencies, in addition to
roughly 5% taken directly in many proposals, such as in the Small Grants Program noted above,
had taken 21.4% of all disbursements from the GEF Trust Fund, or $220 million 1 . The 1999
Annual Report also reveals that an oft-mentioned and never defined "fee-based system"
innovation is nothing other than, at its start, a 1999 $71 million bonus to the unsatiated
Implementing Agencies , in addition to the $220 million already mentioned, bringing the total
cut to the Implementing Agencies to roughly 30% of all GEF funds. By comparison, when
former Soviet governments tweak their books and expenses to siphon off smaller percentages of
World Bank loans and IMF tranches, the rest of the world has little problem complaining of
corruption on the part of entrenched interests. In its continuance, this fee-based system means
that, as of the November 2000 GEF Council meeting, UNDP takes a flat fee equivalent to
roughly 20% of project awards for medium-sized projects43.
As disappointing as these figures are, actual project accountability is little better. GEF's
own targets are to increase its measurable impact, country ownership of programs, the
36 $5,710,000 from 2000-2004. Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United
Nations Population Fund, "Second country cooperation framework for Uzbekistan (2000-2004)," p. 5.
3" Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund,
"UNDP: Financial, Budgetary and Administrative Matters" (Annual Review of the Financial Situation), pp. 31, 41-
43. GEF project funds are similarly on parity with total other local UNDP project funds. Ibid.
38 On the low side is Turkmenistan. See Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the
United Nations Population Fund, "Second country cooperation framework for Turkmenistan (2000-2004)," (May 16,
2000), DP/CCF/TUK/2, p. 9.
39 See Global Environment Facility, "GEF Corporate Business Plan FYOO-FY02" (Sept. 11, 1998), GEF/C. 12/11, pp.
25-29; Global Environment Facility, "Corporate Business Plan FY02-FY04," pp. 17-19.
40 References to "principles of accountability" and to transparency suffuse GEF documents. For example,
"Consistent with provisions in the Instrument, there should be transparency in the preparation, conduct, reporting,
and evaluation of public involvement activities in all projects." Global Environment Facility, "Public Involvement
in GEF-Financed Projects," (June 1996),
http://www.gefweb.org/Operational_Policies/Public_Involvement/public involvement.html.
"' Global Environment Facility, 1999 Annual Report: Volume II, p. 4.
42 Ibid., pp. 4, 16.
4' That is, UNDP takes $146,000 for any medixun-sized project. Assuming that most such projects are roughly
$750,000 (and cannot be more than one million), UNDP's fee is slightly uinder 20%. For projects under $750,000,
IJNDP's take would still be $146,000, but would constitute a higher percentage in relation to the project as a whole.
Figures taken from financial appendices to GEF Council 16 Documents at
http://wwxv.gefweb.org/Documents/CouncilDocuments/GEFC C16/Annexes_A_to_F final.xls.
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commitment of its implementing agencies to the global environment, its partnership with a wide
range of organizations, and its institutional effectiveness 44. Yet, some of its practices cannot be
reconciled with these ambitions. For example, it is not staff from the CBD Secretariat that
evaluates GEF biodiversity projects. Rather, the fox is minding the henhouse. UNDP staff
and/or the GEF Secretariat's Management and Evaluation Team (in its annual Project
Implementation Review) are primarily responsible for assuring the regime of its own
effectiveness. Compounding these problems, a 2001 GEF-sponsored NGO "global assessment"
of GEF projects fails to include any Central Asian projects in its list of 81 projects to review.
Moreover, problems of accountability are magnified in Central Asia, where nepotism and
other non-UNDP forms of corruption, language barriers, and insulation from the frontlines of
scrutiny also regularly challenge the integrity of development programs. For example, when
UNDP-GEF celebrated the success of its Small Grants Program in 1998 by sharing country
reports of each of the 18 states where the small grants program operated, it subtly essayed to hide
the fact that its report was really only about 14 states45; UNDP-GEF's Kazakhstan staff failed to
submit a report to UNDP.
This same Kazakhstan staff (falsely) told local NGOs such as the Karaganda EcoCenter
that they could only apply for medium-sized grants after they had successfully completed a small
grant46, and (illegally) refused to accept or forward on this NGO's medium-sized project
proposals. Even worse, in 1998, a coalition of Tajikistan environmental NGOs submitted a
medium-sized project proposal to, since there was no World Bank presence in Dushanbe, the
UNDP mission in Tajikistan. The local UNDP (falsely) told the NGOs that they could not leave
the project with UNDP and that the local UNDP mission had nothing to do with the GEF,
belying UNDP Headquarters claims to have developed GEF expertise in its missions
worldwide 47, claims trumpeted extensively during the October 1998 GEF Council Meeting 48 that
coincided with these events in Tajikistan. The local NGOs (accurately) informed the local
UNDP mission of its responsibilities and this time insisted on leaving their project. Yet, instead
of responding within the fourteen day deadline that all GEF documents agree are an essential
part of the proposal process, UNDP simply never responded.
Still not capitulating, the Tajikistan NGOs contacted UNDP Headquarters in New York,
and Headquarters immediately promised to get the process back on track. Yet, after several
months, UNDP-GEF and the local UNDP mission had both failed to respond. The fourteen day
deadline was missed several times over. Under GEF rules, if an Implementing Agency fails to
respond to such a submission, it must include that proposal automatically in the GEF Pipeline of
projects under review49. UNDP failed to do that as well.
44Global Environment Facility, "Corporate Business Plan FY02-FY04," pp. 3-4.
45 See Global Environment Facility, "Report on Progress Made in Implementing the GEF Small Grants Programme"
(Nov. 5, 1999), GEF/C. 14/Inf.8 (AnnexVII-Ia: Summary of Replies from GEF/SGP National Coordinators).
46 Personal correspondence with and interviews of Karaganda EcoCenter staff 1997-99. The group's proposal was
for conservation of Karaganda Argali, an endemic endangered species of Ovis ammon with CITES Appendix status.
47Fo example, "At the country level, most UNDP Country Offices have a professional staff member in charge of
handling GEF projects. This individual accepts submissions of project concepts and provides a wide range of
assistance to project proponents including assistance securing governmental endorsement, information on the IJNIDP
Count Programme, and access to a variety of technical experts and stakeholders." UNDP, "Guidebook UNDP-
GEF," available at http://www.undp.org/gef/guide/main.htrn#introduction. By the October 1998 Council Meeting,
UNDP listed UNDP-GEF contact points in both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
48 Observation based on author's observations while in attendance.
49 "A project enters the pipeline [when] an Implementing Agency has received from an eligible count an endorsed
request and . .. the Implementing Agency has not responded to the operation focal point within two weeks of
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Finally, on November, 8 1999 UNDP-GEF responded. UNDP Coordinator for Europe
and the CIS, Christopher Briggs wrote that the proposal would be suitable for GEF funding if
indeed the biodiversity of the Southern Hissar Range was truly endangered and of global
significance. As requested, the NGOs quickly assembled a detailed reply to Briggs confirming
the global significance of the endangered biodiversity of the Southern Hissars. They heard
nothing more for more than six months.
In summer 2000, the UNDP-GEF representative in Tajikistan told the project proposers
that the proposal was on the verge of being funded. But, in September 2000, a UNDP
biodiversity consultant, nine months late, finally arrived in Tajikistan. He told the NGO
coalition that the project was unsuitable for GEF funding because it involved not the Shirkent
reserve itself, but a border area of the reserve and because it did not pursue merely biodiversity
conservation. According to this consultant, since the project would also reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases and provide for improvements in local standards of living,5 1 it was more aptly
described as an effort at sustainable development 2. The GEF, the consultant concluded, does
not fund sustainable development, and so the consultant saw no need to evaluate the incremental
cost analysis of the project, even for its biodiversity benefits.
Ironically, that consultant's home UNDP office in Uzbekistan calls GEF funds
"sustainable development" funds, and exactly concurrent to the release of the consultant's
conclusion, GEF stated that "much of the GEF portfolio has been in protected areas, but the time
is ripe for supporting broader government and community sustainable development efforts in
surrounding areas5 3." The project, still in contravention of GEF rules, was still not included in
the Pipeline54.
This project history illustrates the norm within Central Asia for projects that do not arise
out of UNDP's own "pocket" epistemic communities in NEAPs; thus UNDP has unilaterally
effected a revision of the term "country-driven" to narrow the definition of country to those
citizens of a host country already employed by or beholden to UNDP.
In stark contrast, World Bank GEF efforts in Central Asia exhibit agency disconcernfor
the financial aspects of GEF projects. On the World Bank scale, GEF funding is miniscule.
However, GEF funding exceeds by an order of magnitude the amount the World Bank possesses
in grant funds. Eager to improve its reputation in the environmental sphere, World Bank seeks
the public relations, instead of the financial, rewards from GEF projects. Nevertheless, all three
World Bank-facilitated GEF projects in Central Asia located their genesis in Washington, D.C.
meeting rooms, and all three were suggested to the states in question long after the projects were
receiving their request." Global Environment Facility, "GEF Pipelines of the Implementing Agencies" (Apr. 29,
1999), GEF/C.13/Inf.7, p. 1.
50 Letter of Nov. 8, 1999 from Dr. Christopher Briggs to the project proposers of Nursing Back Biodiversity in the
Southern Hissar Range. In author's files.
The project anticipated establishing a nursery of juniper, walnut, and poplar, extensive restoration of the degraded
Hissar slopes in the populated areas outside the Shirkent National Park, and eventual installation of small
hydroelectric facilities to replace reliance on wood and coal.
5Moreover, his comments were essentially prepared by mid-February, 2000 and simply never forwarded to the
Tajikistan NGOs. See Letter from Jeffrey Griffin, Senior UJNDP-GEF Consultant to Chris Briggs, Regional
Coordinator for Europe and the CIS, UJNDP-GEF, "Recommendations w/respect to the draft proposal entitled
'Nursing Back Biodiversity in the Southern Hissar Range,'" (Feb. 15, 2000).
SGlobal Environment Facility, "Corporate Business Plan EYO2-FYO4," p. 6.
~The consultant's conclusion has no bearing on the Pipeline issue. "Entry into the pipeline does not necessarily
imply concurrence by the GEE Secretariat that the project proposal is consistent with GEE strategy, programs, and
policies." Global Environment Facility, "GEE Pipelines of the Implementing Agencies," p. 2.
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already well-formulated. All they needed, in order to be funded was legitimization in the form of
local voices.
Biodiversity: Embracing CBD Dollars and Avoiding CITES Duties
While the Central Asia Transboundary Biodiversity Project55 (CATBP) only in 1999 received
approval for full GEF funding, for the preceding three years it received preparatory funding from
GEF and other donors. The preparation heavily involved Flora and Fauna International, a United
Kingdom NGO. By all local accounts, this participation absorbed undue funding, and foreign
experts contributed little except translation and coordination burdens considering the high level
of scientific talent already in the region. For geopolitical reasons, the World Bank did not
endorse early local appeals to include experts from Russia, in this and many other projects,
instead of consultants from Europe.
CATBP is a bellwether for biodiversity projects in the region because of its explicit
connection to other GEF biodiversity projects (NEAPs and Enabling Activities), other UNDP
environmental activities (i.e. Agenda 21 implementation), and other state donors, especially
Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark. These related projects involve funding in excess of
CATBP funding, but CATBP is clearly the showcase, central, and model project for the region.
The purpose of the project is to support the protection of vulnerable and unique biological
communities within the Western Tien-Shan Range, which hosts 170 endemic species56 , and to
assist the three countries strengthen and co-ordinate national polices, regulations and institutional
arrangements for
57Figure 2: biodiversity protection
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1992 CBD signatory, and they
* World Bank, "The Central Asia Transboundary Biodiversity Project: Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakstan and
Uzbekistan," (1997). Available at: http://www.gefweb.org/wprogram/nov97/capcd4.doc.56 Hiltunen, Environmental Development Co-Operation Opportunities, p. 67.
5 World Bank, "The Central Asia Transboundary Biodiversity Project: Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakstan and
Uzbekistan."
successfully encouraged Kyrgyzstan to ratify CBD in 1996. Tajikistan independently ratified in
1997, could easily had ratified sooner if a carrot had existed, and could have been included prior
to project submission. In fact, World Bank and the other three Tien-Shan states excluded
Tajikistan simply because none of them desired to burden themselves with what they projected
would be the difficulties of including Tajikistan, which was still engulfed in civil war. Thus,
CATBP stands as a nadir in regional cooperation even though it includes cooperation between
three states.
Yet, it also is the best example of transboundary biodiversity protection in the region
since it actively embraces the goal of creating habitat corridors between four roughly adjacent
nature reserves: Aksu-Dzhabagly (KZ), Besh-Aral and Sary-Chelek (KG), and Chatkal (UZ).
Coming years will test the important questions of how well the three participating states can
cooperate, whether expectations for economic benefits will be realized, and whether this project
will indeed have positive spillover effects on government practices and programs.
Worldwide, 25% of mammal species and 11% of bird species are at risk of extinction58.
Figure 2 reveals that, over the past decade, hopes within development agencies to preserve
biodiversity have, in the face of scientific data, evolved into less heroic, but more realistic, attempts
to mitigate losses of biodiversity.
In this regard, whatever hopes may exist for CABTP, biodiversity protection in Central
Asia at the present date is in shambles. In thousands of pages of reports and project updates, no
donor has yet to claim any tangible progress in preserving biodiversity in the region. Rather, the
outcomes of expensive projects are typically documents, such as the Uzbekistan National
Biodiversity Action Plan". Donors gloss the lack of biodiversity content in biodiversity projects
by celebrating the participation of NGOs, state agencies, and epistemic communities in the
formulation of such reports- a substitution of human organizational diversity for species diversity.
This unmitigated lack of substantive progress contrasts sharply with the mixed record of
Soviet success in protecting
biodiversity. Whereas the Soviet
Union witnessed steady declines in
biodiversity, it nevertheless also
boasted more than a few success
stories. For example, in the late
Soviet period, Turkmenistan's
reserve system painstakingly
worked with local communities
and law enforcement agencies to
increase populations of subspecies
of urial (Ovis vignei; wild goats)
and kulan (Equus hemionus
onager, wild asses).
Both have now been
decimated. Urial populations have
declined generally by one-third to
5 Global Environment Facility, "Corporate Business Plan FY02-FY04," p. 3.
59 The Republic of Uzbekistan, Biodiversity Conservation: National Strategy and Action Plan (Tashkent: 1997),
available at http://www.biodiv.org/natrep/Uzbekistan/Uzbekistan.pdf
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two-thirds60. Worse, until August 2000, the Turkmenistan Ministry of Nature Use and
Environmental Protection believed that the kulan population had risen from less than 2000 to more
than 5000 head since the early 1980s. In August 2000, a WWF sponsored census revealed that
only 200 kulan remain in Turkmenistan6 1. In the face of such decimation, at least for Central Asia,
Figure 3 presents a better view of reality than Figure 2.
Edible plants and animals, especially sport species, have been ravaged in the post-Soviet
period. Many of these species are taken not just for local subsistence, but for export. To the extent
that export of endangered species contributes to loss of critical biodiversity, CITES exists as a
mechanism to introduce protections for wildlife. While CITES does complicate exports of critical
biodiversity from Central Asia (partially because in the CITES regime, exporters need both export
and import permits), it in no way precludes local extirpation due to trade.
When the Soviet Union disassembled in 1991, the Central Asian states pledged to comply
with their CITES obligations even though not officially state parties. In this regard, they
authorized the CITES Management Authority of the Russian Federation to process relevant import
and export permits. Accordingly, someone wishing to export a protected species from Tajikistan
should not have been allowed into, say, France, without an export permit from the Russian
Management Authority.
However, almost as soon as independence dawned in Central Asia, reports started to appear
about massive hunting and export of endangered tortoises, sheep, snow leopards, sturgeon, raptors,
and butterflies by and for Europeans, Arabs, and Americans. These reports came from wildlife
biologists who saw their study populations disappear, from concerned NGOs, and from
whistleblowers in environmental and customs agencies. However, the validity of these reports
came into question precisely because of how CITES works. Over-export from one state should be
traceable through import records of other states. In this regard, no importing states raised any
flags.
The fact that they did not do so points directly to the failings of CITES to accomplish its
goal, which is to protect endangered species by removing the incentives for their extirpation
generated through international trade. Importing states did not raise flags because of the ease with
which smuggling occurs. The case study below illustrates the failings of the CITES regime in
Central Asia.
Argali sheep (Ovis ammon62) are included on the CITES lists of species and subspecies to
be regulated in international commerce. Argali are also one of the most sought-after sport
trophies, and Central Asia provides arguably the most impressive argali hunting in the world.
All of the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan contain globally significant populations of
argali. Each state has introduced limits on the hunting of argali, in most cases a licensing system
that restricts to a few dozen the number of animals that may be taken every year. As opposed to
an outright ban on hunting, these licensed hunts present both opportunities and dangers. All the
states claim that proceeds from licenses go towards conservation 63 . At the local level observers
60 Victor S. Lukarevsky, "The Plight of Urials in Turkmenistan" Ecostan News 7 (March 2000): 2-6.
61 Unpublished data received directly from ministry in August 2000 on the day infonnation submitted.
6Five subspecies of argali inhabit Central Asia. These are Altal argali (0. a. ammon; KZ), Kazakhstan argali (0. a.
collium; KZ), Tien Shan argali (0. a. karelini; KZ, KG), Kara Tau argali (0. a. nigrimontana; KZ), and Marco Polo
argali (0. a. polii; KZ, TJ, KG).
63 30% in Kyrgyzstan should go to conservation measures. Letter from T. Kulumbaev, Chief Inspector of the
Kyrgyzstan State Nature Protection Committee to Doug Yajko of Safari Club (Mar. 11, 1994). FOJA Documents,
see infra note 65. 25% in Kyrgyzstan should go to local communities. "Kelishim, At-Bashi aiyly .. ." Contract of
June 24 1993 between Naryn Regional Inspectorate and At-Bashi District Governor. Ibid. The State Department
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claim that none of the funds go further than the pockets of corrupt officials; they also claim that
local (subsistence) poaching increases dramatically as a result of such hunts since sport hunting
destroys incentives for local populations to themselves refrain from hunting. However, this
corruption and local subsistence poaching, no matter how deleterious for the national society and
environment, are beyond the scope of CITES.
Within the scope of CITES is the simple observation that most of these states actually
issue (through Russia until they themselves become CITES parties) more export permits than
their national laws allow hunts on argali. By how much they exceed their own quotas is
unknown, and perhaps unknowable. From within Central Asia, no more than half of argali
sportsmen in any given year are from the United States. Since the United States strictly forbids
any argali imports from Kazakhstan, in general more Europeans hunt in Kazakhstan 64, and more
Americans hunt in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The U.S. prohibition on imports of argali
occurred under a determination by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act, that argali subspecies in Krgyzstan and Tajikistan were less
endangered and better protected than in Kazakhstan 5, a patently fantastic determination.
The hunters' divvying up Central Asia between continents aside, more argali permits have
been issued to Americans alone in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan than these countries admit issuing.
For 1996, documents received through the Freedom of Information Act6 6 establish that
Americans hunters alone received at least 27 permits to hunt argali and attempted to import at
least 27 argali trophies. Kyrgyzstan claimed to have issued only 18 permits that year to hunters
of all nationalities 67, in accordance with Kyrgyzstan law, which placed an upper limit on permits
of 20 for 199668. Moreover, some of the permit applications contain testimonials that establish
convincingly that the hunts in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are on endangered populations and
have no connection to conservation69
relied on (utterly unsupported) information from Safari Outfitters that 100% of argali revenues in Tajikistan go to
conservation and serve as the only source of state conservation funds. Ibid. Letter from Gretchen Stark, Safari
Outfitters to Mike Carpenter, USFWS (July 23, 1996).
64 From 1990-96, exactly 2/3 (49 of 73) of hunters of argali in Central Kazakhstan were Europeans. North
Americans, led by American citizens, made up the remaining 1/3. Derived from I. V. Kalmykov, "Karagandinskii
argali: okhrana i ratsionalnoe ispolzovanie" (unpublished 1996 report of Chief Inspector of the Karaganda Regional
Animal Conservation Inspectorate).
65 Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, in a report penned by USFWS whistleblowers, alleges that
the entire process was corrupt, illegal, and controlled by the Safari Club. Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility, Tarnished Trophies (Washington, D.C.: PEER, 1996). PEER incorrectly states that the European
Union bans trophy imports, since such individual trophies for which the importer holds a CITES export permit (with
the sole exception of Kara-Tau argali) are permissible as "personal effects" under European Union Regulation
338/97 "On the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein" (Dec. 9, 1996).
Information on Kara-Tau argali from personal correspondence in 1998 with Dr. Ute Grimm of Germany's CITES
Scientific Authority.
66 These documents, hereinafter "FOIA Documents,' include most import permit applications filed with USFWS
over the years in question.
67 Letter 23G-4 19 from Kyrgyzstan Minister of Environmental Protection K. J. Bokonbaev to Beagle Association et
al. (Apr. 17, 1998).
68 See Resolution 159 of the Kyrgyz Republic Cabinet of Ministers (Apr. 19, 1992).
69 I.e., "[W]e were taken into an area which we did not have a permit for .. . A number if [sic] incidences of illegal
hunting were observed. .. On another occasion the game control agent that was guiding us shot a Medium sized ram
in the guts, walked over and looked at it and walked away, when I asked him why he had done that he just waved
me off." 1996 Application of T. M. Lavelle to import one Marco Polo argali into the United States, FOI.A
Documents.
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While there is a ban on imports of argali trophies from Kazakhstan, Americans continue
to hunt in Kazakhstan and may be smuggling their trophies into the United States, possibly by
using Kyrgyzstan as a transit point. Kyrgyzstan is almost certainly exceeding the number of
permits it is allowed to issue by law (20 annually), perhaps in the form of permits for argali
killed in Kazakhstan and perhaps in simple contravention of Kyrgyzstan law.
Given the problems of CATBP and failures of CITES, scant grounds exist for enthusiasm
about the region's prospects to conserve biodiversity. Yet, one project in the region does point
not only to a replicable model for biodiversity preservation, but also to a mode of development
assistance to challenge the practices of UNDP, World Bank, USAID, and other donors.
The German Society for Nature Conservation (Naturschutzbund Deutschland- NABU) is
active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In each state, it endeavors to create a
Biosphere Reserve 70 out of an existing zapovednik and strengthen protection through additional
listing of the area as a World Heritage site. These are Tengiz-Kurgalzhin in Kazakhstan, Issyk-
Kul in Kyrgyzstan, and Nuratau-Kyzylkum in Uzbekistan. Thus, NABU is the only foreign
organization in the entire region that, independent of any GEF funds, from the start approached
Central Asian environmental issues from the standpoint of internationalization of the
environment.
Moreover, NABU is the only large foreign environmental protection organization in
Central Asia that meets the fabled definition of a nonprofit or civil society organization; NABU
is largely volunteer, grassroots, and effective. NABU's dozens of in-country staff are mostly
graduate students from East Germany who speak far better Russian than even those World Bank
and UNDP foreign consultants advertised as fluent Russian speakers. Moreover, these students
are truly volunteer; they contrast strongly with representatives of United Nations Volunteers,
who almost never in Central Asia speak local languages and who actually earn on average
$30,000 tax free during their year of eleemosynary endeavor7. NABU staff live on the ground
with their local partners, accepting the general living conditions of these partners, a view of
partnership that would not be remarkable if any of the major development agencies shared it.
However, since NABU concentrates its efforts in the rural areas in which its projects are
situated, it has had little interaction with other organizations in the region, especially with other
foreign organizations, which rarely travel outside the major cities. Yet, NABU is now on the
verge of informing the mainstream of environmental development in Central Asia through its
successful bid for GEF funds. In 1998, NABU officially began to assemble a medium-sized
project for Nuratau; in summer 2000 its project was awarded $750,000 from the GEF7 . This
award represents the first NGO medium-sized project in Central Asia. Now, highlighting again
the supremacy of the environmental paper chase in Central Asia, NABU will be forced to bid as
a subcontractor to UNDP on the very proposal that would not exist but for NABU.
70
7Biosphere Reserves, like World Heritage sites, exist under the aegis of UNESCO. Biosphere reserves are
intended simultaneously to further conservation, development, and research. See UNESCO, "The Man and the
Biosphere Programme," http://www.unesco.org/mab. To date, the only Biosphere Reserves in Central Asia are
Sary-Chelek (KG), Repetek (TM), and Chatkal, all listed in 1978. See UNESCO, "List of Biosphere Reserves,"
http://www.unesco.org/mab/brlist.htn. Since the Man and the Biosphere Prograrn is not a separate treaty regime,
but part of UNESCO, the status of these sites did not change with the disassembly of the USSR.
71 For the "entitlements" of "non-salaried" United Nations Volunteers, see http://www.unv.org/unvols/isentitl.htm.
72 See UJNDP Uzbekistan, "Establishment of the Nuratau-Kyzylkum Biosphere Reserve as a model for Biodiversity
Conservation in Uzbekistan," June 22, 2000, available at http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Medium-
SizedProjectProposals/MSP_Proposals/Uzbekistan.pdf.
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Should NABU maintain control over this project, it stands ideally situated to highlight the
deficiencies of UNDP and World Bank programming. NABU will stand poised to prove how
much can be done per GEF dollar spent, which will create pressure on the GEF implementors in
Central Asia to increase their own efficacy.
The Transboundary Atmosphere: Ozone, Carbon, and LRTAP
Without question, efforts by the Central Asian states to reduce their production and use of ozone
depleting substances stand out as the most complete and successful contribution of the region to
global environmental cooperation. However, in this, Central Asia merely matches the global
norm; weaning the industrial economies of ozone depleting substances has proven to be easier
than expected. The region's progress towards phasing out ozone depleting substances has been
financed almost entirely by GEF. GEF ozone projects are relatively straightforward payments to
entice the states away from ODS; these projects do not require the civil society participation or
cost-sharing of other GEF projects.
In 1998, the GEF Council reviewed an Uzbekistan ODS proposal (written by UNDP, not
Uzbekistan) and awarded Uzbekistan $3.3 million73. For the total project, far less than 5% of
total funds came from non-GEF sources, which were Uzbekistan itself and a refrigerator factory
in Samarkand, not UNDP or UNEP. In 1999, GEF awarded similar grants to Tajikistan7 4 and
Turkmenistan7, and a $5.6 million project for Kazakhstan was awarded in 200076.
In this beneficence, the ozone regime has chosen to ignore extensive smuggling of ODS
from Russia to the Central Asian states, despite the fact that evidence of such smuggling is
readily apparent. Banned ODS is freely available in Tajikistan markets, since Tajikistan is the
republic most dependent on Russia, and is not difficult to find from automotive repair merchants
in all the other republics. Moreover, these ODS are not even (or at least rarely) disguised with
secondary packaging or false production dates, and no law enforcement efforts within any of
these republics target illegal resale of ODS beyond (empirically ineffective or non-existent)
customs points of entry clearances in each republic.
By 2050, the ozone layer should recover to pre-1980 conditions77. Despite the raw
success of the global ozone regime, it has had special problems with Central Asia; the Secretariat
has singled out Turkmenistan as one of the least compliant states. Outside of seven small Pacific
Island states of no consequence to the ozone regime, Liberia and Kazakhstan are the only
significant ozone regime parties that have never submitted any information on their production
or use of ozone depleting substances to the Secretariat; Kazakhstan, of course, is exponentially
more significant in this regard, both in terms of use of ODS and scientific capacity to report on
73 "Uzbekistan: Programme for phasing out Ozone Depleting Substances' in Project Proposals Submitted for
Council Approval, Vol. III (GEF/C. 12/3), D-15 (Sept. 10, 1998).
74 Global Environment Facility, "Tajikistan: Programme for Phasing Out Ozone Depleting Substances," (1999),
available at http://www.gefweb.org/meetings/GEFC14/Tajikistan/tajozo.pdf.
75 Project in Author's Files. This project also failed to secure authorization from the operational focal point, but was
reviewed anyway. The project anticipates complete disuse of ODS by 2005.
76 Global Environment Facility, ''Kazakhstan: Programme for Phasing Out Ozone Depleting Substances."
77 United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environmental Outlook 2000 (London: United Nations
Environment Programme, 1999), p. 4.
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its use?8. Kyrgyzstan was one of the last states on earth to join the ozone regime, only joining in
2000. Uzbekistan, by contrast has reduced its consumption of ODS by 97%79, one of the best
records in the entire regime. Moreover, since smuggling issues involving Central Asia have been
ignored, Uzbekistan boasts a near-perfect record of compliance with all aspects of the ozone
regime, even if it has not had Kazakhstan's success in winning large amounts of GEF funding.
No regime better illustrates Kazakhstan's favored status within the GEF than climate
change. While Kazakhstan's official position is that, "in any transition country, climate change is
only a priority to the extent that it is related to the general national conception of the sustainable
development and preservation of the environment ," in reality climate change is really a priority
since that's where the money is. Throughout the region, most of this money has gone into the
generation of paper, such as that used in the lengthy Uzbekistan Country Study on Climate
81 82h
Change or its Kazakhstan counterparts. Most states have also sought funds for stock projects
to "remove barriers to energy efficiency in municipal heat and hot water supply8 3 ." Despite this
spreading around of resources, because it is the only state in the region to have received
substantial international assistance to facilitate its participation in the climate regime (receiving
far more than all other states combined thanks to both USAID and GEF contributions),
Kazakhstan serves to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the climate regime.
Kazakhstan's contributions to the climate change regime are unique in this survey; it
contributes to the scientific development of the regime, to ongoing negotiations, and to national
aspects of regime effectiveness. From 1993 to 1997, Kazakhstan's Hydrometeorological Agency
coordinated climate change regime activities; in 1997, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural
Resources took leadership of an Interagency Commission on UNFCCC.
Applying the basic scientific models of U.S. climate change researchers8 4, researchers
from the Kazakhstan Scientific Research Institute to Monitor the Environment and Climate have
used data from Kazakhstan's 251 meteorological monitoring stations8 5 to develop robust
forecasts about climate change in Kazakhstan. In part, they draw on climate data gathered within
Kazakhstan since 1894 to establish that the mean temperature in Kazakhstan has increased by 1.3
86
degrees C and mean annual precipitation decreased by 17mm over the past century8 . Most of
their forecasts suggest that climate change will decrease the number of acres of prime
78 United Nations Environment Programme, "Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal protocol on
Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer: Report of the Secretariat on Information provided by the Parties in
Accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the Montreal Protocol," p. 4.
79 Ibid., p. 28.
80 Republic of Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 52.
81 United Nations Office in the Republic of Uzbekistan, UZB/95/G31l/C/lG/99 (Jan. 1, 1999).
82 Republicof Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Clinate Change The preparation of this report was underwritten by the Netherlnds,
and Kazakhstan's general climate change inventories were supported by the United States from 1994-98. Ibid., p. 7.
For information on the United States Country Studies Program under the Department of Energy, see
http://www.gcrio.org/CSP. No other Central Asian state received assistance under this program.
83 See United Nations Office in the Republic of Uzbekistan, UZB/98/G42 (Jan. 1, 1999) and Table I this Chapter.
84 Within the United States, the government allocates close to two billion dollars annually to national climate change
research. See Subcommittee on Global Change Research, Committee on Environment and Natural Resources of the
National Science and Technology Council, Our Changing Planet: The FY 2001 U.S. Global Change Research
Program (Washington, D.C.: National Science and Technology Council, 2000), p. 4.
85 Republic of Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 31.
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Figure 4:
Kazakhstan's 1998 Projected Increase in Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Electricity Production
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agricultural land in Kazakhstan by 6% to 23% over the next half century, leading to a
generalized decrease in the spring wheat yield of up to 27%87 and a loss of up to 70% yield in
certain areas88 . Although general levels of precipitation in Kazakhstan should increase by up to
25%, climate aridity will also increase because of increased temperatures of roughly 5 degrees to
7 degrees C89. Moreover, 20% to 30% of Kazakhstan's surface water resources could disappear,
with the Ishim River the most adversely affected of the state's major watercourses; one-third of
the Ishim is expected to, and up to three-quarters in a worst-case scenario may, disappear, and
one-tenth to one-quarter of most other major rivers'".
In 1990, Kazakhstan emitted the equivalent of 352,000,000 metric tonnes of carbon
dioxide*l. In 1994, Kazakhstan emitted two-thirds that amount, and in 1997 only slightly more
than half that amount. As Figure 4 92 illustrates, in 1998, Kazakhstan projected that it would not
87 Ibid., p. 9. However, from 2010-30, the yields may actually increase.
as Ibid., p. 37.
"9 Ibid., p. 34-35.
50 Ibid. p. 37-38.
91 Global Environment Facility, "Kazakhstan: Wind Power Market Development Initiative," (2000),
http://www.gefweb.org/COUJNCIL/GEFC1I5/WP/KazakhstanWind.doc. This figure is understated, since it
ignored oil and gas production emissions, but it is the "baseline" for Kazakhstan under the FCCC. Republic of
Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, p. 11. For comparison, Uzbekistan emitted 115 million metric tonnes of carbon
dioxide (163 million total tonnes of greenhouse gases) in 1990 and 102 million (156 million) in 1997, a much less
substantial reduction. See Initial Communication of the Republic of Uzbekistan Under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 36.92 Republic of Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 57.
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average of .39 tonne'. In 1990, Kazakhstan emitted 15.9 tonnes of geenhouse gases per
capita95, and only the United States has a larger per capita emissionO. This lack of efficiency
also suggests that Kazakhstan can adapt to the future emissions reductions requirements of the
regime in large part through relatively basic implementation of best practices in other parts of the
world.
Kazakhstan's proposed efforts to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases include, inter
alia, increasing efficiency, constructing dozens of new hydroelectric facilities and wind power
stations, passing new legislation to create positive incentives, and, possibly, shifting to reliance
on nuclear power. However, the cost of these measures comes to over $5 billion97, and
Kazakhstan explicitly states that it can cover only up to 15% of that cost. Moreover, Figure 5
suggests that Kazakhstan's forecasts for its increased carbon emissions may be unfounded; the
upswing is always, coincidentally, projected to begin the year after an official report is issued.
At the fourth COP of UNFCCC in 1998 Kazakhstan announced that it would be willing
to assume voluntary reductions in carbon emissions. Flowing from this announcement, on April
24, 1999, Kazakhstan proposed to amend Annex 1 of the Convention to include Kazakhstan
93 Ibid., p. 28.
9 Ibid., p. 55.
95 The Main Administration for Hydrometeorology of the Republic of Kazakhstan, U.S. Country Studies Program
Support for National Action Plan (SNAP) for the Republic of Kazakhstan Final Reort (Almaty: 1999), available at
http://www.gcrio.org/CSP/pdf/kazakhstansnap.pdf, p. 8.
" United States Agency for International Development, Climate Change Initiative 1998-2002 (Washington, D.C.:
USAID, 1998), available at http://www.dec.org/pdf docs/PNACC866.pdf, pp. 53-54.
97 Republic of Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 57.
98 See United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change FCCC/CP/1999/2 (May 28, 1999).
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At COP 5, the states did not agree to this amendment. Were Kazakhstan an Annex 1 state, it
would be subject to heavy and frequent burdens to submit reports on implementation to the
Secretariat. However Annex 1 status would also allow Kazakhstan to engage in the emissions
trading and joint implementation that is being restricted to transfers between developed states.
The "Clean Development Mechanism" would allow for transfers between developed and
developing states, but is also strongly resisted by many parties to the UNFCCC. Accordingly,
Kazakhstan reiterated its desire to be included in Annex I at the opening session of COP 6 in
November 200099.
While not stated anywhere in materials produced by U.S. development agencies or
Kazakhstan's environmental agencies, both sides hope that emissions trading and joint
implementation will allow the United States to defray much of this cost in coming decades. At
its 1990 baseline, 61% of Kazakhstan's primary energy consumption came from coal'0 0 . Over
the past decade, through the U.S. Country Studies Program and related initiatives, the United
States has allocated well over $10,000,000 to Kazakhstan and its internal reporting efforts.
Kazakhstan also recently parlayed its small wind power efforts into a major GEF grant
that will likely effect the first tangible climate change reform in the region. Under this three
million dollar grant, part of the funds will be used to establish a 5MW wind farm as a pilot
project' 01 . Through part of its new $1 billion Climate Change Initiative, the United States
expects to expand its experience in Kazakhstan to the rest of Central Asia, and the region in
general is both one of the 12 primary foci of this initiative and has baseline emissions that place
102it on the level of the 10 largest states in the world for greenhouse gas emissions
However the other republics' prospects under UNFCCC are not as propitious as
Kazakhstan's. For example, Uzbekistan did not experience the crash of Kazakhstan, and in 1990
was already relying on natural gas as its principal fuel'0 3. As a result, neither Uzbekistan nor any
of the other republics have the abundant "superheated air10 4" that makes Kazakhstan especially
attractive to Western states.
Most tellingly, since Kazakhstan boasts such a bad record in the ozone regime and
ratified the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution only after
Kyrgyzstan did so, Kazakhstan's efforts in the climate change regime only reinforce the
impression that Kazakhstan has little commitment to international environmental issues.
Kazakhstan adequately meets commitments when fulfillment of obligations is tied to financial
rewards, and it ignores such commitments otherwise. Consequently, if funds within the climate
change regime become endangered, so too will be hopes that Kazakhstan will implement real
reforms to lessen climate change.
99 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 163, Nov. 13, 2000, p. 2.
100 The Main Administration for Hydrometeorology of the Republic of Kazakhstan, U.S. Country Studies Program
Support for National Action Plan (SNAP) for the Republic of Kazakhstan Final Report, p. 24.
10 Global Environment Facility, "Kazakhstan: Wind Power Market Development Initiative."
102 United States Agency for International Development, Climate Change Initiative 1998-2002, pp. 12, 44. At 1990
levels, Central Asia would have been the seventh largest emitter, ocupyiinihe spot in between Germany and the
United Kingdom, perhaps even exceeding German levels. By 1995, it had fallen out of the top ten to the level of
Mexico. Ibid., p. 12.
103 Main Administration of Hydrometeorology, Initial Communication of the Republic of Uzbekistan Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 8.
104 A climate change euphemism for levels of emissions so substantially below 1990 levels that under emissions
trading other states could purchase considerable additional capacity for themselves. Likewise, Kazaklistan's coal
inefficiency creates a similarly rich opportunity under joint implementation.
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Desertification
The Central Asian states remain interested in the CCD regime and, more generally, in
addressing their own problems with desertification. Should desertification and degradation
problems become exacerbated within the region, they could lead to an environmental refugee
problem for neighboring states. All indicators are that climate change will only accelerate
processes of desertification and land degradation within Central Asia' 05 . And yet, climate
change is only one aspect of desertification and land degradation; Soviet practices of industrial
pollution and waste disposal continue to spoil the land on a massive scale. 60,000,000,000
kilograms of industrial wastes, half of them toxic or radioactive, cover 3300 hectares in just the
106Zhambyl Region of Kazakhstan . Over half of Kazakhstan's industrial enterprises lack any sort
of waste treatment' 07, much less effective treatment.
Accordingly, most of the Central Asian states have prepared national action plans to
combat desertification108, held various roundtables on desertification, and assembled annual
reports on desertification' 09. These efforts have involved wider cross-sections of society and
been more sincere than efforts connected to other regimes. However, these efforts are not
qualitatively different than those extant in other regimes; they are primarily urban and paper
efforts.
Thus, despite their interest, the states have yet to implement any strong measures to
control desertification beyond issuing reports. At best, these reports merely track the pace of
desertification and land degradation in the region. At worst, they do nothing to prevent the
enactment of new threats to the land of Central Asia. For example, Turkmenistan in 2000
announced plans to create an immense artificial lake in the Karakum Desert that will almost
certainly only exacerbate land degradation conditions in southern Central Asia 1 0. While some
local communities have pioneered innovative approaches to local control of desertification, in
the aggregate no reform since the Soviet period can be claimed. Accordingly, UNDP predicts
"continuing declining productivity and extensive land degradation"'."
105 Republic of Kazakhstan, Initial National Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 36.
106 P. Aitymbetov, "Otkhody: zlo i blago" Ekokuryer(July 28, 2000), p. 2.
'
0 7 Hiltunen, Environmental Development Co-Operation Opportunities, p.10.
'08 See United Nations Office in the Republic of Uzbekistan, National Action Plan, UZB/98/X19 (Jan. 1, 1999).
109 See, i.e., Turkmenistan Ministry of Nature Protection, Doklad po osuschestyleniyu Natsionalnoiprogrammy
deistvii po borbe s opustynivaniem v Turkmenistane (Ashgabad: National Institute of Deserts, Flora and Fauna,
2000). This report could offer as anti-desertification efforts only one pilot project on eight hectares, the distribution
of "CCD" t-shirts to raise awareness, and the planting of three million conifer seedlings (most of which are now
dead) in the capital.
11 0Niyaz Ataev, "The Lake of the Golden Century" Ecostan News 10 (2000), pp. 6-9;
http://www.ecostan.org/Ecostan/Ecostan710e.pdf.
1 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Progranune and of the United Nations Population Fund,
"Second country cooperation framework for Uzbekistan (2000-2004)," p. 2.
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Regional Ecosystems in the Global Environment: The Caspian Environment
Programmem
The Caspian may contain the third largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world: ten billion tons of
oil and six trillion cubic meters of natural gas.11 3 The wider Caspian Sea region also boasts
substantial hydrocarbon reserves close to shore, especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan."4
Disputes aside about the relative importance of Caspian hydrocarbons, the region certainly faces
a serious challenge of trying to preserve the sea's ecosystem in the face of certain hydrocarbon
development and transportation. Oil is not the only "black gold" of the Caspian; historically and
into the present more revenues and greater dispersion of financial rewards have come from
sturgeon products than from hydrocarbons. Various voices in the Caspian region argue that
caviar could still be more lucrative than oil.
The Caspian Sea actually boasts a comparatively long pedigree as an environmental
regime. In order to protect sturgeon, in 1962 the USSR prohibited open-sea fishing" 5 , and began
to increase regulation of other fisheries.1 1 6 After 1991 some states discontinued the 1962 pelagic
fishing ban, and in most states pelagic poaching of sturgeon expanded dramatically and
continues today, which accounts for the population crash that has a virtual ban on caviar trade a
likely event within the coming two years.
Shore populations and the state have historically also relied heavily on seals, nesting
migratory bird populations, and other biological resources connected to the sea's ecosystem. In
the latest die-off of seals in May 2000, more than 10,000 seal carcasses littered the beaches of
Kazakhstan and Russia."17 The seals primarily inhabit the Northern Caspian shelf, the very
shallow but highly biologically productive area shared by Kazakhstan and Russia; it is here that
Kazakhstan began drilling for hydrocarbons in 1999. It is also near here that Central Asia's only
non-research nuclear power plant is located. This reactor is both obsolescent and has a history of
mishaps, including suffering a fire as recently as September 2000.118
Several important nature reserves lie on the shores of the Caspian or embrace parts of the
sea. These include Kyzylagach Zapovednik (AZ, 88,360 ha), Astrakhan Zapovednik (RU,
63,4000 ha), Dagestan Zapovednik (RU 19,061 ha)119 and Khazar Zapovednik (TM, 262,000 ha).
112 This Section largely derives from Sievers, "The Caspian, Regional Seas, and the Case for a Cultural Study of
Law."
"3 Arthur P. Mizzi, "Caspian Sea Oil, Turmoil, and Caviar: Can They Provide a Basis for an Economic Union of the
Caspian States?" Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy 7, p. 483 (1996).
114 More than 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil and more than 30 trillion m3 of natural gas. Sarah J. Lloyd,
"Land-locked Central Asia: Implications for the Future," in Dick Hodder et al. eds., Land-locked States of Asia and
Africa, pp. 97, 115 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997)
115 Despite this ban (which applied to all fishing except for industrial sprat catches and scientific research), made for
conservation purposes and in an attempt to generate greater export possibilities for caviar (sturgeon spawn in rivers
not the sea), poaching was rampant and sturgeon products widely available to coastal populations. Poachers, faced
with felony charges for one fish or for 1000 fish, had no incentive to work on a small scale. For a discussion of
poaching and Caspian politics in the 1960s and 1970s, see Emil Agaev, "Osetr dlya brakonyera," in S. Ganiev and
V. Maksimov eds., V sudbe prirody- nasha sudba 4-39 (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1990).
116 The most important of which are shad, herring, carp, salmon, sprat, and mullet.
117Bella Sewall, "Caspian Seal Tragedy," Ecostan News (July 2000), p. 9;
http://www.ecostan.org/Ecostan/Ecostan707e.pdf.
118 Liz Fuller, "Fire Extinguished at Nuclear Power Plant in Kazakhstan," RFE/RL Newsline (Sept. 11, 2000).
11L9 "Strict Nature Reserves (zapovedniki) of Russia", http://syseco.pgu.serpukhov.su/nreserve.
25
All these reserve serve as important nesting areas for migratory birds and waterfowl, like
flamingo, herons, and francolins.
Russia's Volga Delta (800,000 ha) and several Iranian sites (like Anzali Mordab, 15,000
ha) are on Ramsar's List of Wetlands of International Importance.'2 0 In fact, the convention is
named after the Iranian Caspian coastal city where the convention was concluded. The List of
Wetlands ofInternational Importance still lists the Krasnovodsk and Cheleken Bays (TM,
188,700 ha) and the Kirov Bays (AZ, 132,500 ha), although their states did not succeed to and
have still not acceded to the Ramsar Convention. The Kirov Bays site and some of the Iranian
sites (like Anzali Mordab) are also listed on the convention's Montreux Record of endangered
wetlands.m The Caspian's biological resources are protected under several additional
international regimes, like World Heritage, CBD, the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve Programme,
and the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
Whereas in the first years after the dissolution of the USSR, debates centered on the
enclosed sea/international lake dichotomy extrapolated from the Law of the Sea, it is now clear
that no dispositive scientific or historic evidence will resolve the character of the Caspian.122
Even were this situation not true, the sea/lake distinction under the Law of the Sea is also
one that is in danger of containing no difference. In a Caspian "Sea," littoral states could have a
right to navigate Russia's Volga/Don canal system connecting to the Black Sea, which would be
of importance to the land-locked post-Soviet states. But, they can use this system now; "free"
navigation would not mean that Russia would be unable to use tariffs and administrative tools to
make the canal even less expedient than it is now.
With the exception of Azerbaijan and, recently, Kazakhstan, no state in the region even
considers the Caspian its major hydrocarbon source,m and no littoral state sees the Caspian
seabed as the optimal transportation route. Questions of succession, monism, development,
popular sovereignty, and agency within these management regimes are, in fact, more pertinent to
the region's contribution to the advancement of international law and are questions that
international law scholarship can partially determine or elucidate.
At a 1994 meeting of deputy foreign ministers, Iran proposed the creation of a Caspian
Cooperation Organization.12 4 In the ensuing five years, dozens of meetings at the ministerial,
deputy minister, and ministry department level occurred between the littoral states on a variety of
issues relevant to management of the Caspian. These meetings, increasingly specialized,
addressed the sea's legal status through a variety of proposed treaties, rights to hydrocarbon
120 Ramsar Bureau, "List of Wetlands of International Importance" (Nov. 8 1999) at http://www.ramsar.org.
121 Ramsar Bureau, "The Montreux Record" (Sept. 30 1999) at http:// www.ramsar.org/key-montreuxrecord.htm.
122 The states appear to be moving toward a regime of national delineation for some resources, while relegating
navigation, fisheries, and seabed ownership to special regimes. While principles gleaned from the Law of the Sea
will be applied to resolving the legal status of the Caspian, international law's normative influence on the resolution
of the remaining discrepancies between the state will clearly be highly subordinate to state interests.
12 See for example Jean-Christoph Peuch, 'The Privatization of International Affairs, " Fletcher Forum for World
Affairs 22, pp. 29-30 (1998) (positing that Russia does not even consider Caspian hydrocarbon reserves as a possible
source of revenues).
14Vyacheslav Giizzatov, "Statement at the Seminar on Caspian problems at the International Institute of Caspian
Studies" (unpublished paper distributed by Kazakhstan ambassador at meeting in Tebran in June 1999;
http://www.caspianstudies.com/seminars/l99906l5.htm). For a rnuch more detailed and excellent overview of the
pre-1994 diplomatic develops concerning the Caspian, see Sergei V. Vinogradov, "Toward Regional Cooperation in
the Caspian: A Legal Perspective", in Michael H. Glantz and Igor S. Zonn eds., Scientific. Environmental, and
Poiia susi h icmCsinRgo (Amsterdam: Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 1996), pp. 5 3-66.
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development, fishing, transportation, and ecology.12 5 Of particular note, the states developed
several draft conventions, although to date none of these have found support from all five littoral
states at the same time. 126
The Caspian Environment Programme (CEP) constitutes the international response to
concerns for sustainable management of the Caspian. The CEP builds on more than a decade of
meetings between and plans developed by local scientists and policy makers. In 1995, a joint
mission to the Caspian region by World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP brought CEP into existence as
a name. Between 1995 and 1998, CEP existed as an informal set of informally connected
national efforts financed primarily with funds from the European Union.m In 1998, the GEF
approved a proposal to address the transboundary aspects of the CEP, 128 transforming CEP into a
larger and more truly transnational project, and in May 1998, in Ramsar, the littoral states
officially launched CEP. World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP, in coordination with state
governments, will implement CEP.
CEP will pursue the "environmentally sustainable development and management of the
Caspian environment, including living resources and water quality, so as to obtain the utmost
long-term benefits for the human populations of the region, while protecting human health,
ecological integrity and the region's sustainability for future generations." 129
To pursue this goal, CEP's structure includes a Programme Coordination Unit (currently
in Azerbaijan), ten Caspian Regional Thematic Centers (CRTCs) and a Steering Committee that
convenes once a year. CRTCs include Data and Information Systems (AZ), Pollution Control
(AZ), Pollution Monitoring (IR), Coastal Zone Management (IR), Water Level Fluctuations
(KZ), Biodiversity (KZ), Legal, Regulatory and Economic Instruments (RU), Fisheries and
Commercial Bioresources (RU), Sustainable Human Development (TM), and Desertification
(TM), as well as an Emergency Response Center in Iran. 3  Major areas of CEP emphasis
include regional cooperation, public awareness, data management, environmental assessment and
monitoring, coastal planning, desertification, sustainable human health, regulatory development,
and investment policy.
Embedded within these CEP efforts is an initiative, also funded by various sources, but
primarily within the purview of UNEP and the legal CRTC, to create a Framework Convention
to Protect the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (FCCS). Four meetings of state experts
resulted in adoption of the final text of the first three articles in March 2000. While projected
dates for adoption of a final text of the entire FCCS are repeatedly pushed back, plans now call
for the littoral states to sign the FCCS in November 2001.131
125 See Gizzatov, "Statement at the Seminar on Caspian problems at the International Institute of Caspian Studies".
126 Vinogradov, "Toward Regional Cooperation in the Caspian: A Legal Perspective," p. 59.
127 Other funds were contributed by a wide variety of bilateral and international donors, with the glaring exception of
the United States; however, the EU's contribution and commitments of more than five million ECU by the end of
the century are by far the largest non-GEF contribution. Caspian Environment Programme website,
http://www.caspianenvironment.org.
18Caspian Environment Programme, "Project Brief: Addressing Transboundary Environmental Issues in the
Caspian Environment Programme" (undated), http://www.gefweb.org/wprogram/Oct98/WP_Sum.htmn. The GEF
Council awarded more than eight million dollars to this project. Ibid.
129 CEP website.
13o Ibid.
131 Caspian Environment Programme, "Project Proposal: Addressing Transboundary Environmental Issues in the
Caspian Environment Programme (CEP)- Strengthened Institutional, Legal, Regulatory and Economic Frameworks
for SAP Implementation," (Feb. 2000), http://wwxw.gefweb.org/EndorsementEndorsements/Endorsements.htm.
AZ hints that it will be the holdout state in terms of resisting FCCS.
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The context for FCCS is the existing CEP. Only beginning now are CEP research and
monitoring efforts beginning to assume a transnational character. During the 1990s, what
cooperation existed in the Caspian Basin consisted primarily of sharing results and, later,
establishing uniform modes of research and monitoring so as to make national programs
complementary. While this nationalization of international cooperation falls short of the ultimate
goals of CEP, it is a typical stage in the development of regional seas regimes.13 2 Similarly, that
FCCS will consume a half decade from conception to adoption of the final text does not of itself
hint at problems in regime building; such a time span is typical. The central question to be asked
is whether FCCS will facilitate the sustainability of the larger Caspian regional seas program.
Since the later stages of the Caspian regime will likely require states to alter their modes
of industry and transportation, as well as their environmental standards, at some point states will
need to change the behaviors of their domestic actors, ostensibly through both economic
incentives and threats of force. While ad hoc negotiations among states and informal agreements
along these lines may go far in facilitating these measures, a formal framework treaty offers the
distinct advantages of assuring other parties that each state is serious, that options for
backtracking are limited, and that a central and undisputed forum exists for clear and current
statements of the requirements of the regime.
The draft FCCS 133 is a sparse framework agreement that anticipates subsequent protocols
or agreements. The goal of the FCCS is to protect the marine environment of the Caspian from
all sources of pollution and to protect and restore the living resources of the Caspian. In very
general terms, the FCCS requires the littoral states to take measures to limit and control pollution
(both land-based and other), protect and restore living resources, and cooperate. In these actions,
the states are to be guided by both the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle.
Section III of the FCCS explicitly binds states to work towards a Land-Based Sources
Protocol that includes best available technology, point source licensing, and special agriculture
rules. Five additional explicitly required protocols include those to regulate uses of the seabed
(including for hydrocarbon and other mineral development and transportation), pollution from
ships, dumping from planes and ships, cooperative emergency response procedures, and sea-
level effects. Three protocols explicitly envisioned (but not mandated) would regulate
agriculture, recreational boating, and invasive species. At this stage, the FCCS is silent as to
whether the Caspian regime will attempt to regulate pollution entering the Caspian basin from
non-littoral states, and is vague about whether these protocols will require separate ratification.
Section IV binds states to pursue conservation programs based on the best available
scientific evidence to ensure sustainable human welfare, sustainable yields, prevent incidental
catches and extinctions, restore endangered populations, and preserve rare or endangered
ecosystems. Section V constrains states to conduct impact assessments for projects that may
have a significant impact on the environment, share assessment results with other state parties,
and create uniform assessment procedures. 134 Further, states commit to cooperate in
environmental monitoring and research, and to expand existing scientific efforts. The parties
further agree to create Appendices to the FCCS of toxic substances subject to regulation or
prohibition. Finally, Section VI establishes the Caspian Environmental Protection Organization
132 Likewise, for the first half-decade of MedPlan, all research was national. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The
Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, p. 100.
13 All referenCes are to the March 2000 final text of the FCCS.
134 Russia and TM, as parties to the Aarhus Convention would be required to make assessments public.
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and its administrative secretariat, responsible for monitoring compliance with both FCCS and
CEP's Strategic Action Plan.
The FCCS is silent on a number of issues, such as public participatory rights and the
degree to which science will be the backbone of administrative agencies (instead of merely being
confined to research and monitoring). Yet, the two CEP proposals to the Global Environment
Facility (signed by all the littoral states) are authoritative and partially binding statements to
questions about regime rules not answered directly by the FCCS. Reading the states' declaration
that "links between science and policy are presently weak and should be strengthened by a
regional program," looking at the current staff of the CEP Programme Coordination Unit, and
considering the professional backgrounds of national focal points, it is clear that the emerging
regime is highly dependent on and geared toward epistemic communities. Likewise, the
proposals, in particular the envisioned Small Grants Programme and a seat for NGOs on the
Steering Committee, constitute a recognition of and reliance on local stakeholders and public
participation substantially better than that reserved in the early stages of any other regional seas
regime.'135
Quite unlike the experience of the colonies of European states, the national republics
were full partners in the human capital building efforts of the USSR. To a degree unknown in
colonial settings, the USSR attempted to level the playing field between its capital and its more
remote territories, within and beyond the Russian Federation. From the 1920s on, Soviet policies
established national academies of sciences, dozens of institutions of higher education (focused
primarily on the technical and natural sciences), and dozens of well-equipped research institutes
in each republic. By the end of the Soviet period and not including university and ministry
research programs and staff, Kazakhstan claimed 159 research institutes within its Academy of
Sciencesl 3 , and Turkmenistan claimed a dozen 37.
While this list does not do justice to the range of interests in the region, it does suggest
the strength of the Caspian's advantages. In contrast, the Aral Sea Basin project promises little
for Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, who consider themselves largely unaffected by the crisis. Even the
upstream states wonder whether there is any strong economic benefit to an altered water regime,
especially considering that the shoreline area of the sea was never a population center in any
state and is not near a capital city. Similarly, there are few clear short-term economic and social
reasons to protect biodiversity or maintain nature reserves; hopes for ecotourism are
understandably slim, despite the prevalence of the term in justifications for protection.
Third, perhaps serendipitously, CEP is by far the most professional of the regimes.
Symptomatically, the 1997 project proposal does not contain the spelling errors, poor writing,
and weak incremental cost assessments of its subregional peers. Underlying these observations,
the scientific data on the sea already makes the Caspian one of the most thoroughly studied
bodies of water on the planet.
Thus, CEP may be the environmental regime that casts the most favorable light on
Central Asian participation. However, and disappointingly, none of the activities of the regime
thus far have had any effect on improving the environmental conditions in the Caspian region.
Without such improvements, the states' participation in the region is not actually more than
participation for the sake of participation; while such participation may increase chances for
'asCf Despite this textual exuberance about NGOs and public participation, to date the CEP has a miserable track
record of responding to information requests from the public.
136 Koltsov, Rol' Akademii nauk v organizatsii regionalnykh nauchnykh tsentrov SSSR, pp. 56, 222.
'3 Babaev et al. eds., Akademiva nauk Turkmenskoi SSR1p10.
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effective environmental conservation efforts in the future, at present the regime itself has
substantial compliance victories and virtually no victories of effectiveness.
Transboundary Watercourse Management: the Irtysh River 38
In 1998, in breaking the story of diversion of the Irtysh River, Asia's largest and the world's fifth
largest139, Erik Nurshin accused Kazakhstan's government of placating China and betraying its
citizens140 . Billion-dollar Project 635 anticipates diverting, initially, from 5-15% of the flow of
the Irtysh 141 to the needs of the Karamai oil fields and to irrigate 140,000 hectares142, and it
threatens the millions of people and dozens of ecosystems that line the Irtysh's 5000-plus
kilometer length. China may increase its diversion to up to 50% of the Irtysh1 4 3, and there are
persistent rumors that it also plans to divert the Ili 144, south of the Irtysh for a total annual
diversion of up to six cubic kilometers 145 . The environmental communities in Kazakhstan and
Russia believe that this diversion will degrade the river's viability as habitat for important
biodiversity and lower water quality levels throughout the river basin, adversely affecting human
health. Moreover, Kazakhstan's commercially significant river ports will have difficulty
operating, and the large hydroelectric cascade may fail if the water level drops further.
The Irtysh controversy is synonymous with opposition to President Nazarbaev. One of
Nazarbaev's rivals, Murat Auezzov, the former Ambassador to China, is now Executive Director
of George Soros's Kazakhstan Open Society Institute, and Auezzov leaked the story to Nurshin.
Auezzov paints a devastating picture of the Chinese as stonewalling prevaricators and the
Kazakhstan government as incompetent collaborators146. Auezzov claims that Kazakhstan was
aware of suspicious activity on the Irtysh in the early 1990s. His first ambassadorial act in 1992
138 This section derives from Eric W. Sievers, "Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China,
Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh," (Unpublished).
139 Depending on criteria, the Irtysh is listed as high as three and as low as 20 on lists of the world's largest rivers. In
terms of drainage basin, the Irtysh, at 3,000,000 km2 , occupies the fifth spot, behind the Amazon, Nile, Mississippi,
and Congo. Joyce L. Vedral et al. eds., World Resources 1998-99 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.
309. Arising in a border region of Mongolia and China, the Irtysh forms KZ's industrial heartland before crosses into
Russia, joins the Ob River, and empties into the Arctic Ocean.
140 Erik Nurshin, "Eto li tsena suvereniteta?!," XXI Vek (Oct. 15, 1998),
http://eurasia.org.ru/archives/october/Kit0021.htm.
141 Vladimir Turov, "Kak Rossiyu ostavlyayut za 'vodo-zaborom'," Nezavismiaya Gazeta (May 12, 1999),
http://news.eastview.com/99/NGA/05/data/n083-4i.htm.
142 Aleksei Baliev and Arkadii Medvedev "Reki sami ne umirayut. Ikh ubivayut," Rossiiskava gazeta (Feb. 12,
1999), http://news.eastview.com/99/RGA/02/data/rg021258.html.
143 Guesses vary from 10% to more than 50% as both KZ and Russian journalists clearly expect the worst from
China. One journalist cites 25-40% as the initial diversion. Boris Kuzmenko, "Druzhba druzhboi, a vodichka vroz.
Paradoksy sosedskikh vzaimootnoshenii," Iterfaks AIF (May 14, 1999),
http://news.eastview.conm/pp/IAI/05/data/i020 _011.html. Almost 10 km3 flows yearly across China's border, which,
many experts contend, constitutes the bulk of the Irtysh's flow. Ibid.
44"In the 1 970s, the Chinese diverted part of the flow of the Ili River, and the consequences for the residents on the
Soviet side of the border were unpleasant. Turov, "Kak Rossiyu ostavlyayut za "vodo-zaborom."
145 Turov, "Kak Rossiyu ostavlyayut za 'vodo-zaborom'."
146 Russian journalists are more to the point, suggesting that Kaz~akhstan politicians allow Chinese expansionism
because the Chinese "sweeten the pill" through personal bribes. Aleksei Gulyaev, 'Kitai-IKazakhstan: Pogranicbnyi
spor prodolzhaetsya," Izvestiva (April 30, 1999), http://news.eastview.com/99/IZV/04/datai078-23.html.
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was to present a proposal to China on "the joint use of border rivers' 47". Expecting an answer
within two months; despite his pressing, he left China in 1995 with no answer148. Lamenting a
total lack of political will from Astana and Moscow, Auezzov declares, "the leaders of
Kazakhstan and Russia must take forcible measures 14 9." From my fieldwork, I believe that most
of northern Kazakhstan agrees.
While the Kazakhstan press agitates on the Irtysh issue, and while NGOs actively lend
their voices, the government refuses to elevate the issue to a tangible national priority. Instead, it
takes pains to focus on the exaggerations of the press and NGOs15 0 . On the one hand, more
substantive recognition of the issue would entail acknowledging the perspicacity of opposition
groups pushing the issue. Yet, on the other hand, despite its sovereignty, Kazakhstan has
virtually ignored both the law of sovereign states and the opportunities inherent in international
environmental regimes to protest this diversion. Rather than a scholarly conclusion, this
assessment implicitly belongs to Auezzov. Nurshin's article, essentially a paraphrasing of
Auezzov, of all the dozens of press articles to follow, alone adequately presents the legal aspects
of the diversion under international law. "Under international agreements [sic], one party does
not have the right ... to substantially impair the functioning of a river without [consulting] the
other partym1 51 ." This article alone also hints that Kazakhstan can defend its rights through
international regimes; Nurshin comments that neither Nazarbaev nor the Foreign Minister had
even mentioned the Irtysh during their recent addresses to the UN General Assembly 52 .
China's diversion violates international environmental law, both treaty-based and
customary. Nurshin exhibits the general tenor of this law, even though his phrasing is
inaccurate. Under both treaty and custom, China cannot interfere with Kazakhstan's use of the
Irtysh for navigation. Under custom, since China's diversion is permanent (the water does not
cycle back into the Irtysh basin), China's violated international law in failing to provide notice to
Kazakhstan and Russia, in failing to consult these states, in failing to conduct an environmental
153
assessment, and in failing to, in good faith, consider the interests of Kazakhstan and Russia .
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Yet, Kazakhstan has glaringly failed to accuse China of violations of international law
147 Erik Nurshin, "Eto ii tsena suvereniteta?!," XXI Vek (Oct. 15, 1998)
http://eurasia.org.ru/archives/october/Kit0021.htm.
148 Based on an interview with Auezzov, in Sergei Borisov, "Kitaitsy mogut vypit Irtysh", Obschaya Gazeta (Oct.
28, 1999) http://news.eastview.com/99/OGA/10/data/043-20.html.
149Ibd
150 See, Makhambet Auezzov, Debyut Ministra", Delovaya Nedelva (November 1999),
http://www.asdc.kz/~rikki/arch/1999/44-99/peace07.htm (Foreign Minister Idrisov contending that KZ contributes
80% of the Irtysh's water, refuting the common refrain that 60% of the Irtysh's flow originates in China).
151 Nurshin, "Eto li tsena suvereniteta?!"
"54 In the closest thing to an accusation, one that falls far short of the scope of China's violation, a representative of
the KZ Prime Minister stated, "The Irtysh is a transboundary river and a state through which a transboundary river
flows has the right to use such water resources to the extent that such use does not cause harm to the water-use needs
of another state." Turov, ''Kak Rossiyu ostavlyayut za 'vodo-zaborom'." More typical is the damning statement of
Ambassador Amangaliev, the chief negotiator "There are international conventions drawn up to settle such issues.
In line with them, the sides undertake not to inflict any losses on each other. If something like that happens the sides
will have to compensate. But now neither we nor China are signatories to such a convention." BBC Worldwide
Monitoring report of Kazakh Television Channel One broadcast, May 17, 1999.
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Kazakhstan pretends to ignore the 1957 USSR-China treaty to which it succeeded that is
violated by this diversion's interruption of navigation155. Likewise, Kazakhstan has failed to
accede to the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses
(1997 Treaty), which codifies much existing customary law on international waters. While all
Irtysh riparians actively negotiated the 1997 Treaty, none has ratified it, even though Kazakhstan
did vote for adoption of the Treaty156. China was one of only three states to vote against it157 .
Under such law, once China manages to move several million people into the affected
area, and once these people are dependent on the diversion project for life, the law's preference
for "vital human needs," will begin to favor China's peasants over Kazakhstan industry. China's
use of the Irtysh to support the modest (by comparison with Kazakhstan and Russia) livelihoods
of a "local" population "dependent" on this source of water will be of decisive importance.
Kazakhstan has also failed to protest this diversion on ecological grounds within
international environmental regimes, particularly those in which both Kazakhstan and China
figure, such as World Heritage, Ramsar, CBD, and CCD. The only current connection between
the Irtysh and international environmental regimes comes under the ozone regime. While as a
result of poor practices in production of caustic soda at the Pavlodar Chemical Factory, over 900
metric tonnes of mercury is seeping towards the Irtysh 58 , the Pavlodar Chemical Factory is the
recipient of foreign aid under the GEF not to address this horrific problem, but to replace CFC-
113 as a cleaning agent in oxygen manufacturing equipment159.
Yet, international environmental administrative settings actually would allow Kazakhstan
several platforms for negative publicity beyond immediately apparent outlets like the media,
NGOs, and the United Nations General Assembly. For exam le, under Article 11(4) of the
World Heritage Convention, the World Heritage Committeel maintains a List of World
Heritage in Danger. Practice shows that states, especially jealously independent and sovereign
states like China, find inclusion of any of their territory on this list to be very distasteful. While
consultation with the host State is required, sites may be, and since 1991 have been, included on
or nominated for inclusion on this List over the objections of the host State161. Accordingly,
Kazakhstan could nominate the Golden Mountains of Altai site in order to provoke discussion of
China's project, even though there appears to be only an attenuated basis for arguing that the
Irtysh diversion threatens this site. More particularly, Kazakhstan could attempt to list Lake
155 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Pravitelstvom Kitaiskoi
Narodnoi Respubliki o rezhime torgovogo sudokhodstva na pogranichnykh i smezhnykh s nimi rekakh i ozere, Dec.
21, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 211. For a detailed explication see Sievers, "Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse
Law: China, Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh."
156 Aaron Schwabach, "The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses: Customary International Law, and the Interests of Developing Upper Riparians," Texas Journal of
International Law 33 (1998), p. 257.
157 While 103 states voted to adopt the 1997 Treaty, only Burundi, China, and Turkey voted against it. Ibid.
158 Gennadi Benditsky, "Pavlodartsy edva ne prevratilis' v afrikantsev: Chernyi mogilnik," Vremya, Aug. 10, 2000.
Available at http://kztime.virtualave.net/Archive2000/08-1l0-OO/strana32.htm.
15 The factory will receive $106,000. Global Environment Facility, "Kazakhstan: Programme for Phasing Out
Ozone Depleting Substances," p. 9.
160 I UNESCO, "World Heritage Committee, " http://www.unesco.org/whc/committ.htm. China has been on the
committee since 1991 and is very proactive. Michael Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy, "China: Implementation
Under Economic growth and Market Reform, " in Weiss and Jacobson eds., Engaging Countries: Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords, pp. 375-76.
161 Edith Brown Weiss, ''The Five International Treaties: A Living History, " in Weiss and Jacobson eds., Engaging
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, p. 98.
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Zaisan and similar sites along the Irtysh as World Heritage sites 162 . Having done so, it would
then be able to call upon China to refrain from actions that would violate the principles of
preservation of acknowledged World Heritage Sites and could self-nominate the Zaisan Site for
the List of Endangered World Heritage.
Ramsar offers a similar vehicle. While Kazakhstan did not succeed to Ramsar,
Kazakhstan has stated repeatedly its intention to accede to Ramsar and maintains close
163
communications with the Ramsar Bureau'6. Under Ramsar, "parties shall consult with each
other about implementing obligations arising from the Convention especially in the case of a
wetland extending over the territories of more than one Contracting Party or where a water
system is shared by Contracting Parties' 64." This provision gives both Kazakhstan and Russia
occasion to argue that China is in violation of Ramsar.
Moreover, under Ramsar, a Montreux Record 165 lists wetlands in danger. Kazakhstan's
Lower Turgai and Irgiz Lakes system was placed on this list in 1993, even though Kazakhstan
was not even a State Party at that time; such treatment accords Kazakhstan a defacto party
status. Accordingly, Kazakhstan could attempt both to list Zaisan166 as a Ramsar and Montreux
Record site or propose that Russia's Irtysh wetlands Ramsar site be listed in the Montreux
Record. Zaisan, which virtually straddles the border with China where the Irtysh crosses, is,
according to the Ramsar Bureau, one of "the most important areas for birds in Western Asia
167
.
At 5,500 square kilometers, Zaisan is also one of the thirty largest lakes in the world and
considerably larger than America's Great Salt Lake. The Zaisan area is also important snow
leopard habitat. By offering, in these and other venues, the world such a threat to "charismatic
megafauna" as a synecdoche for China's activities, Kazakhstan could succeed in maximizing the
efficacy of its efforts to embarrass China into backing down.
All the riparian states are also original parties to CBD168. CBD obligates states to, "in the
case of imminent or grave danger or damage, originating under its jurisdiction or control, to
biological diversity within the area under jurisdiction of other States. . . notify immediately the
potentially affected States of such danger or damage, as well as initiate action to prevent or
minimize such danger or damage' 69." China's actions arguably constitute "grave or immediate"
danger to the widely acknowledged endangered and endemic biodiversity of the Ob-Irtysh Basin.
Accordingly, China has apparently violated CBD notification and mitigation requirements. In
disputes, CBD requires good faith negotiations followed, if needed, by binding third party
dispute resolution
Finally, Kazakhstan and China both became parties to CCD in 1997. In contrast to
World Heritage and CBD, CCD lacks strong language on state obligations. However, CCD's
general purpose is to reduce desertification. Russian and Kazakhstan specialists agree that an
162 While China could attempt to block any such listings, that would equally well facilitate efforts of KZ to draw the
attention of the world community to its plight.
163 Personal communications with staff at KZ National Ecological Center and at the Ramsar Bureau 1997-99.
164 Ramsar, Art. 5.
165 Ramsar Bureau, '"The Montreux Record," (May 10, 2000), http://www.ramsar.org/key_ montreux_record.htm
166 Even before the Irtysh diversion plans came to light, KZ intended to list Lake Zaisan as one of its first Ramsar
sites. Personal communication with KZ environmental officials and unpublished environmental ministry documents
on Ramsar implementation.
167 Mirabzadeh A. Parastu, "Wetlands in Western Asia," http://www.ramsar.org/aboutwestern_asia_bkgd.htm.
168 Convention on Biological Diversity, "Ratification,' (Feb. 14, 2000), http://www.biodiv.org/conv/pdf/ratification-
16KBD, Art. 14(d).
170 Ibid, Art. 27, Annex 1I(1)(1).
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Irtysh diversion would likely exacerbate serious desertification problems in the Irtysh basins of
both states, both directly and due to projected regional warming trends produced by the climate
change projected to occur with lowered river flow' 71 . Kasym Duskaev of Kazakhstan's Ministry
of Environmental Protection predicts that the Irtysh diversion will lead to increased
desertification in Kazakhstan and Russia' 72 . Thus, even without specific language in the treaty,
China's project may give Kazakhstan grounds for protesting the diversion within the CCD
regime, perhaps even with resort to CCD's dispute resolution procedures.
Kazakhstan has remained silent in all the regimes listed above, and in all similar regimes.
Indeed, instead of reaching out to the international community, Kazakhstan helps China keep this
issue out of the international spotlight. Kazakhstan really only reached out to its closest
neighbors, Russia and Kyrgyzstan. It failed to convince Russia to take its side1 73. While the
Russian press and NGOs, alerted by Kazakhstan colleagues, voice condemnation of the
projectm, the issue is likely not among the Kremlin's major impending catastrophes. More
interestingly, Kazakhstan inquired into whether Kyrgyzstan could threaten China with river
175diversion; the rivers shared by these two states mostly flow from Kyrgyzstan into China
Despite close ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan refrains from such threats176
Failing with these two allies, Kazakhstan ceased its search for international support. In
2000, most environmental institutions and most of the scholarly community remain unaware of
this issue. The major Irtysh riparians are members of the "Shanghai Five", the Russian term for
China and the former Soviet republics bordering China177 , and it is only, on China's request,
within this grouping or in bilateral talks that Kazakhstan voices its concerns. The international
community and the English language press either ignore the meetings of the Shanghai Five or
fail to report the results of talks put low on the agenda, like the Irtysh.
As for bilateral talks, Kazakhstan began actively to seek such talks only after sustained
protests by newspapers and NGOs17 8 alleging a dangerous plot to appease China and suppress
information. Negotiations began in May 1999 in Beijing, and it was only there that Kazakhstan
received information sufficient to fulfill China's requirement of notification 79. China stated
plans to divert 450 million cubic meters in 2000 and to expand this diversion to one cubic
171 LI. Agafonov, "Vodnost Obi i klimat planety tesno svyazany" Voda Rossii 87: 8 (1999).
172 Baliev and Medvedev, "Reki sami ne umirayut. Ikh ubivayat."
4 Turov, "Kak Rossiyu ostavlyayut za 'vodo-zaborom'.
174 For example, in 1999, 200 NGOs from KZ, Russia, and Europe appealed to the states to hold trilateral talks (with
NGOs) and follow the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes. "Obraschenie uchastnikov Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii 'Dni Volgi-99' o stroitelstve kanala
'Chernyi Irtysh-Karamai',"http://uchnom.botik.ru:8103/educ/PUSTYN/ecovolga/kaniray.ru.html.
175 KG is the upper riparian for 3 of the 12 major rivers that flow into China, including the second and fourth largest,
which transport over 5 km3 annually. KZ is an upper riparian for two, the Haba and Tekes, with a combined annual
flow of over 2.3 km. The Haba is the third largest river flowing into China. "China", United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization, Aguastat, http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/agricult/agl/aglw/aquastat/chinalchin-
rfr.htm.
176 Cf One article argues that in 1998 the foreign ministries of Russia, KZ, and KG sent unanswered diplomatic
notes to Beijing asking for clarifications of the project. Baliev and Medvedev, "Reki sami ne umirayut. Ikh
ubivayut."
177 See, Aleksandr Sukhotin, "Bisbkek- delo tonkoe," Obschaia Gazeta (Aug. 26, 1999),
http://news.eastview.com/pp/OGA/08/data/034- 11 .htm.
178 See "Obraschenie k Pravitelstvu i Parlamentu Respubliki Kazakhstan," EcoEkho, (Feb. 1999), http://www.sys-
pro.con/~ecocenter/news/ee2_99/obraschen2.htnml. The NGOs call on KZ to reveal its planned response measures
since a diversion of even 6% of the Irtysh would result in "irreversible consequences." Thid.
179 Of course, neither side assessed the information in these terms.
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kilometer by 2020180. Kazakhstan presented a draft bilateral agreement on the use and
conservation of transboundary waters1 81 , but China passed. China also assured Kazakhstan that
it has no plans to divert the Ili River 8 2 . The second round of negotiations took place in
November 1999 in Almaty. Astana's goals at this round were to secure China's signature on a
"framework" agreement and establish a joint Irtysh management authority 8 3. It attained neither
goal.
However, as a result of the third round of negotiations, held in June 2000 in Beijing,
Kazakhstan's government, now under increasing pressure from the public, suggested that China
had agreed to a bind itself never to take no more than one cubic kilometer for its diversion18 4 .
Kazakhstan experts still had difficulty reconciling the immense size of the Irtysh-Karamai Canal
with this comparatively modest diversion1 8 5. During 2000, Kazakhstan's government began
increasingly to suggest in public that law would be at the center of all issues concerning its 8700
mile border, including all issues of transboundary watercourses' 8 6. To the extent that this vague
statement hinted that the two states had signed some sort of binding bilateral agreement, on the
eve of the fourth round of negotiations, Kazakhstan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erlan Idrisov
disappointed his constituents. In an interview provocatively entitled Do We Have an Active
Position in Foreign Affairs? in an opposition newspaper, Idrisov admitted that no such
agreement existed 1 7
However, during the fourth round of negotiations in Almaty, even the state newspaper
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda chimed in with, what only a year ago, were phrases only to be found in
the opposition press, such as the contention that if China proceeded with plans to divert forty per
cent of the Irtysh's flow a "global environmental catastrophe" would ensue' 88 . The article also
states that Kazakhstan cannot allow more than six per cent of the Irtysh's flow to be diverted
without risking local extirpation of muskrat1 9. Moreover, Kazakhstan reopened allegations of
China's plans to divert the Ili, threatening to turn Kazakhstan's Lake Balkhash, one of the largest
lakes in the world, into another Aral Sea'90.
180 "V Alma-Ate prokhodit vtoroi raund Kazakhstansko-Kitaiskikh peregovorov po problemam transgranichnykh
rek," Ekspress K (Nov. 24, 1999), http://www.alatau.ru/scripts/web.exe/doc?id=100718&cp=win&scale=l. The
initial diversion will remove roughly 5% of the flow of the Black Irtysh. Ibid.
181 Ibid. Kazakhstan proposed a similar agreement with China in 1992, and the Chinese response up until the Irtysh
diversion became known two years ago was that it was "studying the issue." Nurshin, "Eto i tsena suvereniteta?!."
182 "V Alma-Ate prokhodit vtoroi raund Kazakhstansko-Kitaiskikh peregovorov po problemam transgranichnykh
rek."
183 Ibid.
184 Vladimir Chernyshev, "Kak podelyat Chernyi Irtysh: Vdol ili poperok?," Transkaspiiskii proekt, June 7, 2000,
available at http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/rus/835.htrfml.
185 Ibid.
186 Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative Bigali Turarbekov, quoted in Aman Kusainov, "Eto
sladkoe slovo- granitsa," Transkaspiiskii proekt, Oct. 4, 2000, available at http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-
bin/web.exe/rus/prn00006263.html.
87 Evgenii Kosenko, "Aktivno li nasha pozitsiya vo vneshnikh otnosheniyakh?," Vremva, Oct. 26, 2000, p. 11.
188 Kseniya Kaspari, "Po obe storony reki: Problemu sovmestnogo ispolzovaniya vodnykh resursov reshayut
Kazakhstan i Kitai," Kazakhstanstanskava Pravda, Nov. 5, 2000, available at http://www.kazpravda.kz. The pro-
government newspaper Panorama carried a similar article, but also detailed the composition of the negotiating
delegations for the November 1 to 7 negotiations and stated that China planned to divert 20% of the Irtysh. See
Kuat Ibraev, "Kazakhstan i Kitai reshayut problemu transgranichnykh rek," Panorama, Nov. 3, 2000, available at
http://www.panorama.kz/info/index.asp?yearfolder=2000&num=4A3&NumnArticle=1
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Kazakhstan's dealings with China resemble those of the KazakSSR with the Kremlin
during Perestroika; however, at that time, the KazakSSR had inestimably fewer recourses to
international law. Yet, while Kazakhstan's options have changed, its leadership and methods
remain essentially those of 1989. Straightforward power politics characterize Kazakhstan's view
of its range of possibilities. Kazakhstan's lack of faith in legal arguments and methods, while
understandable for post-communism, contrasts sharply with its eagerness to appear active in
regimes founded on global environmental accords.
Beyond Thinking Globally: Local Action for the Aral Sea
The first reaction of the newly sovereign Central Asian states in response to the plight of
the Aral Sea was not to band together to address root causes of the Aral crisis, despite the
existence of Soviet and UNESCO studies outlining clear policy and management reforms.
Instead, no state made any notable reforms within its own borders, and regional cooperation
consisted of unanimity in blaming the situation on the Soviet Union and urging Western
assistance. Even to this day, resolution of the Aral Sea crisis is not a salient priority in any state;
this situation displays how regional harmony can endure despite little progress in the
enforcement of environmental laws or adherence to environmental commitments1 9 1
In February 1992, the states created an Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
(ICWC) to determine annual water allocations. The commission had little funding and no
enforcement powers. With active donor participation, especially World Bank and USAID, in
March 1993, the states created an Interstate Council on the Aral Sea (ICAS) and folded ICWC
into this new body. Concurrently, they created an International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS), to
which the states were to contribute one per cent of their GNP. The council was as politically
unremarkable as the fund was poor, both the result of state disregard for these institutions.
World Bank and USAID actively encouraged plans in 1994 for a billion dollar aid
program for the Aral Sea, called the Aral Sea Basin Program. In time, these donors began subtly
to try to back away from their early commitments to "save the sea." In July 1994, the states
continued a clear effort to create symbols of the need to take action by creating a Sustainable
Development Commission. In 1997, IFAS swallowed ICAS, and the former is now governed
through an Executive Board composed of deputy environment ministers of the five Aral Sea
Basin states.
The UNDP Aral Seashore Rehabilitation and Capacity Development Project began in
192 193April 199719. It has provided 16,000 residents of Karakalpakstan with safe drinking water
and planted thousands of trees unsuited to the local climate that died immediately
194
. Expensive
and unsustainable, these UNDP projects are still the most notable successes in the region.
While the Aral crisis generated an unusually large number of World Bank grants, these
grants have totaled on average only a couple hundred thousand dollars a year' 95, an order of
191 International Fund for the Aral Sea, "Water and environmental management in the Aral Sea basin."
192 United Nations Office in the Republic of Uzbekistan, UZB/96/O05 (Jan. 1, 1999). Despite its name, the half
million dollars for this project was almost exclusively for foreign consultants.
193 Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund,
"Second country cooperation framework for Uzbekistan (2000-2004)," p. 5. The Nukus Green Shelterbelt Project
can be found at United Nations Office in the Republic of Uzbekistan, UZB/96/006 (Jan. 1, 1996).
194Ibd
195 See Hiltunen, EvrnetlDvlpetC-prtoOpruiis, pp. 57-58.
magnitude less than the amount of grant money made available through GEE. This began to
change when the bank spearheaded the effort to get GEF funding for an Aral Sea project
(AralGEF). AralGEF envisions accepting the loss of the sea, but in its place creating small but
viable wetlands and fisheries in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan through restoration of a modest flow
to the old seabed. This modest flow is envisioned to be made possible through improvements in
the efficiency of irrigation and curtailing out of basin water transfers.
While advertised as an IFAS and GEF project, AralGEF is in fact almost entirely an
Uzbekistan and World Bank creation. At the time of AralGEF's submission, only Uzbekistan
was a GEF member. Since each state receives funding under the project, no state has protested
to donors (although Uzbekistan taxes grant funds), but as of this writing, the Tajikistan
government, including the Tajikistan director of this GEF project, cannot explain how, when, or
where Tajikistan agreed to this project. Symptomatically, Uzbekistan alone receives the half of
the grant earmarked for a pilot wetlands restoration project in northern Uzbekistan. Under this
project, Lake Sudoche will be improved and is slated to become the first Ramsar site in
Uzbekistan.
While this ambition appears on its surface to be a laudable and desirable result, even if
disproportionately favorable to Uzbekistan, its larger context is that highlights the deep
animosities between World Bank and UNDP in Central Asia. In order for AralGEF to be
realized, World Bank envisions that agricultural runoff along the Amudarya will be almost
entirely restored to the Amudarya. Much of this water for decades has run into Uzbekistan
valleys outside the Amudarya watershed, collected there, and formed immense lakes that now
support local agriculture, fisheries, recreation areas, and biodiversity habitat.
Accordingly, UNDP endeavors to nominate one of these lakes196, the Dengiz-Kul as
Uzbekistan's first Ramsar site since that lake does now constitute important habitat for migratory
species that, ostensibly, formerly relied on now inhospitable Aral Sea waters. Under World
Bank's plans, Dengiz-Kul, and a number of other large lakes, will virtually disappear.
World Bank views the root causes of the Aral crisis to lie in the fact that irrigation waters
from the Amudarya become both heavily polluted and fail to return to the Amudarya. UNDP
views the root causes of the Aral crisis to lie in the general unsustainability of both present and
past human practices in the region. Which, if either, of these agencies is correct is a different
question from that of whether the (attempted) removal of the root, Soviet-era, causes of the Aral
crisis could conceivably lead to protection of biodiversity, healthier waterways, better living
conditions, and sustainable development within the region.
What World Bank seems to ignore is the fact that the Aral Basin, including the Aral Sea
itself, has changed qualitatively in the past fifty years. Given the current pollution of the Aral
region and the extirpation of the sea's aquatic species, increased flow of better quality water into
the sea might be a very inopportune use of fresh water resources considering as well that the
lower reaches of the Amudarya are among the least densely populated regions in Uzbekistan.
The World Bank evidences little concern for the general population of Central Asia or the
health of its ecosystems, but a great desire to claim an environmental victory in saving the Aral
Sea, even if that victory is hollow and symbolic. A deeper concern touches on the fact that most
stakeholders, including the scientific community, do not expect the project to yield tangible
results or substantive environmental improvements.
196 See United Nations Office in the Republic of Uzbekistan, "GEE PDFA for Project Proposal 'Demonstrating
Wetland Biodiversity Conservation in Uzbekistan,'" UZB/99/G43/AI1G/99 (Apr. 1, 1999).
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They base
these expectations
on general instincts
about just how
difficult it will be
to create incentives
to alter water use
patterns throughout
Central Asia.
However, recently
their expectations
became much more
difficult to dismiss.
In September,
Turkmenistan
announced plans to
construct an
artificial lake in the Kara-Kum desert one-quarter the size of the previous Aral Sea. While under
AralGEF both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would get sizable lakes, Turkmenistan's lake will be
substantially larger. Of course, the problem is that the lake is to be filled with water diverted
from the Amudarya, which will preclude fulfillment of AralGEF's ambitions. In addition, most
models of the effects of climate change suggest that it, too, will reduce the flow of both the
Amudarya and Syrdaryal' .
These practical snafus in addressing the Aral Sea's environmental problems and the fact
that these problems rest in fundamental conflicts between the main agents of reform (the states,
World Bank, and UNDP) engender pessimism about the viability of even minor proposals for
reform in the Aral Sea basin. This general failure is also mirrored in the Aral Sea's connection to
international environmental law itself. In September 1995, the Central Asian heads of state
issued the Nukus Declaration in an attempt to draw international donor attention to the Aral Sea.
In article 2 of this Declaration, the heads of state declared it "necessary to create an International
Convention for the Sustainable Development of the Aral Sea Basin." After this declaration, no
state even prepared a draft convention; money set aside by UNDP for this purpose was never
sought by any of the states.
Evaluating Central Asia and the Internationalized Environment
When I interviewed dozens of the most key officials for international environmental
regimes from environmental, justice, and foreign affairs ministries in all five Central Asian states
in 1998, my near-decade of work in the region left me unprepared for the confusion surrounding
international environmental regimes that I documented. For the most part, the officials I
interviewed enjoyed a solid understanding of and concern for environmental problems, yet they
struggled to understand how regimes operated to effect environmental change.
197 Main Administration of Hydrometeorology, Initial Communication of the Republic of Uzbekistan Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 11.
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Only one person, Dr. Marat Ishankulov, the Chair of the Committee on International
Environmental Conventions of the Kazakhstan National Environment Center, provided both
thorough and reliable information on his state's integration into international environmental
regimes 9 8 . Ishankulov was not only unusual in his breadth; his reliability was also unusual. The
average environmental minister in 1998 (not to mention his deputy minister charged with
international affairs) could not state, and possessed no reliable information about, to which
conventions his state had acceded. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, no foreign ministry
possessed a clear understanding of issues of succession or the differences between ratification,
succession, and accession, much less any staff prepared for environmental diplomacy. Ministries
of finance did not know how much and where to wire membership dues.
Justice ministries acknowledged the problem of non-implementation, but rightly
explained that until funds and computers became bountiful, they could do nothing. National
focal points for specific conventions usually had never read or understood the convention whose
regime was under their supervision. A spattering of lower level technical specialists
knowledgeable about the technical and vaguely familiar with the legal aspects of regimes were
clearly the forces sustaining these states' connections to international regimes. Ironically, non-
English speakers usually were more knowledgeable about international environmental regimes
than their younger, better-traveled, and heavily internationally trained colleagues, despite the
lack of materials on the subject in Russian. Even where, as in Kyrgyzstan, substantial efforts are
made to coordinate ministries and monitor compliance, the government reports that result from
such efforts are so disappointing that they are not released to the general public.
Yet, over several years, I began to realize that Ishankulov was not necessarily unique in
the ways I initially imagined. When Ishankulov himself began to admit over time that he could
see some small improvement, but very few solutions, to be gained from international regimes, he
also began to voice fears that the gains in organizational capital in environmental agencies in
Kazakhstan were probably at least offset by their losses in human capital. Younger staff,
proficient in English and Western organizational practices, were equivalently non-proficient in
scientific analyses and an intuitive sense of ecological systems.
In time, I began to realize that the confusion around international environmental regimes
within Central Asia stemmed as much from a lack of indoctrination as from a lack of knowledge.
Environmental leaders within the region wanted to see in international environmental regimes
the rational and effective mechanisms for environmental protection that the regime leaders and
literature trumpeted, but their own scientific training, fieldwork, and experience erected
substantial cognitive barriers. Since the source of this confusion has been cognitive dissonance
and not simply lack of information, the dozens of trainings and glut of informational materials
now available in the region has created increased ability to work with regime leaders, but no
increased faith in the underlying regimes.
The question begging to be asked from this survey of the internationalized environment
of Central Asia is whether conditions would have been even worse without international
environmental regimes. That is, without such a counterfactual, the worsening environment in
Central Asia does not really constitute a denunciation of international environmental regimes.
Indeed, it is almost certain that the environment would be even worse in the transition period in
198 See also Komitet po Mezhdunarodnym ekologicheskim konventsiyam, Uchastie Kazakhstana v
Mezhdunarodnykh ekologicheskikh konventsiyakh i soglasheniyakh (Almnaty: National Environmental Center for
Sustainable Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1998).
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the short-term were it not for international environmental regimes and their infusion of
information and financial support to environmental agencies.
That said, corruption might not have reached its current levels absent such international
environmental regimes. Corruption and legitimization of disregard for the context of
environmental projects (that is, environmental projects are no longer assessed primarily on their
environmental results) do leave open the question of long-term impacts of international
environmental bureaucratization on sustainable development. The personalistic bonding social
capital world of UNDP, World Bank, and other international agencies creates substantial rent-
seeking opportunities that fuel corruption. Moreover, the examples in this Chapter of supposedly
august international institutions breaking their own rules and dismissing issues of accountability
within their own ranks sends a destructive message to their local partners.
For example, in their efforts to assemble successful projects, World Bank staff violate
GEF procedures regularly. GEF proposals require proof of state support before review, and
official GEF focal points exist in each state to sign-off on proposals. Instead of proposals to
these focal points, World Bank, in every case, has simply asked its primary government contact
to sign the proposal, and then claimed that person to be that state's authorized focal point199.
UNDP has committed numerous similar infractions of GEF protocol with focal points, but at
least in its largest projects in the region, most notably the 2000 Kazakhstan wind power project,
it has secured the appropriate focal point endorsement.
Even in 2000, Kazakhstan's ozone proposal still lacked approval from the correct
operational focal point200. The GEF Council, for its part, for three years running ignores the fact
that proposals submitted from Central Asia states rarely meet the basic formal requirement of
endorsement by the authorized focal points. This practice is perhaps the single clearest example
of donor disregard for the fundamentals of rule of law in Central Asia; to follow established GEF
Procedures would simply burden World Bank, and so Bank staff merely ignore these procedures.
As with other donor practices, it merely suggests to post-Soviet officials that Soviet era
undemocratic modes are actually acceptable and justifiable in regular day-to-day administration.
Generally, GEF staff actively seek opportunities to expand their role, influence, and
sources of funding. In this, they are no different than those of any other administrative
apparatus201. GEF actively seeks to be named the financial mechanism of any new global
environmental accord and announces this intention publicly to architects of such new regimes,
such as that forming now around the draft convention on persistent organic pollutants 202.
The relationship of GEF to democratization and markets is counterintuitive. GEF exists
on, and its implementing agencies compete for, exactly the kinds of subsidies that flowed from
Moscow to the republics., those foreigners paid (all under non-private sector contracts2 03) to help
the region overcome the negative environmental externalities of the Soviet and move towards
199 For example, in CEP, World Bank claimed that Minister Daukeev (KZ) and Deputy Minister Atamuradov (TM)
were authorized focal points; neither was. It never bothered to get any focal point authorizations for Aral-GEF.
200 The proposal was endorsed by Bulat Esekin from the National Environmental Center, while Deputy Minister
Murat Musataev from the Ministry of Natural Resources is the actual operational focal point.
201 For a review of the types of behavior and agency costs of the administrative state, see Jerry L. Mashaw at al.,
Administrative Law (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 36-5 5.
202 Global Environment Facility, ''Corporate Business Plan FY 02-FYO4" (Oct. 4, 2000), GEF/C.16/8, p. 2.
203 Within Central Asia, such $500/day salaries (even ignoring lush benefit programs) are so fabulously and
exponentially beyond, to borrow GEE terminology, "country-driven" markets as to mock any claims these agencies
may have to further the Central Asian states' transition to a market economy. For GEE salary information, see
Global Environment Facility, "Proposal for a Fee-Based System for Funding GEF Project Implementation."
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democratic markets now receive better than market rates for their services, exemplifying the
deep paradoxes of this system.
While the Soviet Union brandished "democratic centralization," the GEF implementors
claim adherence to "country-driven" priorities. Both slogans contain hollow claims to
democracy. The USSR never trusted its populace to make correct decisions; in exactly the same
way, GEF's funders do not trust developing states to handle GEF funds without supervision. In
this, GEF projects foster democracy in no less indirect and paternalistic a manner than does, say,
Niyazov (or Karimov, or Nazarbaev) when he claims adherence to democracy in the long-term
but that the population of his state is, in the short-term, "not yet ready for democracy."
Importantly, UNDP missions, unlike their World Bank counterparts, must maintain
strong relations with the host government. UNDP Resident Representatives are, arguably, as
responsible to UNDP Headquarters as they are to the host government; any local office that
soured relations with the host government would be considered a failure. What would keep local
UNDP offices clean, honest, and focused on results in such a system?
If the Soviet Union suffered not only because its basic ideology was flawed, but also
because claims to adhere to the "correct" ideology do not in themselves create good governance,
then the supposed beneficence of UNDP and World Bank efforts deserve critical attention. Such
attention, not surprisingly, reveals that the very same problems that flowed from the quasi-
legitimate national republic governments under the USSR flow from UNDP and World Bank in-
country missions in Central Asia.
Rarely today in Central Asia do internationalized environmental projects immediately
impact or improve their target problems. While the internationalized environmental community
fosters development of social and organizational capital, the assets it produces within Central
Asia are not necessarily consonant with sustainable development. These assets encourage the
operation of organizations that are not effective in meeting their administrative goals, but often
suffer from agents substituting their personal goals for those of the principal. These assets also
encourage quasi-epistemic communities that are insular, ambiguously professional, and revolve
around incentives to capture scarce zero-sum resources (like funding) instead of around
incentives to share public goods (like information). Thus, to the extent that, in Central Asia,
human capital assets relevant to sustainable development are also not increasing, the first post-
Soviet decade has been one of both worsening environmental conditions and little or no progress
towards building the foundations for sustainable development.
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CONCLUSION
PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA
This dissertation argues that current prospects for sustainable development in Central
Asia are less encouraging now than at the dawn of independence, not the least because the last
decade eroded the potential of Central Asia and exacerbated many environmental problems.
However, the events, trends, and figures presented herein are admittedly not the whole story, but
only selective portraits. Some practitioners, both local and foreign, remain optimistic about the
directions reform pursues within Central Asia. Especially for such optimists, the data upon
which my arguments rely are open to potentially substantive criticism if the "black boxes" of
these arguments are opened. Such concerns urge a revisitation of my methods.
For example, optimists would argue that I ignore or underemphasize important facts. To
wit, development agencies often point to newly drafted laws, actions plans, and concluded
seminars as establishing a dynamic and necessary foundation for future reforms. Likewise,
donors suffuse reports of their programs with glowing testimonials from stakeholders and
participants attesting to the importance and success of programs. As someone formerly enthused
by such paper successes (for the three years during which I worked for development agencies)
and someone who took pride in glowing reviews of my own programs in the region, I appreciate
the force of conviction that such positive reinforcement breeds. However, time spent standing on
the proverbial other side of the fence of such projects creates equally strong contradictory
impressions. Despite great hope for the implementation of paper successes, the bulk of such
paper plans and laws finds very little real world application. Likewise, there are just as many
compliments issued to development staff as there are biting allegations issued outside of the
earshot of donors, often, ironically, made by the same individuals.
Even high-level successes in the region often do not withstand much scrutiny. For
example, Kyrgyzstan announced in several ways in 1997 and 1998 that its government would
found all future policies on UNDP's conception of "sustainable human development." In making
such an announcement, Kyrgyzstan indeed was more daring than most other states in the world.
I myself am still encouraged by Kyrgyzstan's unusual move. However, disappointingly, I find no
substantive connection between this discursive reform and any actual reforms for sustainability
within Kyrgyzstan. In short, Kyrgyzstan is not, in fact, actually adhering to the ambitions it
stated to UNDP. Other policy decisions announced contemporaneously by the Kyrgyzstan
government, such as that to reduce wheat production in order to make tobacco its primary
export', belie ambitions for sustainability.
Moreover, even where substantive reforms occur, they are usually offset by related
disappointments in the same sector. For example, everywhere in Central Asia, new nature
reserves have been established. Yet, their benefits have been more than offset by degradation or
dissolution of pre-existing reserves2. Similarly, where true reforms for sustainability have
occurred, state reaction to them can be unambiguously negative. Kazakhstan's population is 10%
less now than in 1990. Yet, Kazakhstan (like Russia) considers its declining population (a result
of emigration) to be a tragedy instead of an opportunity. Likewise, all the states consider their
1Akaev, "July 29, 1997 Report to the Security Council of the Kyrgyz Republic,"' p. 13.
2 Sievers et al., "National Parks, Snow Leopards, and Poppy Plantations: The Development and Degradation of
Central Asia's Preserved Lands," pp. 17-26.
downturn in industrial pollution levels to be a grossly inadequate reward for lowered levels of
industrial production. Thus, in the aggregate, non-discursive non-ambiguous and welcome
reforms for sustainability in Central Asia are almost non-existent. It may be that abandonment of
Soviet era levels of application of agricultural chemicals is the only major such reform visible
through readily available statistical information related to environmental issues. While
important, that reform alone will not produce sustainability in Central Asia.
However, the more relevant second concern regarding my methods is that available
statistics related to sustainability issues may mislead. To be sure, Soviet-era statistics painted an
overly-rosy picture of development success within Central Asia. If a problem of the post-Soviet
era in Central Asia is that development agencies incorrectly conflate paper plans with real world
impacts, this practice is not unprecedented in the region, but, rather echoes Soviet-era practices
of tweaking paper reports for political purposes. Conversely, if independence era statistics, often
lacking in reliability, overstate declines in the region, declines may not have been as harsh as I
detail or, conversely, my analysis may have missed a reversal of decline in recent years. Indeed,
the ten year period of transition tracked herein marks only the beginning of ongoing process.
To address this concern, while Soviet statistics were opportunistic, they were not
divorced from reality. In other words, they were not so grossly inflated as to allow one to argue
credibly that incomes, levels of education, and levels of environmental protection in Central Asia
were actually not greater in 1990 than today. However much Western critics may wish argue
that they were no better in 1990, even the staunchest local anti-communists and staunchest
foreign anti-communists who have spent time in the region in both periods will readily concede
this point.
Yet, I cannot as quickly dismiss the possibility that Central Asia is now bounding back
from a post-independence depression. UNDP Human Development Reports from the various
republics suggest scattered significant increases in incomes, and states claim, across the board,
substantial accretions to GDP in 20003. Likewise, although critical of their own initial efforts,
World Bank and IMF staff now trumpet that the post-Soviet states have "recovered" to roughly
60% of their previous output4 . Yet, none of the states claim substantially better schooling,
health, or democratic freedoms, but, nevertheless, positive signs should not be dismissed.
Accordingly, while these victories hint at recovery and better conditions for sustainable
reforms, they do not alter the fact that the 1990s was a decade of strong decline in Central Asia.
I endeavor no hard policy prescriptions for the region, nor any clear predictions of what the
future may bring. In the end, my description of the degradation of capital assets in Central Asia
during the 1990s is more severe than that anticipated at the beginning of the decade and deeper
than generally recognized at the end of the decade. The contours of this decline follow.
Tracking the Decline in Comprehensive Capital
Central Asia's diverse stocks of capital assets degraded both strongly and unevenly during the
first decade of independence. The independence era continued Soviet era degradations of natural
3Kazakhstan claimed a 14.6% industrial output rise. Liz Fuller, "Kazakhstan Posts Solid Rise in Industrial Output"
RFE/RL Newsline (January 16, 2001). Tajikistan claimed an 8.3% GOP increase. Liz Fuller, "Tajik Economy
Continues to Recover" RFE/RL Newsline (January 18, 2001). Turkmenistan claimed a 17.6% increase in GOP, and
added that it had the highest rate of growth in the world. Mikhail Pereplesnin and Yegor Yashin, "Jspytataelnyi srok
dlya chinovnikov," Nezavisimaya gazeta (January 19, 2001), http://www.ng.ru/cis/2001 -01-19/5_srok.html.
4 Fischer and Sahay, "Economies in Transition: Taking Stock," p. 2.
capital assets, exacerbated Perestroika era declines in human capital, sparked declines in
organizational capital, and may have least adversely affected assets of social capital.
Central Asia's endowments of natural capital are considerable. The region possesses
what may be the planet's fourth most important reserves of hydrocarbons and large reserves of
precious metals and diamonds. Based on these reserves, many Central Asians expected their
states to become new Kuwaits. Nowhere did this happen. Outside of these reserves of natural
resources, due primarily to Soviet development, Central Asia inherited degraded stocks of the
natural capital necessary to a healthy environment for humans. In other words, at independence,
the agricultural lands of the region were degraded and salinized, the major watercourses heavily
polluted, and residential areas inflicted with high concentrations of industrial pollutants.
Moreover, levels of biodiversity in the region declined sharply during the Soviet period.
During the past decade, Caspian fisheries collapsed, the Aral Sea all but disappeared,
deserts expanded, and air pollution in major cities increased due to cars. In addition, several
more important species neared extinction. On the other hand, with foreign funds, chemical,
biological, and nuclear testing facilities have been closed and/or restructured. Moreover, an
economic dislocation that has closed factories has also made the post-Soviet period in Central
Asia less environmentally unsustainable by reducing levels of industrial effluents, although it has
also seen the decay of existing pollution mitigation technology. Yet, this economic dislocation
has also stripped the region of its potential to use the momentum of this token movement towards
sustainability to effect further reforms for sustainability, which are desperately needed
considering growing threats to the viability of the region's lands and the ability of major
watercourses to support life, both non-human and human.
The USSR garnered a remarkable track record in building human capital. One-third of
the physicians on the planet, at one time, practiced in the USSR 5. Yet, in the past decade Central
Asia's human capital infrastructures crumbled. Hospitals lack even the most basic of supplies.
Near epidemics of diseases such as tuberculosis, largely unknown by the end of the Soviet
period, are now common. Diseases linked to environmental problems, diseases such as cancers
and respiratory problems, increased dramatically in the final decade of the USSR, and have
remained at high levels in independence. Life expectancies for both men and women have fallen
by several years in the past decade.
These declines in health are matched by educational declines. The region began
independence with near universal literacy and an educational system that, at least for grammar
schools, was very strong. Literacy is now in decline, and schools cannot hire or keep talented
teachers. As for higher education, while the region began independence with large numbers of
scientists and engineers, funds for research have largely disappeared, and this cohort has
experienced the highest level of emigration. Paralleling these problems, median monthly
personal incomes fell from roughly $300 at the beginning of the decade to roughly $60 at the end
of the decade, with roughly half the population living below the poverty line in 1999.
In considering these trends, while the USSR did bequeath to Central Asia an array of
problems challenging the region's maintenance of high levels of human capital, it also left behind
the medical schools, hospitals, norms of nutrition, sports habits, and lifespans upon which any
credible effort to maintain or expand the region's human capital would necessarily depend. The
speed of Central Asia's degradation of human capital stocks does not only erode the potential of
the region to recover, it contains a great deal of suffering as people die at young ages for lack of
sNovosti Press Agency, "Public Health in the USSR: The Personnel and Their Salaries" in Burenkov ed., Medicine
and Health Care in the USSR, p.17.
simple medical supplies or attention, as parents cannot educate their children, and as people
abandon professions to seek subsistence employment.
The Soviet Union's track record in building organizational capital is more problematic.
The USSR's major mobilizations of organizational capital, especially in the early decades of the
regime, were for repression, war, and forced integration. Yet, even from its earliest days, the
Soviet state devoted considerable resources to create the infrastructure of a modem state, with
schools, housing, courts, and transportation systems. At the end of the Stalin era, repression
abated considerably, although efforts to create a modem state continued and achieved success in
integrating the diverse areas of the USSR into a shared cultural space. While the USSR, and
especially Central Asia, never (and, because of the limits of Soviet economic planning perhaps
never could have) reached Western levels of organization, progress over the course of 70 years
was impressive considering the region's lack of development at the beginning of the century.
During the Perestroika era in Central Asia, both the state and the populace embarked on
efforts to battle corruption, embrace democracy, experiment with decentralized economic
decisionmaking, and improve rule of law and civil society. Despite the state origins of
Perestroika, the Communist Party continued to resist the implications of such reforms on the
continued legitimacy of economic planning, restrictions on free enterprise, and the curtailment of
individual liberties. Nevertheless, improvements in all these areas occurred, but they were
largely offset by an economic downturn that suffused the 1980s, exacerbated the dislocations
produced by Perestroika reforms, and left the Soviet Union ripe for internal disassembly.
Thus, as Central Asia entered independence, ideas such as popular sovereignty, rule of
law, civil society, and free enterprise were far more legitimate than five years earlier. However,
as the USSR's disassembly was peaceful, Central Asia also entered independence with a cadre of
political leaders groomed in the communist system and expert in communist modes of career
advancement. Throughout the decade, one by one, with the ambiguous exception of war-ravaged
Tajikistan, the presidents of the region abandoned democratic reforms in order to maintain
power, with the result that levels of democracy and individual rights in the region were lower at
the end of the decade than at the beginning.
Moreover, in every republic this nomenklatura turned the economic reform process,
especially privatization and international credits, into a mechanism to create personal wealth.
Most of the presidents of Central Asia are now widely rumored to be billionaires. The region's
experience with privatization reflects deep failures of organizational capital. Privatization, as
suggested by Western developers, assumed that the region's organizational capital produced
incentives isomorphic with those in Western states. Privatization was envisioned as the best way
to inspire restructuring of inefficient firms. Only now are economists beginning to admit that
post-Soviet privatization could not have led to such restructurings given actual conditions6 in
reality it led to asset stripping instead of secondary trading 7.
While often not considered together, the failures of privatization and the failures of
democratic accountable government in Central Asia are symptoms of the same disruption of
organizational capital. In both cases, managers have engaged in ultimately rational rent seeking
behavior that has depleted the organizational capital assets, as well as other capital assets, of the
6 John Nellis, "Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies?" Finance & Development 36 (June 1999), p.
16.
7Fra review of the linkage between the development of market institutions and incentives for corruption, see
Harry 0. Broadman and Francesca Rescatini, "Seeds of Corruption: Do Market Institutions Matter?" World Bank
Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000).
region8 . Information about exactly how such asset stripping has occurred is mostly anecdotal;
stakes are high enough to keep such information out of public discourse since documentation
could lead to criminal cases, re-nationalization, and confiscation.
Finally, social capital remains an understudied aspect of Central Asian capital assets.
During Perestroika, the region witnessed a sharp rise in numbers of independent associations
suggestive of active stocks of bridging social capital. While numbers of NGOs in the region are
still high, popular movements in Central Asia have no victories to boast comparable to pre-
independence success in closing weapons test sites, halting state plans to divert northern rivers,
and introducing reform legislation. Moreover, through traditional structures such as mahalla
residential community associations, the region evidently also contains strong stocks of bonding
social capital. Soviet and post-Soviet patterns of communal housing, newspaper readership,
carpooling, informal employment, socializing, hobby groups, travel, information exchange, and
even downsizing all suggest that social capital survived and even flourished in many parts of the
Soviet system, despite the assumptions of theorists like Francis Fukuyama that communism and
social capital were mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, while group solidarity appears not to have
been eroded strongly in the post-Soviet period, ongoing reforms in Uzbekistan suggest that
bonding social capital may also be threatened. Likewise, bridging social capital assets may be
less robust now that at the beginning of independence due to the reversion of many people from
"modern" lifestyles in the Soviet era to current subsistence lifestyles.
The decline of Central Asia's capital assets catalogued above relies exclusively on
measurements within the region, but the increasing implications of globalization for publics
around the world impels an examination of Central Asia's capital assets as they relate to global
regimes. Theories of comparative advantage and neorealistic international relations, among
others, predict contradictory impacts of globalization on developing states, the former, for
instance that developing states will experience more income and the latter, that strong states will
manipulate affairs so as to divert wealth to themselves. While a full assessment is still many
years away, landlocked Central Asia's limited experience with globalization is largely negative.
International trade, as yet, has not developed into a more lucrative endeavor than Soviet autarky's
guaranteed markets and state subsidies. Although many more years may be needed for
international trade to fully develop in Central Asia, especially since only Kyrgyzstan is a WTO
member, globalization has more quickly impacted the other two media of globalization: people
and capital. Those migrating from Central Asia to Russia and the West disproportionately
represent the most educated and wealthy classes. Of similar negative impact on the capital assets
of the region, wealthy individuals in the region, do not automatically apply their wealth to
domestic investments. Quite frequently, they choose to dismantle physical capital for sale
overseas and/or to hold their wealth in foreign banks and firms, where such funds find
application, for the most part, in fueling the economies of developed states. Both emigration and
unregulated flows of capital challenge claims of comparative advantage theories to improve
equitable distributions of wealth under globalization, and, consequently, the net impact of
globalization in Central Asia may be to exacerbate post-Soviet declines.
* While arrogation of political power for personal gains is a well-accepted possibility, the equivalent economic
practice has not been as readily accepted until recently, despite work in economics showing that rent-seeking can be
more profitable in emerging economies than devoting assets to productive activities. Anne Krueger, "The Political
Economy of a Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64: 29 1-303 (1974). Paraphrased for the
transition context, capitalists maximize profits, not the competitieness of markets. Havrylyshyn and Odling-Smee,
"Political Economy of Stalled Reforms," pp. 7-10.
In other words, asset stripping behavior is a partial consequence of globalism and the
increasing free trade of goods of services that mainstream proponents of free trade argue furthers
both democracy and the prosperity of developing states. Put differently, much of the aspirations
of free trade proponents hinge on a conception of comparative advantage that envisions a world
in which things move. The soft underside of this theory is a disregard for interest in the
movements of non-things, specifically people and money. The glaring hole in the theory is the
abundant evidence that flows of people and capital mirror and are exacerbated by flows of trade9 .
Outside of these overarching theories of globalization10, international environmental
regimes explicitly aim to facilitate the efforts of developing states to pioneer sustainability. The
states of Central Asia receive substantial aid from such regimes, regularly participate in such
regimes, and host hundreds of programs and consultants generated through such regimes. Yet,
the states fail to maximize the efficacy of their participation in such regimes, and their
representatives in such regimes lack the skills to apply the strengths of these regimes to the
resolution of Central Asia's environmental problems. In no small part as a result of such
weaknesses displayed by Central Asian environmental institutions and professionals,
international agencies like UNDP have arrogated many ostensible state duties for environmental
development, even in some states displacing environmental ministries.
The two unfortunate results of the failures of the Central Asian states to integrate
themselves dynamically into international environmental regimes are undue diversions of
resources to international development agencies like UNDP and a lack of discrete interventions
to protect the environment. To date, most results of environmental development projects in the
region have been limited to the generation of paper plans, draft laws, and completed seminars,
even where, as in the cases of the Aral and preventing wildlife poaching, little disagreement
existed either at the beginning or at the end of the decade about what kinds of discrete tangible
intercessions were required. Moreover, where the Central Asian states encounter environmental
challenges not addressed by existing international environmental regimes (such as in the cases of
the Caspian, the Aral, and the Irtysh), they have failed to mobilize or respond to conflict
resolution mechanisms generated by international law. As a result, while it has been a boon for
foreign consultants, the globalization of the international environment has largely failed to date
to build capacity within Central Asia or to improve environmental conditions.
Winston Churchill's quip sixty years ago that Soviet Russia was "a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma" extrapolates in spirit to the bureaucracy surrounding international
donor efforts to build sustainable development in Central Asia. These efforts are a strategy
wrapped in a program inside a plan. The language and unchallenged ideological platitudes of the
international environmental sphere are, especially within the post-Soviet republics, no different
and no less rich than Orwellian doublespeak. Practice now demands no more than that projects
legitimize their claims for funding and support through discursive claims to be "country-driven,"
build capacity, "train the trainers," adhere to "project sustainability," draw on all "stakeholders,"
effect "transition," and further the "plan," usually some sort of national action plan. In mood,
these rhetorical tools are deployed by international agencies with zeal equivalent to that which
Soviet architects displayed in calling upon the proletariat to effect five-year plans. If yesterday's
9 See, generally, Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents.
10 An argument not addressed here is that, in the sustainable development context, unregulated global trade cannot
be a panacea. First, free trade will only increase resource throughput and, second, free trade cannot alter Liebig's
Law. Referring back to the Introduction, Liebig's Law states that ecological carrying capacity is always determined
by one limiting factor. If that limiting factor in Central Asia is water, free trade is meaniingless for sustainable
development, since water will not be imported into the region.
ideologically confident prescription for socialism was electrification plus Soviet Power, today's
ideologically confident prescription for sustainable development is the National Environmental
Action Plan plus civil society.
Accounting for Decline
Even if decline was not expected in the region, it may have been inevitable given Central Asia's
difficult landlocked geopolitical position, the state of the world in the 1990s, and the shortfalls of
capital assets inherited from the Soviet Union. Even if this decline was not inevitable, it surely
has deeper roots than Soviet failings, cultural traits, the actions of dictators, or the mistakes of
donor agencies alone.
Of the possible reasons suggested at the beginning of this study, "civilization clash" and
that the region's decline is a mere "blip" appear unlikely. Two other possible reasons,
globalization and unnecessary dislocations, find more ready application. First, there are
structural alterations introduced in the global system by globalization; in short, the tighter
commodity markets, increased personal mobility, and the isomorphic institutionalism of the era
of globalization put any state that undergoes deep structural changes at the present time at a
serious disadvantage. Second, donor policies and pressures from influential states have
weakened Central Asia; in particular, failures of international planning institutions have led to
needless distortions in local societies and abandonment of the stronger aspects of Central Asia,
like emphases on education, community, science, and Perestroika expressions of consensus for
substantive democratic reforms. Yet, mitigating this last reason for decline, there is no
indication that donor avoidance of the area would have led to a better future for Central Asia,
only that the donor community fell far short of its potential.
In the end, the environmental disappointments of the independence period could only
have been prevented by massive reorientations of local economies and equivalently unusual
capital investments. For example, to save the Aral Sea, the states would have needed to effect an
immediate ban on transfers of water outside the basin, an immediate improvement in irrigation
technology, and drastic reduction in cotton production. Such reforms, among other things,
would have wiped out infusions of foreign capital to the governments of Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Neither the financial resources nor the political will existed to embark on this
project, and Western states applied little pressure. To save Caspian fisheries (or preserve other
commercially valuable biodiversity), the states would have needed to enforce existing anti-
poaching laws militantly and allow access to each other's facilities to provide oversight of state
fishing monopolies. Here, the loss of control by central governments over local activities and the
distrust between state governments prevented effective local law enforcement and precluded a
regime of interstate accountability.
To continue, the creation of strong environmental ministries would have required the
existence of key officials versed in environmental law, international law, English, and
economics, as well as the support of central governments. Unfortunately, competing ministries
usually outmaneuver environmental ministries, nepotistic oligarchies preclude appointments of
capable individuals to senior environmental positions, and, anyway, the Soviet legacy left not
one single person with all these qualifications. Similar shortfalls in critical financial, human,
organizational, and social capital assets lay at the heart of other environmental development
failures in the region. Similarly complex interactions illustrate the dilemmas that frustrated
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preservation of scientific institutions, hospitals, democratic elections, and important professional
networks.
Consequently, despite the promise felt at the beginning of the decade, Central Asia was
probably destined to experience decline in its first decade of independence. Yet, foreign
assistance probably exacerbated the severity of this decline, or, at the very least, foreign
influence and aid could have been managed so that decline was not as severe as it has been.
Ironically, the failures of foreign aid in Central Asia find their roots in the existence within aid
agencies of the very qualities that the Western world identified as both "Soviet" and "liabilities."
The foreign aid enterprise in Central Asia, although directed towards building the non-state
economy, democratic accountability, and a new reliance on effectiveness over jingoism, has
itself been almost exclusively state directed, unaccountable, and defiantly managed for
ideological and political correctness.
Whereas Eastern Europe benefited from an outpouring of assistance and new enterprises
generated through private foundations and European businesses, Central Asia has, by
comparison, received almost no private-sector assistance. For example, according to a
December 1997 Foundation Center report 1 , in comparison to $40,000,000 provided by US
foundations (not including Soros) to Hungary, $40,000 was provided to Uzbekistan. In
comparison to $9,000,000 provided by US foundations to Russia, MacArthur's $15,000 to
Dashkhovuz Ecological Guardians was the only funding for Turkmenistan. 1000:1 and 600:1
discrepancies such as these make it difficult to overstate the comparative disadvantages that
nascent Central Asian democratic and environmental institutions.face. Moreover, since the
programs of Soros's Open Society Institute in the region are both more cost effective and more
effective overall than those of USAID or TACIS, some estimate of the cumulative disadvantage
of so much state-sector support for the private sector can be guessed.
However, to the extent that Central Asia certainly needed foreign assistance in order to
make its transition to democracy and markets, donor agencies and states had limited choices.
Western states could not mandate to private foundations that they work as assiduously and
actively in Central Asia as they did in the more developed, more Christian, and less Asian areas
of the former communist world. Moreover, the failures of the private foundation world as a
community to address Central Asia raise uncomfortable allegations of latent Eurocentrism or
racism that do not afflict USAID. Partly to address this problem, USAID and TACIS provided
grants and contracts to private foundations and NGOs to administer reform programs in Central
Asia. However, importantly, such state donors kept their fundees on short leases and, as the case
of the 1995 Kazakhstan Constitution showed, were willing to stifle free speech, ignore violations
of the law, and assent to authoritarianism for short term assurances of stability and protection of
international investors. To the extent that states like the United States will probably never be
willing to relinquish control over U.S. funded development projects, this corruption of
development by state interests was inevitable.
A negative view of foreign assistance now reigns among analysts in the former USSR.
For example, in response to President-elect Bush's threat to cease aid, Russian Presidential
Economic Advisor Illarionov replied that "[t]he rejection of corrupting aid is true assistance1 "
For Illarionov, American assistance to Russia, by opening paths for corruption, has done more
harm than good. Sergei Duvanov argues that the same thing occurred in Kazakhstan. He
believes that the manner in which the bulk of American assistance was distributed through the
" Foundation Center, Grants for Foreign and International Prograrns (The Foundation Center: New York, 1997).
12 Paul Goble, "Still More Reaction to Bush Interview" RFE[RL Newsline (January 18, 2001).
ruling oligarchy meant, ironically, that it constituted a subsidy (instead of market assistance) and
(since the State Department refused to care much about accountability) was used to enrich the
oligarchy, protect oligarchic businesses against private competitors, and kill democracy 3.
In contrast, donor lack of appreciation for local culture and local practices does not rest in
similarly systemic problems of foreign assistance, but merely in poor planning and research. For
example, in hindsight, Perestroika dialogues should have been nurtured1 4 in the post-
independence era. Perestroika dialogues had more in their favor than their gradualism. Indeed,
perhaps the disassembly of the Soviet Union and the counterfactual of China's successes suggest
that they were not gradual enough. The Perestroika dialogues were as celebratory of democracy,
as cognizant of the efficiency of decentralized decisionmaking (for governments and for
markets), and as committed to rule of law as any of the Western agencies and reformers who
entered the shattered Soviet Union. The Perestroika reforms may not have been committed to
the American or European institutional manifestations of rule of law, democracy, and
decentralization, but that does not besmirch the ideological strengths that they did exhibit.
Likewise, especially given the failures of Western developers and, again, China's recent
experience, it was in hindsight a mistake to place too much emphasis on or read too much into
the shortfalls between Perestroika aspirations and actual events.
The dialogues of Perestroika showed promise of becoming no less forceful and eloquent
foundations for democracy and rule of law in the former Soviet world than the Federalist papers
were for the United States of America. To be sure, continental political philosophers deserve
credit for penning the best and first general expressions of democracy, constitutionalism, and
accountable government in the 18th century. In parallel, there can be no doubt that Western
economists and constitutional scholars of the 20th century beat out their post-Soviet counterparts
in describing the normative bases of modern secular states. Yet, in the American experience, for
the American people, and even for American courts, the Federalist papers read with an authority
not possessed by any continental philosopher. Likewise, notwithstanding his erudition or
personal ambitions, Jeffrey Sachs should not have hoped to or been allowed to attempt to
displace Andrei Sakharov and other authoritative local critical voices. Accordingly, the actions
of Western development agencies, especially Americans, in ignoring Perestroika dialogues and
advocating what, in effect, was a tabula rasa approach to democracy, rule of law, and civil
society, was a terrible mistake that derailed much of the potential for reform in the region.
As social and organizational capital turns out to be so fragile and like Humpty-Dumpty, "hard
to put back together again," one can argue that it is best to start with existing social
institutions and try to induce their incremental transformation- rather than trying to
eliminate them "root-and-branch" in order to start out with a "a clean sheet of paper15 ."
As this quote from World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz suggests, international
institutions now view with suspicion plans to effect radical change in the institutional
foundations of states. This caution contrasts starkly with and was in no small part formed by the
failed efforts of developers in the former Soviet Union in the past ten years. Deploying
"3 Sergei Duvanov, "Demokratiya po-amerikanski?," (January 16, 2001),
http://eurasia.org.ru/2001/analitica/01_16_ an_amer.htmnl.
14 "Reformers who recognize that real transformation requires participation and involvement would have welcomed
this reform momentum and would have helped it push all the way to full privatization. Yet, the western-oriented
reformers took the opposite course. In Russia, the leasing movement was stopped dead in its tracks in favor of
voucher privatization." Ibid. p. 25.
SStiglitz, "Whither Reform: Ten Years of the Transition," p. 24.
ideological rhetoric and zealously urgent arguments remarkably similar to those belonging to the
Bolsheviks eighty years ago, an ultimately influential group of Western reformers convinced the
international community in the early 1990s that the appropriate Western response to needs for
institutional change in the former Soviet Union was shock therapy. The effects of this strategy
are yet to be fully appreciated, but no one would now dispute that the strategy itself was flawed.
Implications of Decline for Sustainable Development
The full costs of repairing the environment in Central Asia and ensuring that this part of
the world does not exacerbate global environmental problems probably exceed the total GDP of
the states by several times; even mitigation measures may be well beyond the financial means of
these states. The states are all already unable to meet the burdens imposed on their budgets by
basic social welfare programs for education, medical care, and poverty alleviation.
Environmental problems exacerbate demands for further expenditures for medical care, poverty
alleviation, and mitigation, which further weaken these states and reduces revenue coming back
into state budgets. Central Asia's confluence of environmental disaster and economic
dislocation has launched these states into a positive feedback loop of decline.
How and whether states resolve the environmental challenges facing the world in the 21st
century are two distinct questions. Not only will states need to develop and coordinate a level of
will heretofore not seen in any single state, much less the community of states in the aggregate.
Also, successful environmental responses may require adjustments in population, patterns of
consumption, and sovereignty unheard of in any peacetime setting.
Moreover, not all states will be able to implement policies to effect these adjustments, no
matter how high their level of will. The examples yielded by Central Asia's environmental
practices in the post-Soviet decade suggests that these states will be among those probably
lacking the capacity to implement such reforms even if the general population supports such
reforms. This condition leads to the argument that arms' length assistance may not be enough,
especially when such assistance is so often diverted. An aid regime more suffused with
accountability and control may be needed; whatever it is called, such a regime would restore
elements of colonialism and reduce the sovereignty of affected states. Sovereignty, in the end,
may not further the welfare of either the citizens of Central Asia or the global welfare.
Unfortunately, if this assessment is accurate, Central Asia would not be the first region of
the world so affected. Africa, particularly Rwanda' 6 , yields a compelling, albeit a distasteful
argument, that a citizen of a state subject to the human and organizational capital practices of
colonialism, as practiced by the English and French, may be better situated than a citizen of a
state subject to the human and organizational capital practices of development assistance, as the
latter is now practiced by UN agencies, the United States, and the European Union.
Faced with serious environmental and other security problems, humanity may not be able
to permit for much longer the coordination quagmires, free riding, and strategic behavior
occasioned by the existence of two hundred sovereignties, especially the kind of sovereignties
now dotting the landscape south of Russia. It is an irony of 20th century history that the first half
of the century generated momentum towards popular revolts against colonialism and an end to
16 SeRegine Andersen, "How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda," Third
World Quarterly 21(3), pp. 44 1-56 (2000).
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colonialism despite the ambitions of developed states. Since free trade now ensures the access
formerly enabled through colonialism, but without attending responsibilities, the irony is that the
century ends with the developed states now decidedly convinced that colonialism is not in their
national interests, while popular will in many developing states would welcome a new colonial
order. Indeed, my own general impression from having spent half of the past decade in the
region is that the general population of Central Asia would, with each passing year, more warmly
welcome the chance to be a European colony, weakly as regards Russia, but strongly as regards
any other developed state.
An emerging rule of international environmental law is the principle of "common but
differentiated responsibility 7 ," enshrined in, inter alia, the ozone and climate change regimes.
This principle acknowledges the need for all states to act, but places a greater burden on
developed states. While hints of a such a principle in development assistance also exist, they
should be formalized to ensure that developed states do not shirk responsibility for humanity,
and also do not shirk responsibility for the actions of their agents in developing states Quite
the opposite, for development assistance to be effective, enduring and lasting commitments from
donor states to achieve results must at least be as extensive and meaningful as under colonialism.
The general population of Central Asia remains concerned about environmental problems
and yearns to live in a democratic rule of law state. Complementing this will, the population of
the post-Soviet world remains more educated than the norm for developing states. However, this
human capital remains, except for Soros-funded efforts, a rare target of development assistance.
More than likely taking their cue in part in reaction to expressions of Western perceptions of
priority needs, none of the post-Soviet republics has essayed to maintain human capital.
For example, shortly after it was announced that he won the 2000 Nobel Prize for
physics, Russian Duma deputy Zhores Alferov, a communist, complained publicly about just this
problem. He complained that, in stark contrast to levels of science funding in the Soviet era, one
apartment building being planned for legislators would absorb several times more government
funds than all capital investments in science' 9 .
Yet, in order to move into the kind of information and service economy that characterizes
the developed states, Central Asia will need to draw specifically on this human capital. And in
order for that economy to be sustainable, natural capital stocks will need to be safeguarded.
Such a sustainable transition will require innovations that the Central Asian republics are
incteasingly unlikely to make. While command economies stifle innovation 2 0, a market
economy devoid of scientific and technological capital does not merely stifle innovation; it
precludes it. No state in the "failed state" pantheon popularized by Robert Kaplan produces
innovations at a scale near that of the Soviet Union.
17 As stated in the Rio Declaration: "In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation,
States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that
they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command."
18 In this regard, the fact that HIID was forced to close its doors because of, among other things, the indiscretions of
its Moscow staff under USAID contracts is relevant. Instead of assume responsibility for either these indiscretions
or the general failure of HIID programs, HID leadership merely opened a new body, the Center for International
Development. The explicitly stated focus of CID is sustainable development: "'CID has been established with one
overriding conceptual notion: the need for cross-disciplinary approaches to challenges of sustainable development."
Center for International Development, "Center for International Development at Harvard University," undated,
http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidpapers/cidbrochure.pdf. In its actions, however, it is still HIID.
19 Julie A. Corwin, "New Nobel Laureate Pleads for More Cash for Science," RFE/RL Newsline (October 12, 2000).20See Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation.
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To date, Western scholars of Central Asia, who tend to see Central Asia as it was long
before Soviet development policies took hold, and international development agencies, who want
to see Central Asia as like some South American or African state in which they have experience,
underestimate or overlook Central Asia's strongest endowments for development. People, not
hydrocarbons, are Central Asia's strongest endowment.
For both sustainable development and development in general, not all aspects of the
Soviet past should be dismissed. Educational policies favoring the natural sciences, Perestroika
dialogues on rule of law, restrictions against fetishistic consumerism, and disdain for nationalism
are all consonant with sustainable development and strongly contrast with Western emphases in
the first post-Soviet decade. To truly move beyond the limitations of Cold War defensiveness, it
is time for even the strongest proponents of democracy, sustainable development, and individual
dignities to admit that, part due to abandonment of the strengths of the Soviet system, Central
Asia is further from these goals today than it was just ten years ago.
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